STRATEGIC POWER-PLAY IN THE ARCTIC

Build-up of Ice-Cutters. In order to support transit through the NSR, Russia has undertaken a sustained build-up of its fleet of ice-cutters. This includes nuclear-powered ice-breakers, with greater operating power and better endurance than conventionally powered vessels. It is also believed that the Russian government has regained control over most ice-cutters in the country, in consonance with its capability development plans to support civil and military operations.³

Military Posturing. In addition to controlling the region’s rich resource base and shipping lanes, Russia also aims to develop power projection and defence capability along its northern borders. Recent important actions by the Russian military, including restoration of Soviet-era facilities, strengthening of its Northern Fleet, and establishing new bases with advanced air-and sea-defence systems, is indicative of the country’s focus on security of its national interests in the region.⁴

China’s Arctic Ambitions

Arctic Strategy. To begin with, China owns no territory above 66.50° N, yet it claims to be a ‘near-Arctic’ state vying for equal rights in the region’s governance and resource exploration.⁵ It published its Arctic Policy in 2018, outlining a string of objectives that largely aim at greater Chinese presence and influence in the region. The policy prioritises Chinese use of Arctic shipping routes as part of a so-called ‘Polar Silk Road,’ resource exploration and exploitation in the region, and better Arctic governance. In addition to gaining access to the region’s rich resource and mineral potential, access to the Arctic would also assist China in mitigating its Malacca Dilemma. Moreover, the estimated 30% shorter transit route to European markets through the NSR, as compared to the Malacca-Suez route, also adds to China’s interests in gaining greater control over the region’s sea routes.⁶ Build-up of Ice-Cutters. To substantiate its ‘Polar Silk Road’ vision, China is in the process of acquiring a fleet of ice-breakers for its missions in the Arctic, as well as in Antarctica. This includes construction of a 30,000- tonne nuclear-powered icebreaker.⁷ In 2019, it commissioned Xue Long II, which completed an Antarctic mission in April 2020 and is currently deployed on its maiden Arctic deployment. The vessel is owned and managed by the Chinese Polar Institute and is the successor to the Ukranian-built Xue Long (Snow Dragon).⁸ Till date, China has conducted 36 Antarctic and 10 Arctic expeditions.⁹

Leveraging Russian Support. Chinese oil and gas companies are increasing their engagement with Russian firms, primarily with the objective of leveraging the latter’s expertise of offshore exploration in the region. The canvas of collaboration extends from joint offshore exploration, shared ownership of projects, joint development of deep water ports and undertaking joint research projects in the High North. Adding fillip to this collaborative tempo is the increased transit revenue for Russia, generated by the surge in Chinese trade passing through the NSR. At the same time, cooperation in the Arctic over the last few years has not contributed towards alleviating the longstanding conflict between the two countries in the Russian Far East, especially on demographic issues.¹⁰

The US Response

US Policy Focus. The renewal of great power competition has raised concerns on the priority that should be given to the Arctic in overall US policymaking. During the post-Cold War era, when the Arctic was generally a region of cooperation and low tensions, there may have been less need to devote attention and resources to the Arctic. But, with increasing polar ice melting and resultant quest for resources, USA is increasing its national focus on Arctic, while adopting a more prominent position regarding the region.

Response to Russian and Chinese Arctic Ambitions. In May 2019, the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, acknowledged the Arctic as “an arena for power and for competition,” and countered China’s claims to be a ‘Near-Arctic State.’ Even though he was accommodative towards Chinese investments in the region, he insisted that it needed to be transparent and constructive, and avoid the “pattern of aggressive behaviour elsewhere.” As regards Russia, Secretary Pompeo expressed concern about Moscow’s territorial claims, intensified military presence, and plans to integrate the NSR with Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road. Summing up the US Administration’s outlook, he said, “Under President Trump, we are fortifying America’s security and diplomatic presence in the area.”¹¹

US DoD Arctic Strategy. The US Department of Defence (DoD) released its Arctic Strategy in 2019 (an updated 2016 version), with specific focus on DoD’s strategic trajectory for the region. The document puts forth the department’s vision and strategic approach for protecting US national security interests in the region. Importantly, the document acknowledges the current period as an “era of strategic competition” and articulates the desired end-state for the Arctic as “a secure and stable region in which USA national security interests are safeguarded, the US homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges.”¹²

Military Actions. USA has also commenced construction of polar ice-cutters for undertaking both, Arctic as well as Antarctic missions by the US Coast Guard. As regards its operational philosophy for the region, the last few years have witnessed a strong case being made by the US administration for conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Arctic. Aimed primarily at contesting Russian claims, which categorise the NSR as an internal rather than an international body of water, these operations are an important cornerstone of the larger US strategy for the region. In a more recent development, and as a demonstration of its increased focus towards the Arctic, the US Navy deployed a four-ship Task Group in the Barents Sea in May this year.¹³ Importantly, this is the first such deployment by the US Navy in the region since the end of the Cold War.

Implications for India

India and the Arctic. India’s engagement with the Arctic started in 1923, when as part of the British Empire, it joined the Svalbard Treaty. The Treaty permitted signatories to undertake commercial activities on Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago. Subsequently, post-independence, India’s polar focus turned to the Antarctic, where it presently operates two research stations.¹⁴ Acknowledging the growing focus on the Arctic, in 2008, India inaugurated its first Arctic research station, Himadri. The other important developments included grant of Observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, and conclusion of a deal between ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Russia’s Rosneft in 2014 to explore oil and gas in the region.

Statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs - 2013. A statement titled India and the Arctic, released in 2013 by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), articulated India’s official stance and objectives on the Arctic. It acknowledged that, “Arctic region is increasingly being effected by external global forces and in turn is poised to play an increasingly greater role in shaping the course of world affairs.”¹⁵ It also stated that, “India has been closely following the developments in the Arctic region and India’s interests in the region are scientific, environmental, commercial as well as strategic.” Importantly, the statement identified the following objectives of the Indian research in the Arctic: -

• To study the hypothesised tele-connections between the Arctic climate and the Indian monsoon.

• To characterise sea ice in the Arctic using satellite data to estimate the effect of global warming in the northern polar region.

• To conduct research on the dynamics and mass budget of Arctic glaciers focusing on their effect on sea-level change.

• To carry out a comprehensive assessment of the flora and fauna of the Artic vis-à-vis their response to anthropogenic activities.

Why is Arctic Important for India?

India’s Arctic focus, till date, has largely been centred on scientific research. The true potential of the region, in safeguarding and promoting India’s security and developmental needs, remains to be fully harnessed. With measures focused on increased cooperation and collaboration with important Arctic states, India would need to pursue a recalibrated approach to the region. The following four key issues emerge as the ‘front and centre’ of the Arctic’s growing strategic context and merit due consideration: -

• Access to Resources. Receding sea ice and permafrost thaw is significantly impacting the accessibility to the region’s mineral and energy resources. A US Geological Survey report in 2008 estimated that the area north of the Arctic circle is likely to store 90 billion barrels of oil, 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, and 1,760 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, collectively accounting for nearly 22% of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources of the world.¹⁶ With advancements in exploration technology, supported through climatic changes and access to shipping routes, the quest for these resources is likely to increase with time.

• Increasing Chinese Influence. China’s interest and influence in the Arctic has witnessed a significant upsurge in the last few years, implementing a threefold strategy to meet its goals. First, is to use its economic might to gain leverage over the region’s vulnerable actors. Secondly, is to effectively tap into the multilateralism sentiment of many Arctic nations. And thirdly, is to invest in Arctic oil and gas, example of which is China’s significant investments in Russia’s Yamal natural gas fields. Collectively, this strategy would provide China increased access to the region and its resources, a passage through its shipping routes and, most importantly, an economic dependency for Arctic states, which it can exploit for unilateral advantage.¹⁷

• Indian Investments in the Region. India has accorded a positive focus towards oil and gas exploration in the region. India and Russia’s oil and gas companies have signed agreements and are cooperating on 36 shared production projects as well as offshore exploration. Further, OVL holds a 26% stake in Russia’s Vankorneft and a 20% stake in the Sakhalin-I project. Recently, Gas Authority of Indian Limited (GAIL) renegotiated its 20-year LNG agreement with Russia’s Gazprom, adding two million tonnes to the previously concluded deal of 2.5 million tonnes per year and extending the term by three years. Further, in 2019, a consortium of Indian energy firms - Indian Oil, OVL and Bharat Petro Resources entered into an agreement with Rosneft for projects in the Arctic region.¹⁸ Expanding the basket of energy import options is an important planning agenda and, therefore, protection of these interests would remain a key security consideration in times to come.

Policy Recommendations

National Strategy for the Arctic. In light of the increasing inter-linkages between the Arctic region and global power-play, it is imperative that an apex-level strategy be formulated with a coherent and synergised ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to the region. It is important for such a policy document to set India’s comprehensive strategic priorities, and position India to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from the significant increase in Arctic activity. India’s long-term national security interests in the Arctic region, and prioritised lines of effort, would need to be conceptualised as part of this strategic framework. In this regard, the following overarching strategic objectives are recommended to steer future national effort in the Arctic: -

• Build Arctic awareness founded on the ongoing scientific research effort in the Arctic, with the aim of establishing an evidence-based causal relationship between the region’s developments and its impact on India.

• Enhance engagement with Arctic states to shape India’s future cooperative engagement, and define our continuing and constructive role in the Arctic Council. Pursuing a strategy for conducting polar engagement, under a guiding principle of ‘Polar Zone of Peace’ may find wide spread support as well as global acceptance.

• India’s firm and resolute commitment towards promoting prosperity and sustainable development of the region should serve as the guiding vision for our future presence and sustained operations in the Arctic region.

Polar Commission. At present, the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) is responsible for scientific exploration and research undertaken in the polar regions of Antarctica and Arctic. While scientific research remains an important driver of India’s interest in these regions, the increasing economic, environmental and commercial stakes merit a broader management of India’s polar strategy. Therefore, it is recommended that, on lines of the domain of ‘space,’ a ‘Polar Commission’ be constituted. This would give a much required fillip to India’s polar strategy, bringing all concerned stakeholders together and channelising their efforts in a synergised manner.

Arctic Research

India’s commitment to research in the Arctic was bolstered in 2018, with the renaming of the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research as the National Centre for Polar and Oceanic Research.²² Further, India’s first Polar Research Vessel is also likely to be commissioned soon. This would allow planning of diverse scientific programmes, which were limited hitherto, due to the chartered nature of ice-cargo vessels used for such missions by Indian researchers. The Navy could leverage this opportunity by participating in future Arctic missions and incorporate important domain aspects into future operational planning.