The Politics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Introduction

The ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC), an unprecedented package of economic cooperation with its ‘Iron brother’ China, promised an economic boom for Pakistan. The CPEC framework agreement was signed on 05 July 2013 and formally launched with great fanfare during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit on 20 April 2015. It proposed a massive investment of US $46 billion. The project seemed to hit the ground running and by end-2015 upgradation of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), one of the ‘early harvest’ projects was already complete. In November 2016, arrival of a Chinese convoy from Xinjiang was touted as the start of Gwadar Port operations.¹ In the first few years, reflective of the excitement and optimism of CPEC’s initial promise, the size of planned investments kept increasing. By May 2017, the quantum of proposed investments had reached US $62 billion. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), for building a cascade of five dams on the Indus River, boosted the intended value of investments to US $112 billion. There was palpable excitement in Pakistan that CPEC would prove to be the much-awaited ‘game-changer’ and even China anointed CPEC as the ‘flagship project’ of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, after a phase of rapid growth and implementation, which saw the completion of nine projects (largely energy and one for digital connectivity), CPEC saw a perceptible slowdown in project implementation starting 2017-18. This reduced activity was attributed to the infusion of some much-needed realism on CPEC’s projects, differing perceptions of the Imran Khan government in Pakistan on its orientation, a profoundly changed geopolitical environment and an unseemly tussle between civilians and the Army for ownership of CPEC. CPEC is yet to recover from this reduced activity. The sharp deterioration in the security landscape of Pakistan due to resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistan and Baloch and Sindhi insurgent groups may also have contributed to China’s unease in initiating or executing certain projects. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic added to the problems of project execution.

Even nearly eight years after its launch, CPEC continues to be a major bilateral initiative between China and Pakistan though, there is little doubt that the initial enthusiasm has waned considerably and the promise of an anticipated economic revolution has been belied. Notwithstanding, CPEC continues to be largely driven by mutual animosity of the two countries towards India.²

CPEC is a strategically important project for both China and Pakistan in their quest for regional and global relevance as well as addressing their core economic and security concerns. The scale of investment is unprecedented. While Pakistan casts CPEC as a ‘game changer’ to resolve its perpetual energy crises, boost its economy, and improve transport and connectivity infrastructure; China aims to use Pakistan to fulfil its ‘Chinese dream’ of creating a Eurasian network centred on it. China also aims at providing stability to the troubled Xinjiang province by managing the problem of Islamic terrorism through stronger economic growth and development. Finally, the Gwadar Port project will be an important constituent of its naval ambitions centred on being a major player in the Indian Ocean. These developments in our neighbourhood are, therefore, a clear cause for concern and need a thorough understanding of its political, economic and strategic logic to strategise our responses. This article will, therefore, endeavour to examine the original motivations of China and Pakistan, the domestic and international political landscape in which CPEC developed and identify the developing fault lines.

What is the BRI?

Much has been written on the origins of the BRI; earlier known as the ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR).’ Broadly, as per China’s official Visions and Actions document, released in March 2015, the BRI consists of two main routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) consisting of six land corridors and two maritime routes.³ The six land corridors include the New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor; China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor; China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor; China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. It is interesting that initially CPEC and BCIM were not an integral part of the BRI but as per official documents, only ‘closely related’ requiring ‘closer cooperation.’⁴ The two maritime routes connect China’s east coast with Europe and South Pacific respectively.⁵ Importantly, among all the corridors, CPEC is the only one connecting China with a single country.⁶

Original Impulse for BRI. While China’s official statements and documents positioned the BRI as a purely economic project for enhanced connectivity and global engagement, western critics gradually came to see it as a manifestation of Beijing’s global ambitions and desire to alter the security status quo in strategically important regions like the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.⁷ One exhaustive study by Malik, et al from the AidData Project of the College of William and Mary, Virginia has traced 13,427 projects from 2000 to 2017. The China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Washington also maintains a comprehensive database on all of China’s global investments since 2005 and estimates it to be about US $2.2 trillion. Based on these reports, it is clear that the original impulse for the growth of the Chinese overseas development programme was China’s ‘Going Out’ or ‘Go West’ or ‘Western Development’ Strategy of 1999, initiated by then President Jiang Zemin.

This strategy aimed to overcome the challenges of domestic overproduction, the need to profitably invest burgeoning foreign exchange reserves and the search for natural resources deficient in China. Weak returns from US Treasury bonds after the 2008 financial crisis were another inflexion point when China ramped up its overseas development program in search of better returns. After the financial crisis, China’s overseas development program tripled in one year from US $28 billion to US $98 billion in 2009. Since then it has been on a steady rise, with the announcement of the BRI making no particular difference to its trajectory (Fig 1).⁸ Jeremy Garlick, a China expert, at the Jan Masaryk Institute of International Studies (IIS), Prague, after examining a wide range of official publications, media reports and scholarly texts, came to a similar conclusion that ‘the Belt and Road is a continuation of previous official Chinese government policies and is merely a ‘repackaging’ of the previous strategy.⁹ Interestingly, Jonathan Hill at the CSIS, Washington, through an analysis of 173 Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, across 45 countries along the SREB, found no correlation between the participation of a country in BRI and Chinese project activity, except in CPEC.¹⁰

Fig 1: Official Finance Commitments of China, 2000-2017

 Source: Ammar A Malik, et al, “Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects” Policy Report, AidData at William & Mary College

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Origin. CPEC was first proposed in May 2013, during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Pakistan, a few months before unveiling of the SREB. As per the Sino-Pakistan joint statement at that time “the two sides agreed to make efforts to combine China’s western development strategy with Pakistan’s domestic economic development process more closely” and “jointly study and formulate the long-term plan of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.”¹¹ After several consultations under a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), both sides agreed to develop a ‘Long-Term Plan for CPEC.’¹² The project was eventually launched on 20 April 2015 during President Xi’s visit to Pakistan, after an earlier visit in November 2014 got cancelled due to demonstrations by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). CPEC’s profile continued to grow with time and by the time the first Belt and Road Forum (BRF) was held in May 2017, CPEC’s profile had been raised to that of a ‘flagship’ project.¹³ By November 2017, the ‘Long Term Plan for CPEC’ cited it as the ‘pilot’ project of BRI with plans of using its experience in other countries.¹⁴ The plan was built around a 1+4 framework with CPEC at the core and Gwadar, energy, transportation and industrial cooperation being its four pillars.¹⁵

Goals and Motivations. Among the six land corridors of BRI, CPEC has challenged analysts the most not only because of its size and scope, its central character but also because a robust China-Pakistan partnership, especially in the military and nuclear domains, already existed. Accordingly, most analysts have attributed additional distinct aims to China’s gigantic economic push into Pakistan. These include: -

• providing Western China access to the Arabian Sea.¹⁶

• development of Western China and “wean the populace from fundamentalism.”¹⁷

• development of the Pakistani economy.¹⁸

• reigning in the recalcitrant East Turkistan Movement.¹⁹

An unstated strategic aim of China was likely to encircle India and keep it tied down in the region using Pakistan as a counterweight.²⁰ Pakistan, on the other hand, was convinced that CPEC was a ‘game changer.’²¹ Pakistan also assumed that the project would transform the country into “a regional hub and pivot for commerce and investment.”²² The motivation was clear; obtain a second line of credit and investment from China at a time when foreign investments in Pakistan had dried up.²³ It was also a means to make the China-Pakistan relationship more broad-based, which up until then had military and security relations at its core.²⁴ Interestingly, analysts have commented on how CPEC was an attempt by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to “tilt the balance a little further in favour of the country’s politicians running the economy.”

Internal Politics

While there was euphoria in the initial days, it also opened up political fault lines. Criticism soon started piling up due to allegations of inflated project costs; political favouritism; unfavourable terms and conditions; and overall opacity in project details. Descriptions of this fault line have been captured well in Arif Rafiq’s CPEC: Barriers and Impact.²⁵ Andrew Small’s excellent analysis in Returning to the Shadows also shares a similar thought process.²⁶ These concerns range from lack of transparency in project selection; fears among smaller provinces of being left out from this ‘national’ project; political ‘mistrust’ between parties; lack of consultation in the selection of the ‘route;’ inclusion of a ‘municipal’ project like the Orange Metro Line at Lahore in this ‘national’ endeavour; and finally the ever troubling issue of Baloch alienation fuelled by fears of resource exploitation and lack of equity. Some politicians even said that the ‘P’ in CPEC stood for Punjab.²⁷ At the same time, others accused it of becoming another ‘East India Company.’²⁸ Andrew Small highlighted other problems, including concerns amongst the Pakistani business community against preferential terms being offered to China, influx of Chinese workers, exploitation of local women by Chinese human-trafficking networks, growing militant attacks and finally economic concerns of Pakistan falling into a Chinese ‘debt-trap.’

This criticism unsettled China and it came out strongly against this negative portrayal.²⁹ Abdur Rehman Shah writing in The Diplomat attributed China’s discomfiture to the clash of two distinct political systems, one where decision-making was centralized (in China) and another where provincial governments had important roles. Since then, China has been actively trying to dispel negative accounts in Pakistan: -

• through seminars.³⁰

• meetings with politicians.³¹

• organizing visits to China and has also formed a ‘Political Parties Forum of Pakistan and China on CPEC’ for building consensus.³²

Yet another fault line emerged between political parties on one hand and Pakistan Army on the other. While Nawaz Sharif was keen that CPEC remained in civilian hands, Pakistan Army, which saw itself as a natural stakeholder and final arbiter of the country’s foreign and security policies, wanted more say.³³ It was also keen that the project remained non-controversial so as not to destabilize its deep military cooperation with China.³⁴ Despite being happy with PML-N’s (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) ‘Punjab Speed,’ China was not averse to deeper military involvement in CPEC.³⁵ In late 2015, the Army even proposed a CPEC board as an apex policy-making and coordination body. However, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif refused. Then in an ‘undisclosed’ meeting, now known as the infamous ‘Dawn Leaks’ case, the government warned the Army of growing international pressure and asked it to change the way it deals with Islamic terrorists. The Pakistani Foreign Secretary brought out that even China had indicated a preference for a change in course by Pakistan.³⁶ This was among other tensions that finally contributed to the ouster of PML-N in an engineered election in 2018.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and CPEC

While much of domestic opposition from multiple quarters was successfully managed and a national consensus towards the project orchestrated, one of the biggest challenges for CPEC arose in the form of Imran Khan and his PTI party. Earlier, during the ‘route’ controversy, Imran Khan’s PTI Chief Minister from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) had warned the Federal government it would not allow CPEC to pass through KP if the Western route were not part of it.³⁷ Viewing CPEC as PML-N’s pet project, PTI came out strongly against CPEC’s lack of transparency and corruption during its election campaign in 2018. After coming to power, controversies continued to fester with the regular raising of demands for renegotiation of CPEC terms and even calls for a pause in investments to handle repayment issues.³⁸ Charges of the Chinese offering bribes to PML-N were also levelled much to the chagrin of China which claimed to be following a zero-tolerance policy oncorruption back home.³⁹ Further, the PTI government’s unilateral suggestion to include Saudi Arabia in the project also troubled the Chinese who viewed CPEC as an exclusively bilateral project.⁴⁰

Pakistan Fault Lines

While many feel CPEC has strengthened the bonds of mutual friendship, the article brings out that it has increased friction between various stakeholders within Pakistan and also between China and Pakistan.

Mistrust Among Political Parties. CPEC has increasingly become political in Pakistan. Though Nawaz Sharif was quick to embrace CPEC, it was first proposed by Asif Ali Zardari (leader of the PPP) which, even China accepts.⁵⁷ The association with PML-N also led Imran Khan to cold shoulder CPEC when he came to power. Unequal project distribution, the disparity in the allocation of funds and allegations of personal benefits drew criticisms from other political parties too. China, which was comfortably navigating its relations with Pakistan from behind the scenes, then had to get its hands dirty in Pakistani politics. The Pakistan Army too has had to expend a lot of energy in keeping parties under control and preventing public criticism of CPEC. Any weakening of Army control on the political discourse on CPEC would crack this fault line leading to further politicisation making China a convenient target for Pakistan’s failings.

Angst Among Local Businessmen. The plethora of concessions and exemptions offered to the Chinese has led to complaints and criticisms among local businessmen who protest against not being provided similar terms. On the other hand, Chinese investors refuse to invest or do business without these sops. Lucrative rates of return, special concessions, exemptions from taxes and waiver of duties on imported items are some of the advantages that Chinese investors get. With the ‘next Phase’ of CPEC-induced ‘industrial cooperation’ set to commence, this fault line is likely to widen.

Friction in Civil-Military Relations. CPEC has become one more reason for increased civil-military tensions. While the Army considers itself as the natural and primary stakeholder in formulating Pakistan’s security and foreign policies, absence of a direct stake in this large external economic program was a cause for concern for the Army, especially since it involved the politically sensitive regions of so-called Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan. The thwarting of efforts by politicians created major friction with the Army, especially with PML-N. On the other hand, even after gaining a direct role, the failures of CPEC are being attributed by the Army to mismanagement by politicians and bureaucrats.⁵⁸ Considering CPEC’s problems are multifaceted, this friction will continue.

Provincial Apathy. Despite being a ‘national’ project, political mistrust, ensures that not all provinces are on board, especially Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and so-called Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. With significant legislative and administrative powers shifting to provinces after the 18th Amendment, this problem has become even more acute. Progress on projects then gets bogged down due to non-prioritisation by provincial governments, pressures from local interest groups and bureaucratic apathy. Without a reformed political system, this fault line will continue to stall CPEC’s progress.

The Chinese Fault Line

Differing Motives for Project Selection. An interesting aspect of CPEC is that most of the projects selected for CPEC were proposed by Pakistan with China focusing only on select ‘strategic’ projects, such as Gwadar; the Optical Fibre Cable; the Main Line-1 railway line; and the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway to maintain connectivity with Pakistan. One of the main motivators for Pakistan was the prospect of earning revenue through tolls and goods transiting using the ‘corridor.’ Pakistan also had expectations of a large number of China-sponsored projects. However, Pakistan ended up spending a lot of its own money on realising the ‘corridor’ and being laden with heavy Chinese loans.⁵⁹ With no easy money coming from China, unlike from Paris Club members, this is a fault line China is navigating carefully. Pakistan’s reluctance to go ahead with the Main Line-1 upgrades on current terms is proof of Pakistan now drawing clear lines. This has become another reason for friction between China and Pakistan.

Debt-trap. This has been one of the biggest concerns of Pakistan and a constant source of criticism from both international and domestic opinion makers. Although many studies bring out that CPEC per se is not the major contributor to Pakistan’s debt; associated implicit guarantees, concessions and exemptions provided to Chinese companies were significant. US information operations through its army of think tanks and analysts on BRI debt distress, keep Pakistan on the back foot about its CPEC commitments. Pressure from the IMF and constant threat of downgrading by credit rating agencies also leads to Pakistani dismay. The worsening of Pakistani economy, all of which is not the result of Chinese involvement adds to criticism of CPEC and the demand from China to constantly defend the ‘corridor’ creating another fault line.

Friction between Pakistan Army and China. The military-to-military ties between China and Pakistan have long been the bedrock of their relationship. However, the political acrimony created due to CPEC did threaten to derail it with China putting pressure on the Army to rein in political parties. Its subsequent role in propping up Imran Khan, a known critic of CPEC, also put strains on the Army’s relationship with China. To assuage China’s disappointment, the Army pushed through creation of the CPEC Authority, a long-time Chinese demand, but corruption charges against its first Chairman, a retired General, muddied waters. Pakistan Army will likely continue to be called upon by China to progress things. This will only make their relationship more complicated.

The US Fault Line

Great Power Rivalry. Pakistan is being buffeted by the emerging US-China great power rivalry. While in the initial stages, USA was ambivalent towards CPEC, after it rolled out its NSS and FOIP strategies, it has come out clearly against the initiative. It has warned Pakistan against pursuing unsustainable projects based on heavy loans. Though China is Pakistan’s biggest trade partner, major defence supplier and strategic ally, the USA remains its largest export destination and a crucial foreign exchange earner. Pakistan has to balance between the two countries, their rivalries and their propaganda machines. With a growing US-China rivalry, Pakistan and CPEC will continue to fall under its crosshairs.

Endnotes

1. “Today Marks Dawn of New Era: CPEC Dreams Come True as Gwadar Port Goes Operational,” Dawn, 13 December 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1296098, accessed 27 August 2021.

2. Andrew Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

3. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” NDRC, Minsitry of Foreign Affairs, China, March 2015 . http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/ publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm, accessed 10 January 2022.

4. Garlick, Op Cit., ch.1, n.5.

5. Ibid.

6. Jonathan Hillman, “China’s Belt and Road is Full of Holes,” CSIS Briefs, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-full-holes#:~: text=The%20Issue,data%20across%20the%20Eurasian%20supercontinent, accessed 22 January 2022.

7. David F. Gordon, Haoyu Tong and Tabatha Anderson, “Beyond the Myths – Towards a Realistic Assessment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: The Development-Finance Dimension,” IISS Report, International Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2020 . https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/beyond-the-myths-of-the-bri, accessed 20 January 2022.

8. Malik, et al, Op Cit., ch.1, n. 18.

9. Garlick, Op Cit., ch.1, n.5. 154.

10. Hillman, Op Cit., n. 6.

11. Joint Statement, “Deepening the Overall Strategic Cooperation Between the Two Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/ gjlb_ 663354/ 2757_ 663518/. See also https:// policy. asiapacificenergy. org/ s i t es/ default/ fi l es/ Joint% 20 Statement% 20of%20China%20and%20Pakistan%20on%20Deepening%20the%20Overall%20Strategic%2 0Cooperation%20between%20the%20Two%20Countries%20%28EN%29.pdf, accessed 22 January 2022.

12. Joint Statement, “Common Vision for Deepening China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 05 July 2013. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2757_663518/2758_663520/201307/t201 30708_519742.html, accessed 20 January 2022.

13. Ananth Krishnan, “China Formalises CPEC as One Belt One Road 'Flagship' While Xi Says will 'Respect Sovereignty,” The Hindu, 14 May 2017. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/belt- and-road-china-silk-road-massive-funding-open-to-all-976956-2017-05-14, accessed 20 January 2022.

14. “CPEC Long- Term Plan Launched,” The News, 18 December 2017. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/ 257655-cpec-long-term-plan-launched, accessed 20 January 2022.

15. “The Long Term for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (2017-2030),” Ministry of Planning and Development, Pakistan. https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/cpec/LTP.pdf, accessed 20 January 2022.

16. Landry, Op Cit., ch.1, n. 23.

17. Banyan, “Massive Chinese Investment is a Boon for Pakistan,” The Economist, 09 September 2017. https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/09/09/massive-chinese-investment-is-a-boon-for-pakistan, accessed 20 January 2022.

18. Small, Op Cit., n.2.

19. “China Media: LiKe qiang’s Visit,” BBC World, 24 May 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22650591, accessed 20 January 2022. While Most of the World Media Reported the Announcement of the Corridor, Chinese News Agencies Emphasized on the Security Cooperation Against the "Three Evil Forces" of Extremism, Terrorism and Separatism.

20. Small, Op Cit., n.2.

21. Shahbaz Rana, “CPEC Not Just Game But Fate Changer: PM,” Express Tribune, 30 August 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1172309/cpec-not-just-game-fate-changer-pm, accessed 14 November 2021.

22. Irfan Haider, “Economic Corridor in Focus as Pakistan, China Sign 51 MoUs,” Dawn, 20 April 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1177109, accessed 15 January 22.

23. Small, Op Cit, n.2.

24. Gordon, et al. Op Cit., n.37.

25. Ibid.

26. Small, Op Cit., n.2.

27. Syed Irfan Raza, “Senators Say CPEC Turned into ‘China-Punjab’ Corridor,” Dawn, 24 November 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1221849, accessed 23 February 2022.

28. Syed Irfan Raza, “CPEC Could Become Another East India Company,” Dawn, 18 October 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1290677, accessed 23 February 2022.

29. Ansar Abbasi, “Propaganda Against CPEC Upsets China,” The News, 07 October 2016. https://www. thenews.com.pk/print/155573-Propaganda-against-CPEC-upsets-China, accessed 23 February 22.

30. “CPEC was Idea of President Asif Zardari, Startling Revelation by Made by Chinese Envoy,” Times of Islamabad, 26 June 2018. https://timesofislamabad.com/26-Jun-2018/cpec-was-idea-of- president-asif-zardari-startling-revelation-made-by-chinese-envoy, accessed 23 February 2022.

31.  31 Press Release, Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 08 July 2020 . http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/202008/ t20200808_1134908.htm, accessed 23 February 22.

32. “Political Parties Forum Adopts Declaration Reiterating its Commitment to CPEC,” Radio Pakistan, 20 March 2019. https://www.radio.gov.pk/20-03-2019/political-parties-forum-adopts- declaration-reiterating-its-commitment-to-cpec, accessed 23 February 2022.

33. Syeda Mamoon Rubab, “CPEC and the Army: Red Flag,” The Friday Times, 02 September 2016. https://www.thefridaytimes.com/red-flag/, accessed 13 February 2022.

34. Small, Op Cit., n.7, 37.

35. Hufaiza Rehman, “China Discards ‘Shenzhen Speed’ for ‘Punjab Speed’,” The News, 26 July 2016. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/137730-China-discards-Shenzhen-speed-for -Punjab- speed, accessed 23 February 2022.

36. Cyril Almeida, “Exclusive: Act Against Militants of Face International Isolation, Civilians Tell Military,” Dawn, 06 October 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350, accessed 02 March 2022.

37. Mohammad Ashfaq, “CPEC won’t Pass Through KP Sans Western Route, Says Khattak,” Dawn, 08 October 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1288791, accessed 23 February 2022.

38. “Pakistan Official's Criticism of China's 'Silk Road' Projects Raises Worries,” Reuters, 10 September 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china-silkroad/pakistan-officials- criticism-of-chinas-silk-road-projects-raises-worries-idUSKCN1LQ1KR, accessed 10 December 2021.

39. Iftikhar A Khan, “Chinese Firm Rejects Corruption Charge in CPEC Project,” Dawn, 20 February 2019. https://www.dawn.com/news/1464816, accessed 13 February 2022.

40. Khaleeq Kiani, “Saudi Arabia Not to be Made Part of CPEC,” Dawn, 03 October 2018. https://www.dawn. com/news/1436506, accessed 13 February 2022.

41. “Cost of CPEC’s Railways ML-1 Project Brought Down by $2bn: Shiekh Rasheed,” The News, 02 October 2018. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/375438-cost-of-cpec-s-railways-ml- i-project-brought-down-by-2-bn-sheikh-rashid, accessed 22 February 2022.

42. “Pakistan’s Army Chief Visits Beijing After ‘Silk Road’ Tension,” Reuters, 17 September 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china-military-idUSKCN1LW0PR, accessed 13 February 2022.

43. Small, Op Cit., n.2, 45.

44. Khaleeq Kiani, “China Commits $1bn for 20 Social Sector Projects,” Dawn, 08 March 2019. https://www.dawn.com/news/1468315, accessed 23 February 2022.

45. “ CPEC Ordinance,” 08 October 2019 , National Assembly of Pakistan. https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ 1575477741_189.pdf, accessed 24 February 2022.

46. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, December 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18- 2017-0905.pdf, accessed 23 February 2022.

47. Chad P. Bown and Melina Kob, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-To-Date Guide,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 31 October 2021. https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide, accessed 03 February 2022.

48. Vinay Kaura, “US-Pak Relations in the Trump Era: Resetting the Terms of Engagement in Afghanistan,” Observer Research Foundation, 06 December 2017 . https://www.orfonline.org/research/us-pakistan-relations-trump-era-resetting-terms-engagement-afghanistan/, accessed 23 February 2022.

49. Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan Placed on FATF ‘Grey List’ Despite Diplomatic Efforts to Avert Decision,” Dawn, 28 June 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1416630, accessed 23 February 2022.

50. Senator Chuck Grassley, “Grassley, Senators Express Concerns Over China’s “Debt Trap” Diplomacy With Developing Countries,” 08 October 2018. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-senators-express-concerns-over-china-s-debt-trap-diplomacy-developing/, accessed 04 February 2022.

51. “Pompeo Says US to Fight China 'Empire' of 'Bribes',” Energy Daily, 26 October 2018. https://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Pompeo_says_US_to_fight_China_empire_of_bribes_999.html, accessed 05 February 2022.

52. “U.S. Pompeo Warns Against IMF Bailout for Pakistan that Aids China,” Reuters, 31 July 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-pakistan-idUSKBN1KK2G5, accessed 05 September 2021.

53. “China’s Debt-trap Diplomac,” National Review, 03 July 2018. https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/china-belt-and-road-initiative-debt-trap-diplomacy/, accessed 06 September 2021.

54. Sanaullah Khan, “IMF Approves $6bn Loan for Pakistan,” Dawn, 03 July 2019. https://www.dawn.com/news/1491889, accessed 05 December 2021.

55. “A Conversation with Amb Alice Wells on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” The Wilson Centre, Washington, 21 November 2019. https://2017-2021.state.gov/a-conversation-with-ambassador-alice-wells-on-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/index.html. See also, Michael Kugelman, “The Speech Heard Round the World,” Asia Despatches, Wilson Centre. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-speech-heard-round-the-world, both accessed 09 February 2022.

56. Small, Op Cit., n. 2, 48-49.

57. “Chinese Envoy Says Idea of CPEC Proposed by Zardari in 2013: Report,” Pakistan Today, 26 June 2018. https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/06/26/chinese-envoy-says-idea-of-cpec-proposed-by-zardari-in-2013-report/, accessed 22 February 2022.

58. Rafiq, Op Cit., n. 12, 40-42.

59. Landry, Op Cit., n.23.

60. Markey, Op Cit., n. 193, 52