THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN: RELEVANCE FOR 21ST CENTURY

Introduction

World War I was a war of global proportions centered in Europe that began on 28 Jul 1914 and lasted until 11 Nov 1918. The war drew in all the world’s economic great  powers, assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies consisting of the United Kingdom, France, Russian Empire and the United States and the Central Powers, comprising of Austria-Hungary and Germany.¹ In August 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. Consequently, in September 1914, Turkey closed the Bosporus (Istanbul Boğazı) and Dardanelles straits, the important waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This being the only outlet of the Black Sea, it stopped Russian seaborne trade with the rest of the Allied nations.

By December 1914, opposing European forces were largely deadlocked along the Western Front of World War I, as the German march towards Paris had been halted and massive armies stood trench-to-trench, each side daring the other to attempt a charge in the face of withering machine gun fire. Amongst this carnage, came an idea by the British to make a bold, strategic move in the East: namely, “an attempt, first by sea and then by land, to pierce and break down the barriers separating Russia from her allies and in so doing possibly to shorten the war.”² These attempts, known sequentially as the Dardanelles and Gallipoli Campaigns, would become military disasters of the highest magnitude.

The Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 was a major joint littoral operation and a significant operational failure for Allied forces in World War I. In Feb-Mar 1915, the Allies attempted to force open the Dardanelles Straits and Bosporus Straits in the face of Turkish defences bolstered by German assistance. Initial operational planning was conducted for a combined British and French naval expedition, independent of ground force support, designed to force its way through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara and then compel the capitulation of Constantinople and in effect, Turkey, through naval bombardment. This reliance on a naval expedition stemmed from a reluctance to divert troops from the Western Front or the Suez and from an underestimation of the capabilities of the Turks. The fleet of warships that attempted the initial assault on the Dardanelles faced three mutually supporting Turkish defences: naval mines, short-range mobile howitzers along the shoreline and the long-range guns of the forts. The attempt to force the Dardanelles Straits failed and subsequently, the Allied forces attempted an amphibious landing to capture the city with land forces supported by Naval fleet. Though the landings were successful, the landed troops saw fierce opposition. After ten months of fighting, the situation developed into another stalemate with no significant territorial gains. Having not achieved any objectives of the Campaign, the Allied forces called off the effort in early 1916.

The Dardanelles campaign, though more than a century old, throws up certain pertinent questions which are still relevant today. The Campaign was an attempt by a superior maritime power to overpower a weaker power in its littorals. Are today’s warships powerful enough to cause destruction ashore and project power in the littorals? Are warships and their weapon fit designed for destruction of targets ashore? And as a corollary, are amphibious operations possible today?

The Campaign

Planning. With the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WW1 in October 1914, Britain and France sought a way to quickly defeat their new enemy. The Ottoman Empire was perceived by several Allied strategists, especially British, to be the weak link amongst the Central Powers. Winston Churchill, then a young and enthusiastic First Lord of the Admiralty brushed up an old idea of seizing the Gallipoli peninsula by attempting a bold naval manoeuvre to break through the lines of Ottoman naval mines, destroy the shoreline fortresses along the Dardanelles, and sail up the Straits swiftly and decisively to capture the Ottoman capital of Constantinople.³ Thus inclined, Churchill sought the opinion of the Admiralty. Admiral Carden, Commander of the British East Mediterranean Squadron, replied that he did not think a rush through the Straits was possible, but that extended operations with a large number of ships might meet with success. Further, Admiral Carden prepared an operational plan, which provided a linear scheme of slow progress employing overwhelming force, in which his ships would first silence the forts protecting the Straits one by one, then proceed into the Straits to silence the concealed guns and mobile batteries while providing cover for minesweepers to clear a channel to the Narrows. Once this channel was opened, the ships could advance to demolish the forts protecting the Narrows and into the Sea of Marmara.

Concerns. The Navy-only plan did raise concerns from many corners, especially from senior naval officers. They felt that it should have been a joint effort with naval ships bombarding and the ground troops occupying territory in synergy. Admiral Fisher raised his concerns with Churchill and the Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith privately. However, on Churchill’s recommendation, Admiral Fisher’s concerns were not tabled at the War Council meetings.

Turkish Defences. The Turkish defences at the Dardanelles were constructed in three layers, outer, intermediate, and inner defences as follows:-⁴

• The Outer Defences. The outer defences were two historical forts at the entrance of the straits: Kumkale and Seddülbahir. These forts were equipped with 13 heavy and 7 medium guns, which were obsolete (Fig 1).

Fig 1: Turkish Defences at Dardanelles⁵

• The Intermediate Defences. The second layer of defense was at the point where the Straits widen past the entrance. It consisted of numerous permanent 6-inch gun batteries, mobile 6-inch howitzer batteries and numerous searchlight batteries. The land ward defence was complemented by minefield in the water.

• Inner Defences. The most powerful third layer defence was at the Narrows. The inner defences consisted of two huge fortresses armed with 72 guns of Fig 1: Turkish Defences at Dardanelles⁵ various calibers. However, these guns were also antiquated, and ammunition was scarce.

The forts protecting the shores of the Dardanelles were reinforced with guns dismantled from old warships. There were 230 artillery guns of different sizes, but most of them were around 25-30 years old and only 82 were good enough to match the artillery of the Allied fleet.

Sea Mines. In addition to the shore guns, the Dardanelles straits were defended by the Turks using sea mines. The Turks, with German assistance had laid 324 mines in the narrows, in ten lines, each of them 90 yards apart, in what is known as Kephez mine field.⁶ The shore guns were positioned on both sides to prevent enemy minesweeping operations. Most of these mines were old and several of them had broken from their moorings and drifted away. The Turks had only 36 mines in reserve. The Turks were so short of mines and desperate, that they had been collecting those mines that had been floated down the Bosporus from the Black Sea by Russians (in hope of destroying German ships Goeban and Breslau) and reusing them.⁷ In addition to the mines, two submerged nets to prevent submarine ingress were also placed in the Straits as shown in Fig 2.

Fig 2: The Dardanelles Minefield⁸

The First Attack. On the morning of 19 Feb 1915, the Fleet began the attack which was planned in three parts: a deliberate long-range bombardment followed by medium-range bombardment, and finally an overwhelming fire at very close range.⁹ Under the cover of this attack, the minesweepers were to clear the channel up to the entrance of the straits. Despite being hit many times during the relentless firing by the ships, the Turkish guns at the forts were still firing at the end of the first day. The lesson learnt was that it was extremely difficult for the ships to destroy the Turkish guns unless a direct hit was achieved. This could only be achieved with overwhelming fire at closer ranges to achieve better accuracy. However, the weather played spoil sport and this knowledge could only be applied when the weather cleared on 25 February.

Attrition. Having dealt with the outer defences of forts, the ships began their attacks on the next layers of defence. However, the narrowness of the Straits restricted their manoeuvre space. Thus, the ships themselves taking heavy fire, could not provide adequate cover to the minesweeping operations at the Narrows. This was further compounded by the fact that the minesweeping operations were being undertaken by fishing trawlers, equipped with minesweeping gear and manned by fishermen, designated as naval reserves.

Mine Clearance Operations. After a week of ineffective minesweeping operations, the tactics was changed. The minesweepers with their sweeps streamed could only achieve 2-3 knots of speed against the current and hence, were slow and easy to target. The new tactics involved the trawlers to move upstream faster without streaming their gear, under the cover fire of the ships, turn around, and then extend their gear and sweep downstream. However, the seven trawlers set out to do this, panicked under the surrounding gunfire. Having assessed that the fishermen were unable to carry out the operations, they were replaced with navy volunteers.¹⁰ On 13 March, seven trawlers with the new crew were sent up the Straits at night, this time preceding them with two hours of naval gunfire directed at the searchlights and howitzer batteries. However, this new tactic was discerned by the Turks who trained the searchlights on the trawlers and targeted them.

Plan for Renewed Attack. The Fleet continued the plan to force the Straits and launched the attack on the Narrows on 18 Mar 1915 (scheme of manoeuvre is shown in Fig 3). The ships were formed up in three lines/ divisions: First line consisted of four most powerful ships including Queen Elizabeth; second line consisted of the four old French battleships; and the third line was made up of four old British battleships. Both first and second lines were flanked by two pre-dreadnoughts each. The plan envisaged the first line to move within seven nautical mile of the Narrows forts and open fire, while flanking pre-dreadnoughts would focus on silencing the shore howitzer batteries. Once the big guns at the Narrows had been silenced, the second line of ships would advance through first line to within five nautical mile and add their fire to that of first line. The two lines of ships would continue the bombardment and advance another one nautical mile. The third line would be standing by outside the Straits and would relieve second line when ordered. This enormous display of firepower would suppress the forts and six mine trawlers under the protection of two more old battleships would advance and sweep the channel. Once the channel is swept, the three lines of ships would then proceed to pound the forts at Narrows at point-blank range. Observation of fire (spotting) was to be done by the aircrafts from Ark Royal, which was to launch one seaplane every hour.

Fig 3: Plan of the Naval Attack¹¹

The Attack on 18 Mar 1915. The attack began around 1030 hrs. However, events that unfolded were not as planned by the attackers. While the third line of ships were replacing the second line of French ships, their manoeuvre tactics took them close to an unknown mine field. Bouvet, Inflexible, Irresistible and Ocean while turning around were stuck by mines and put out of action. Two other ships, Gaulois and Suffren took heavy enemy fire and were rendered unusable. At this point, the fleet withdrew, without knowing exactly what caused their loss. What the attacking force did not know until after the war was over, was that while the main mine lines in the Narrows were identified by mine-spotting planes, another line of twenty mines were laid perpendicular to the ten lines already in place.¹² This line of silent killers had damaged both the fleet and the leadership’s enthusiasm for the operation. The schematic of the naval attack is given at Fig 4.

Fig 4: Schematic of the Naval Attack, 18 Mar 1915¹³

Amphibious Landing. On 22 March, the Fleet Commander and the Commander of Allied land troops informed the Admiralty and War Council that the Dardanelles could not be forced by the fleet alone. They recommended an amphibious landing, which was approved by the War Council without discussions. On 25 Apr 1915, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) landed at five different points of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Though the Allies could establish two beachheads by first week of May, they could not capture the high ground on the peninsula.¹⁴ The fighting at Gallipoli peninsula soon became reminiscent of the trench warfare in the Western Front, where small shifts of territorial control came at an enormous human cost (Table 1). The Allied troops were finally evacuated in early January 1916.¹⁵ The landing areas and the main front lines are depicted at Fig 5.

Fig 5: The Landings and Front lines¹⁶

Table 1: The Causalities at Gallipoli

The Indian Connection. About 15000 Indian troops served in the dramatic and doomed eight-month land campaign at Gallipoli, after the naval attempt through Dardanelles. Their part in the invasion of Gallipoli has lain largely unknown since the publication of long disregarded regimental histories and forgotten British officers' memoirs. Force G, as it came to be known, included Sikhs, Hindus and Punjabi Musalmans and four battalions of Gurkhas.¹⁹ Of the estimated 15000 Indians who took part in the Gallipoli campaign, 1516 lost their lives while 3137 were wounded. The Indians fought valiantly, in frigid climes and environments that were physically and culturally hostile - often laying down their lives to defeat an unknown enemy.

Analysis of Failure

Strategy. Considering the quagmire of stalemate and attrition in the Western front, the Dardanelles plan indeed reflects strategic brilliance. However, British leaders failed to articulate clearly what, and how important, their strategic objectives were. The War Council and the senior staffs in London were seeking a quick and cheap victory, expecting ambitious gains with the minimal commitment of resources. Accordingly, the campaign was not planned as a sequential, combined, joint operation that would seize operational objectives with strategic implications.

Planning Failure. The basic premise of the campaign was to tie down the enemy so that a war-winning blow could be landed elsewhere. During the formulation of alternative plans, two major factors contributed to the genesis of the campaign and its subsequent unfolding. First were the personalities and composition of the British War Council, and the second were the availability and prioritisation of force. About the former, the Dardanelles Commission report clearly brings out the power structure in Britain at the time. The War Council was a committee of the Cabinet, with naval and military expertise added in an advisory role. The War Council's ostensible purpose was to advise the Cabinet, which was supposedly the decision-making body. But, in reality it made and carried out its own decisions. As about the latter, prioritisation of forces was given to the Western front of the war with the assumption that the superior enemy was there and the Turks were weaker.

Mission Creep. Winston Churchill put forth the idea of forcing the Dardanelles in response to a request for a demonstration against the Turks to relieve pressure against the Russians. Thus, the initial concept of the operation was as a simple demonstration by the Royal Navy to force the Dardanelles. It was only after the Royal Navy’s failure in February 1915 with the loss of two capital ships that the idea of landing troops on the Gallipoli peninsula was batted around. The Dardanelles campaign is one of the glaring examples in recent military history of what has become known as “mission creep” or the inevitable addition of tasks to what was originally a simple and straightforward assignment.

Intelligence and Estimating the Enemy. The plan to force the straits was conceptualised based on wrong intelligence inputs on Turkish forces. Though adequate intelligence on the terrain conditions were available, it was not put to the best use. The terrain conditions of the area were subject of intense study as part of several appreciations by British forces between 1906 and 1912.²⁰ However, none of these were properly analysed during the run up to the campaign. Subsequent use of ground troops was undertaken hastily without adequate groundwork. In case of the land campaign, there is little evidence that a proper appreciation was conducted with regard to Turkish dispositions and troop numbers.

Lessons Learnt

Space, Time and Force Factors. Straits by their nature result in reduced manoeuvre space. Combine that with requirement to assault forts, withstand their counterattack and negotiate the mine fields and the ships are severely restricted in their freedom of movement. The lack of manoeuvre space likely contributed to their repeat tactics, which the Turks observed and exploited by planting the additional line of mines shown in Fig 2 and Fig 4.²¹ Time factor is always favourable to the actor closing the straits as he has the initiative. The more time the countering forces take to act, more difficult is the effort required to open the straits as the defender can considerably shore up his defences. The inherent advantages of space and time also plays into the hands of the defender helping him to use lesser assets than the countering forces.

Effectiveness of Naval Guns on Shore Targets. The trajectories of naval shells tend to be very flat, for various reasons. Unlike a howitzer, which is long ranged weapon for firing shells on high trajectories, at low velocities naval guns can generally produce descent angles of up to 21 degrees only.²² Thus, naval guns are not ideal for shore bombardment, especially at short ranges as in Dardanelles. Further, the relative flat trajectory of naval gunfire results in large range probable error and hence, a rough elliptical dispersion pattern with long axis in the direction of fire (Fig 6). Thirdly, the largest cruiser and battleship sized guns wear down relatively fast, especially when using long range shots.

Fig 6: The Trajectories²³ 

Own Capabilities. Some serious technical difficulties were overlooked in preparation for the campaign. For example, the capability of the Royal Navy in the unique geographical conditions of the Dardanelles straight was never tested before and no special provisions were made atop the warshipsn to counter these challenges.²⁴ The Dardanelles Commission report mentions about the poor quality of spotting provided by the aircraft. Further, owing to underestimation of the mine threat, the British employed fishing trawlers fitted with sweeping gears manned by civilians.

Coalition Issues. The combined efforts of the Allies were weakened by the conflict of interest among the coalition partners. For instance, the Russians were more concerned by the advantages Britain and France would gain through the conquest of Constantinople. The apprehensions on part of the Russians meant that they were reluctant to undertake their assignments on the Black Sea. They also undermined the British efforts by providing unreliable intelligence.²⁵ The British and French were disinclined to the enlargement of Russian power in southern Europe. The British wanted control over the Suez Canal and their interests in West Asia and India could be jeopardized by the Ottoman Empire.²⁶ The French wanted to secure their interests Syria and Libya.²⁷ These interests affected the allotment of troops for the venture, as well as operational conduct of the campaign.

Planning Assumptions. In 1906, the British War Office, in conjunction with the Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, considered a joint sea and land operation against the Gallipoli Peninsula, and concluded “military opinion ... will be in entire agreement with the naval view that unaided action by the Fleet, bearing in mind the risks involved, is much to be deprecated.”²⁸ This memorandum was brought up and discussed at the War Council in February 1915, and later, it was ignored based on assumptions related to the defences at the Straits and the improvements in British naval gunfire capabilities.

Estimating the Enemy. The British decision makers pre-supposed victory on the assumption that the show of strength by powerful warships in the straits would unleash chaos in Constantinople. During conceptualisation of the plan, Churchill and Admiral Fisher had catered for heavy losses to ships.²⁹ However, it was never passed on to the operational commander.

Alignment of Ways and Means with Ends. As discussed earlier, ship’s guns are more suited for battles against other ships and their effectiveness against land-based artillery, especially when unsupported by spotters, is less. Also, the British considered the Dardanelles campaign as a secondary front where they could achieve quick and cheap victory and expect ambitious gains with the minimal commitment of resources. Thus, the least capable assets, be it warships or minesweepers, were pressed into action. Similarly, the most difficult part of the campaign, mine clearance operations under enemy fire was undertaken by fishing trawlers turned minesweepers manned by civilian crew. Post the failed naval attack, there was a shift in strategy to involve army. However, this progressive expansion of mission was not adequately supported with military or diplomatic efforts.

Forewarned. On 31 Oct 1914, Turkey declared war. Churchill, incensed at the Ottomans for allying with Central Powers, ordered the British East Mediterranean Squadron to display a show of force at the entrance of Dardanelles. On 03 Nov 1914, the British East Mediterranean Squadron bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles for twenty minutes, highlighting the weakness of the Straits’ defences at that time.³⁰ The expenditure of eighty naval shells did little damage to the forts but prompted the Turks to evaluate defences and begin improvements.

Mining Operations. The British Mine sweeping operations in the campaign were plagued with many planning oversights. The significant among them are:-

• Fishing Trawlers fitted with sweeping gears manned by civilians were deployed in lieu of naval minesweepers manned by naval personnel.

• The fact that minesweeping was to be undertaken under enemy fire could induce fear amongst the crew, which in turn could reduce their efficiency was not considered decisive.³¹

• The attacking forces underestimated the mining capability of the Turkish forces.

• The British spotting aircraft had spotted the Kephez minefield and hence, mining efforts were concentrated there. The Turks, noticing the Allied ships manoeuvres on the previous bombardment runs, laid an additional line (Geehl’s mines) of 20 mines parallel to the shore on the Asian side on 08 March 1915. This was not spotted by the spotting aircraft. Allied ships were lost to this line of mines.³²

Decisive Points. The Allied fleet’s plan for the Dardanelles consisted of seven main phases. The first of which was the reduction of the defences at the entrance to the Straits. Sweeping the minefields and destroying the forts between the entrance and the narrows was the second phase. Once phase one was successfully accomplished it was evident that the second phase would be more arduous and riskier to accomplish than originally conceived. Operational Art recommends Decisive Points (DP) which are important milestones that need to be achieved while progressing to attain the objective. Lines of Operations (LOOs) connect and correlate these DPs.³³ In case of Dardanelles, the second and third phases could not be achieved, and the operational commander, Adm de Robeck decided to halt the naval assault. Had the plan had deliberate DPs, non-achievement of which would have been discussed at the War Council, they would have had two options: to call off the assault and withstand the loss of face; or, to make a renewed and rapid joint operation effort to force the Straits. The end result was a classic example of “Mission Creep.”

Attrition vs Manoeuvre. Naval warfare is often considered as manouevre style of warfare. Though at tactical levels, there is emphasis on attrition, naval warfare at strategic and operational level is essentially about physical and psychological dislocation before or during battle. Though the Allied Powers had conceived the Dardanelles campaign as a manoeuvre to overcome the impasse in the western front, by pushing themselves into the straits and thereby restricting the mobility of their ships, they ended up in a classical naval war of attrition. By restricting the powerful ships in the confined waters of Dardanelles, the Allies lost the element of mobility and relied on their superior firepower and the resultant attrition to push through the straits. However, issues like efficacy of naval guns against fortified shore guns and operations in mined waters prevented success of attrition. Further, even after the army troops landed, the strong and unexpected Turkish defences resulted in another deadlock.

Joint Operations. The originally conceived idea for the Dardanelles Campaign, which was presented in the War Council, consisted of joint operations involving naval action in the Straits, amphibious assaults on both sides of the Straits and ground operations towards Constantinople. However, Lord Kitchener decided that troops could not be spared for the ground operations from the main Western Front and hence, Churchill seized on the naval part of the plan alone.³⁴ Further, at the military strategic level, the Army and Navy had completely different appreciations of what was happening.

Relevance and Applicability

Though India does not control any Straits, its maritime trade passes through few vital Straits viz., Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb and the Malacca Straits. However, these Straits are the energy lifelines of the world and their disruption would have far ranged international repercussions. Thus, closure of any of these may not need India’s intervention, at least, alone. Thus, the Dardanelles Campaign’s relevance to India is more with respect to littoral warfare rather than closure of Straits.

Littoral Warfare. The term littoral has its origins in oceanographic literature and is described as coastal or shore region. The actual extent of the area is largely a function of the reach of the weaponry involved.³⁵ Thus, for the US Navy armed with its Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles with a range of 900 nautical miles, the littorals extend to 650 nautical miles inwards from the shore. Other navies have a much more modest extent of littorals.

While highlighting the centrality of the affairs on land in great fleet battles, one needs to examine the means in the 21st Century to direct naval influence on land. Navies can influence the battle on land by undertaking direct attack with ordnance such as guns, bombs, missiles, and naval air strikes; isolating the enemy with naval blockade; attacks on shipping; via offensive mining; supporting the land offensive with amphibious assault; and providing logistical support for landed forces.

The ship has changed. Ships are now much faster, more manoeuvrable, somewhat stealthy, and can appear and disappear at whim. Ships are capable of attacking at distant stand-off ranges with long range vectors complemented by the power of manoeuvre from the sea. These long-range vectors, especially aircraft and land attack missiles, enable the ship to engage a “fort” without ever being detected. The fort too has changed. The term “fort” has come to mean all of the surrounding and supporting land rather than a single fixed fortification. Thus, land-based aircraft, long range, land based anti-ship missiles, long range artillery and the supplies in the surrounding area have all become part of the “fort.” Thus, forts of today are far more potent than those of the 18th Century. Space based sensors and seamless data networks have equally enabled both ship and the fort. The fort/land side of things retains the traditional advantages of large magazines in the form of unlimited aircraft, missiles, artillery, and manpower. Though today’s ships carry tremendous number of aircraft and ordnance, they can never match the fort in this aspect. However, the mobility and stealth advantages of the ship more than negates the fort/land advantages. The ultimate truth is that you can’t shoot what you can’t see. All the aircraft and missiles in the world are useless if you can’t give them targets and a naval force that can remain hundreds of miles out to sea is a difficult target to find. Conversely, the fort/land defences are largely fixed and known and very susceptible to cruise and ballistic missile attack.

As seen from discussions above, most of the factors are evenly matched on both sides. However, what tilts the balance is the fact that ship borne weapons are designed for targets at sea and hence, have limited effect on hardened land targets. Further, the calibres of naval guns have reduced progressively with time, though their effect may not have. Though, newer weapons like Land Attack Cruise Missiles can be effectively employed for precision strike, their limited numbers preclude significant effect. Technology is a double-edged sword and provides benefits to both the attacking and defending force. What is good for the goose is also good for the gander.

Amphibious Capabilities. The Indian Navy’s (IN) inventory, its tactics, and its ability to harness combat power with effective use of seas are predominantly to gain strategic leverage in a conflict.³⁷ However, the IN while capable of decimating potential adversaries in the maritime domain in its sphere of influence, has limited capability to facilitate effects directly on land. The IN amphibious capability is woefully inadequate and for long we have neglected it claiming that we have no expeditionary intent. However, it is a capability which can tilt the balance in our favour, if correctly applied.

Conclusion

On the cold night of 09 Jan 1916, the remnants of a force, which during the previous ten months struggled to wrest control of the Straits and the Peninsula, quietly left Cape Helles on the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Such was the ignominious conclusion of England’s great gamble

- the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign, a campaign as noted for its strategic vision as its fatally flawed plans and heroically fought battles. The campaign was conceptually strategic and daring. Its goals, if realised, would have arguably hastened the end of the war. But, Great Britain's political, military and naval leaders, who were never in full agreement, drifted into a decision and then executed a complex amphibious operation without a comprehensive plan.

Allied powers learnt from the lessons of Dardanelles and Gallipoli and applied it correctly to undertake power projection using the manoeuvre warfare, inherent in the navy, successfully at Normandy in World War II. Analyses of Dardanelles Campaign indicate that the lessons learnt are still relevant for navies today in littoral warfare. Navies today are capable of taking on forts/land defences, provided adequate information on enemy capabilities are available and the forces deployed are accordingly equipped.

Endnotes

1. John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Random House, 1998), 17.

2. Henry W. Nevinson, The Dardanelles Campaign (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), 33.

3. Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (Annapolis: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1956), 36-37.

4. http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/gallipoli.html,accessed 06 December 2021.

5. Piotr Nykiel, “Naval Operations in the Dardanelles 1915,” Weapons and Warfare, 23 December 2015. https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2015/12/23/naval-operations-in-dardanelles-february-march-1915/, accessed 16 October 2021.

6. Piotr Nykiel, ”Minesweeping Operations in the Dardanelles ( 25 February - 17 March, 1915),” Naval Operations in the Dardanelles, 1915. http://www.navyingallipoli.com/teksty/minesweeping.pdf, accessed 23 October 2021.

7. Ibid.

8. https://gallipoli100education.org.uk/about-gallipoli-2/the-campaign/could-the-navy-have-succeeded/, accessed 15 October 2021.

9. Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War- Naval Operations vol.2 1914-15 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 99.

10. Nykiel, Op Cit., n.6.

11. “Battle of Dardanelles 18 March 1915,” The Anzac Legend, 19 March 2015. http://theanzaclegend.blogspot.com/2015/03/battle-for-dardanelles-18-mar-1915.html, accessed 16 November 2021.

12. Ibid.

13. Brian Lewis, “Battle of Gallipoli,” Time Toast. https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/battle-of-gallipoli, accessed 18 November 2021.

14. Ibid.

15. Dardanelles Commission. The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, London, United Kingdom: H.M. Stationary Office, 1917. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/RCDIG0000093, accessed 02 November 2021.

16. “Gallipoli Tour,” Fastbook Travel. https://www.constantinopleguide.com/gallipoli-tour.php, accessed 02 November 2021.

17. Cecil Faber and Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli: May 1915 to the Evacuation (London: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press, 1932), 175-6.

18. Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing, 2001), 246.

19. Peter Stanley, Die in Battle, Do Not Despair: The Indians on Gallipoli 1915 (Oxford: Helion & Company, 2015).

20. Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles 1915 (United Kingdom: Spellmount Kent, 2005), 45.

21. Nykiel, Op Cit., n.6.

22. Dardanelles Commission. The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, 1917, 25.

23. https://gallipoli100education.org.uk/about-gallipoli-2/the-campaign/could-the-navy-have-succeeded/, accessed 17 October 2021.

24. Dardanelles Commission, Op Cit., n.15, 56.

25. Keegan, Op Cit., n.1, 65.

26. Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C Vedeler, The World in Crucible 1914-1919 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984), 134.

27. George H. Cassar, The French and the Dardanelles (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971), 36.

28. Ibid.

29. Nevinson, Op Cit., n.2, 23.

30. Moorehead, Op Cit., n.3, 33.

31. E Michael Golda, “The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare,” Naval War College Review vol. 51 (Summer 1998), 83-96.

32. Ibid.

33. IHQ MoD (Navy), INBR 34 (2) Operational Planning Process (OPP): Naval Operational Manual II (New Delhi: IHQ MoD (Navy), 2012).

34. Ibid.

35. Geoffrey Till, Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty First Century (London: Routledge, 2018), 290.

36. Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 144.

37. Colin S. Grey, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free Press Macmillan Inc, 1992), 1.