Introduction

Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban on 15 August 2021, thereby bringing to close the fast-track advancement of the group to establish its dominance and control over most of Afghanistan’s territory. The day also marked the end of the speculation of whether either a civil war or a fierce resistance by the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) would delay the inevitable. The takeover was without bloodshed and resistance as President Ghani fled the country resulting in political collapse. On 30 August, the last US soldier left the Afghan soil, bringing an end to the two-decades long war in the country.1 As celebratory gunfire erupted in Kabul, the international community was being forced to internalise this new reality of Afghanistan passing under an Islamic Emirate established by the Taliban once again.2 India too is slowly waking up to the grim reality of not just the lost leverage, which it swayed over the civilian governments in Kabul for last two decades, but also the dangers of complete reversal of the strategic and goodwill gains it had made in that period. Worse still, the security vacuum left behind by the USA is being sought to be filled up by countries like China and Pakistan, for whom India’s absence could be a tactical victory.

What are India’s options in the new Afghanistan? Is the unveiling scenario a stark binary of India either shunning Afghanistan as an area of secondary importance or recognising the Taliban in an attempt to build afresh? Could India have done any better to avoid the current predicament? What are the chances of New Delhi regaining its strategic leverage? This paper provides a critical analysis of the India’s Afghan policy and attempts to lay bare the options that are available to the country in the near to medium term.

Limits of Soft Power

Soft power policy works well with relative political stability. It is a useful tool to consolidate peace and expand the pool of stakeholders in peace and stability. However, it cannot guarantee the continuity of peace. Violence can reverse the gains, made through painstakingly implemented projects, almost instantly. India’s policy in Afghanistan suffered precisely from this major lacuna. India refrained from military involvement in the war-torn country. Working under the security umbrella provided by the USA and the NATO forces, New Delhi’s $3 billion worth aid (pledged and actuals), over the years, resulted in the implementation of several development and infrastructure projects.3

The Afghan parliament building, the Salma Dam, the Zaranj Delaram highway are some of the large scale and high value projects. In addition, there were many more projects-high value as well as small development projects-which directly aided the health, education and agricultural sectors.4 To a large extent, these projects expanded the reach of the central government in Kabul. This fulfilled a critical necessity during a time when insurgents were building a narrative of how a ‘puppet government in Kabul’ is incapable of serving the Afghans well. India worked through the Afghan government, thereby providing an alternate development model.5 This was in contrast to the model pursued by the Western donors whose engagement in Afghanistan was primarily through subsidiaries and sub-contracting. The actual effectiveness of their projects remained poor, with much of the money returning to the donor countries through the ‘Phantom Aid’ phenomenon. Although India’s project implementation may too have suffered from the lack of detailed impact assessments, this method of aid delivery did receive appreciation from the Afghans.

India’s exercise of soft power, however, looked impressive as long as it lasted.6 There was no durability built into it. Once the USA decided to draw down its forces, the very foundation of the projects, based on conditions of minimum security, was shaken. The beneficiaries of these projects were no match for gun-toting insurgents who are not shy of inflicting actual violence.

In this backdrop could India have done better, is a relevant question to probe. India probably could have worked more on strengthening the institutions in the country. It could have used its leverage to address the issues of governance, credibility and lack of transparency, which affected the government in Kabul. Blind and uncritical association with the Hamid Karzai and the Ashraf Ghani governments made India appear like a collaborator with the ills that affected the state of governance. By putting all its cards on the regime, New Delhi seemed to have lost out on maintaining ties with the political and non-political elements that were not part of the government. This includes the Northern Alliance, with which India once shared a close bond. India’s policy also lacked efforts at establishing unity among the deeply divided political elites in Afghanistan. This worked in favour of the Taliban, as political opportunism by various actors undermined the Ashraf Ghani-led regime.

And lastly, New Delhi’s reluctance to contribute to building a strong Afghanistan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) may have deprived the latter of the critical exposure to fighting insurgency, even though India did train some Afghan army and police personnel. However, given its long experience of fighting insurgencies, New Delhi missed out on an opportunity to make a valuable contribution to the ANDSF’s capacities. The Afghan wish list of military hardware submitted to New Delhi on umpteen occasions was never fulfilled beyond on and off delivery of supplies.7 Even the Mi-24 and Cheetah light utility helicopters gifted by India to Afghanistan were either unserviceable or not meant for fighting the insurgents.

The counter-argument to the facts elaborated above are mostly rooted in the steps India initiated to build the Afghan state economically as well as to enhance its diplomatic profile. India was the first country with which Afghanistan signed an Agreement of Strategic Partnership in 2011.8 New Delhi was instrumental in including Afghanistan as a full member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007.9 In 2012, New Delhi organised an investment summit to attract foreign investment in Afghanistan particularly in mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, telecommunications, agriculture, education, health services sectors.10 Even with Pakistan’s hostility, which kept Indo-Afghan trade a one-way affair, bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan grew using dedicated air corridors and the long circuitous route of Chabahar port in Iran. Afghanistan was allocated a significant portion of India’s limited development assistance fund. India’s Afghan policy remained more or less uniformly titled towards continued engagement, even with regime changes in New Delhi.

End of the Road for India?

The power shift in Afghanistan was dramatic and high-paced. Even as provinces and major cities continued to fall into the hands of the Taliban, none inside or outside of Afghanistan could anticipate the ease with which the Taliban could march into Kabul on 15 August 2021. Only three days earlier, on 12 August 2021, negotiations at Doha between Afghan representatives and 12 countries including India, had demanded that the Taliban put an ‘immediate end to attacks against cities.’ It urged ‘a political settlement,’ warned that ‘a government imposed by force will be a pariah state.’11 Under unknown circumstances, President Ashraf Ghani flew out of Kabul. His decision, he later explained, was primarily intended at avoiding bloodshed and the possibility of his execution by the insurgents. Vice President Amrullah Saleh retreated to Panjshir to declare himself as the Caretaker President and start a localised resistance movement against the insurgents. This unsustainable resistance too collapsed in a matter of days. The resistance fighters reportedly retreated to caves and mountains as Taliban cadres choked the valley by cutting off supply lines.

As Taliban leaders, including many of the designated terrorists, started converging on Kabul to deliberate on the future form of government, the attention of most countries shifted to evacuating their diplomatic staff and nationals out of Afghanistan. India, which had shut its consulates earlier, flew two military aircraft to Kabul to evacuate all Indian embassy staff and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel on 16 and 17 August 2021.12 The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) tweeted, “In view of the prevailing circumstances, it has been decided that our Ambassador in Kabul and his Indian staff will move to India immediately,” without clarifying whether the India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan had ended.

While New Delhi - by not closing its embassy officially - has kept its options open for a future diplomatic return to Kabul, it is clear that the unveiling of the Islamic Emirate and announcement of an exclusive Taliban caretaker cabinet on 07 September 2021, may impact India in several ways. It will have little or no leverage over the government in Kabul, which ironically will govern from the Parliament building built by India. The power shift in Kabul will disrupt the pattern of India’s engagement with Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the significant benefits accrued to the Afghans from these projects, the new regime will renegotiate the terms of India’s future presence in that country. India will also have to renegotiate the existing trade agreement with Afghanistan. The power shift in Kabul will also put a halt to New Delhi’s unstated objective of using Afghanistan as a land bridge to connect with the Central Asian Republics impacting on its Connect Central Asia policy.

In addition, there could be two other strategic and security implications for India, in the short and medium term. First, the onset of a Taliban-led regime will invariably enhance Pakistani influence over Kabul. China, which has aligned its Afghan policy with Islamabad, too will aim to take advantage of the situation. Not surprisingly, even amidst a frenzy of many nations to evacuate their diplomatic staff out of Kabul, both these countries chose to maintain their respective embassies. 13 Islamabad has been pursuing a policy of regaining its strategic depth vis-à-vis India and undermining India in Afghanistan for the past two decades. For China too, enhanced profile in yet another South Asian nation will provide it with a distinct advantage compared to New Delhi and Washington.

Secondly, the Taliban victory over the USA potentially turns Afghanistan into a launch pad for terrorist activities in India in general and Kashmir in particular, by Pakistan-sponsored groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Both these groups share close proximity with the Taliban and are known to have training camps and other facilities in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the Taliban capture of power, a large number of Islamic State, LeT and JeM cadres have reportedly entered Kabul carrying Taliban flags.14 The February 2020 Peace Agreement between the USA and the Taliban, obligates the latter against permitting the use of Afghan soil by groups like al Qaeda for terror acts against the US and its allies. However, the Agreement does not extract any such promise in the context of regional countries like India. In addition to a projected increase in infiltration attempts by terrorists into Kashmir, the Taliban’s claim of victory has the potential of inspiring local cadres of several terror groups to recommit themselves to acts of violence. Media reports have already indicated a possible ripple effect of significant increase in terrorist violence and infiltration attempts in Kashmir.15

Blueprint for Engagement

On the face of it, the developments in Kabul could indicate an end of the road for India and two decades of engagement with the country has come to an abrupt stop. Any prospect of future engagement will have to be according to a new script. Not surprisingly, the suggestions made by the policy experts range from shunning Afghanistan as a distant reality and concentrating on the security challenges the Taliban might pose, to embracing the new reality in Afghanistan by recognising the Taliban regime and opting to do business with it. Both these extremes however, are fraught with loopholes. India neither can afford to have a hostile Afghanistan as a neighbour, nor can it choose to abandon the countless Afghans who considered India a friend in need. Thousands of Afghans - students, traders, ordinary Afghans on medical visa - are currently in India. They would need to return to a country where their safety and dignity is guaranteed.

Although the present situation looks ominous and future uncertain, there may still be light at the end of the tunnel. Regaining past leverages may be a difficult task for the moment, but with astute diplomacy, New Delhi can hope to turn the table on its adversaries. A new foreign and security policy blueprint needs to be scripted taking a few factors into account with some options elucidated below:

An Inclusive Government, India’s Best Hope. The formation of a Taliban only caretaker government is a setback to the hopes by the international community and even by India that an inclusive government would be in charge. The Taliban initially too had promised to form an inclusive government. It is reportedly was holding wide-raging consultations with a large number of groups and members of the Afghan political elite including former President Hamid Karzai, Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hetkmatyar, and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Dr. Abdullah. These leaders, known for their antipathy towards the Ashraf Ghani government, were evidently seeking political roles in the new government.16 Those speculations have been put to rest. The group has not announced a tenure for the caretaker government.

Since the capture of power in Kabul, the Taliban statements on women rights have also undergone significant change. In the initial days, the Taliban spokespersons underlined the group’s accommodative posture and indicated that there will be no restrictions on women either pursuing their education or professions. However, subsequently, the same spokespersons and new ministers have spoken of a restrictive regime outlining the women’s primary role to bear children. While educational institutions will have segregation for male and female students, the group has no plans for including women in the workforce.

Evidently, internal contradictions within the group-a tussle between the political and military factions-is playing a critical role. The Taliban is not a monolithic organisation and is riddled with factions. In the days after the capture of Kabul, Mullah Baradar, the leader of its political team in Doha, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai interacted with the media to outline the agenda of the organisation. However, the Haqqani Network (HN) a key constituent tied firmly to the Pakistan military, prevailed over the so-called moderate factions. It is widely believed that the Taliban decision to continue violence even as it engaged the Afghan groups in negotiations was directed at keeping the faction ridden group together. The group might find it challenging to deliver on its promises as it transforms itself from an insurgency to a governing entity. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the HN leader and the new Interior Minister, clearly seeks to establish an orthodox regime completely dominated by the Taliban. Similarly, the Kandahar-based Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban chief Mullah Omar, who was appointed as the Defence Minister could be having separate ideas about how to run affairs of the country. The new government was formed with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) playing the role of a broker and represents, at best, a coalition of compromises.17 Such governments, by their essential character, are fragile.

These contradictions provide an opportunity to push for the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan. Such a government will not only have an inbuilt check and balance mechanism to address the issues about women and minority rights in the country, but can also steer the future government’s policy towards India.

Strength of Economic and Development Engagement. India’s economic profile in Afghanistan in the last two decades and its rising global profile are bound to be an attraction for the Taliban seeking to rebuild the country. Since the capture of power on 15 August 2021, Taliban leadership has consistently tried to project the group as a responsible inheritor of power. It has declared amnesty for all those who were associated with the previous regime and foreign missions; asked government employees to return to their workplace; and assured others that it will not pursue a policy of revenge against anyone. Although reports of Taliban cadres indulging in killing and looting, and conducting a door to door search for Afghans who worked in the erstwhile Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) have surfaced, the insurgent group is also making serious attempts to gain international legitimacy and recognition.18 It has assured the continuation of Indo-Afghan trade, both through the Chabahar port, as well as the land route through Pakistan.19

Although implementation of much of these announcements would depend upon the complex regional powerplay and Pakistani attitude, it is evident that Taliban is indeed seeking to portray a reformed image. As it seeks to formalise its administrative structure, India’s past engagement in the development sectors would certainly come in handy. In the past, India’s private companies displayed reservations about investing in the country citing prevailing insecurity. In the long-term horizon, if the Taliban manage to bring about peace and stability in the country, such concerns could be put to rest. Chinese investors may provide stiff competition to such ventures. But India’s past experience in the development sector, familiarity of Afghanistan and cultural proximity with the country would be added advantages. It may also be possible for India to attach conditionalities such as respect for human rights and zero tolerance to terrorism to future development assistance programmes in Afghanistan.

Taliban Overtures. On several occasions, prior to the capture of power and in the days following it, Taliban leadership have made statements concerning India’s future role in Afghanistan. While on one occasion the statement resembled a warning asking India to play an unbiased role, on others, there are unmistakable overtures seeking India’s engagement. On 31 August 2021, a Taliban delegation headed by Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai sought a meeting with India’s Ambassador to Qatar. In the meeting, which was held in the Indian embassy, discussions ‘focused on safety, security and early return of Indian nationals stranded in Afghanistan.’ ‘The travel of Afghan nationals, especially minorities who wish to visit India, also came up,’ the Ministry of External Affairs tweeted.’20

Taliban leadership has assured that it will not promote terrorism in Kashmir, which is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan.21 It has also categorically underlined India’s importance for the region. “India is very important for the region and we want trade and economic relations with it. We expect the relationship will continue like before,” said Stanekzai in a video message on 29 August 2021.22 There are two factors at play here. The Taliban is indeed expressing its willingness to address India’s concerns and also expecting New Delhi to give up its inhibition of doing business with it. India’s attitude towards the Taliban may influence the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s position on de-notifying the HN as a designated terrorist organisation.

The Taliban and HN have been an anathema for India. In the mid-1990s, the Taliban regime had played a dubious role in the IC-814 hijacking episode. Its regressive policies against women and minorities, and more importantly, its close ties with the Pakistani military establishment, are of concern to India. However, in realpolitik, the past, howsoever dark it may have been, should not become a baggage. When regional players are reaching out to the insurgent group with a bid to retain their influence in Afghanistan, New Delhi can ill afford to pursue a policy similar to the 1990s. In spite of its close ties with the civilian regimes in Afghanistan, promotion of democracy has never been a stated objective of India. It has established full-fledged relations with nations ruled by military juntas and theocratic states in the past. The Taliban must promise to control anti-India activities and prevent its soil from being used for terrorism. It must pursue an inclusive policy and protect the rights of women and minority groups. As long as these two conditions are fulfilled, New Delhi should not shy away from dealing with the new regime in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani High Wall. For the past two decades, Pakistan served as a critical factor behind the survival of the Taliban-led insurgency. Sanctuaries, in its ungoverned territories and the safe houses provided in the country’s urban centres, protected much of the Taliban leadership and enabled them to unleash a bloody long war, which finally culminated in the US withdrawal. The insurgent leadership certainly owes their Pakistani mentors a lot of ‘gratitude.’ On the other hand, the Taliban victory ensures the fruition of Islamabad’s objective of regaining strategic depth in Afghanistan and quite naturally, the policies of the future government in Kabul would be pro-Pakistan.

However, in the medium to long term, as the insurgents sit down to run the affairs of their own country from the safety of their own familiar territory, they might find Pakistan a liability. An impoverished country with its own serious economic issues, Pakistan can offer very little to Afghanistan in terms of either trade or development projects.23 The only project of consequence, which the Taliban would be interested in, is the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, thereby transforming the project’s nomenclature to China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Economic Corridor (CPAEC). Given the CPEC’s rather poor run in Pakistan and its potential of dragging Pakistan into a debt trap, the CPAEC’s long-term impact on Afghanistan’s economy too may not be significant.24 While it may be an exaggeration to expect Taliban to severe its ties with Islamabad, it will also be impractical for the Taliban to factor in Pakistan’s anti-India agenda into its policy in the medium to long-run. A China-Pakistan nexus alone cannot fulfill the post-conflict Afghanistan’s myriad needs.

Conclusion

In spite of what appears to be a long dark tunnel for India, almost resembling a strategic black hole, the political shift in Afghanistan does not foreclose all of India’s options in that country. On the contrary, it opens up new opportunities to regain influence, although the quality of leverage India might be able to sway in the new Afghanistan would be qualitatively different from yesteryears. However, for this to happen, a measured policy overhaul would be necessary. This would have to be based on a realistic assessment of India’s strength, its strategic objectives and to what extent a Taliban led regime would be able to fulfil those. While India must not jump the gun to embrace the Taliban, a perennial ‘wait and watch’ policy too may not protect the nation’s interest.

India will have to draw red lines regarding the activities of anti-India terror groups and also, the rights of women and minority groups and make their inviolability a condition for its engagement with the Taliban. New Delhi must also recognise that international diplomacy still has relevance in the new Afghanistan. A victorious, yet fractured, legitimacy-seeking Taliban can be made to accept internationally recognised norms particularly when the group has captured power without local acceptance. Any international recognition and aid must be made on conditions of adherence to the red lines. Afghanistan is indeed a test case for India’s rising power status and the country must not falter to abandon the Afghans for whom India has been a reliable friend.

Endnotes

  1. Shivani Kumar, “US Troops Exit: This Army General is the Last American Soldier to Leave Afghanistan,” Hindustan Times, 31 August 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-troops-exit-this-army-general-is-the-last-american-soldier-to-leave-afghanistan-101630378833920.html, accessed 31 August 2021.

  2. Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Gunfire Fills the Air in Kabul as Taliban Celebrate Airport Takeover,” The Guardian, 31 August 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/31/gunfire-fills-the-air-in-kabul-as-taliban-celebrate-airport-takeover, accessed 31 August 2021.

  3. “India Says it Brought Development Projects to Afghanistan, World Knows What Pakistan Brought,” ANI, 24 June 2021. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-says-it-brought-development-projects-to-afghanistan-world-knows-what-pakistan-brought20210624190442/, accessed 28 August 2021.

  4. Nirupama Subramanian, “Explained: What are India’s Investments in Afghanistan?,” Indian Express, 16 July 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-indias-afghan-investment-7406795/, accessed 28 August 2021.

  5. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “India’s Role in the Economic Stabilisation of Afghanistan,” Policy paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kabul/12959.pdf, accessed 27 August 2021.

  6. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “The Limits of India’s Soft Power in Afghanistan,” Fair Observer, 18 March 2019. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-india-south-asia-security-news-00081/, accessed 28 August 2021.

  1. Suhasini Haidar and Dinakar Peri, “Afghan Army Chief Coming to India with Revised Wish List,” The Hindu, 25 July 2016. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Afghan-Army-chief-coming-to-India-with-revised-wish-list/article14507929.ece, accessed 28 August 2021.

  2. “Afghanistan and India Sign Strategic Partnership,” BBC, 4 October 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15161776, accessed 29 August 2021.

  3. “Afghanistan Inducted as 8th Member: 14th SAARC Summit Begins,” Dawn, 04 April 2007. https://www.dawn.com/news/240651/afghanistan-inducted-as-8th-member-14th-saarc-summit-begins, accessed 27 August 2021.

  4. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan,” 25 June 2012. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/19887/Delhi+ Investment+Summit+on+Afghanistan, accessed 29 August 2021.

  5. Zalmay Khalilzad, “US Special Representative,” Twitter, 13 August 2021. https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1426047143102631941, accessed 30 August 2021.

  6. Suhasini Haidar, “140 Indians Fly Home as Govt. Closes Embassy in Kabul for Now,” The Hindu, 17 August 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indians-fly-home-as-government-closes-embassy-in-kabul-for-now/article35950418.ece, accessed 30 August 2021.

  7. “Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan Operating Normally Taliban Promises Safety of Embassy: Ambassador,” Global Times, 17 August 2021. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/ 1231771.shtml, accessed 31 August 2021.

  8. Kallol Bhattacherjee, “Islamic State, JeM, LeT Fighters have Entered Afghan Capital: Sources,” The Hindu, 17 August 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/islamic-state-jem-let-fighters-have-entered-afghanistan-sources/article35951834.ece. accessed 28 August 2021.

  9. Neeta Sharma, “Amid Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan, A Worrying Trend In J&K,” NDTV, 30 August 2021. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/in-jammu-and-kashmir-terror-attacks-rise-as-us-pulls-out-of-afghanistan-2523827, accessed 31 August 2021.

  10. Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Former Afghanistan President Karzai Talks with Taliban About Power Transfer,” The Guardian, 18 August 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/ 18/afghan-ex-president-steps-in-for-talks-with-taliban-over-peaceful-transfer-of-power, accessed 31 August 2021.

  11. “Taliban to Announce Framework for 'Inclusive Islamic Government' Soon,” Voice of America, 22 August 2021. https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/taliban-announce-framework-inclusive-islamic-government-soon, accessed 31 August 2021.

  12. Sharangee Dutta, “Taliban were ‘Catching and Killing Us’: Afghan Intel Officer Who Fled to Delhi on Last Flight From Kabul,” Hindustan Times, 17 August 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/afghan-intel-officer-fled-to-delhi-on-last-flight-from-kabul-to-escape-taliban-101629139600183.html, accessed 30 August 2021.

  13. “We Want to Maintain Afghanistan's Trade, Political Ties With India: Taliban Leader,” India Today, 30 August 2021. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/taliban-maintain-afghanistan-trade-political-ties-india-stanekzai-1846887-2021-08-30, accessed 30 August 2021.

  14. Shubhajit Roy, “India officially talks to Taliban, discusses safe evacuation, terrorism,” Indian Express, 31 August 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-officially-talks-to-taliban-discusses-safe-evacuation-terrorism-7480632/, accessed 31 August 2021.

  15. Avik Roy, “Internal, Bilateral: Taliban 'Clarify' Position on Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, 17 August 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/taliban-kashmir-pakistan-terror-groups-insurgency-afghanistan-security-situation-101629204421516.html, accessed 30 August 2021.

  16. Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India Silent on Taliban Leader Sher Mohammed Stanekzai's Overture,” The Hindu, 30 August 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-silent-on-taliban-leader-sher-mohammed-stanekzais-overture/article36169097.ece, accessed 31 August 2021.

  1. “Pakistan Suffers Setback as Trade with Afghanistan Declines,” ANI, 11 May 2021. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/pakistan-suffers-setback-as-trade-with-afghanistan-declines20210511071404/, accessed 30 August 2021.

  2. Nayanima Basu, “Pakistan Struggles Under the Weight of CPEC but Puts on Brave Face Against US Criticism,” The Print, 26 November 2019. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/pakistan-struggles-under-the-weight-of-cpec-but-puts-on-brave-face-against-us-criticism/326143/, accessed 30 August 2021.