Editor's Note: This article by the Captain of INS Kolkata is virtually a first-person account of the capture of a merchant vessel that had operated as a pirate ship in the NW Indian Ocean for some time before his ship executed a daring, well-planned rescue of the hostages and the capture of the pirates. It follows a narrative format and concludes with some important lessons learnt. While it is the ship's account, it incorporates inputs from VADM
Sanjay J. Singh, FOCINC West and RADM CR Praveen Nair.

Abstract
This article describes the mission to rescue the Merchant Vessel Ruen and its crew of 17 international seafarers, from the clutches of 35 Somalia Pirates. The pirates were armed with automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and years of determination and experience. The incident took place from 13-15 Mar 2024. It required sustained, coercive and coordinated action on the part of the Indian Navy to overcome the pirates, while ensuring absolute safety of the hostages. This article provides first person chronological details from the perspective of the Commanding Officer of the ship involved in the operation. It also details the rationale behind decisions taken at sea and ashore. In conclusion, it draws lessons that would possibly be applicable for the future.

"Indian warship, if you come any closer, we will shoot the hostages." This was the message from what was now a pirate ship almost with a "Jolly Roger" flag. MV Ruen had 35 armed Somali pirates who held 17 hostages onboard. It was 15 March 2024, about 200 nautical miles (nm) East of Somalia, in the Arabian Sea. The warship being addressed, standing resolutely at 400 yards, was INS Kolkata.

Just four days earlier, on 11 March 2024, Kolkata was 450 nm to the West, in the Gulf of Aden, off the port of Djibouti. The ship had completed a two month deployment under Op Sankalp and Op PoG (Patrol Off Gulf of Aden) in an area of very high drone and missile attacks by Houthi rebels, and had successfully rendered lifesaving and firefighting assistance to multiple merchant ships. This was the second such deployment for the ship, coming on the back of a five month mission to the East, in which she participated in Malabar 2023 off Australia. The ship had just shaped course for Mumbai, and the crew was looking forward to a long overdue reunion with loved ones.

Before a relaxed mood could set in, information was received of a pirate mother-boat operating off the East coast of Somalia. Another Indian Naval warship, Tarkash, had been diverted to the area to look for the boat. She was part of the Navy's Op Sankalp, a broad maritime security operation in the Arabian Sea since December 2023. But the search area was vast and growing larger with every passing minute. It was clear that more ships would be required. Two aspects were considered onboard Kolkata. The first was the endurance of the ship. Quick time-space-fuel calculations were done and revealed that, despite the search area for the boat being about 700 nm South of Kolkata's intended track, it would be feasible to reach there within a day and a half at high speed, with adequate fuel leftover to assist in the search and return to Mumbai. The other consideration was morale. The ship's senior Master Chief Petty Officers were requested to gauge the effect of the delay in returning home on the morale of the crew. Unsurprisingly, everyone was enthusiastic about the new tasking. They had been in the thick of action for the past few months and were still hungry for more. Kolkata immediately signalled her readiness to Command Headquarters at Mumbai, who promptly diverted her to search for the pirate mother-boat.

Fig.1 Routeing of Kolkata to intercept Ruen (Chart compiled by INS Kolkata)

On the evening of 14 March, Kolkata received another input. MV Ruen had also been detected off the East coast of Somalia. This was a fateful coincidence. Three months earlier, during Kolkata's previous deployment in the Gulf of Aden, Ruen had been hijacked. The Indian warship, Kochi, had been diverted from Op Sankalp to shadow Ruen and had evacuated an injured crew member. At the same time, Kolkata had been directed towards the fishing dhow suspected of having been used by the pirates for the hijacking. Investigation of the dhow had revealed no piracy tattle-tales such as weapons, ladders or skiffs. In addition, the Master had vehemently stated that no pirates had embarked his vessel. It would later be realised that this was a blatant lie.

Three months later, on the evening of 14 March, the Bulgarian owned, Malta-flagged, 45,500 tonne Ruen was heading East into the Arabian Sea, with pirates embarked. This time not as a hijacked merchant vessel, but as a pirate mothership, to evidently carry out more attacks and hijackings further away from land. Kolkata adjusted course to maximise chances of interception.

Just past midnight on 14 Jan, at 150001/March to be precise, a non-AIS (Automatic Identification System) contact was detected and positively identified on infra-red camera as Ruen. She was 260 nm East of the Somali coast. Kolkata closed Ruen to 02nm and transmitted on AIS as ‘Indian Warship.' It was hoped that learning of the proximity of a warship would make the pirates abandon the merchant vessel, as had happened on a few occasions in the past. Kolkata also hailed Ruen on Marine Radio Channel 16 and ordered her to stop. Instead of complying, however, the pirates reversed course towards Somalia and responded on the radio, "this is not an Indian ship, these are not Indian waters, there are no Indians onboard, so we do not take orders from you." From the arrogance in the voice, it was apparent that these were not run-of-the-mill Somali pirates often encountered but likely experienced pirates who were confident they had the situation under control. They probably had, at some previous time, encountered other Navies, wherein reference to jurisdiction may have deterred the latter. On Kolkata, it was decided not to precipitate further action in darkness, as neither the status of crew members of Ruen, nor the number and location of pirates was known, and due consideration had to be accorded to the possibility of facing seasoned/ hardened pirates. However, preparations were made for all contingencies: Ruen's layout drawings and crew list were obtained from the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) at Mumbai; the team of embarked Marine Commandos (MARCOs) was briefed; sea boats were checked; and weapons and sensors prepped.

At first light on 15 March, Kolkata positioned herself within two cables (i.e. 400 yards) of Ruen. Fourteen pirates carrying rifles were seen roaming freely on the upper decks, showing no fear of the warship lurking close by. The Maltese flag had also been taken down. This seemingly innocuous act had significant implication on the status of vessel and its jurisdiction under international law. According to UNCLOS Articles 92 and 110, a vessel not flying any nation's flag would be ‘without nationality'. Hence, Ruen now became subject to the jurisdiction of any state vessel that approached it, with a right for conducting Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Further, considering UNCLOS Articles 101, 103, 104, 105 and 107, Ruen's character had become that of a ‘pirate ship', thereby making her liable to action by Kolkata.

To ascertain the presence of Ruen's crew, the pirates were asked to bring them on the upper decks. In response, the pirates produced only the ship's erstwhile (Bulgarian) Master on the bridge wing, who stated that all 17 crew members were safe but were being held hostage. To further assess the situation, Kolkata launched her spotter drone and sent it close to Ruen. In a sudden, brazen hostile act, the pirates opened fire on the drone and shot it down. They were immediately warned on radio that they had committed a Hostile Act and that there would be consequences. The pirates' response was aggressive. They demanded that Kolkata move away from Ruen and, further, threatened that if another drone was sent, it too would be shot down. It was clear that these pirates harboured aggressive and hostile intent and would not be deterred by the mere presence of a warship and warnings over radio. Other methods and actions to counter the pirates and thwart the threat they posed to international shipping would need to be used, albeit within the bounds of international law and reducing collateral risks/ casualties for the hostages.

A situation report (SITREP) was sent to the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) at Mumbai. The Command Ops team reviewed the legal and tactical situation. UNCLOS, the UN resolution on anti-piracy, and other applicable international and national laws, including the Navy Act 1957, Regs IN, Maritime Anti-Piracy Act 2022, were all checked. It was ascertained that Ruen was well beyond the territorial sea of Somalia and was not flying the flag of any country. Hence, she was legally a ‘pirate ship' that posed a danger to international shipping. This was quite different from the Ruen's last encounter with the Indian Navy three months earlier, when she was flying Malta's flag and had entered Somali waters as a ‘hijacked ship.' This time, the warship present in her vicinity could be given a broader remit.

Armed with clear directives, Kolkata fired warning shots with her 76 mm gun across the bows and stern of Ruen. This shook the pirates up and they rushed to take shelter. But they also stopped all radio communication. The next viable option seemed to be to carry out opposed boarding. The operation would be executed by the eight Marine Commandos embarked in Kolkata, supported by the ship's boarding team of 14 personnel. They would climb from the foxle of Ruen, where there were no pirates, and make their way aft under covering fire from Kolkata. This proposal was sent to MOC, but was not approved by higher authorities, who assessed it to be tactically not viable, in view of the numerical superiority of the pirates, their demonstrated competence with weapons, and their height and fire cover advantage. Instead, Kolkata was directed to undertake calibrated stand-off actions to coerce and immobilise Ruen, to prevent her from continuing towards the Somali territorial sea.

By the forenoon of 15 March, Kolkata was required to stop this merchant ship through application of force without imperilling hostages onboard. The example of INS Godavari and INS Betwa interdicting MV Progress Light in 1988, for rescue of hostages from the armed group that attempted a coup in Maldives (foiled by Indian Armed Forces during Op Cactus), was recalled. It was decided to undertake actions in a deliberate, sequential, step wise and escalatory manner, with tactical pauses in between to assess effect and build psychological pressure. First, to disorient Ruen's crew, the GPS antennae and navigation radars were targeted through sniper fire. This was swiftly and accurately achieved. While the radars stopped turning and the GPS antennae broke, the ship continued her path. In the next step, HE ASW rockets were fired 30 metres astern of Ruen so as to impact the steering/ propeller. The underwater explosions rattled the pirates, as learnt later, but there was no decrease in the ship's speed nor response on marine radio. Thereafter, the funnel was targeted, with the aim of choking the exhaust/ intake of the engine. While the funnel sustained damage, the desired impact on engines was not achieved. Lastly, the anchor system on the foxle was fired upon, to release the anchor and make it drag and slow Ruen down. While the capstan got damaged, the anchor stayed in its position, probably because of the anchor strops/ slips.

What did, however, happen was that these measures increased the unease among the pirates. This was evident from the continuous chatter on Ruen's handheld transceivers, the radio frequency of which was being monitored by Kolkata. The pirate leader inside the ship passed instructions to the bridge not to stop under any circumstance and to continue towards Somalia. A few hostages were also produced on the bridge wing, with their hands above their heads, under escort of heavily armed pirates. Kolkata was told, somewhat hysterically, that if she did not back off, the crew members would be shot. In reply, the pirates were sternly cautioned that any harm to a single hostage would result in very dire consequences. There would be no mercy.

Fig2. Hostages at Gun Point
Hostages (the crew) paraded on deck by pirates. (Photo Courtesy Indian Navy)

By the afternoon of 15 March, despite Kolkata's strong words and the firepower to follow through with them, it was assessed that the presence of hostages tilted the situation heavily in favour of the pirates. All firing at Ruen was paused. However, psychological pressure was maintained on the pirates by aiming underwater rockets around the ship. This unfavourable situation was communicated back to MOC, with a suggestion to cease further kinetic action and just wait and watch. But orders from ashore were clear: Ruen was to be stopped. Not doing so would result in a large pool of pirates and a seagoing mothership being available for continued hijacking, endangering the lives of even more seafarers. This would have a debilitating effect on security of international shipping, trade and seafarers. It would also give a boost to the pirates' morale. They would only continue to challenge warships using this modus operandi, with further ramifications on the regional maritime security environment.

At the MOC recent attacks by drones on merchant vessels in the Arabian Sea were studied. It was determined that cases in which the drones had impacted and exploded on the transom had led to loss of steerage way. Accordingly, Kolkata was directed to undertake accurate firing with HE shells on Ruen's transom and observe the effect. Kolkata manoeuvred behind Ruen, maintaining 200-300m from her and fired short, accurate bursts of 30 mm calibre ammunition at the stern. This effort bore quick success. Ruen's steering was damaged, and she consequently stopped dead in the water.

Fig3. MV Ruen's transom targeted (Photo Courtesy Indian Navy)

Night of 15/16 March. The mood in Kolkata was upbeat. It seemed only a matter of time before the pirates would surrender; but that was not to be. The pirates made Ruen's crew undertake temporary repairs to the steering system, partially restoring it by midnight. The merchant ship once again started motoring towards Somalia, albeit with manual steering that was unsteady and slow to respond. The pirates also warned that hostages had been placed in the steering compartment. The original Master also came up on marine radio to request no firing on the ship's transom for safety of the crew. This planted a seed of doubt at MOC, as to whether an understanding had been reached between the pirates and original crew on the latter's release if they facilitated the piratical operations. This aspect was dwelt upon and would be built up later, to neutralise the pirates' key leverage. Meanwhile, fresh options were carefully examined onboard. It was decided to again target Ruen's funnel, just astern of the bridge, with ‘point detonation' ammunition that would explode on impact. The aim was to shock and coerce the pirates, most of whom were huddled in the bridge, into submission. The pirates were warned, once again, to stop the ship immediately. The plan worked. Ruen stopped. One shot at the funnel proved enough to make the pirates abandon further motoring towards Somalia. The pirates were now evidently fearful for their lives. The sustained, calibrated and sequential, escalatory action over the past 24 hours seemed to have had effect.

By the morning of 16 March, just as daylight broke, the ship pressed on the psychological advantage. Kolkata offered the pirates safe passage in their own skiffs, wherein they could proceed unhindered to the Somali coast if they agreed to surrender. The pirates took some time to respond to this. It was later learnt that the delay was due to their need to communicate, through Sat Phone on every issue with handlers ashore. The pirates finally reverted in the negative. They feared proceeding in their small skiffs through the open, somewhat heavy, sea towards land by themselves. This implied that several of them may not be seamen or have sailing experience and confidence. For insurance against further firing from Kolkata, they positioned Ruen's crew members as human shields at critical locations of the ship. They then made a counteroffer.

They requested to be permitted to proceed to Somali territorial sea on Ruen. Once there, personnel from Kolkata could embark Ruen to ascertain safety of the hostages, after which the pirates would proceed to land by boat. The proposal was conveyed to the FOCWF and C-in-C, who rejected it, as the legal position would change if Ruen entered Somali territorial sea. There was also no guarantee that the pirates would release the ship's crew, once near the Somali coast. Further, allowing the pirates to set the conditions and control the sequence of events would render them in an advantageous position versus Kolkata, which would in turn lose the extant control over initiative and escalation. Hence, the cost-benefit assessment of this proposal was clearly not in our favour. The request did, however, provide two opportunities. First, Kolkata was able to buy time by stating that the pirates' offer would be forwarded to authorities ashore for consideration, allowing psychological pressure to build up. Second, the pirates were asked to show proof of life of all 17 hostages as a gesture of good faith. The pirates obliged, clearly demonstrating a change in their stance from stubborn arrogance to reasonable compliance. This small victory did not distract those onboard Kolkata from the fact that a stalemate had been reached. The pirates were refusing to leave Ruen, and Kolkata was not letting them motor to their destination of choice. The stalemate could not last for several days as the sea current was slowly, but surely, carrying both ships towards Somalia, and there were probably enough rations and fuel on Ruen to last this journey. As the ship drifted towards Somalia, the confidence and resolve of the pirates would also strengthen.

Forenoon of 16 March. Another aspect of concern was that the Bulgarian firm that owned and operated Ruen prior to its hijacking might prove to be a roadblock in the ongoing operations. The firm was previously unsuccessful in negotiating the release of Ruen for a reduced sum from the pirates' ransom demand of about 60 million US dollars, but now was apparently in touch with the ship or the pirate handlers. It sent an email to the Indian Naval HQ, requesting for ceasing of any firing by the IN on Ruen. The firm was, however, informed that the Ruen was now a pirate ship without nationality, as per international law, and posed a threat to innocent shipping and mariners, and hence the IN would be taking calibrated action as necessary to neutralise the threat. In effect, it was intimated to the firm that the owners no longer had any role or jurisdiction at this stage, as its erstwhile vessel had been commandeered by pirates and was being used as a pirate mothership, without nationality, and also posed a threat to all nations and shipping.

Time was, therefore, of essence. Urgent discussions were held between Kolkata and higher commanders, leading to the formulation of a new dual-pronged approach to break the stalemate. It was decided to increase pressure on the pirates by deploying more Indian Naval assets to the region. In the meanwhile, clearance was taken by HQWNC from NHQ and thence GoI, for undertaking armed action in accordance with the approved SOPs for Anti-Piracy and Hijacking, as required by the tactical situation. The approvals were accorded swiftly. The warship Subhadra, deployed in a nearby area, was diverted towards the scene of action. MARCOs, based in Mumbai, were ordered to embark an Indian Air Force (IAF) C-17 for aerial insertion at a position 1500 nm away. At the same time, the pirates were to be deprived of their trump card, the hostages. They were to be informed that since Ruen was not flying the flag of any country, she would be treated as a pirate ship without nationality. Also, since the ship's crew had been operating with them for three months in evident harmony, they would be considered as complicit in the actions of the pirates and endemic to their group, and not as hostages.

This was duly conveyed to Ruen, along with fresh calls to surrender. There was evidence of panic and consternation onboard Ruen, whose earlier Master was permitted to speak to Kolkata on marine radio, to protest and project that the crew remained hostages to the pirates. It was evident by now that the pirates were heavily dependent on the crew for operating the ship. Their lack of confidence to put to sea in a skiff, not availing the safe passage offer, and the continued safety and presence of the full crew inside the ship, opened a window of opportunity for a new line of persuasive and coercive effort. The C-in-C issued final directives to the FOCWF that the pirates were not to be allowed to reach ashore, and the threat of piracy from Ruen, as a pirate ship, to international shipping and seafarers was to be neutralised before nightfall on 16 March. Additional forces were being positioned in the area with the same objective.

Afternoon of 16^th March. By noon, Subhadra arrived on the scene, demonstrating the Indian Navy's resolve and setting the plan into motion. Soon thereafter, the pirates were informed that their proposal of proceeding on Ruen into Somali waters had been rejected by the authorities ashore. It was reiterated to Ruen that she was considered a pirate ship that would not be allowed to proceed any further, and everyone onboard was being considered as a composite pirate group. They were further informed that Kolkata had been given orders to sink Ruen. As expected, this created fresh panic on the merchant ship. The erstwhile (Bulgarian) Master came up on the radio to emphasise that his crew was not complicit with the pirates. Kolkata responded that, while the endeavour all along had been to save every life onboard, it had received new orders, that would have to be complied with. Notwithstanding the same, Kolkata was still amenable to allowing the crew and pirates some more time to discuss the matter and safely surrender. The aim was to portray Kolkata as the ‘good cop' vis-à-vis authorities ashore, so that surrendering would not seem like too stark an option. To reinforce this, the pirates were assured of getting a fair trial in a court of law.

After deliberations, however, the pirates again refused to back down, even stating that they were ready to go down with the ship. The perceived bluff had been squarely called. The IAF C-17, in the meanwhile, had got airborne from its base in North India and landed in Mumbai, where the MARCO Team was prepared and equipment loaded onboard. By 1400 hrs, the C-17 was taxiing for take-off towards the Area of operations (AO), 1500 nm away, with an IN P8I maritime patrol aircraft in support. Kolkata informed MOC of the situation and was conveyed C-in-Cs approval for continued escalation of force with a clear, stark message, "the pirates must surrender or sink." Accordingly, Kolkata started firing single shots from its 76 mm gun at Ruen's ship side, along with the same clear and stark warning, "You can surrender now, or you can surrender after the ship sinks." With each shot, the pirates tried to create and move a human shield of hostages towards the line of fire. But such was the size of the ship that it was impossible for the shield to be at each vulnerable point at all times. The target points were also carefully chosen for escalatory impact. In a short while, the explosive impacts began to have the desired effect. The erstwhile Master of Ruen came back on the radio, stating that the pirates were divided into two groups, one of which was ready to surrender, while the other was still not relenting. Some more time was needed to convince the hardliners. These, as was gleaned later, were centred on the pirate leader, who was a tough experienced former pirate in his mid-40s. He was the Centre of Gravity of the pirates' resistance. He evidently shored up the hardliners in the gang had the final say.

By this time, the MARCOs were enroute to the area on the IAF C-17 shepherded by the IN P8I. Kolkata quickly set up a drop zone 1000 yards from Ruen. With no surrender announced by the pirates, after some time, Kolkata gave another warning and then resumed firing from its 76 mm gun in single shot mode. The ensuing damage on Ruen enhanced the fear and dissension amongst the pirates, whereupon their cohesion started disintegrating. One of the pirate hardliners-- as it emerged later-- had received a shrapnel wound in his leg. Another reported breach in the ship's hull in the forward position. The pirate leader went ahead to inspect the area and was himself hit by shrapnel from the next shell. He temporarily collapsed, bleeding profusely. The disintegration of morale and cohesion of the pirates was now complete. Around this time, at about 1720 hrs, and still about 90 minutes short of sunset, the C-17 had arrived and the MARCOs insertion by Combat Free Fall started. The sight of 22 parachutes descending from the sky, after facing sustained coercive pressure for more than 36 hrs, followed up by direct action and firing as compellence to eventually achieve compliance and with their pirate leader lying unconscious and bloody, was the last straw for the pirates and they broke. They quickly capitulated, beseeching, "please, please... give us a few moments to surrender."

Kolkata ceased firing and prepared for boarding Ruen, in a simultaneous process of apprehending the pirates and securing the hostages, while also recovering the MARCO combat free fallers from the water. All resources on Kolkata and Subhadra were pressed into motion with a sense of urgency brought about by the approaching sunset. The 35 pirates were ordered to muster on the cover of the foremost cargo hold, with the hostages on the cover of the centre hold, and all arms and ammunition deposited on the aftmost hold. Subhadra's helicopter was launched to provide covering fire to the MARCOs as they boarded Ruen, in case of any last-minute opposition from the pirates. Fortunately, it was not required. The fight had been completely taken out of the pirates. They surrendered safely and were peacefully transported by the ships' boats to Kolkata, while the grateful crew of Ruen was sent to Subhadra. By 1945 hrs, all parachutes and air-dropped equipment were also recovered onboard, bringing to an end the 44-hr saga of the anti-piracy operation. Ruen was taken over by the Indian Navy. By this time, her diesel alternators had run dry and stopped. The ship had no power. So, a small team remained onboard, and further checks and sanitisation were carried out the next morning, on 17 March. In a manner of speaking, the black Jolly Roger, said to be flown by pirate ships of yore no longer flew on Ruen!

Fig5. CFF from IAF C 17

Fig 6 . Surrendering of Pirates

However, the mission was not yet over. Orders were received from MOC to repair the damaged Ruen and make her seaworthy. Early in the morning on 17 Mar, three teams of exhausted yet enthusiastic MARCOs were sent onboard Ruen to sanitise her for ordnance left behind by the pirates. They discovered significant quantities of multi-calibre ammunition and rocket propelled grenades. However, as a standard practice followed by the pirates, rifles and grenade launchers had been thrown overboard.

Once the ship was made safe, technical personnel from Kolkata and engineers from Ruen embarked the ship. After eight hours of sustained efforts, they were able to restore steering and propulsion. In the meanwhile, orders were also received to debrief the Ruen crew and interrogate the pirates individually. The two injured pirates, including the purported leader, were given medical treatment. Both of them recovered substantively by the time Kolkata reached Mumbai. The Ruen crew were allowed to call home using INMARSAT, to convey to their families that they were safe. The legal status of Ruen was checked against the applicable laws of piracy, prize and salvage. It was decided, however, to restore the crew and ship to their owners. The Ruen's firm was contacted and asked for their readiness to accept the ship in its ‘as-is' condition with the damage incurred in the anti-piracy actions. They gratefully accepted this offer through an email and additionally requested for Ruen's safe escort to Salalah. Ruen was then handed back to her Master and crew, who hoisted the Maltese flag and sailed her to Salalah under escort of Subhadra, while Kolkata took the 35 pirates under custody to Mumbai, where they were handed over to the Mumbai police for prosecution under India's new Maritime Anti-Piracy Act 2022.

 Fig. Restoration of Seaworthiness

The bold, assertive and decisive action by the Indian Navy garnered international acclaim and dealt a major blow to the recently resurgent piracy off Somalia. The President and Foreign Minister of Bulgaria tweeted their gratitude to the Indian Navy for the successful and safe rescue of MV Ruen, which was duly acknowledged by the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister of India. The exchange of tweets is reproduced here.

Lessons Learnt

While the operation to rescue Ruen seemed to have proceeded very satisfactorily several things could have gone wrong at any stage, with serious multinational and legal implications. There are ten main lessons to be drawn from the successful operation in which the simply stated principles of war are apparent.

First there was a clear, singular chain of command and control, enabled by availability of secure, real-time satellite-based network and communications. The Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet (FOCWF) was directly contactable by, Kolkata for discussions and guidance, as required. Similarly, the FOCWF was on a direct line with the C-in-C for higher commander's directives. There was clear communication of unwavering intent to the ship at sea from authorities ashore. This was elucidated in broad strokes, with the tactical commander accorded complete freedom in execution.

Second, Kolkata was passing frequent situation reports to the Maritime Operations Centre at Mumbai. The tactical picture around Kolkata was available almost instantly to Subhadra and MOC and the higher commanders. This allowed authorities ashore to comprehensively assess the situation, and provide guidance/ directives.
Third, at all stages, it was unambiguously conveyed to Kolkata that the pirates along with Ruen as mother pirate-ship were not to be allowed to escape, as they constituted a serious threat to international shipping and marines. Towards this, calibrated escalation of force was permitted.

Fourth, the parameters of time, space and force were clear and adequate, wherein Kolkata could balance all these for optimum course of action. E.g. the factor of space required that Ruen be kept in international waters. For this, force could be escalated. Once Ruen was immobilised, the factor of space was addressed and there was adequate time now available to calibrate further application of force. As the broad timelines for concluding the operation crystallised, it was decided by the higher commander that stalemate had to be ended by nightfall of 16 March. Accordingly, the factor of force was correspondingly escalated to balance/ address the shortened timelines.

Fifth, all kinetic actions by Kolkata were taken keeping the safety of the hostages in focus, resulting in zero injury to any crew and their safe rescue. There remained some risk of collateral damage, especially after the factor of force was increasingly applied. The risk was sought to reduce to the maximum extent feasible, by steady, sequential application of force whilst frequently pausing for negotiation, and always offering a way out to the pirates. These ranged from safe passage to safety on surrender, and post-surrender lawful treatment.

Sixth, the application of force was effectively combined with non-kinetic methods, such as use of drones for surveillance additional forces and psychological warfare, rendering the pirates progressively unbalanced. This was done to minimise risk, optimise efforts, and maximise overall affect.

Seventh, just a month earlier in Feb 2024 in preparation for such an eventuality, the MARCOs had practiced Combat Free Fall insertion at sea by IAF C-130 in a similar exercise at 750 nm from Mumbai. The exercise had enabled the assault team to be in date, with lessons learnt and experience gained duly incorporated to streamline procedures. This reassured the planners of the ability to execute long range aerial insertion by the MARCOs in an actual situation, albeit at twice the distance and at short notice.

Eighth, there was a high level of jointness between the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, leading to planning and execution of the Combat Free Fall at an unprecedented 1500 nm from Mumbai, in a short 12 hrs from decision to completion.

Ninth, was the state of work up and combat readiness of Kolkata and its crew. The ship was fully ops, with a settled crew, and had undertaken two long range operational deployments wherein she had built up crew proficiency and fine-tuned system performance. The challenges of the immediately preceding Op PoG deployment in a high-risk zone had, particularly tested and enhanced the ship's combat skills. This gave the ship confidence to undertake the operation, including accurate, calibrated, armed action against the pirates.

Tenth, was the overall ability of the Western Fleet and Western Naval Command to build and maintain maritime domain awareness and adequate presence through deployments across the Arabian Sea. This ensured adequate capability against the rising, simultaneous threats of drone/ missile attacks and resurgent piracy, under the ambit of twin operations,
Op PoG and Op Sankalp. The swift launch of Op Sankalp in Dec 2023, at the very onset of these rising threats with a large number of ships and aircraft deployed, provided a concrete framework and clear objectives and cohesive actions. This enabled quick redeployment and reinforcement of forces for countering the threat from pirate-ship Ruen, resulting in its rescue of its crew, and restoration as MV Ruen.

"Operation Ruen" carries many lessons for operational and tactical naval commanders and staff. A narrative like this could be an essential foundation for further study, analysis and discussions. While memories are still fresh, this analytical narrative drawn from the captain's chair and with additional inputs, to complete the picture obtained from the Fleet Commander and C-in-C hopefully could be the basis for study, reflection and lessons for all.

Captain Sharad Sinsunwal is an alumnus of the Naval Academy and a specialist in Navigation and Direction. He has spent more than 15 years at sea on frontline warships, teneting various operational roles. These have included Executive Officer of a Frigate and Commanding officer of a Corvette and a Destroyer. The officer is a graduate of the UK Staff College, where he was awarded the ‘Andover Prize' for best dissertation, and earned an MA with Distinction from King's College, London. He was also the Naval Attache at the Embassy of India, Beijing. He speaks Hindi, English, Chinese and Russian. He was recently awarded the Shaurya Chakra. He is married to Preeti. They have two children.