Why the Need for Theatre Commands Must Be Debated

Name a new play, and he’s the poet’s friend,

Nay show’d his faults-but when would poets mend?

No place so sacred from such fops is barr’d,

Nor is Paul’s church more safe than Paul’s churchyard:

Nay, fly to altars; there they’ll talk you dead:

For fools rush in where angels fear to tread.

-Alexander Pope¹

Introduction

In recent months the call for the theaterisation of Indian armed forces has gained traction. Indeed, discussions on the subject have moved from debating the need for theatre commands to a distinct sense of imminence.² Yet as the juggernaut of the most awaited military transformation begins to roll, there might be a case to pause and ponder, to reflect once again upon the ‘whys’ and ‘wherefores’ of theaterisation. For, once such a radical change as envisaged by the theatre command concept begins to take shape, it is nigh impossible to reverse its course. There are many voices in favour of theaterisation and some against it. The ‘pros’ views have been treated in detail in the main part of this paper. The opposing views follow two main themes. The first is that it may not be prudent to imitate the ‘Western Model’ and an organisation that is more suited to India’s defence needs must be evolved. The second theme, which emerges largely from proponents of airpower, is based on how theaterisation is antithetical to the ‘unity of airpower.’³

This article presents some arguments which seek a review - not of the need for change but of the shape of change that is desired to improve military efficacy and fighting efficiency of the armed forces. There is no doubt that greater jointness, synergy and, perhaps, integration, would yield optimum results in most future military operations. This article also does not contest the premise that to be more effective, India’s armed forces should be prepared to embrace changes in their operational, training and maintenance philosophy, which would lead them towards greater jointness. What this article aims to do, however, is to de-hyphenate ‘jointness’ from ‘theaterisation,’ because quite often the two are conflated in military discourse.

The theme of this article - that theaterisation in the Indian context must be carefully contemplated - is based on five core issues. The first is the need to distinguish between ‘unity of command’ and ‘unity of effort.’ This article argues that the theatre command structure focuses more on the former instead of the latter and therefore, the idea of ‘unity of effort’ which is central to jointness is likely to be neglected. The second argument stems from the widely discussed geographical aspect where it is believed that presenting a single theatre vis-à-vis land borders and the sea area would probably enhance cohesiveness and facilitate focused military operations. That such a belief rests on a rather tenuous premise forms one of the core arguments of this paper.

Thirdly, it is reasoned that segregating the ‘raise, train and sustain’ functions from warfighting are likely to create a dichotomy and also adversely impact operational effectiveness. Fourthly, it will be endeavoured to show that many of the ‘ills’ that beset the armed forces lie not in the existing organisation of military commands but elsewhere in areas such as civil-military chasm, indigenous defence industry, capital procurements, capability for absorbing technology and human resource management. Finally, this article will analyse the extant ‘successful’ theatre command structures in other armed forces to evaluate whether such structures are implementable in toto in India’s context and if not, what could be the possible modifications that might need to be incorporated.

Need for Theaterisation

The call for theaterisation perhaps gained traction sometime at the beginning of this century, when immediately after the Kargil Conflict, the government had commissioned studies to reform the national security apparatus. This also included, inter alia, reforms in defence management.⁴ The key focus of these studies lay in problems about jointness, civil-military relations, defence acquisitions, Defence Research and Development, budgeting and financial powers of Service Headquarters (SHQs). One of the many recommendations of the post-Kargil study was to introduce the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a post which was expected to render single-point military advice, prioritise inter/intra-service acquisition projects, administer strategic forces and ensure required ‘jointness’ among the three Services.⁵ This recommendation was implemented in 2019-20.

Post-Kargil, many military experts continued to seek full implementation of the Kargil Review Committee recommendations and extend the concept of CDS, seeking ‘integration’ of armed forces through the establishment of theatre commands.⁶ This idea of theatre commands in India was modelled after the US armed forces in the initial stages, which eventually evolved into a more ‘Indianised’ model as typified by a recent document published by the Takshashila Institution, among others.⁷ The justification presented for the need for Theatre Commands is covered in succeeding paragraphs.

It will be useful to explore the rationale behind having several geographical commands facing a single frontier such as that between India and China. It is not hard to imagine the tribulations of a ‘Theatre Commander’ who is responsible for the defence of a 3,500 km long boundary that has stark variations in terrain and climate. How soon could the report of slightest border intrusion travel up the chain in such a vast theatre and how rapidly would the Theatre Commander’s decision travel downward? How will the Theatre Commander, daily, personally monitor the situation in peacetime, and more so, in times of conflict? Essentially, and this is the core counter-argument, it is not the entire theatre that is pitted against the opposing theatre. Instead, it is the smaller units that fight in their allocated sectors or areas of responsibility. The more pertinent question, therefore, is of control and coordination of these units. This is addressed next.

Integration is more Cohesive and Synergetic

Closely related to the grandiose justification of the ‘One Threat - One Theatre’ stratagem is another simplistic argument that integration ensures better cohesion and synergy.¹⁰ While it certainly is true that integration or jointness ensures greater cohesion, the same is not synonymous with theaterisation. A greater degree of cohesion is needed within each Service for which Service-specific procedures have painstakingly evolved over decades. For example, the Navy has an elaborate doctrinal framework, numerous policy documents, detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and various orders in addition to a meticulously crafted human resources system and training infrastructure, which ensure coordination and cohesion within the various arms and branches in the Service. The case of the Army and the Air Force is also similar. The problem with theaterisation is that to integrate various components in a theatre, one would essentially be disintegrating intra-service cohesiveness. To elaborate, in the present set-up, each Service is ‘integrated’ as far as combat efficiency is concerned. The combat policy, tactics and doctrines are developed by each Service according to their need, forces are tasked according to the plan envisaged by SHQs, reinforcements are made available where required under the directions of SHQs while enablers such as intelligence, media campaign as well as coordination with other ministries are also carried out by SHQs - all under a unifying and integrating umbrella of how each Service sees itself fighting the battle. With theaterisation, the fighting components of each Service would be subsumed in a theatre construct, thereby destroying intra-Service cohesion to a large extent.

The second reason why an integrated theatre concept needs more thought is that it makes no distinction between ‘unity of effort’ and ‘unity of command.’ The former implies an ‘effect,’ wherein, disparate forces, which may be following separate chains of command, act together to address a common objective. This is akin to the ‘Distributed Lethality’ concept propounded by the US Navy some time ago.¹¹ An example could be an attack on a key enemy location from the sea and the air while land forces are in an assault. Unity of Command, on the other hand, seeks to deliver the same effect while necessarily having the relevant forces under the command of a single Operational Commander. The purported advantage of this system is that the concerned forces can be ordered to act as and when required by the Commander. But then so can the forces, which are not directly under command, provided that swift and robust communications are ensured. There could, however, be a situation where the Air Force or naval platforms are not available or ready when the ground force commander needs them. Such situations can also be avoided through proper planning and ensuring real-time communication between forces.

Others Have Done It - Why Shouldn’t We?

Another compelling argument for theaterisation emerges from the experience of the US armed forces where jointness brought about by the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is often brandished as ‘proof’ of the success of the Theatre Command concept. Similarly, the reorganisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from seven military regions to five Theatre Commands is also used to highlight the impending ‘danger’ if the Indian armed forces fail to adopt a similar system. These arguments presuppose that organisational change alone can enhance military efficiency. Critical factors like the following are often ignored: -

• inequity in defence spending.¹²

• technological base and size of the military.¹³

• strategic context as well as the chain of command at the national level.¹⁴

Some of these differences have been elaborated upon by some authors to highlight key contextual differences between the USA, China and India as far as their respective military organisation is concerned.¹⁵ One view against Theatre Commands is that the changes in the US military were brought about after a review of three operations conducted by the US forces: -

• Operation Eagle Claw.¹⁶

• Operation Urgent Fury.¹⁷

• The Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983.¹⁸

However, no such critical review has been carried out for military operations undertaken by the Indian armed forces, implying an absence of empirical evidence in support of theaterisation. Nevertheless, it will be useful to see how jointness has fared in other militaries.

Experience in Other Armed Forces. Organisational change in some militaries did indeed result in success at the operational level. As brought out earlier, these changes were supported by commensurate fiscal, technological, political and geo-strategic factors. Further, many successes that are quoted to demonstrate the effectiveness of Theatre Commands were perhaps so heavily influenced by an asymmetry in military and economic power that regardless of jointness, any consequence other than victory would have been hard to imagine. There are, however, some “unintended consequences” of jointness in advanced militaries.¹⁹ These are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

UK Armed Forces. British policy has consistently emphasised a joint approach to operations and they have been rather adept at them. Yet, in an insightful piece on amphibious operations, Ian Speller proposes that “the most effective way to promote the development of joint capabilities is to link these explicitly to the self-interest of the key provider(s) [the Army, the Navy or the Air Force] and to build joint structures that encourage rather British amphibious capabilities than inhibit this.”²⁰ Studying the evolution of amphibious capabilities in the UK armed forces from the beginning of the Second World War, Speller contends that the British amphibious capabilities continued to atrophy after the war until the Admiralty adopted them under a broader context of Expeditionary Warfare. He quotes another example in Joint Force Harrier (JFH), wherein, the Harriers of the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) were merged into a new joint structure, which eventually led to the retirement of Sea Harriers because of the RAF’s “preference for land-based, fast jets over anything that operates from the sea.”²¹ This ultimately resulted in the scrapping of the RN’s carrier air arm, which impacted operations during the Libyan War when the British government admitted that “it was spending far more than it had imagined, and that even one carrier could have done far better at a much lower cost.”²²

US Armed Forces. For many, integration in the US armed forces is the epitome of jointness. However, there are some divergent views emanating from within the US armed forces on the subject, especially on how Goldwater-Nichols has dented single-service interests. The expanded power of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), for example, is debated on whether the quality of military advice (as rendered by the CJCS) is superior to that of the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era when all service chiefs had an equal say.²³ It is suggested that the CJCS would invariably be coloured by his service perspective and may be unable to see a balanced picture.²⁴ Some believe that appointing the Chairman as the Principal Military Adviser has “limited…..the scope of military advice available to the political leadership.”²⁵ It has also been suggested that Combatant Commanders often compete with Service Chiefs, even in bureaucratic, non-warfighting service functions.²⁶ Another author notes that the Services are becoming “less joint,” referring to the predominantly ground-based wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have widened the chasm, particularly between the Army and the Air Force.²⁷ This may have lessons in India’s context where the Army has similarly been the pre-dominant player in majority of the past conflicts.

In operations, the Service bias of Theatre Commanders is likely to be more pronounced. For example, in Operation Desert Shield/ Storm, General Colin Powell (CJSC), Gen Schwarzkopf (CINCCENT) and Lt Gen Thomas Kelly, Director of Operations (J-3) in Joint Staff “primarily called for using land forces and assigned only a minor supporting role to airpower,” “did not think airpower would have a significant strategic impact” and as army generals “had only considered land-centric alternatives.”²⁸ Similarly, in Operation Just Cause, “Powell favoured an Army-oriented plan by stifling disagreement and failing to consider alternatives that reduced risks.”²⁹ Therefore, there is a danger in unification when “under cover of jointness, [the US forces] are moving toward a one-service type military.”³⁰ Another pitfall of unification in the US has been the re-emergence of ‘careerism’ wherein officers jockey for assignments to Joint Staffs and as Staff in Unified Commands to enhance their promotion prospects.³¹

People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Post reform, each Theatre Command in the PLA has responsibility for specific contingencies based on geography. However, this organisation is not yet perfect, as one expert postulates that in the event of a conflict with India, the WTC has no naval component to address the naval conflict. In this scenario, the responsibility for naval operations would perhaps be given to PLAN HQ, thus challenging the principle of unity of command and raising the issue of how the PLA would coordinate land and naval operations in different theatres.³² It has also been suggested that in practice, the PLA Service headquarters have held onto some operational command responsibilities, including some relevant to overseas operations.³³

Theatre is the ‘Modern’Way to Fight³⁴

Proponents of Theatre Commands have also called the existing organisation in India ‘outdated.’³⁵ They have drawn attention to the fact that most advanced militaries have since long abandoned their old organisation in favour of a more agile and responsive one. The Theatre/ Joint/ Unified/ Combatant Command concept in modern warfare emerged during the Second World War in the European Theatre.³⁶ In the era preceding airpower, however, several successful expeditions combining the land and sea forces were led by kings and generals in India and abroad.³⁷ Therefore, as a concept, a Unified Command of armed forces is hardly modern.

What might be referred to as ‘modern,’ is the US model. It is common knowledge that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 cemented the joint structures in the US armed forces. What is less commonly known is the laborious journey of this process that began with the National Security Act of 1947 which slowly worked through four revisions in 1949, 1953 and 1958. It might be unsurprising then that the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols legislation itself took almost five years.³⁸ The point that must be emphasised here is that the theatre concept is hardly ‘modern’ by any standard. Instead, the concept is based on the necessity that emerges from the need to position forces under a single commander in cases where the battle is conducted far from its territory, or in other words, expeditionary operations. In such cases, it is neither feasible to assign forces to the on-location commander at immediate notice nor orchestrate the battle from the homeland due to a lack of communication and real-time situational awareness. Therefore, the Theatre Commander is entrusted with the command of all forces participating in that operation so that he can act independently in pursuit of the assigned mission. In the case of territorial defence, the problems of communication and swift assignment and re-assignment of forces do not exist and therefore, the need for theaterisation does not arise.

Theaterisation Promotes Jointness and Optimises Resources

It has been argued that theaterisation will eliminate parochialism, ‘turf-wars’ and ‘inter-service rivalry’ because everyone will be joint. No other argument could be more misplaced. To be sure, competition among Services is a good thing because it promotes innovation and preserves the core competencies of each Service. Inter-service rivalry arises due to the competition for resources, which will always be limited. This is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In the USA, for example, rivalry for resources now occurs primarily among Combatant Commanders.³⁹ Further, inter- service politics in the USA pervades even the selection of Combatant Commanders.⁴⁰ In India’s context, intra-service parochialism itself is so deep-rooted that it is difficult to see how this will not impact inter-service relations if the armed forces were to become ‘truly joint.’⁴¹ A first step, to begin with, would perhaps be to smoothen the ruffles within each Service.

One might also be tempted to conclude that theaterisation will result in greater synergy in operations, training and acquisitions simply because the three Services are working together. It does, but only to the extent that Services are willing to be joint. This is so because experience indicates otherwise. In Operation Desert Storm, for example, US Navy aircraft could not freely operate with other joint assets within the framework of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) even though this deficiency was subsequently eliminated in Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁴² As far as training is concerned, a survey conducted in the US War College classes of 1998 indicated that parochialism does exist among future leaders. It also suggested that joint education and experience may not reduce Service bias.⁴³ Acquisitions in the US armed forces have perhaps been the worst affected by jointness. Seemingly, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the process the Joint Staff uses to develop warfighting requirements, turned out to be both ‘cumbersome’ and ‘unresponsive.’⁴⁴

Optimisation of Resources. A common refrain supporting the call for jointness is that India has 17 different commands across the three services and not any two of them are co-located. But this hardly makes the case for theaterisation; at best one could ask for co-location of commands if that is the point of contention. It has also been suggested that structural integration of the current service-specific commands will lead to optimisation (read cuts) in manpower, and, eventually free up the budget for capital expenditure.⁴⁵ Although this argument appears logical, evidence indicates otherwise; the manpower, as well as revenue expenditure, increases due to joint staffing needs.⁴⁶ A January 2015 report by a federal advisory panel in the USA found that the Pentagon could save US $125 billion in administrative waste by streamlining its bloated bureaucracy.⁴⁷ Although the idea of pooling resources together to optimise costs seems attractive, it does not work in practice. This is simply because the need for resources and services is directly proportional to the size of combat forces and unless the combat forces are reduced, the costs will not. On the contrary, by creating Theatre Commands which will not need to depend on external support, the Services will be replicating the existing infrastructure in each of these commands.

The Naysayers’ Plea

Having described the key arguments demanding the theaterisation of Indian armed forces, it is apt to explore contrarian views and their underlying rationale. Admittedly, one needs to look harder for these opinions since they are few and far between, often overwhelmed by the massive rhetoric that runs against them. This, of course, by no means implies that the contrarian view stands on tenuous ground. Indeed, if at all, scholarly thought must evaluate issues based on rationality instead of giving in to brute majoritarian views. The counter to theaterisation is based on three main arguments: -

• Need (lessness) of theaterisation in India’s context.

• Advantages of command and control by Services while maintaining unity of effort in operations.

• Preserving core competencies of each Service.

Theaterisation in India’s Context. The need for theaterisation in expeditionary operations has been elucidated earlier in this article. What must be emphasised here is that within the limits of ‘defence-based missions,’ that is, where primacy is the preservation of territorial integrity against external aggression, the theatre concept is what Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy (Retd) calls an “unnecessary idea.”⁴⁸ This is because against any external aggression, the limited resources of one Theatre Commander will not be sufficient. Instead, the entire armed forces will be mobilised depending upon the place and manner in which aggression happens. The movement of assets will need to be coordinated across the country and reinforcements will need to be provided where required. All this can easily be controlled and coordinated by SHQs. As far as the orchestration of battle is concerned, this will be done best at the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Thus, emerges the second argument in the succeeding paragraph.

Centralised Command and Control by the Services. Modern long-range vectors, improved communications and enhanced battlespace transparency enable centralised control of forces at the operational level. The inherent flexibility of modern combat platforms, especially naval and air assets and even long-range artillery, dictates that their employment be controlled centrally instead of assigning them permanently to theatres. Of course, for administrative reasons, these assets would have to be based at some peacetime location but their wartime employment must be controlled centrally. This means that these assets must be deployed or assigned to the theatre (or area of operation) that needs them and then re-deployed to another area when the need arises. It would simply be wasteful to tie down these assets permanently in a theatre.

Problems with the ‘Raise, Train and Sustain’ Model. One of the common extensions of the theatre command concept is that while the operational control of combat forces will lie with the Theatre Commander, the ‘raise, train and sustain’ functions will be carried out by Service Headquarters.⁴⁹ This proposition raises crucial questions such as on what basis will resources be allocated to theatres? At a time when Services are struggling for resources, it is unclear how frontline combat units can be distributed in ‘penny packets’ even as the IAF is striving to build up its sanctioned 42 squadrons strength.⁵⁰ The other issue is accountability and responsibility. In the present set-up, the Services are acutely aware of capability shortfalls and therefore focus their effort and resources on making up the deficiency in the shortest time possible through re-allocation and re-basing of assets in the short term and expediting acquisitions in the long term.

The bigger problem, however, is that all Theatre Commanders will seek the best possible equipment and manpower without themselves having a real stake in the long-term functions of ‘raising, training and sustenance.’ Therefore, their perspective will invariably be limited to the short-term duration of their tenures, a problem that has equally been faced by the US armed forces.⁵¹

Perhaps the most significant impact would be due to human resource management, a practice that is vastly different in the three Services. Recruitment, training, transfers, welfare, discipline, accommodation, terms and conditions of service, promotions and suitability of employment in specific billets are all managed differently among the three Services. Before the armed forces transition to theaterisation at the operational level, the administration, HR and most importantly, service culture, would need to be harmonised lest they should adversely affect morale.

Preserving Core Competencies of Services. Many American authors, recalling impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the US armed forces, have written how this legislation also served to blunt the core competencies of individual Services. One author, for example, calls attention to the dangers of ‘Strategic Monism’ - a term that refers to primary reliance on a single concept, weapon, Service or region because power “has shifted from Laws limit flexibility required the Services to Joint Staff.”⁵² Another quotes a former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, “ In our effort to standardize how we treat Service members across the Department of Defense, our laws increasingly limit the flexibility required to maintain Service competencies and cultures.”⁵³ Noting that the Services are where warfighting capability lies, he calls for restoring the authority of Service chiefs in the US armed forces.⁵⁴ Steven Wills writes that in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, opinions of Senior naval leadership on naval strategy and force structure were rejected in favour of those of an army general. Consequently, the Navy’s inability to exert influence on its size, composition and missions reduced its strategic concepts to a regional rather than global character.⁵⁵ It is another matter that because the US defence spending is the highest in the world and it spends more than the next ten countries combined, the debilitating effects of ‘forced jointness’ are hardly visible. But, in India’s context, the evidence against emulation, even if meagre, must be factored in decision-making at higher levels.

Conclusion

This article made three key arguments. First, ‘theaterisation’ is not synonymous with ‘Jointness.’ The former only seeks to unify, sometimes unnecessarily, diverse elements of military power without much regard for the specialised capabilities of each such element. The second argument highlighted the many pitfalls of theaterisation. Among them, the key is the risk of blunting core competencies of Service elements at the cost of one dominant Services’ perspective. The third argument is about context. In India’s context of a focus on territorial defence and eschewal of expeditionary ambitions, the need for theaterisation does not appear justified. More importantly, there is a need to look at critical deficiencies in areas such as defence procurement and civil-military relations to enhance defence preparedness.

Theaterisation is not bad. However, it must be understood as one of the means to improve synergy among the three Services and not necessarily the only means. There is a need to first identify own needs and then adopt a model of jointness that will be most suitable to do that. On the same note, inter-service rivalry is also not an evil to be shunned. The West has succeeded because it understands the value of pluralism: Rivalry between the Services can bring out the best in all. Stifling that rivalry does not necessarily bring efficiency.⁵⁸ The existing model of jointness and inter-service cooperation among India’s armed forces has been tested in battle. Of course, there is a huge scope for improvement but theaterisation is not necessarily the answer.

Endnotes

1. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, Part 3. http://www. public- library.uk/ebooks/33/23.pdf, accessed 04 February 2022.

2. “Army, Navy and IAF Get 6 Months to Respond to Theatre Command Final Proposal,” Hindustan Times, 22 November 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-navy-and-iaf-get-6-months-to-respond-to-theatre-command-final-proposal-101637481379968.html, accessed 18 February 2022. Also see Manjeet Negi, “Navy Holds High Level Meeting on Creation of Maritime Theatre Command,” India Today, 24 January 2022. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/navy-holds-high-level-meeting-on-creation-of-maritime-theatre-command-1903961-2022-01-24, accessed 13 February 2022.

3. S Krishnaswamy, “Why Theatre Commands is an Unnecessary Idea, Centre for Airpower Studies,” 20 August 2018; Vinod Patney, “Clamour for Theatre Commands is a Peacetime Phenomenon,” Centre for Airpower Studies, 08 May 2017 and Narayan Menon, “Theatre Commands – The Indian Context,” Centre for Airpower Studies, 20 August 2018.

4. From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 252-258. Group of Ministers Report on National Security. http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf, accessed 11 April 2018.

5. GoM Report, 100-101.

6. PC Katoch, “Viewpoint: Theatre Commands – Long Overdue,” SP’s Land Forces, 31 July 2017, accessed https://www.proquest.com/magazines/viewpoint-theatre-commands-long-overdue/docview/1927472948/se-2?accountid=132150; Also see Vijay Oberoi, “Need for Holistic Restructuring of the Indian Military,” Journal of Defence Studies vol. 2 (Summer, 2008). https://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_NeedforHolisticRestructuring oftheIndianMilitary_Voberoi, accessed 11 April 2018.

7. Prakash Menon, “India’s Theatre Command System : A Proposal . ” https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/u ploads/2020/06/India-Theatre-Command-System-Prakash-Menon-Takshashila.pdf. For Other Proposed Models of Theatre Commands see, Harsha Kakkar, “ Creating Theatre Commands to Meet Our Specific Requirements,” https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/creating-theatre-command-to-meet-our-specific-conditions-2/, accessed 09 February 2022. Vinod Bhatia, “Integrated Theatres – Transforming Indian Military Force to Military Power.” https://cenjows.in/article-detail?id=424, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-get-5-military-theatre-commands-one-each-for-china-and-pak/story-UzFJNollsvpj3tcUet WVNMM.html and PR Shankar, “Shapes of Theatres,”nGunnersshot. https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/02/shapes-of-theatres-by-lt-gen-p-r.html.

8. Ajay Shukla, “CDS General Bipin Rawat Reveals Shape of India’s ‘Joint Theatre Commands,” Business Standard , 15 September 2021 . https:// www. business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/cds-general-bipin-rawat-reveals-shape-of-india-s-joint-theatre-commands-121091501662_1.html, accessed 18 February 2022.

9. Ashish Singh, “Achieving Jointness in War: One Theatre < One Strategy,” Journal of Defence Studies vol. 14, no. 1-2, (2020, January-June), 1.

10. Deepak Kapoor ed Vinod Misra, Higher Defence Organisation and the Pursuit of Jointness, Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms (New Delhi: IDSA, 2015), 66- 67.

11. Thomas Rowden, Peter Gumataotao and Peter Fanta, U.S. Navy, “Distributed Lethality,” USNI Proceedings vol. 141/1/1 (2015, January), 343.

12. In Absolute Terms, for the Year 2020, the Defence Budget of USA (USD 766 Bn) was 10 Times that of India’s Defence Budget (USD 73 Bn; China’s Defence Expenditure (USD 244 Bn) was More than Three Times India’s. SIPRI Military Expenditure Data base , https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

13. The Military Balance 2019, Chapter Two: Comparative Defence Statistics, The Military Balance, vol. 119, no.1, 21-27, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2019.156102. The USA and China Respectively have Five Times and Three Times more Capital Ships than India. This Ratio is Similar for Fighter Aircraft. In Terms of SSBN, Strategic Lift Aircraft, AWACS, Attack Helicopters etc, the Ratio is Even More Skewed. China Fields Almost Twice the Numbers of Main Battle Tanks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles than India, While the Numbers in USA is Slightly Less.

14. In the Case of USA, the Chain of Command to a Unified Combatant Command Runs from the President to the Secretary of Defence to the Combatant Commander. In China’s Case, the Theatre Commander is Responsible to the Central Military Commission which is Headed by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (who is also the President). In Essence the Chain of Command is Direct in Both These Cases. For details see, PR Shankar, “Theaterisation – Are We Ready?.” https://www.raksha-anirveda.com /theaterisation-are-we-ready/, accessed 13 February 2022.

15. See Anil Golani, “Theatre Commands Need Careful Planning. ” https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/theatre-commands-need-careful-planning-279723, accessed 10 February 2022 and Shankar, Op Cit., n. 14.

16. Operation Eagle Claw was the Attempt to Rescue 52 Embassy Staff held Captive at the Embassy of the United States, Tehran on 24 April 1980.

17. Operation Urgent Fury was the US Invasion of Grenada in October 1983. Though the Operation was Successful, it Highlighted Several Inconsistencies in Information Apparatus as well as Lack of Coordination among the Services.

18. Anil Golani, “Jointness and Theatre Commands: Rhetoric or Substance,” Trishul vol. 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2018), 26.

19. Mackubin T Owens, “Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective,” Marine Corps Gazette vol. 80, no. 12 (1996, December), 48-53.

20. Ian Speller, "Neither Fish Nor Fowl Nor Yet Good Red Herring: Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious Capabilities in Postwar Britain,” Naval War College Review vol. 73, no. 4 (Autumn 2020), 89-115.

21. Ibid.

22. Norman Friedman, “The High Cost of No Carriers,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 137, no. 8, (2011, August), 90-91.

23. Mackubin, Op Cit., n. 19.

24. Robert Pervidi, “Goldwater-Nichols: Where have Ten Years Taken us?,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 123, no. 5 (1997, May), 14-16.

25. James R Locher III, “Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval War College Review vol. 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 95-115.

26. Robert Pervidi, “Goldwater-Nichols: Where Have Ten Years Taken us?,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 123, no. 5 (1997, May), 14-16.

27. Sandra Erwin, “Iraq, Afghanistan Wars Have Widened Inter-Service Rifts,” National Defense vol. 94, no. 678 (2010, May), 9.

28. Bash, Op Cit.

29. Bash, Op Cit.

30. Robert Pervidi, “Restore Authority to the Service Chiefs,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 130, no. 2 (2004, February), 83.

31. Mackubin, Op Cit.

32. Phillip C. Saunders, “Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations,” Strategic Forum, July 2020. https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-306.pdf, accessed 18 October 2021.

33. Ibid.,The Army Headquarters Retains Responsibility for Border and Coastal Defence; Navy Headquarters Supervises the Counterpiracy Patrols in the Gulf of Aden; Air Force Headquarters Retains Centralized Control of Bomber, Transport, and Airborne Operations. Moreover, all the Services are Using Service Training Requirements, Including Single-Service, Multi-Theatre Exercises, as a Means of Asserting a Continued Operational Role.

34. Menon, Op Cit., n. 7.

35. Oberoi, Op Cit., n.6.

36. In the European Theatre, Allied Military Forces were Under Command of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF); After the SHAEF was Dissolved at the End of WWII, the US Forces were Unified under the US Forces European Theatre (USFET). See Wikipedia, Unified Combatant Command.

37. The Overseas Expeditions of the Chola Empire in India, the Persian Empire Against Greece as well as Several European Powers may of Interest to the Reader.

38. Locher, Op Cit., n. 25, 95-115.

39. Mackubin, Op Cit.,

40. Russel Rumbaugh, “The Best Man for the Job? Combatant Commanders and the Politics of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 75, no.4 (2014), 91-97.

41. KJ Singh, “Parochialism in Army Cannot be Tackled by Tokenism, but Change of Mindset,” The Times of India, 08 December 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/generals-jottings/parochialism-in-army-cannot-be-tackled-by-tokenism-but-change-of-mindset/.Also see, Mrinal Suman, “Colonel Commandants: An Archaic and Parochial Institution,” Indian Defence Review ( Net Edition ), 20 October 2014. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/colonel-commandants-an-archaic-and-parochial-institution/, accessed 11 April 2018.

42. Benjamin S Lambeth, American Carrier Airpower at the Dawn of a New Century (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 3-4. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dssc-ebooks/detail.action?docID=300518, accessed 23 September 2020.

43. Brooks L. Bash, “Leadership and Parochialism: An Enduring Reality?,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 22 (Summer, 1999), 64-71.

44. Carlo Munoz, “Combatant Commands Still See JCIDS As Inefficient, Unresponsive,” Defense Daily vol. 250 (2011, May).

45. Prakash Menon, “Joint/Theatre Commands Strategic Perspectives,” USI of India (2020, April-June). https://usiofindia.org/publication/cs3-strategic-perspectives/joint-theatre-commands/, accessed 18 April 2018.

46. RS Sawan, “Eleven Reasons Why Jointness is Overrated,” Trishul vol. 31, no. 1 (Autumn, 2018), 6-7.

47. Elliott Negin, “It’s Time to Rein in Inflated Military Budgets,” Scientific American, 14 September 2020. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/its-time-to-rein-in-inflated-military-budgets/, accessed 18 April 2018.

48. Krishnaswamy, Op Cit., n. 3.

49. Menon, Op Cit., n. 45, 8.

50. Huma Siddiqui, “IAF Ready for ‘Two Front’ War, Shortage of Squadrons Until the Next Decade: Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari,” Financial Express, 05 October 2021. https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/iaf-ready-for -two-front-war-shortage-of-squadrons-until-the-next-decade-air-chief-marshal-vr-chaudhari/234435 4, accessed 20 April 2021.

51. Mackubin, Op Cit.,

52. Mackubin, Op Cit.,

53. Pervidi, Op Cit., n. 30.

54. Pervidi, Op Cit., n. 30.

55. Steven Wills, “The Effect of The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987-1994,” Naval War College Review vol. 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016), 20-40.

56. Demand for Grants 2021 - 22 Analysis Defence . https://prsindia.org/budgets/parliament/demand-for-grants-2021-22-analysis-defence, accessed 08 February 2020.

57. Arun Prakash, “Roots of Civil-Military Schism in India: The Need for Synergy,” Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms, ed. Vinod Misra, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press; 2015), 19-37. Also see, R Chandrashekhar, Rooks and Knights : Civil Military Relations in India (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2017).

58. Friedman, Op Cit., n. 22.