TRANSPARENT OCEANS – IMPLICATIONS FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

Abstract: Rapid advancements in satellite technology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning have revolutionized maritime surveillance. Historically constrained by high costs and technological limitations, space based ISR was limited to government entities. Today, the proliferation of commercial low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and improved electro-optical imagery provides near-constant global coverage, enhancing transparency in maritime activities. Techniques like "tipping and cueing," combining various satellite sensors, significantly improve the detection of "dark vessels." The integration of AI and machine learning facilitates the processing of vast data sets, allowing non-government entities to detect illegal fishing and other suspicious behaviours. This convergence of military and commercial domains exemplifies the increasing role of dual-use technology, as seen in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The implications for naval operations are profound, with enhanced capabilities for strategic and tactical detection, tracking, and targeting. Overall, these developments have made oceans increasingly transparent, and necessitate a thorough reassessment of force structures and operational doctrines to address the challenges and opportunities presented by space-based ISR.

Introduction

“By 2025, we will detect every vessel on the ocean larger than 15 meters, every day, everywhere. Fully automated, highly scalable, open data available to everyone.”¹

The above proclamation was made by Paul Woods, the Chief Innovation Officer at Global Fishing Watch way back in 2018. This non-profit organisation provides data and reports to provide greater transparency of human activity at sea. The claim would have been almost unimaginable a decade ago, particularly from a non-government entity. But advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and, most importantly democratisation of satellite data have slowly begun to create transparency on a domain considered too vast for a single entity to surveil or monitor. Advances in the military domain are closely guarded secrets; however, the development of technology and its deployment in the commercial domain can provide vital clues as to the extent of technological advancement and allow for reasonable inferences to be drawn on their utility in tactics. The rampant use of dual use technology particularly in unmanned aircraft systems in the ongoing war in Ukraine, highlights the growing convergence in the military and commercial domains.² The innovative use of drones which have actually been around for decades in several conflicts, thanks to democratisation of several technologies is a harbinger of a similar revolution happening in space. The large-scale harnessing of the commercial space industry by Ukraine from communications to ISR presents a real-world example of this convergence.³ The article aims to explore the advances driving transparency in the maritime domain and analyse its likely impact on naval operations at sea.

Space-based ISR is a broad term encompassing several remote sensing tools such as electro-optical imagery, SAR imagery, space-based AIS, space-based ELINT satellites, etc. These tools and technologies are not new; space-based imagery and ELINT collection have been available for several decades. The earliest imaging satellite, the Corona satellite, was launched in 1960 by the United States Central Intelligence Agency⁴ (CIA) and the United States Air Force. India has also been an early entrant to the field, launching the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite-1A (IRS-1A) on 17 March 1988. These early satellites required niche technology in their time, were expensive, and therefore understandably restricted to governments that used them primarily for non-tactical purposes. The exorbitant costs of launching and operating these satellites meant only the most advanced nations could afford them, and even then, these countries could not claim to have real-time coverage around the globe.

The life of a satellite is proportional to the orbital height, as satellites in higher orbit face lesser atmospheric density and consequently lesser decay. Therefore, satellites in higher orbits offered much longer life spans. Perhaps, considering the complexity and costs involved in launching satellites, most satellites launched in earlier generations were in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). An analysis of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) satellite database⁵ offers some interesting insights. Before 2007 (when the first commercial imaging satellite was launched), out of 256 launches, 174 satellites were in GEO. Satellites in GEO, apart from having a longer life span, could be launched into space to be stationary with respect to a specific location on the Earth. A limited number of GEO satellites could cover the entire globe. However, while suited for communication, GEO satellites served poorly for surveillance, given their poor imagery resolution due to the sheer distance from the globe.

On the other hand, low earth orbit (LEO) satellites orbit relatively close to the Earth; they travel at high speeds, completing orbits in a relatively short time compared to satellites in higher orbits, such as geostationary orbit. LEO satellites are preferred for surveillance as they can undertake high-resolution imagery. However, considering an LEO satellite completes its orbit in roughly 90 minutes, a given location could only be monitored for limited durations in a day. The frequency and duration a satellite can monitor a location are given by its "revisit time." Revisit time refers to the interval for a satellite or spacecraft passing over/ looking at a specific location on the Earth's surface during its orbital path. In the context of satellite systems, especially those used for Earth observation or remote sensing, the revisit time is a critical parameter. It indicates how often a satellite can collect data or imagery of the same area on Earth, providing valuable information for various applications such as environmental monitoring, disaster response, agriculture, and urban planning. A shorter revisit time means the satellite can capture more frequent updates of a particular location, enhancing the timeliness and effectiveness of data collection and analysis.

What has changed?

The first commercial imaging satellite was EarlyBird 1 (later renamed "WorldView-1"), launched in September 2007. This satellite was designed explicitly for commercial high-resolution Earth observation, marking the beginning of the commercial satellite imaging industry. The gradual reduction in the cost of launching satellites slowly paved the way for commercial market development. Much like other technologies, such as the internet, which originated from military applications but later became predominantly driven by commercial interests and further advanced for commercial purposes, space-based imagery seems to follow a similar trajectory. Early entrants into the field, such as Airbus, Maxar, and ImageSat, provided high-resolution imagery using a small number of satellites with high resolution.⁶ The traditional model comprised launching a few satellites with high-resolution electro-optical payloads. The limited number of satellites meant the revisit time was too high to be used for maritime applications such as reasonably tracking vessels of interest. However, later entrants in the markets have aimed to disrupt the market by launching many cheap satellites in low earth orbit.⁷ Companies such as Planetlabs and its competitors have pioneered this approach to drive down the costs of satellite images. The large number of satellites in low earth orbit has also meant that these companies can provide near-persistent coverage of an area. The lacunae these companies suffered from was the relatively poor resolution vis a vis the established players; however, scaling the technology and rapid advancements in electro-optics have improved the resolution significantly. Today, many constellations of commercial low-earth orbit satellites promise to provide near-persistent coverage of the globe.⁸

Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellites

Early satellites only carried electro-optical payloads restricted to clicking pictures in clear weather. The advent of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) addressed this critical lacuna. NASA's launch of the SAR satellite SEASAT in 1978 demonstrated the potential of SAR in remote sensing applications from space. Soon, SAR satellites became a crucial remote sensing tool deployed by countries to augment their space-based surveillance capabilities. Notably, these satellites had civil and military applications from the beginning, and governments were cognizant of their commercial value. Like the trajectory of electro-optic satellites, several private companies such as ICEYE, US-based Capella Space, and Umbra Lab promise to disrupt the field with large-scale launches of LEO satellites with SAR payload.⁹ ICEYE, with a constellation of 30 satellites, promises near-persistent coverage, with upcoming launches of more satellites in the coming years to drive down the revisit time.¹⁰ The use of small, agile SAR satellites providing high-resolution imagery allows these companies to position themselves in the market, offering services to both government and non-government entities.

Apart from the democratisation of the technology, another significant development has been the development of payloads, which have greatly enhanced the satellite's capability to be used for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and, general domain awareness itself. Most interesting is the use of low light imaging, originally developed for meteorological purposes, which is now being exploited for MDA thanks to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration¹¹ This writer has seen the use of low-light imaging to detect fishing boats engaged in squid fishing in the IOR as a user case during a demonstration to law enforcement agencies. The now publicly available Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) boat detection tool has been integrated by Global Fishing Watch and the results of the analysis can be accessed by the public.¹²

Another satellite payload that has been in the realm of government agencies so far is ELINT satellites, such as the Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellites (NOSS) series of satellites operated by the United States. Companies such as the US Hawkeye 360 and Unseen Labs¹³ have launched satellites capable of detecting radio transmissions at sea. Considering that even vessels not transmitting on AIS would often transmit on nav radar and V/UHF communication equipment, RF detection satellites promise to be an essential addition to the repertoire of satellite-based sensors for detecting activity at sea. Satellite-based AIS, data from coastal radars, and vessel management systems are other key data sources that shed light on the maritime domain.

Detecting Dark Vessels

Understandably, no single source of satellite-based sensor can detect or track dark vessels (vessels not transmitting on AIS). However, combining these sensors highly increases the probability of a vessel being detected. The technique widely used for detecting dark vessels is called "tipping and cueing”.¹⁴ In this technique, satellites in higher orbits use low-resolution images or ELINT intercepts to detect vessels of interest called tipping. The detected vessels are then co-related with other available inputs, and if classified as suspicious, a high-resolution EO-IR satellite is "cued" for further surveillance of the suspect vessel. This technique substantially reduces the number of high-resolution satellites that would otherwise need to be deployed to detect a dark vessel. The time required for “tipping and cueing” to detect a dark vessel accurately would depend on the number of satellites available. Companies combine predictive analysis to increase the possibility of the process being successful.

A discussion on advances in space-based surveillance would be incomplete without considering the advances in data processing and analytics. AI/ML has allowed unprecedented amounts of information to be processed. For instance, Global Fishing Watch claims to have processed over ten terabytes of data so far to generate a comprehensive picture of human activity at sea.¹⁵ By using machine learning to automate the patterns humans have been looking for and combining that with massive cloud computing platforms, Global Fishing Watch has created the first global view of fishing over time and made it available to everyone worldwide for free. ML Engine models are built by feeding thousands of "training data tracks" that humans have manually classified so it can then analyse movement patterns to determine the class of each vessel (cargo, tugboat, or type of fishing gear such as long-line, purse seine, trawl), and when and where fishing activity occurs.¹⁶ These insights enable the team to estimate the global level and distribution of fishing effort over time and automatically detect and flag instances of illegal fishing. Similarly, AI/ML algorithms could easily identify dark ships not adhering to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code regulations or exhibiting suspicious behaviour consistent with warships. Tailoring ML models to specific regions or vessel types or patterns akin to vessels engaged in search or patrol will enhance detection accuracy. However, striking a balance between sensitivity detecting dark patterns and minimizing false positives is crucial. Human experts validating ML results can be considered till systems mature to avoid misinterpretations.

Are Oceans Transparent?

Global Fishing Watch is not the only platform claiming to have the capability to shed light on human activity at sea. Several other private players are marketing their ability to track any vessel anywhere on the globe at every moment.¹⁷ A common thread amongst all these players is the utilisation of many datasets, such as data from EO/IR, SAR, RF and AIS data; fusing and analysing the data using AI/ML to promise near real-time surveillance. Interestingly, these players have actively been vying for government contracts in maritime domain awareness. The IPMDA (Indo-Pacific MDA) initiative by the QUAD is perhaps the best acknowledgement of the potential of these private players to play a vital role in the maritime security architecture of countries. IPMDA officially claims to offer a near-real-time, integrated, and cost-effective maritime domain awareness picture utilising commercially available data usingAbstract:  existing technologies.¹⁸ While near real-time surveillance of the entire world may still be some distance away, based on the available open-source data, it is safe to infer that nation-states can cover much broader swathes of the ocean with surveillance approaching near real-time. The sanctuary of stealth and anonymity provided by the oceans is receding rapidly.

Implications on Naval Operations at Sea

In 1798, French vessels at anchorage watched in trepidation as Adm Nelson's fleet made its way to the Aboukir Bay for battle. Adm François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers, perhaps, saw the battle unfold before his eyes.¹⁹ Has surveillance technology advancement reached such a state of development that fleets will manoeuvre de facto in plain “sight” of one another as in the age of sail? Would ships be required to be closed up at action stations throughout their time at sea? In an era where the overt declaration of war is no longer the norm, and heightened states can stretch for weeks, could ships sustain such states of readiness and preparedness?

Given the massive investments made by the two prominent powers the USA, and China, in the space domain for ISR, it is a reasonably accurate assumption that the technologies presently commercialised, are already available for military applications. Under its "Proliferated War Fighter Space Architecture," the US launched hundreds of small LEO satellites for critical warfighting functions.²⁰ Critical warfighting functions include missile warning, tactical targeting, and communications. China launched 180 satellites into orbit in 2022, a fivefold increase in satellites deployed compared to five years ago;²¹ as of March 2022, China has 290 systems for ISR in orbit, a quantity second only to the US. The impressive strides made by commercial and non-profit ventures in maritime surveillance offer clues on the capabilities of the satellites being deployed by major powers.

However, a different frame of discussion is required to effectively analyse space- based ISR’s impact on fleet tactics and naval operations. Deploying satellite based ISR for detecting dark vessels engaged in illegal fishing and utilising the same architecture for detecting, tracking, and targeting an adversary's ship is a different ball game altogether. The central problem of naval tactics succinctly laid down by Capt. Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.) in his book "Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations" is to attack effectively first. In his book, discussing scouting during World War II, he describes a sequence of measures to attack effectively first.

Table 1: Measures Required for Effective Attack²²

Further discussion in this article seeks to analyse space- based ISR's utility in addressing tactical problems at sea.

Scouting

The effectiveness of a scout can be assessed by its ability to undertake different measures required for an effective attack. An aircraft could undertake all the functions laid down in Table 1 and, therefore, has been the predominant platform of choice since World War II. However, aircraft have range limitations, require airfields or carriers to operate from and are vulnerable to enemy’s air defences. Satellite-based ISR can presently carry out A to B function.²³ Initially, reconnaissance satellites were predominantly utilised for strategic detection purposes due to their high costs, extended revisit times, and the necessity for meticulous image analysis. The reliance on ground stations for image download and manual interpretation resulted in significant delays between force detection by reconnaissance satellites and the dissemination of information to field commanders. However, as discussed previously, this paradigm has undergone a significant shift, as advancements such as the proliferation of LEO satellites and automated data processing through AI/ML promise near real-time surveillance capabilities. The surface of the sea presents a much simpler background than land, for ISR satellites to detect objects at sea. Utilising tipping and cueing, a ship could be theoretically detected at sea. However, for a ship to be tracked near real-time, updates on its position must be available with sufficient latency to allow for targeting. Therefore, for space based ISR to be utilised for scouting, it should be capable of tactical detection, tracking, and targeting, a scouting function hitherto reserved for manned and unmanned aircraft.

Targeting Data from Satellites?

Ranges of anti-ship missiles have seen a phenomenal increase over the years. While, prima facie, the technology for a missile to travel several hundreds of miles has existed for several decades, the problem for many years was the missile's ability to accurately arrive at the future location of a manoeuvring ship and home on accurately, catering for errors in the missiles inertial navigation system. Much of the scepticism of the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile program stemmed from the fact that it was unclear how a ballistic missile would home on to a manoeuvring aircraft carrier (or any other large-sized ship) at ranges more than 1000 miles. Andrew Erikson, the author of the book "Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications" in an interview in 2020,²⁴ pointed out ASBM's effectiveness hinged on a comprehensive reconnaissance and targeting architecture and noted that while China had made impressive strides in that field there was a considerable distance to be covered. Erikson believed that China sought to overawe audiences limited in access to technical details and limited in understanding of basic technical principles—and thereby generate deference that it had not earned operationally. ²⁵

One of the technicalities that commentators refer to is the problem of reducing the target probable area to manageable dimensions for an integral homing head of a missile to search for a target. Given that the purported range of the DF 26 is 1850nm,²⁶ with an estimated flight time of 20 minutes, a ship doing 30 kts would have moved 10nm from when the missile was launched. Unless the missile is guided mid-course, the integral seeker would need to search an area of 314 square miles. This problem is even more acute for the more widely fielded anti-ship missiles YJ 12 and the YJ 18, with claimed ranges of 290nm and 330nm and estimated flight times of 30 and 35 minutes. While targeting data could be given by aircraft (manned or unmanned), the formidable AD capabilities of today’s warships would make it extremely dangerous to approach a fleet, particularly a carrier group operating a CAP.

One of the earliest analyses of the feasibility of using space-based targeting for ASBMs by China is a 2009 study by Eric Haght and Mathew Durnin. The study draws extensively on Chinese literature from the 1990s on the technical problems of a kill chain for an ASBM. The authors note that Chinese writers noted two primary areas of concern with the state of space reconnaissance capabilities. The first is an inadequate number of the “right type” of satellites, and the second is the ability to seamlessly integrate the images in time to provide targeting data to the launch platform.²⁷ The study noted that China would require a large number of satellites to offer persistent coverage and, crucially, process and transmit the data to the launch platform quickly enough to allow for an attack. Comparing the capabilities of China in 2009 with those of the US, the study noted that the US achieved a sensor-to-shooter time of 15 minutes using space-based ISR assets in the Iraq War.²⁸

Though the study is dated, the developments of the Chinese space program in the last decade and a half point toward significant strides in addressing these technical challenges. China has successfully placed 144 Yaogan (Yaogan translates to remote sensing) satellites in space since 2006.²⁹ The latest satellite Yaogan 41 is a GEO optical remote sensing satellite launched to provide persistent coverage over the Indo-Pacific.³⁰ This is augmented by the GAOFEN series of satellites forming part of the China High-resolution Earth Observation System (CHEOS).³¹ Further, China has a functional data relay satellite system, which provides a near-continuous link between ground stations and satellites in orbit, significantly reducing data latency.³² These capabilities are well acknowledged by the US. In its 2023 annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China (PRC), the US DoD noted that China could undertake precision anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS from mainland China utilising both the DF 21D and the DF 26.³³ The report states "China has been actively enhancing its military reconnaissance satellites to monitor, track, and target American and allied forces.”34

The US Navy has distinctly modified its operating philosophy in response to the Chinese A2/AD challenge. The concept of Distributed Maritime Operations calls for "Dispersing Navy units over a larger area within the theatre of operations, so as to make it harder for an adversary to detect and target Navy units, while still permitting Navy units to support one another and concentrate their fires on adversary targets;”³⁵ this is a distinct acknowledgement of the adversary's ability to detect and track the fleet at extended distances. The problem of classification would be made simpler by the repertoire of tools available in space based ISR, such as SAR imagery, ELINT signature, and Contact Motion Analysis undertaken using AI/ ML, which would fuse the information to provide tangible conclusions to the operational/ tactical Commander.

Fig 1: PLA Navy Fielded Conventional Strike³⁶

Massing v/s Dispersion

A critical tactical problem for fleet operations is, and often has been, the dilemma of massing vs dispersion. Naval forces must strike a balance between massing for decisive impact and dispersing to reduce vulnerability. The existing and evolving threat landscape and technological advancements continually shape their approach to achieve operational success. While massing allows for easier concentration of force, dispersion makes the adversary's ability to track and detect forces much harder. The increasing AMD capabilities of ships necessitates an attacking fleet to concentrate its ordnance to achieve a sufficient weight of attack to have areasonable chance of inflicting damage on the adversary.³⁷ The concentration of forces that required massing earlier can now theoretically be achieved by network-centric operations that allow a fleet to aggregate a salvo from dispersed land- and sea-based forces. However, a combined salvo would need to arrive on target almost simultaneously to saturate the enemy's AMD capability. If a dispersed formation, while launching missiles got its sequence wrong or incorrect, the adversary would have the opportunity to address individual missiles in detail as they would arrive at different times.³⁸ Coordination of a very high order would be required to achieve such a combined salvo for dispersed units operating in a contested EM environment. Dimitry Filipoff, in his outstanding series of articles on Distributed Maritime Operations,³⁹ notes that there is a distinct possibility of finding the adversary first but not having enough firepower available to overwhelm their defences.⁴⁰ Massing, which was synonymous with the concentration of forces in World War II, is passé, as enhanced means of surveillance mean that a fleet operating as a composite group is more likely to be detected and attacked. The trend towards distributing ordnance on multiple platforms (not placing all eggs in one basket) and aggregating salvos from land and sea are here to stay.

ASAT Weapons and their Limitations.

On 27 March 2019, India carried out its first Anti-Satellite Weapon Test under Project Shakti joining China, Russia, and the United States as the fourth member of the “club” of nations to have destroyed a satellite with a kinetic ASAT weapon.⁴¹ The reliance on space for Command-and-Control systems and communications by major powers was bound to be contested. ASAT weapons have been tested as early as the early 1960s during the Cold War, with both the United States and Russia destroying satellites in orbit using kinetic means. China joined the club in 2007, destroying an old weather satellite with a ballistic missile.⁴² Tests by both India and China have been met with international consternation about space debris and the beginning of a space war.⁴³ Much of the concern was the possible effect of the debris affecting satellites already in space and the probability of leading to the orbit becoming unusable due to a spiralling number of collisions in space in what is known as the Kessler syndrome.⁴⁴

An adversary has very limited control over a kinetic attack on a satellite to ensure it is limited to one particular country or conglomerate.⁴⁵ With thousands of satellites in space, the use of a ballistic missile to target a satellite could quickly end up damaging one's or an ally’s satellite and is, therefore, not an attractive proposition. Understandably, non-kinetic means of disabling satellites, from infecting satellites with viruses to using laser dazzlers against EO/IR satellites, have been developed. Interestingly, many space debris removal technologies are dual-use and can also be conveniently used to remove functioning and operational satellites. Apart from its focus on developing ground-based ASAT, China has been an early mover in this dual-use technology. The Chinese satellite Shijian-21, equipped with a robotic arm, removed a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite in January 2022.⁴⁶ On 14 Feb 2022, even as the first attacks took place in the invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched a concurrent cyberattack on ViaSat’s KA-SAT GEO satellite network, which was used by the Ukrainian army.⁴⁷ Whilst not targeting the satellite in orbit, the cyber-attack focussed on the terrestrial network. It widely disrupted internet across multiple European operators apart from the Ukrainian security forces.⁴⁸

Limitations of Satellites in ISR role

Despite recent advances, even as capabilities improve significantly, space-based ISR continues to suffer from certain limitations. EO/ IR satellites continue to be highly susceptible to weather conditions for their performance. While ISAR and SAR satellites are independent of weather, they are severely limited by the onboard power since they must operate what is ultimately a radar in space. Increasing the size of the solar panels increases the atmospheric drag, diminishing the satellite's life. The Soviet nuclear-powered ocean reconnaissance satellite RORSAT overcame this limitation by dispensing with solar panels.⁴⁹ Interestingly, the Soviets launched these satellites to track US carrier forces at sea.⁵⁰

Satellites in space can be easily tracked, allowing an adversary to calculate the time between revisits and assess the most vulnerable period for a fleet in a particular area. Of course, this would not be applicable in the case of a large constellation of satellites that theoretically have no gaps in surveillance, like the Proliferated Warfare Space Architecture of the United States. However, where the number of satellites is limited, countries can reasonably avoid surveillance by simple techniques such as entering and leaving the harbour at night and operating in dispersed formations. Vulnerability of satellites to debris, and difficulties in maintenance post-launch continue to be significant limitations, albeit technological solutions are already available to address these issues.

Conclusion

The democratisation of space and lowering of the launch cost of satellites has resulted in a proliferation of satellites, particularly in the Low Earth Orbit. Based on open-source data, it is impossible to accurately predict whether satellites can now be used for detecting, tracking, and targeting. However, there are enough and more indications that the technology is now available and is being actively pursued, at least by the US and China. The planned use by the US of a space missile warning system including fire control and tracking, indicates the potential of space based ISR for tactical applications and effectiveness.⁵¹ These developments have an important bearing on force structure and tactics. Considering the long lead time in the development of naval technology, be it sensors or weapons, the impact of space based ISR deserves critical research.

Several assumptions on the ability of a fleet to operate undetected would presumably need to be questioned, and newer tactics would have to be developed. Could satellite-based ISR completely or very considerably replace aircraft for at least scouting? The increasing threat to maritime patrol aircraft from extended SAM ranges lends credence to the assumption. SM-6 SAM boasts a range of 150nm.⁵² which would deter a MPA from closing a formation close enough to classify using its integral sensors accurately. However, aircraft have been around for several decades, and with mature technology and well-developed tactics, it might be premature to write an epitaph on the role of aircraft as scouts. Aircraft continue to offer unparalleled flexibility to the operational commander to change the tasking mid-mission depending on the operational scenario. The rigidity and predictability of the orbit of LEO satellites would probably need to be hedged with airborne sensors, which would offer persistent, localised coverage.⁵³ In all likelihood, aircraft (manned and unmanned) would augment a country’s space- based ISR capability providing redundancy and reducing dependency.

Every naval technology, be it the aircraft carrier or the homing torpedo, has been met with scepticism when initially introduced. But, notwithstanding the scepticism, these technologies changed the way the battle was fought at sea. The United States planned for World War II, assuming the dreadnought would play a central role in its tactical engagements.⁵⁴ However, carrier aviation decisively changed the war plans as they took centre stage in the Pacific against the Japanese. This was despite the creative use of cruisers in conjunction with aircraft carriers.⁵⁵ It is a well-known aphorism that technology forces change in tactics and that new technology cannot be fully exploited unless it's accompanied by the development of new tactics that enable users to take the best advantage of it.⁵⁶ Similarly, space based ISR promises to force navies to reassess and adapt. It is important to note that even if space based ISR has matured to provide real-time tracking and targeting data, there is no cause for defeatism. Dependence on space based ISR by China will offer an adversary a useful asymmetry to exploit, albeit by non-kinetic means, as discussed previously. In the short term, emphasis on a dispersed aggregation of salvos on target and massing of land and sea-based fires seem to be promising avenues of development. Utilising commercial domain space based ISR as envisaged in the IPMDA could augment the capabilities of countries in the medium term. In the long term, a careful reassessment of force structure and operational doctrines is imperative to address the challenges posed by space-based ISR.

Endnotes

1. Paul Woods, "GFW and Open Source Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)," Jack D Gordon Institute for Public Policy’s (JGI) Security Research Hub (SRH) https://srh.fiu.edu/home/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/GFW-and-Open-Source-Maritime-Domain-Awareness-MDA-Paul-Woods.pdf, accessed 02 May 2024.

2. Caitlin Lee and Paul Lushenko, "Getting 'Left-Of-Launch' in the Counter-Drone Fight," War on the Rocks, January 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/getting-left-of-launch-in-the-counter-drone-fight/, accessed 19 May 2024.

3. Arda Ayan and Brian Ladd, "The Impact of Commercial Space in Times of Conflict," https://www.japcc.org/articles/the-impact-of-commercial-space-in-times-of-conflict/, accessed 19 May 2024.

4. "Corona: America’s First Imaging Satellite Program," Central Intelligence Agency Museum, https://www.cia.gov/legacy/museum/exhibit/corona-americas-first-imaging-satellite-program/, accessed 07 May 2024.

5. “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, updated on 01 May 23, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database#.W7WcwpMza9Y, accessed 07 May 2024.

6. Gregory B. Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean—Fixing Southeast Asia's Remote-Sensing Blind Spots,” Naval War College Review 74, no. 1 (2021): Article 8, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/8, accessed 07 May 2024.

7. Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean.”

8. “A real-time satellite-based surveillance of ships has gone live”, Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC), 20 Jul 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/19/leonardos-satellite-based-surveillance-of-ships-has-gone-live.html, accessed on 06 May 2024.

9. Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean.”

10. "ICEYE Satellites," ICEYE, https://www.iceye.com/satellites, accessed o6 May 2024.

11. " Using Bright Lights to Reveal the ‘ Dark’ Fleet," Global Fishing Watch, https://globalfishingwatch.org/research/viirs/, accessed 07 May 2024.

12. "VIIRS Boat Detection," Colorado School of Mines, https://mines.edu, accessed 07 May 2024.

13. Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean.”

14. "Tipping and Cueing," Windward, https://windward.ai/glossary/what-is-tipping-and-cueing/, accessed 06 May 2024.

15. "Global Fishing Watch: Protecting Global Fisheries, a Case Study," Global Fishing Watch, https://cloud.google.com/customers/global-fishing-watch, accessed 07 May 2024.

16. "Global Fishing Watch: Protecting Global Fisheries, a Case Study."

17. “Real-time satellite-based surveillance of ships,” CNBC.

18. " FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders’ Tokyo Summit 2022 ," The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/, accessed 06 May 2024.

19. Wayne P. Hughes Jr. and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 9.

20. Grant Rebecca, “Low Earth Orbit Is a High-Value Domain,” RealClearDefense, 11 April 2024, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/11/low_earth_orbit_is_a_high-value_domain_1024394.html, accessed 06 May 2024.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments I n v o l v i n g t h e P e o p l e ’ s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , 1 9 O c t o b e r 2 0 2 3 , 9 9 , https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY- DEVELOPMENTS- INVOLVING- THE- PEOPLES- REPUBLIC- OF-CHINA.PDF, accessed 07 May 2024.

22. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 101.

23. Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 100.

24. Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D and DF-26B ASBMs: Is the U.S. Military Ready?,” Andrew S. Erickson (website), https://www.andrewerickson.com/2020/11/chinas-df-21d-and-df-26b-asbms-is-the-u-s-military-ready/, accessed 07 May 2024.

25. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D and DF-26B ASBMs.”

26. Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, Pt. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes,” Center for International Maritime Security, https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/, accessed 07 May 2024.

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