Disclaimer: Certain sections of this article have been reproduced/ adapted/ encapsulated from earlier works by the author and reproduced with the permission of National Maritime Foundation. Citations to the earlier works are: Cdr Himadri Das, Coastal Security: Policy Imperatives for India (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2019) and Cdr Himadri Das, “India’s maritime security governance challenges: A decade after 26/11,” Maritime Affairs 14, No 2. (Winter 2018): 106-119.

Maritime Security and its Governance

Literally, ‘security’ means the state of being free from danger or threat, including the ‘safety of a state or organisation against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage.’1 As per the Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy document, “in the broadest sense, security can be understood in terms of the presence of freedom and the absence of fear and want - with regard to pursuit of the core purpose and values governing the existence and evolution of a society and state.” Furthermore, “national security is viewed in a holistic framework, which extends to all aspects of societal well-being and growth, including physical, economic, energy, food, water, health, and environment.”

The concept of ‘maritime security’ is relatively new with its origins in the 1990s.2 It does not have a universally accepted definition and, its usage being largely contextual, can be viewed comprehensively to encompass security from both, traditional and non-traditional threats to security in the maritime domain and adjoining coast. Or, it could be viewed from narrower compartmentalised and fragmented perspectives to exclude certain elements. A typical approach to classic maritime security, especially in an Indian context, would entail ‘defence’ (against State actors), ‘security’ (primarily against non-state actors, or state-sponsored non-state actors, particularly those resorting to ‘unlawful acts against safety of maritime navigation’ at sea, or those using the sea to commit acts of violence ashore), and ‘maritime crime’ (enforcement of laws applicable to the maritime domain).3 Consequently, maritime security governance encompasses a wide range of functions, which includes operational actions, but is not limited to it.

As per Ensuring Secure Seas, “maritime governance relates to structured and coordinated actions to govern the maritime domain under India’s jurisdiction, with multiple agencies and functions involved.” This essentially includes mechanisms for policy and review, centralised monitoring mechanisms, and the legislative and regulatory framework. The strategy document also highlights that the “legislative and regulatory framework for maritime domain requires regular review and revision, to identify and address any limitations.”4 In essence, the strategy alludes to the need for a whole-of-government approach and structures for cooperation between the Centre and States/ Union Territories (UTs).

Conceptually, the US Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide defines six functions for the maritime security sector, primarily at the national level maritime governance, maritime civil and criminal authority, maritime defence, maritime safety, maritime response and recovery, and maritime economy. While the functions apply across all levels of governance, in particular, the Guide highlights the roles of ‘sub-national’ level structures with respect to the following: -5

    • Delineation of roles and responsibilities between national and sub-national agencies, to ensure inter-agency and intergovernmental coordination in support of national strategy (maritime agency organisation).

    • Delineation of roles and responsibilities within maritime agencies with defence roles, at the national and sub-national levels, and to coordinate in support of national strategy (maritime defence administration).

    • Aid to civil power (maritime defence assistance to civil authorities).

    • Response to maritime-related incidents (emergency response administration).

Cmde Sam Bateman, Royal Australian Navy (Retd), has posited that, “capacities for maritime security are required at the provincial, national, regional (and international) levels. Such capacities are required in the form of institutional arrangements (work allocation, committees, Information Centres, Op Centres, etc.); legislative framework, including state legislations; and, availability of resources in terms of assets, manpower, technology, etc.”6

This paper examines the role of states in security - particularly maritime and coastal security - and how it could be strengthened, especially with an operational focus. The relevance of the paper is in the fact that the Indian Navy is the agency responsible for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security.

Maritime Security Governance in India

India has a federal structure of governance. The key features of a federal system include dual governments (the national or federal Government and the Government of each component state); division of authority between the national and state governments; supreme powers vested with the government, whether national or state; and, the overriding authority of Courts to interpret the Constitution (independent judiciary).7 The relation between the Union and the States is covered in Part XI of the Constitution. It includes Legislative Relations (Chapter I) and Administrative Relations (Chapter II). In accordance with Article 246 and Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, legislative powers are distributed amongst the Union and the State, through the Union, State, and Concurrent List.

In general, the distribution of executive powers follows the distribution of legislative powers.8 The Union and the State have exclusive executive power over matters included in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule respectively. For matters in the Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh Schedule), the executive function ordinarily remains with the states, but is subject to provisions of the Constitution or any law of the Parliament conferring such function expressly on the Union.

Considering the provisions of the Constitution of India and the concept of maritime security, which covers a wide swath - from law enforcement to national defence (and the overlaps therein) - the governance of maritime security in India transcends all the three lists, and is undertaken concurrently by the Centre and States in coordination with each other.

Increasing Role of the States in Maritime Security

Since independence, the overarching responsibility for maritime defence and security has been with the Centre, viz. the Indian Navy. In the backdrop of discussions at the 3rd Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) on the creation of sui generis zone, viz. the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the raising of the Coast Guard was proposed by the Indian Navy to avoid duplication and economise effort, and to enable the Indian Navy to focus on its primary warfighting charter.9 The Coast Guard was raised in 1977 “for ensuring the security of the maritime zones of India with a view to the protection of maritime and other national interests in such zones and for matters connected therewith.”10 However, the overall responsibility for maritime security continued to be with the Centre.

In 1983, a commission under Justice RS Sarkaria (Sarkaria Commission) comprehensively reviewed the working of the existing arrangements between the Union and States.11 Chapter VII of theCommission’s report pertained to deployment of Union Armed Forces in states for public order duties. Inter alia, it recommended self- reliance of the State Police, so that assistance of the Union is necessary only during severe disturbances; personnel exchange between State and Central Police, including common training centres; and financial support to states for strengthening armed police.

Subsequent to the 1999 Kargil War, based on the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC), a Group of Ministers (GoM) was set-up in April 2000 to review the national security system in its entirety and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. The creation of a Department of Border Management (DoBM) and the setting up of specialised Marine Police in all coastal states and island territories were some of the major recommendations with regard to coastal border management. The subsequent implementation of the recommendations marked a paradigm shift in the management of maritime security in India, with focused attention to ‘coastal borders’ at the national-level by the DoBM and a greater operational role of states in territorial waters.

The setting-up of the Marine Police in states was undertaken through a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) financed Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) Phase I. The components of the scheme included provisioning of boats, establishment of Coastal Police Stations (CPS)/ check-posts/ outposts, and procurement of vehicles.12 While the provisioning of boats was undertaken by the MHA on behalf of the states, all other components were progressed by the states with financial support from MHA. The MHA driven scheme was a key driver for the ‘marinisation’ of the police force. In addition to the recommendation for Marine Police, some other recommendations related to states included integration of the Navy’s War Watching Organisation into the surveillance and reporting chain; development of island territories; and representation of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in State Maritime Boards/ Maritime State Development Council (MSDC).13

In 2007, a commission under retired Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi examined and reviewed Centre-State relations, in view of the changes in the polity and economy of India since the Sarkaria Commission.14 The commission submitted its report in 2010. Volume V of the report addresses the issue of management of internal security in a federal set-up. Towards improving the interface of the Centre and State with regard to internal security, the Commission recommended that specific internal security problems be addressed through greater emphasis on development; improving the security apparatus and ensuring similarity of objectives of the Centre and concerned states; implementation of police reforms; and, adoption of new approaches and tools to criminal justice system involving all levels of government.

Subsequent to the ‘26/11’ terrorist attack, from Pakistan, a new paradigm of maritime and coastal security emerged. At the level of the Centre, the Indian Navy was designated as the agency responsible for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security, and the Coast Guard was entrusted with the responsibility for coastal security in territorial waters, as also for overall coordination between Central and State agencies in matters related to coastal security. Other measures pertained to capacity building and capability augmentation of maritime security agencies, particularly the Coast Guard; increased focus on electronic surveillance, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and networking by central agencies, such as the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, the Director General Lighthouse and Lightships, and a Public Sector Undertaking, viz. Offshore and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC); and, establishment of coordination mechanisms across levels of governance, including the national-level coordination mechanism, viz. the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security Against Threats from the Sea (NCSMCS) under the Cabinet Secretary, involving all major maritime stakeholders including the States.

The new paradigm also involved a significant greater role for States in coastal and maritime security. Although there is variance in the implementation of measures by various States/ UTs, inter alia the development trajectory has included the following: -15

  • Governance

    • Integration of state level departments/ agencies/ stakeholders in the maritime/ coastal security construct. This includes the departments of fisheries, forest, home, ports, transport, forest and wildlife, etc.; state-level security agencies, such as the Coastal Police/ State Marine Police (SMP), State Police, State Reserve Police, State Industrial Security Force, Home Guards/ Marine Home Guards (MHGs), India Reserve Battalions (IRBn), etc.

    • Setting-up of state-level and district-level coordination committees for coastal security.16

    • Establishment of State Maritime Boards (SMBs)/ equivalents.

    • Allocation of jurisdiction to one Coastal Police Station in each state to deal with maritime crime in ‘international’ waters.

  • Capacity-Building/ Capability-Augmentation

    • Capacity-building of the SMP by implementation of MHA CSS Phase II.

    • Raising of dedicated wings of the Police in some states, such as the Marine Task Force (MTF) in Gujarat and the Marine Enforcement Wing (MEW) in Tamil Nadu.

    • Capability-building through ad hoc training programmes to SMP with the assistance of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.

    • Coastal Mapping.

    • Active support, coordination and participation of state-level stakeholders in exercises and drills, such as the major national coastal defence Exercise Sea Vigil, biannual coastal security exercises (Exercise Sagar Kavach), and security drills such as Exercise Sajag.

  • Inter-agency Coordination

    • Integration with inter-agency coordination structures, such as through the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the ‘hub-and-spoke’ model.

  • Sectoral Initiatives

    • Implementation of measures for improved monitoring and control of the fisheries sector. This included registration of fishing boats; issuance of biometric identity cards to fishermen; colour coding of boats; notification of fishery landing sites and establishment of monitoring measures for such sites; establishment of lanes in some harbours, etc.

    • Implementation of measures for improved security of non-major ports/ Single Point Moorings (SPMs) in accordance with MHA guidelines.

  • Community Engagement

    • Focus on community engagement through Community Interaction Programmes (CIP), engagement of community as MHGs, etc.

The new paradigm necessitated greater coordination and integration between the central and state agencies for coastal security for a wide range of security-related activities across maritime sectors. In other words, coastal security now entailed a holistic approach to security. It is evident that, in the past decade, States have taken substantial initiatives towards strengthening maritime and coastal security.

Strengthening the Role of States in Maritime Security

The states have emerged, post 26/11, as key stakeholders in the national quest for strengthening maritime and coastal security, with a pivotal role across the spectrum of functions for maritime security. Notwithstanding, as brought out earlier, the role of the Centre and States in public order/ security is inherently complex. For example, the proposal for setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was opposed on the grounds that it would violate the principles of federalism.17 Some inherent issues of security governance in a federal governance structure, especially from a maritime security perspective are: -

  • The blurring of concepts of ‘security’ and ‘defence,’ necessitating a greater role of states in the security and defence of the nation.

  • Multiplicity of agencies (and overlaps in jurisdiction and responsibilities) with respective chains of reporting reduces agility in decision-making, information-sharing, and response.

  • Dependence of states on the Centre for financial support for capacity-building/ capability-augmentation.

  • Differing threat perceptions lead to differing approaches to security.

  • Non-uniform implementation of national projects/ directives across states.

  • As coastal security gained considerable focus only after 26/11, lack of institutional orientation, knowledge and expertise within the state governments relating to maritime security.

Between 2011 and 2018, the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC), Parliamentary Committees, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), have examined issues related to coastal security, including coastal policing and implementation of the CSS.18 Some of the issues highlighted/ recommendations include the following: -

  • Slow progress with regard to implementation of CSS Phase II, including procurement of boats and construction of jetties.

  • Poor maintenance support for boats and shortfalls in patrolling effort.

  • Shortage of manpower in the SMP and lack of adequate training.

  • Need for improving coordination and consultation between Central and State Governments

  • Enhancing MDA.

  • Legal empowerment of maritime security agencies.

  • Strengthening of measures for port security.

  • Strengthening fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) by fitment of tracking devices on fishing boats, registration of all boats, improving measures for safety and security of fishermen at sea, etc.

  • Further integration of coastal communities into the security framework.

The above leads us to the question as to what are the contours for strengthening the role of states in maritime and coastal security. The suggested broad areas of focus include the following: -

  • Capacity-building of the SMP, and other agencies of the State, such as the MTF and MEW, with the aim of states exercising complete jurisdiction over the entire adjoining territorial waters.

  • Capability-augmentation of the coastal police by raising a dedicated force/ specialised teams; procurement of larger vessels and aerial assets such as UAVs; transition to a network centric operational concept; revitalisation of training, etc.

  • Focus on inter-agency operational coordination and information-sharing by establishing active linkages with Operation/ Information Centres, and integration of information sources/ sensor data with overarching national-level systems, such as the National Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) Network. This will facilitate better coordination and greater transparency of the coastal and maritime spaces, and development of a Common Operational Picture (COP) across all maritime security agencies.

  • Strengthening of security (and safety) mechanisms in maritime sectors, which are primarily governed by states, such as fisheries, port, shipping, and tourism.

  • Strengthening (and institutionalisation) of mechanisms for community-participation in the maritime/ coastal security construct.

  • Strengthening the legislative framework for maritime enforcement, such as in the fisheries sector.

  • Periodic review of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and regular focused audits of specific elements of the maritime security construct.

  • Leveraging institutional mechanisms for coastal and maritime security, at the national- and state-levels, to incrementally consolidate on gains made and to address identified gaps.

This leads us to the final question as to how state-led initiatives will contribute to overall maritime security. The likely effects of robust state-level mechanisms on overall maritime security are listed below: -

  • Removal of overlaps in jurisdiction and responsibilities, especially in the territorial waters. This will also contribute to achieve the overarching aim of ‘one border-one force’ and unitary responsibilities in designated maritime zones.

  • COP and real-time awareness amongst all maritime security agencies and other stakeholders (Central or State) will enhance MDA and speed-up operational responses. This will contribute towards economising effort and enhancing cooperation and synergy amongst stakeholders.

  • Strengthening MCS ashore and at sea, complemented with other measures such as transponders on smaller boats, has the potential to significantly mitigate one of the most challenging aspects of operations at sea – identification of small craft.

  • Strengthening the legislative framework in States, such as penalties for non-compliance to security-related initiatives in maritime sectors and empowerment of agencies for enforcement, will not only deter to offenders, but will also facilitate a ‘legal finish’ to maritime crime.

  • Enhanced engagement of the large maritime community in the security construct through institutional mechanisms has the potential for contributing significantly towards improving security and response to emerging situations at sea, and for enhancing safety at sea.

  • In view of the inextricable linkages between security and defence, several elements of wartime coastal defence such as war-watching organisation, naval control of shipping, activation of coastal batteries, establishment of swept channels, etc. are undertaken in coordination with state/ district administration and local authorities. Robust inter-agency peacetime linkages are a foundational requisite for coordination for wartime defence.

Conclusion

There has been a paradigm change in the management of maritime security in India over the past decade. The responsibility for maritime security in India is shared between the Centre and States and their multiple organs, wherein states have a pivotal role. Post ‘26/11,’ the role of States in maritime security has increased manifold, which augurs well for overall maritime security. Activities at sea are invariably linked to activities on land robust mechanisms at the state-level are a facilitator and enabler for effective operational response to both, traditional and non-traditional threats, at or from the sea. Furthermore, progressively strengthening role of states in maritime security has the potential to reshape the maritime security construct, especially at a time when India faces increasing challenges from external aggression and, in accordance with its proactive foreign policy, strives to be a net security provider in the wider Indian Ocean Region.19

Endnote

    1. S.V. Lexico, “Security (n.),” accessed 16 September 2020. https://www.lexico.com/definition/security.

    2. Christian Buerger and Timothy Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies,” International Affairs vol. 93, no.6 (2017), 1293.

    3. Himadri Das, Coastal Security: Policy Imperatives for India (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2019), 54-55.

    4. Himadri Das, “India’s maritime security governance challenges: A decade after 26/11,” Maritime Affairs vol. 14, no. 2 (Winter 2018), 108.

    5. US Department of State, Maritime Security Sector Reform, 6-10, 33.

    6. Sam Bateman, “Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What are we talking about?,” ed. P Cozens and J Mossop, Capacity building for maritime security cooperation in Asia-Pacific: a selection of papers presented at the CSCAP Study Group Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation, 15-16.

    7. Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (Gurugram: Lexis Nexis, 2013), 53-54.

    8. Ibid., 347.

    9. VAdm G Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976-1990 [New Delhi: IHQ of MoD (Navy), 2005], 503-504.

    10. The Coast Guard Act, 1978 (30 of 1978).

    11. “Sarkaria Commission,” Inter-State Council Secretariat.www.interstatecouncil.nic.in/sarkaria-commision, accessed 08 November 2019.

    12. “Coastal Security Scheme,” Ministry of Home Affairs, https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files /BM_II_CostalSecurity_18062019.pdf, accessed 16 September 2020.

    13. Ibid.

    14. “Punchhi Commission,” Inter-State Council Secretariat. http://www.interstatecouncil.nic.in/punchhi-commision, accessed 04 November 2019.

    15. Ensuring Securing Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, [New Delhi: IHQ MoD (Navy), 2015], 104-123. For a detailed coverage of the overall construct, see also, Op.Cit., n.3, 90-162.

    16. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report, 2016–17, 51.

    17. “NCTC violates principles of federalism, says Nitish Kumar,” The Economic Times, 07 May 2012.

    18. 15th Lok Sabha: 22nd Report of the Standing Committee on Defence; 10th Report of the Standing 

      Committee on Defence; 177th Report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing

      Committee on Home Affairs; 187th Report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing

      Committee on Home Affairs; 21st Report of the Public Accounts Committee; Reports of

      Comptroller and Auditor General of India: No. 3 of 2016, Report No. 1 of 2017, Report No. 4 of 2017.

    19. Manish Chand, “Defining the ‘India Way’ in global relations, the Jaishankar way,” India Writes Network. https://www.indiawrites.org/india-and-the-world/defining-the-india-way-in-global-relations-the-jaishankar-way/, accessed 17 September 2020.