PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES: A FOOTSOLDIER’S PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

Professional Military Education (PME) is the foundation on which the ability of military professionals lies for the purpose of successfully accomplishing their assigned tasks and responsibilities in peace and war. Interestingly, while the components of PME have been listed variously depending upon the source one reads from,the author failed to find any source where PME could be defined clearly.

For the purpose of this article, we shall be focusing on PME for officers of the Indian Armed Forces and not dwell on service or domain specific PME, since at a certain level, regardless of their specialist domain, officers across the service are expected to have the ability to understand and act on matters concerning the service as a whole. With this background, currently PME for officers contains the following milestones, which are analogous to the Just-In-Time (JIT) concept: -

• Young Officers Courses. Attended by officers post their commissioning. Provides officers with an understanding at the tactical level with an overview of different arms of their respective service.

• Staff Course (at Defence Services Staff College). Attended by officers between 11 to 14 years’ service. The curriculum provides exposure to the operational level and basic understanding of Civil-Military Relations (CMR).

• Higher Command/Higher Defence Management Course (at respective War Colleges/College of Defence Management). Attended by officers between 18 to 22 years’ service, it aims at the development of strategic military thought and defence management precepts amongst student officers, along with a deeper understanding of CMR.

• National Security and Strategic Study Course (at the National Defence College). Attended by officers between 26 to 28 years’ service.

The curriculum is pitched at the national strategic security level.

Why Professional Military Education?

The foundation of PME in India appears rooted in the JIT concept; as an officer progresses along the career trajectory, he/she is equipped with the skillset to execute nearer-term assigned responsibilities. Prior to the birth of the nation-state, the king or emperor was a statesman and military professional rolled into one. As nation-states emerged, the concept of democracy took root and with that came the need to maximise military professionalism since a competent and professional military was subordinate to political authority.

Maximisation of military professionalism was needed across rank and file, since military officers were professionals dedicating their lives to this calling. While a lot of it came through experience in various assignments, a common level of experience was not available to all. The General Staff of the Prussian Army was among the early results as the need was recognised. By the First World War, general staffs were far more common and began to address the felt need.¹ The introduction of the tank, the aeroplane and even the submarine in the First World War was the first instance of militaries witnessing the tectonic impact of technology in battle (artillery had had its share of glory for some time).

The world moved on from Industry 2.0 affairs with technological advances.² It moved on to Industry 3.0 and as technology leapfrogged into the military domain, PME needed to keep pace.³ By all accounts, the Second World War played a major role in the way technology became the enabling differentiator, from tactical to strategic level. Project Manhattan brought another dimension into warfighting.⁴ As technology and the adversary kept the character of war in a constant state of mutation, PME needed to adjust to the mutating threat. Militaries across the world integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence into their combat manuals and training.

The First Gulf War, a watershed event in the military world (followed by Industry 4.0), had two key takeaways: -⁵

• The impact of technology and information, and the highly aligned, loosely coupled sensor-shooter systems, made the owner of ordnance less relevant; the desired effect and its impact on operations mattered much more.

• The war was a litmus test of jointmanship. The US military was put into serious military action for the first time after its structural and operational transformation consequent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

PME seemed to have been redefined overnight, in a revolutionary rather than evolutionary manner. The First Gulf War surfaced the term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). As with other militaries, the Indian Armed Forces have inducted modern weapon and sensor systems that fit in with our concept of operations and threat matrix. Training incorporates the technical knowhow to operate and exploit these systems. But has PME in the Indian military kept pace?

Themes for PME

Before we go further, let us understand the drivers of effective PME. Just like Principles of War are fundamental, the author suggests that there are some important themes within PME. The following constitute a sort of a catalogue of such themes: -

• The Character of Warfare. From trench warfare, the evolution of mechanized operations, the arrival of amphibious operations, aerial dominance, aerospace systems, Electro Magnetic (EM) spectrum management, information warfare, operational logistics, jointness, unmanned systems and the omni-present nuclear overhang, warfare is a constantly evolving animal. Long range surveillance and targeting are the new precepts that guide warfare. Satellites, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and miniaturisation of drone technology have made the theatre of war far more transparent. Long-range targeting complements battlefield information by delivering accurate fire. There is even lesser teeth or tail in present-day warfighting. The military machine is an integrated (or joint) animal.

• Technological Competence. In the corporate world there is an oft repeated saying “Every Company is a Tech Company.”⁶ The same is relevant to the military. A military professional, regardless of professional specialisation, needs to be well-versed with world-wide technological advances. Industry 4.0, Internet of Things (IoT), Blockchain, Pattern Recognition, Deep Learning, Machine Learning, Big Data, Additive Manufacturing, 5G communication, Edge and Quantum Computing, Data Analytics are many that come to mind (cyber security and such are a given in contemporary times). Is there a systemic structure in place to provide even a primer of knowledge related to these? Technological competence also gives rise to thinking ‘out of the box’ and a capacity to join the dots.

• Civil-Military Relations. There are no more autonomous military spheres in a theatre of war. Given the power and instantaneous mass reach of social and conventional media, military practitioners cannot remain disconnected from political forces in the operational environment. Working with the civilian administration is a reality.

• CBRN Training. For numerous militaries world-wide, operations under a nuclear overhang are a reality. Understanding its implications on military operations needs a grasp of the theory and practice of integrating CBRN measures in managing a combat force and executing operational missions before, during and after a CBRN event. CBRN planning must form part of Operational Orders to subordinate commanders at all levels.

• An Affinity for Data. Data is called the new oil.⁷ There is a propensity amongst commanders to call upon past experiences and extrapolate those circumstances to the situation confronting them. Incorporation of the commander’s opinions or hunches as assumptions in the planning process follows. Data seeks to purge opinions and hunches, and base decisions on well analysed and processed data. Cleaned, refined and analysed data is a powerful decision-making tool that replaces opinions and hunches. Managing existing data, seeking better and more data in future and creating better data processing tools and models provides better insights and interpretations. Data, and its analysis, must be shared across the organisation. The same data may mean different things to different verticals, making data visibility important.

• The Importance of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM). STEM is the foundation of critical thinking and innovation.⁸ Armed forces across the world put great premium on Critical, Analytical and Innovative Thinking (CAIT), but miss the bus nurturing CAIT. STEM subjects teach more than concepts of science and mathematics. They build a talent pool that helps the organisation stay abreast of technological developments. STEM subjects bring an exploratory, open ended and hypothesis-based fact-finding structure to problem solving.

• Elevating Thought to Mission Command. Establishing the understanding that tactical actions have operational and strategic ramifications, to grasp the implications of one’s role in the broader scheme is vital. This is one of the foundational concepts of Mission Command.⁹ In the fog of war and friction of operations, irrespective of transparency and near real time information flow, there will be breakdown in communications and information flow. Mission Command will come into play wherein the tactical commander will need a ‘long view’ of the operational situation and bind success at the tactical and higher levels in chorus.

• Igniting Strategic Thought. PME must ignite the spark of strategic thought in officers from a young age to understand that armies, air forces and navies do not go to war. Nations go to war or find themselves in a war of another’s choosing. Strategic thought must, therefore, include an understanding of political, economic, social, technological and other environmental factors that impact, directly and indirectly, the theatre of operations. Strategic thought helps identify the invisible before it manifests in an adversarial shape. The study of military history is inexorably linked to strategic studies.

• Leadership and Management. As any conflict, and preparedness for conflicts show, leadership remains central at all levels from the political to the tactical. At the same time, the “management” of violence through the mil-political instruments require eponymous management approaches in complex ways. Leadership and management are not contradictory PME and real-life demands; they are complementary. Further, a well-crafted PME structure needs practical training through a feedback mechanism.

• Jointness. The criticality of jointness hardly needs reiteration. PME plays a major role in bringing together officers from different services, at different experience levels, to generate an understanding of jointness, focus on joint planning (rather than planning jointly), understanding the capabilities and constraints of each service and learning about fire-delivery systems available across services. Graduated increase in the degree of jointness at each level facilitates a deeper investment and involvement in the success of jointness.

• Peer to Peer (P2P) Interaction. This happens at two levels; first, PME establishments (especially those dealing with joint training) cross-pollinate thoughts of faculty and students by a Knowledge Management System (KMS) that facilitates exchange of ideas/information and interaction. Second, the student body itself includes a panoply of officers/professionals from various organisational bodies that impact national security or have a stake in matters that impact national security. Such P2P interaction seeks to eliminate biases, fosters understanding and develops a healthy appreciation of each other’s role in the national security matrix.

• Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as Faculty. PME is shaped and reinvigorated not only by those who are meant to practice the art of war, but also by scholars and SMEs who have a deep understanding of developments around the world through their pursuits in chosen fields. This also promotes inter-agency and multi-agency integration and cooperation with the military. These SMEs help in curriculum formulation, upgradation and review. It aids in keeping PME relevant and contemporary and avoids possible pitfalls that may come with an inward-looking approach that purely uniformed faculty may bring.

The Trap of Decay

In the corporate world, successful businesses stay relevant by periodically asking themselves, “What business are we in?” And having identified the strategic gap in their business model, they undertake interventions to stay relevant in their business. Business school graduates who go on to form the top management of corporates have the following drilled into them since day one: -

• An inactive organisation resists change and gradually decays and fades away, since its product becomes irrelevant to customers.

• A reactive organisation changes, but only when forced, due to changes in its business environment. It depends on sub-par performance feedback from unhappy customers.

• A proactive organisation has forecasting tools that makes strategic changes on the fly, based on real-time voice of the customer.

• An interactive organisation creates a favourable future for itself. It leads the way by creating structures and systems that have a revolutionary impact on the entire business environment. Other players are left to play catch-up.

Military professionals must ask of themselves two questions - “How is the military strategic environment changing?” and “How are we reacting to the changing environment?” It will immediately dawn upon us the type of organisation we are. Of course, merely asking these questions is not enough; corrective actions must follow the internal inquisition, otherwise militaries may lose their relevance the next time they are called upon to meet national security objectives.

A Review Through the Lens of PME Themes

Let us now examine the existing PME structure through the lens of the PME themes discussed earlier. This examination would be critical; there is no point highlighting what we are good at (inactive organisation); we need to be more concerned with what may be wrong or where we may be found wanting (reactive, proactive or interactive organisation). This would serve to give us a reality check on the state of affairs as far as PME is concerned.

• The Character of Warfare. We still seem to be more comfortable living in a world of armour breakouts, strike and holding Corps, Divisions as the first all-arms level fighting formation, fleet level manoeuvres at sea, even as infighting continues over control of aviation assets. This, while the rest of the world moved much earlier to Brigade and Regimental Combat Team (BCT and RCT) concepts, and Distributed Lethality Task Forces (DLTF) at sea. This, even as enemy drones surprised us with alarming low-level attacks at an Air Force station or defence against ballistic and other missiles, is not sufficiently considered. Our syllabi essentially remain entrenched in fighting the last war. We refuse to study the likelihood of attacks on fleet units at sea by swarms of fishing boats and trying to find means to combat such threats. Refusing to acknowledge a threat also eliminates the need to study and counter it. Even as professional militaries are integrating support structure into fighting elements at the lowest levels (read RCT), we are busy talking about supporting arms and combat arms, and structuring exercises around each, rather than looking at all-arms integrated exercises.

• Technological Competence. Today’s operator must also be an innovator, an innovator of ideas on ensuring that technology leapfrogs the capability it provides. Technological advance must look beyond jury-rigging equipment, at creating ideas for next generation equipment. Whilst service specific training establishments can ignite that spark, research work and applied thought is abysmally lacking at institutions across levels of PME. It is unlikely that any path-breaking research or ideas have emerged from the hundreds of dissertations submitted annually at our joint training establishments. Almost all these establishments espouse their eminence as Centres of Excellence (COEs). However, they miss the bus when it comes to such centres being the fountainhead of research in their fields.¹⁰

• Civil-Military Relations. The narrative of this subject ought to be on cooperation rather than confrontation. But CMR (essentially the pol-mil and civilian bureaucracy) studies in the Indian Armed Forces have a distinct orientation towards highlighting what is wrong rather than what is right or possible. This widens the ‘us versus them’ gap.

• The Nuclear Overhang. Every officer in service today, and in the future, will fight a battle under the nuclear overhang regardless of the scale and scope of the conflict. Unfortunately, hardly any faculty-led discussions or more than a solitary speaker (or two) is called to talk on the important aspects of nuclear deterrence strategies of N- architecture and lessons from the “nuclear age” let alone a deeper grasp of what nuclear overhang implies for several countries. In case we have convinced ourselves that our adversaries will not go nuclear, based on Kargil, Uri and Balakote, then we need to change our thinking. We cannot plan on a premise; if a threat exits, its counter must be taught. Unfortunately, capstone exercises at joint training establishments are not conducted under the nuclear overhang. Will the lessons learnt in such exercises be real world?

• An Affinity for Data. All services have copious lists of returns that are rendered periodically to higher headquarters. But what becomes of those returns? What happens to all that performance data? Is it processed and made available to field units to undertake operational process improvement? If yes, the amount is probably rather dismal. A big reason for this is lack of comfort with data processing tools. We are all proficient at MS Word and MS PowerPoint. But talk of MS Excel and the reality is stark. Very few are au fait with the software and its capabilities. It is a basic data analytics tool. Then why not start early, at the service academies? Make every officer fully comfortable with the software. Further, creation of information systems that give visibility to data and its manipulation to derive meaningful analyses is vital. Developing an understanding of what data needs to be collected, how it needs to be manipulated/processed, how the right questions ought to be asked (else we shall be back to “Garbage In/Garbage Out”), and how models can be created to process any information at any level without waiting for information to trickle down from higher formations, is the need of the hour.

• Importance of STEM. This author once read an article by another officer wherein he had recalled the pride he felt when at the training academy he was issued the same textbook on a STEM subject that his father had been issued over 25 years earlier. Doesn’t this tell us something about syllabus review and the importance we lay on STEM subjects? Another question we may ask of ourselves: how many dissertations/research papers on STEM topics have come out of core training establishments? Is no one studying them because no one is teaching or speaking about them?

• Elevating Thought to the Operational Level. This is specifically relevant to the mid-career PME courses. The outcome desired by each service at the operational level of warfare is disparate and so, one wonders at the actual depth of jointness achieved.

• Developing Strategic Thought. At almost every joint training establishment, the Directing Staff (DS) are likely to be more concerned with conforming to “DS” solutions rather than using opportunities for experimentation and developing attributes of risk-taking and initiative by student-players during wargames. Students are steered to generate plans and options that DS seek, and this could curb creativity and innovation. CAIT thinking requires creation of a context rather than exercising control. The strategic realm is often foggy and needs a practitioner to make sense of events, trends and interests. A context helps develop this understanding. Strategic theory is unforgiving; mistakes often have very serious national and even international ramifications. High performance is also fostered through context. In reality, control trumps context and strategic thought is channelled into parochial conduits.

• Leadership and Management. Here maximum stress is laid on values. But what is often forgotten is that values are what we value. This reflects in who is rewarded, promoted or let go. When we discourage questioning of inconsistency or do not penalize behaviour that is unwanted, we are not valuing our values. Any education of leadership - no matter how necessary - is thereafter, cynically viewed against the gaps, real and perceived, between the walk and the talk. It is quite noticeable that not a single joint training establishment or War College has an Honour Code, let alone an Honour Code Committee. While acknowledging some security classification issues that may exist, not all PME institutions publish students’ or faculties’ research work on their website (a matter of pride for military establishments world-wide) even when academic accreditation with civilian universities and academic stipulations require that only unclassified reference material is used. Could a reason be because of relatively easy attitudes to absolute prohibition of plagiarism? If values are not what we value, what do we value?

• Jointness. Sitting together in a lecture hall and listening to a guest speaker or a DS is not quite joint training. Jointness is about joint warfighting; it is about joint planning so that services operate in a highly aligned but loosely coupled manner that allows pairing of sensors and shooters to achieve desired fires and effects. Every joint session should focus on joint warfighting and its relationship with tenets of Operational Art that focus on joint operations (Op Fires, Op Logistics, Op Design, Op Manoeuvre). A chunk of training time is wasted in teaching the basics of each service to students from other services. It is unacceptable that officers above 5 to 7 years’ service are unaware of the organisation and structure of other services. In fact, despite the need for it, not much stress is laid on a comprehensive understanding of operational art in PME. Jointness will remain a pipedream unless fundamental issues are addressed.

• P2P Interaction. Integrated KMS is unheard of in our PME. There is a forum where the War Colleges meet up for exchange but these interactions are structured and bureaucratic; a learning journey has to be exploratory and on call. Whilst P2P interaction amongst officers of the uniformed services takes place at the desired level, limited vacancies for government/parastatal bodies that impact national security or have a stake in policy matters is undesirable. Importance of such an interaction cannot be stressed enough, and vacancies must be made available to these organizations in most, if not all, joint courses.

• SMEs as Faculty. Whilst some joint training establishments have visiting faculties who conduct specific capsules, there is no resident civilian SME as faculty at any joint training establishment. The fear of unwanted motivations (political or ideological) is well taken, but there are mechanisms to avoid them. The opportunity for students to develop thinking along a continuum of options (as academic scholars do) rather than seek out a DS solution (as military DS are wont to do) would help break the mould of straightjacketed solutions and nurture critical thinking and research.

There are some cultural or organisational issues as well that we need to address as far as PME is concerned. But before we delve further into that, a segue is in order. A top Indian multinational has a policy akin to study leave. This corporate house encourages executives and managers to undertake training programs, from minor certifications to a two-year MBA program anywhere in the world. It also pays for the programme. The catch: the returning student must undertake a month-long in-house programme to share knowledge with selected executives/managers. If these executives/managers do not rate the knowledge-sharing session 4 or more (out of 5), the returning student must refund the cost of the programme. Such is the level of premium put on gaining and sharing knowledge. The author would, as a corollary, compare this with selection for a Higher Command (HC) or Higher Defence Management Course (HDMC). Many officers selected for HDMC feel unhappy, not because HC is a better course but because HDMC demands academic rigour of a higher level whereas HC is perceived to be relatively lower on the scale of academic rigour. The idea here is not to berate a particular course but highlight the perception towards PME, which is seen as a break from the grind of soldiering and file pushing. Nothing could be or ought to be further from the truth; PME is a steppingstone towards higher responsibilities and preparation to undertake those responsibilities. Can there be a “wakeup call” for this literally laid-back attitude? If modernisation and capability upgradation is suffering in some cases, it may be directly related to the lack of rigour invested in that subject by the concerned desk officer during past PME opportunities. No wonder, even a former Defence Minister had termed the Staff Qualitative Requirements (SQRs) generated by a service as something straight out of Marvel comics.¹¹

Study Leave. The concept of study leave, aimed at maximising military potential in individuals through opportunities for self-education in chosen fields, has been reduced largely to a welfare measure. The panoply of courses that an officer can choose from incredibly is extremely vast, and much of it can be termed irrelevant to contemporary military practice, such that there is no quantifiable benefit the service achieves out of it. Officers primarily use it as a tool for preparation for post-retirement avenues. The service is that much poorer, in addition to the services of the officer being unavailable for two years.

Restructuring PME for the Future Indian Armed Forces - Where do we Start?

Training Academies. There are two reasons for this to be included here. First, this is hallowed ground where PME takes root. Second, during interaction with the DS at a PME establishment in 2021, the author was stunned to hear from a DS that in the DS’ view the purpose of training officers at that establishment (where officers came in at 12 to 14 years’ service) was to enable the officers to find their purpose in their careers and to groom them. His was also not an isolated view. If officers at 12 to 14 years’ service are yet to find their purpose, then our academies deserve a wake-up call. And can we as a military force define grooming? This incident highlighted the shortcoming of a system where a purely military faculty remains inward-looking. The faculty stays in its comfort zone of grooming and revealing purpose, while training time is wasted in such pursuits. The loss is not for the student officer to bear, but for the service and the nation. Thus, our training academies need to revisit their focus on: -

• Grooming character and professionalism and generating a sense of purpose in cadets. Regardless of the setting, if a DS had the occasion to highlight this issue, academies must undertake due diligence on it.

• Maintain a relentless focus on developing leadership qualities. The word “manage” must be removed from the lexicon of cadet language, as it develops negative connotations very early in their careers. Defence management itself gets a rough deal downstream!

• Develop a spirit of enquiry by nurturing a habit of reading about technological developments and their impact on cadets’ lives as tactical military practitioners.

• The training academies must focus on STEM subjects more diligently, rather than be satisfied with the label of a graduate degree on passing out. A cadet ought to have a sense of pride on earning the degree that comes thorough due to the rigour associated with an undergraduate course. Only then will a semblance of seriousness come in for future PME programmes he or she aspires for. The syllabus should be tuned to facilitate cadets in their professional performance in their careers, while keeping an eye on advancements in technology. An example of such tailored curriculum exists in the Naval Academy, and could serve as a model for others as well. The curriculum must be reviewed periodically to remain relevant.

The Way Ahead

Academies and Young Officers Courses. Basic training must move away from stereotyped undergraduate programmes that have outlived their utility to a fine balance between contemporary STEM subjects and service-oriented technological exposure. A case-based pedagogy is considered vital to develop understanding and a spirit of enquiry. Humanities must develop an understanding of world economy, international relations, political science and military history. Officers’ courses must build on the foundation laid by service academies and drive technological understanding at the tactical level while providing an inclusive perspective of data-driven decision making, leadership, management and jointness. Appreciation of joint operations must be sparked here, before service specific biases creep in. Syllabus audit must be a periodic process overseen by a team of neutral observers, including civilian SMEs.

Higher Command/Higher Defence Management Course. These courses need to step up to pure military-strategic context, with an exposure to the national security domain. The course curriculum needs to be practical rather than theory-based with exercises and simulations driving knowledge development. Tours to technology giants as well as Technology MSMEs and SMEs in India and elsewhere could help develop a deeper understanding on the direction military technologies ought to take. These tours should be followed by exercises where students write technology roadmap papers. Critical thinking and innovation develop from the art of writing ideas on paper and then subjecting them to critical review. An exposure to world economy, geopolitics, geo-economics, humanities and international relations is also useful at this level. Data-driven decision making must be solidified as another driver of military thought. The proportion of civilian officers in this course could also be much higher than exists at present.

Study Leave. Study leave must be persisted with; however, the options of courses that an officer can pursue must be pruned down to those relevant to the military. In addition, officers must necessarily be posted to staff or training assignments on completion of study leave to maximise sharing of the knowledge gained. A case for study leave must be grounded in service requirements, rather than being a personal incentive or a welfare measure. Research work produced by an officer as part of the study leave must be peer-reviewed by a panel of SMEs to ensure suitable academic rigour.

Conclusion

This authors book, The Wellington Experience, was received well amongst the majority readers in India. While it may have its own biases, and a small data and opinion base, for this author, it was largely a reflection of reality.¹² The first step is to appreciate and accept criticism and then analyse it. This is also a building block of Emotional Intelligence (EI), a key leadership trait. The general adverse reaction this publication received in Indian military circles is a reflection of our difficulty in accepting feedback and change. We are quite consumed by our conviction in the correctness of our systems, processes, and procedures and thus unwilling to look beyond. The archaic and outdated contents of many professional publications/precis that we still teach from in many PME programmes, to our obduracy in integrating civilian SMEs as faculty, to the lack of development of operational and strategic thought cannot be brushed aside too long. A limited skirmish such as Kargil (1999) or even Nathu La (1967) will not expose the chinks in our PME systems as the young officer and the gallant soldier will carry the battle on their shoulders, but a Galwan had the potential to blow up and expose some of the deficiencies that we have been carrying, with difficulty in acknowledging and correcting them. The Galwan pot continues to simmer and China is a very different animal.

This conclusion does not seek to be an archetypal summary. It merely espouses that we need to pursue the deficiencies that our PME system has in providing a much broader and wider world-view to military professionals as students of the art and science of war and warfare. Our PME must create human capital that has the appropriate assessment of the national security environment and the tools available to meet rising challenges. Without referring to the concept of scholar-warrior and its relevance or otherwise, we need to look at maximising military professionalism; to creating systems that address shortcomings by accepting them, studying their cause(s) and solutions that fix the problem.

To wrap up, this author would like to highlight a few salient points about this paper that may already be apparent. This is not a research paper, and the absence of copious footnotes/endnotes would have made that apparent. This is a not a compilation of feelings and hunches; it is an assemblage of thoughts and ideas churning in the mind of the author ever since a tenure as DS, exposure to a business management course and work thereafter, in an agile corporation. These thoughts and ideas have been reinforced and distilled through the shared wisdom of several seniors, peers and admired junior comrades, and transformed to the written word after serious consideration. The author is not a graduate of NDC and interaction with graduates of NDC was undertaken for this paper to evolve suitably. Thoughts and ideas from those interactions are part of this paper.

Finally, to quote Margaret Thatcher - “I love argument, I love debate. I don’t expect anyone just to sit there and agree with me; that’s not their job.” This paper seeks to generate that argument and debate.

Endnotes

1. Wilkinson Spenser, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1913), 173-191.

2. Nilüfer Serinikli, “Transformation of Business With Digital Processes,” IGI Global. https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/transformation-of-business-with-digital-processes/71028, accessed 20 November 2021.

3. Ibid.

4. “Manhattan Project: United States history,” Encyclopaedia Britanica .https://www.britannica.com/event/Manhattan -Project, accessed 19 November 2021.

5. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf, accessed 19 November 2021.

6. Peter Sondergaard, “Keynote at the Gartner  Symposium 2013, ” https://itbrief.co.nz/story/gartner-every-company-is-a-technology-company, accessed 19 November 2021.

7. “Data is the New Oil of the Digital Economy,” Wired . https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/07/data-new-oil-digital-economy/, accessed 20 November 2021.

8. “What is the Value of STEM Education?” National Inventors Hall of Fame. https://www.invent.org/blog/trends-stem/value-stem-education, accessed 19 November 2021.

9. Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7, “Insight and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission Command.” https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/missioncommand_fp_2nd_ed.pdf?ver= 2020-01-13-083451-207, accessed 18 November 2021.

10. “Centers of  Excellence (CoEs),” Project Management Institute. https://www.pmi.org/disciplined-agile/people/centers-of-excellence, accessed 20 November 2021.

11. Rahul Bedi, “Services’ Penchant for ‘Utopian’ Materiel,” The Tribune, 23 May 2019. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/comment/services-penchant-for-utopian-materiel-776995, accessed 21 November 2021.

12. David Smith, The Wellington Experience: A Study of Attitudes and Values Within the Indian Army (The Stimson Center: Washington DC, 2020).