PLA’S MULTI-DOMAIN PRECISION WARFARE

‘Precision guided weapons will become the main means of attack’

- Chinese Science of Military Strategy 2020

Introduction

Numerous ongoing conflicts in different parts of the world have highlighted the importance of MDPW. The two most intense conflicts, Russia-Ukraine and Iran-Israel have witnessed both confronting sides execute strikes using missiles, drones, rockets, and air strikes suitably synergised with cyber-attacks, decoys, and space-based provision of accurate Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR). In a GPS-denied, drone-infested, electromagnetically (EM) contested, densely congested Air-Defence (AD) battlespace, militaries try and exploit all possible domains and advanced technologies to enhance the precision of their strikes. Precision is important to minimise collateral damage in the intense social-media invasive battlespace, minimise the need and cost of heavy barrages and maximise the destruction potential. The optimal exploitation of all possible domains facilitates penetrating an adversary’s EW and AD networks through saturation and pre-emptive suppression. The major takeaways from the ongoing conflicts are the return to “trench” and attrition warfare, the miniaturisation of drones, commercialisation of space, technological innovations in battlefield, and formation of tactical and operational Reconnaissance Strike Complexes (RSC). They have all together enhanced multi-domain precision strike capabilities and reduced kill-chain cycles.

CPC and PLA have been closely watching these conflicts, testing many technologies, displaying latest strategic and tactical capabilities, and applying the lessons learnt in PLA’s organisational structuring, doctrinal evolution, and cross-domain synergy with every new exercise in and around Taiwan Strait and along Indian borders. In coherence with the Chinese Rejuvenation Dream, Mr Xi Jinping, CMC Chairman has directed the PLA to accelerate the preparations to become a world-class military by 2049. A major preparatory step in that direction is the year of 2027, marking the PLA’s Centenary, by which it is supposed to have basically modernised its strategic forces and precision strike capabilities.¹ As per Xi’s latest directions, further amplified by his Military Deputy CMC’s Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia during PLA’s Military Theory Work Conference from 14 to 16 October 2024, the Centennial goal of 2027 has been designated PLA’s core task with focussed development of strategic capabilities.² Xi’s follow-up visits to 611 Missile Brigade of PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), Headquarters of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps³ and then to Headquarters of Information Support Force (ISF) are indicative of his emphasis on multi-domain strategic capabilities to dominate the strategic commanding heights of modern battlespace.

PLA’s Desired Multi-Domain Precision Warfare Capabilities

This longish excerpt from the Science of Military Strategy is of significant importance:

“Compared with the era of mechanization, the main position of the army in war has changed.... Under the conditions of informatisation and intelligence, the combat capability depends more and more on the quality of the army rather than the quantity, and the military significance of the number and scale of the combat unit or group is relatively weakened. The suddenness, complexity, diversity, and uncertainty of future threats also require faster response capabilities… At present, there is still a certain gap between the level of our army’s weapons and equipment compared with military powers, and a certain amount is still needed to make up for the lack of quality… Vigorously advance the Army’s informatisation⁴ and intelligence construction,⁵ increase the informatisation and intelligence content of the Army’s equipment, gradually expand the size of the information operations force, and add various types of electronic countermeasures to the theatre and the group army. Comprehensively improve the army’s information offensive and defensive capabilities and enable the army to move from plain to three-dimensional, and from single-dimensional to multi-dimensional.”

-The Science of Military Strategy 2020⁶

The 2020 edition of PLA’s SMS introduced the term Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (MDIJO) and called it as the basic operational form⁷ henceforth for PLA. MDIJO, as per PLA’s military scholars, is an operational evolution from horizontally networked sub-domain joint operations to both vertical and horizontally connected cross-domain joint operations.⁸ Numerous PLA military authors have further written about MDPW, a sub-set of MDIJO. MDPW is basically striking all types of targets accurately adhering to the new combat phrase ‘Detection Equals Destruction.’ The standard horizontally networked battlespace kill-chains involved an optimum combat integration of ISR sensors with strike assets to detect, acquire, track, strike, assess and re-engage if required. However, compressed decision cycles with enhanced battlefield transparency, necessity of quick combat transition, precision for cost-effectiveness and minimum collateral damage in a social-media-transparent battlespace, and the temporal-shortening of kill-chain cycles to engage dynamic targets has necessitated cross-domain near real time linkages of sensors and shooters horizontally, vertically, and even diagonally across organisational networks. For example, an illustration of a notional Multi-Domain Anti-Ship Ballistic-Missile (ASBM) Kill Chain is given below:

PLA’s push for enhanced Informatisation and basic Intelligentisation for establishment of tactical and operational RSCs, under the umbrella of MDIJO, to execute MDPW has thus necessitated PLA to establish multi-domain kill webs. The multi-domain kill-web established connects the systems across both tangible domains that include air, land, sea, space, and non-tangible domains like cyber, electromagnetic, and cognitive to carry out a comprehensive multi-domain multi-dimensional strike.⁹ The SMS 2020 amplifies that ‘The battlefield information network with the C4ISRK system as the centre can connect battlefield perception, network communication, command and control, precision strikes, and support systems.’¹⁰ The nomenclature of combat terms may just be propaganda and a linguistic gimmick. However, if multiple Chinese documents for capability development for world-class army are stitched together, PLA is clearly accelerating the pursuance of following multi-domain capabilities to enhance their precision strike proficiencies:

• Real-time precise information acquisition and transmission. To achieve this objective as specified in SMS 2020, Chinese space scientists are aiming to build a Space Trilogy comprising Positioning, Navigation, Timing, Remote Sensing, and Communication (PNTRSC) satellites. While regional coverage of China and BRI countries necessitates 50 EO, 50 SAR, 150 communication satellites for 24x7 coverage from Chinese perspective, global coverage requires 200 RS and 300 communication satellites. Additionally, they are aiming at temporal resolution of 5 min, PNT accuracy of 0.5m, most importantly on-orbit processing and communication time <1 minute to reach user's mobile phone.¹¹ While these are highly ambitious projects, PLA has achieved significant ISR capabilities but is critically short on communication satellites on which they are focussing very seriously.

• Precise Means of Attack. PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), as per SMS 2020, has been mandated to develop medium and long-range large-scale conventional precision strike capabilities. The long-range precision weapons are also planned to be used for warning strikes, both medium and high density, forming the eighth step of China’s deterrence escalation ladder. PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) has also been mandated to enhance precision operations. The execution of precision strike, from PLA’s perspective requires accurate detection, positioning, and application of precision guided weapons, and accurate evaluation of strike effects. PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is mandated to ensure that precision guided weapons become its main means of attack. PLA Navy (PLAN) has been given the mandate of employing carrier-based UAVs and unmanned surface ships to revolutionise long-range precision strikes on land targets.¹²

• Precise Information Support. PLA aims to ensure guaranteed information support at the right time, place, and amount. SMS 2020 amplifies this attribute by stating ‘The way of fighting, with precise asymmetric, non-contact, and non-linear long-range firepower strikes, destroys the enemy's combat system, forcing the enemy to fight against us at unexpected opportunities, inadequately prepared regions, and using incomplete systems and hastily selected tactics.’¹³

• Reformed Combat Organisation. PLA aims to undertake deep reform of its organisational structures across the breadth and depth¹⁴ to make them process-oriented, and refined, thereby making PLA’s combat process control more precise and efficient. To achieve this, informatisation must increasingly pursue high-efficiency, high-benefit, low-risk, and low-cost small and medium scale precision operations.

Thus, PLA desires to establish a Multi-Domain Kill Web to enhance its Anit-Access Area Denial (A2AD bubble as called by Western scholars) as part of its Active Defence Strategy in the new Informatisation era. It mainly aims to achieve the following: -

• ISR. A Mult-Domain ISR (MDISR) network, primarily Aerospace Force (ASF) enabled and space-based for assured near real-time Indo-Pacific region coverage and maximum possible global 24x7 coverage. The other services and arms, primarily Cyber-Space Force (CSF) and Information Support Force (ISF) have their own multi-domain ISR organisational structures to complement them as illustrated below across the various intelligence disciplines, such as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) comprising Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMNINT), Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT) for generation of Common Operating Intelligence Picture (COIP). PLA aims to exploit this MDISR network to detect, cue other source to corroborate, acquire accurate geospatial coordinates, track dynamic targets, and conduct battle-damage assessment post engagement.

Fig 2: PLA’s MDISR Grid (Source-Author’s Research)

• Multi-Domain Precision Strike Network. PLA is aiming to expand its multi-domain precision strike capabilities particularly long-range strikes. PLARF has clearly shifted its focus away from SRBMs to MRBMs and IRBMs. PLAGF has covered that gap with the induction of Long-Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) like PCL 191. Based on the various new inductions, as confirmed in Military Balance 2024¹⁵ and US DoD Annual reports,¹⁶ PLA’s strike capabilities can be summarised as under:

Fig 3: PLA’s Multi-Domain Conventional Strike Assets (Source-Author’s Research)

• Communication. PLA’s famous claim of ‘Four Chains, One Network’ to integrate all sensors and shooters in one grid is completely dependent on secured multi-tiered multi-media communication means and informatisation platforms. While PLA’s biggest challenge has been getting satellite communication away from borders and coastline, it has tried to exploited military, government, and civil companies to expand 5G and OFC networks along its coastline and borders. Thus, the multi-media of Quantum, OFC, mobile and satellite communication means are being seamlessly integrated to ensure 24x7 communication coverage.

• Doctrine. Adequate focus is being put on doctrinal evolution like the recently conducted Military Theory Work Conference. Xi demanded an accelerated building of a modern, strengthened and transformed “Military Theory Content System with Chinese Characteristics.” ¹⁷

• Organisational. While Intelligentisation aims to minimise human involvement, PLA has aimed to streamline its organisation structures like the raising of new Long-Range Artillery Brigades and possibly even ISR brigades as assessed by Taiwanese OSINT experts.¹⁸

Hence, PLA’s desired kill web is assessed to be structured as below: -

Fig 4: PLA’s Notional Multi-Domain Kill Web (Source-Author’s Research)

Realistic Assessment of PLA’s MDPW Capabilities

Actions speak louder than words. While Xi has been forcing PLA to accelerate the development of MDPW capabilities, PLA’s lack of modern battle-experience and inadequate validation of its modern weapon systems, particularly in qualitative considerations has placed doubts over its claimed capabilities. However, it must be noted that CPC and PLA have mastered the art of grey zone standoffs along their borders and coastline. They have very effectively created crisis at areas of their choice, advanced their core interests without allowing escalation into war by maintaining effective control of the escalation ladder. Hence, there are great variations in military scholars’ calibration of PLA’s actual capabilities to build a multi-domain kill web. Hence, an unbiased attempt will be made to realistically assess PLA’s capabilities for MDPW across all domains in the basic components of a kill-web / kill-chain: Detection, Acquisition, Tracking, Engagement, Assessment and Re-Engagement.

In the space domain, the major focus has been on establishing a web of collaborative satellites achieving 24x7 near real time all-weather ISR capability. A variety of multi-spectral constellations using ELINT, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) and Electro-optical (EO) today form the upstream infrastructure. While the Military Balance 2024 estimates PLA’s space based ISR satellites at 92, ELINT/SIGINT at 81, and EW at 5, the close military-civil fusion ensures that the capabilities are much more. A detailed breakup of its more than 660 remote sensing satellites for EO, SAR and ELINT / SIGINT is given below:¹⁹

• Type: >240 military, >403 civil (>269 private owned).

• Payloads: >27 Hyperspectral, > 150 SIGINT ELINT/EW, >41 SAR, >210 EO, > 68 Met, >26 Map / EO, 17 Multi-payload, >16 Video, >12 Ocean, >16 AIS.

• Orbit: >22 GEO, >9MEO, >628 LEO, >3 VLEO

• Major Constellations / Companies: 147 Yaogan, 139 Jilin, 11 TJS, 36 Gaofen, 9 Superview, 6 Beijing, 29 Shijian, 32 Shiyan, 12 Zhuhai / OHS, 13 HEAD, 10 Taijing, 16 Tianhui, 9 Fengyun, 18 Yunhai, 22 Tianmu, 17 Yunyao,

Four famous American Institutions, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Taylor Geospatial Institute, Taylor Geospatial Engine, and the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, together rated the world’s best commercial space-based remote sensing systems and produced a report ‘Gold Rush: The 2024 Commercial Remote Sensing Global Rankings’ in October 2024.²⁰ The medal count proved China was leading the world in qualitative commercial ISR. Apart from holding nearly half of world’s ISR systems in space, the balanced mixture of quality and quantity significantly gives credence to PLA’s ASBM kill chain.

Fig 5: ‘Gold Rush: The 2024 Commercial Remote Sensing Global Rankings’ (Source-CSIS²¹)

Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, based on their May 2016’s simulation at National Institute of Advanced Studies, deduced that any three operational ELINT clusters provide 18 contacts in a day with a moving target with a maximum pass duration of 23 minutes. They further brought out that minimum 24 satellite passes over the target per day by Yaogan’s SAR and optical imaging satellites together facilitate 16 targeting opportunities with the uncertainty in the target’s location being less than 10 km. They had concluded in May 2016 that ‘China has in place an operational ASBM system that can identify, locate, track and destroy an Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific Ocean’. As per them, the system together could sweep a larger area than 4000 km in the North-South direction and 3200 km in the East-West direction within a single day. They further said that detection in complete area is possible but identification will be limited to one-third area.²² There have been significant improvements since then which are discussed below.

An American ISR University ‘Integrity-Flash’ report of August 2024 provides an update on Yaogan ELINT constellation’s capabilities. As per them, 45 ELINT satellites Yaogan-35/36/39 constellations operate in 5 orbital planes with each orbital plane containing 3 triplets (9 satellites total per plane).²³ Furthermore, PLA is changing the orbital parameters of Yaogan-43’s 9 satellite cluster.²⁴ PLA’s Aerospace Force may be  undertaking these orbital manoeuvres to better place the cluster for most appropriate position for detection.

Fig 6: PLA’s Yaogan-35/36/39 ELINT Constellation Orbital Path Depiction (Source-Integrity Flash²⁵)

China’s Super View Networking Earth Observation (NEO) commercial constellation, operated by a commercial company China Sewei Surveying and Mapping Technology Co Ltd, plans to launch 16 high-resolution optical (HREO, 20-30cm; 2 launched in 2022 and in orbit currently) under Super View NEO-1; 8 satellites of 0.5m high-resolution SAR (HRSAR; 2 launched in 2022, 2 in 2024, total 4 in orbit) under Super View NEO-2; and 4 wide-swath optical (.7-1m resolution, coverage 100 km swath, 1 launched in April 2024) under the Super View NEO-3. PLA is likely experimenting with networking of these constellations for cross-cueing with the “tip and cue” one another function of these NEO satellites. In the current formation status, the wide swath (lower resolution) satellites appreciably identify possible objects of interest which could then be confirmed as target by an image from the HREO satellite. However, the ISR University team assesses that the Super View NEO-2 SAR satellites are not in position to coordinate with the NEO-1 or NEO-3 satellites. However, they expect it to change whenever China Sewei will complete the constellation.²⁶

In addition, while China faced significant challenges to launch of communication satellites till November 2024 to catch up American Starlink, December 2024 has witnessed significant successes for Chinese commercial communication constellations of G60 / Thousand Sail (54 already launched), Guowang (10 launched in December 2024) and High-Speed Laser Diamond Constellation Test System (5 satellites launched in December 2024). Today, China has more than 175 communication satellites, 70 navigation and 7 test satellites to be able to boost the existing remote sensing constellation to form strategic and operational RSCs for timely exchange of information. As per Andrew Jones “Inter-satellite laser link capabilities would be highly applicable to China’s mega-constellation projects, the national Guowang constellation, and the Shanghai-backed Qianfan/Thousand sails constellation. Inter-satellite laser links could mitigate China’s limited global ground station coverage — an issue that is apparent in its reliance on onboard space situational awareness capabilities.”²⁷ With the aim of achieving the desired quantum of nearly 25,000 communication satellites by 2030, PLA would need to launch nearly 5000 satellites per year which is a major challenge in many ways- number of launch centres and their maximum launch capacities, production of satellites, rocket engines, reusable rockets, payloads, rocket fuel, revenues, frequency spectrum, orbital slots etc.

Fig 7: 54 Qianfan / Thousand Sail / G60 Satellites over 3 Orbital Planes Group 3 West, Group 2 Centre, and Group 3 East

(Source-Integrity Flash Report 22 December 2024²⁸)

Another assessment of end 2022 by National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Services (NESDIS), ex US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) deduced that Jilin EO constellation could achieve a revisit of 15 minutes from 0900 to 1230 hours daily with 64 satellites. Similar assessments have been made for SAR and hyperspectral.²⁹ A US OTH Intelligence Group LLC report, submitted to US China-Economic and Security Review Commission in December 2024, concluded that “PLA’s improving remote sensing capabilities and ability to access the growing number of Chinese commercial remote sensing satellite constellations are likely to allow the PLA to more successfully: 1) locate US and allied mobile assets; 2) track US and allied deployments; 3) develop and deploy new autonomous capabilities; 4) improve situational awareness and understand topographical, marine, and atmospheric conditions in operating environments; and 5) strike US and allied assets with greater range and precision. These risks could only grow over time as improved fidelity of remote sensors will allow the PLA to access more precise observational data over greater distances. Remote sensing data will then be processed with AI algorithms to rapidly detect objects, patterns, and anomalies.”³⁰

Thus, there is a stronger acceptance of the fact that China’s civil-military fused space-based capabilities can allow it to detect, acquire, track, and precisely engage a mobile target. A step-by-step brick of PLA’s space-based capabilities for establishing a kill-chain is explained below in succeeding paragraphs and amplified with an infographic.

Base / Null Layer. To detect any movement, a base layer or null layer is required to autonomise ‘Change Detection.’ PLA has supposedly collaborated with PRC’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and research organisations like the China Academy of Sciences (CAS) to map large expanses of the Indian Ocean Region and gather precise remote sensing data about undersea features.³¹

Detection. A GEO constant stare of 4 Gaofen / Yaogan satellites with resolution from 2.5 m of latest Yaogan-41 to 50 m of oldest satellite provides continuous daytime detection capabilities. The Ludi Tance-4 SAR satellite is the world’s only GEO satellite that carries a SAR payload that too with 20m resolution. PLA is assessed to operate 3 SIGINT satellites in GEO, the TJS-1, -4, and -9. The American OTH Intelligence Group Report of December 2024 cite CSIS deduction that Yaogan-41, Ludi Tance-4 in conjunction with other Chinese surveillance assets could “provide China an unprecedented ability to identify and track car-sized objects throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region.”³² In addition, for all-weather 24x7 capability,

>90 Yaogan ELINT satellites will be able to provide continuous cover of Indian Ocean Region, East Asia and Western Pacific region to catch AIS/ EM emissions. In case of no SIGINT emissions, more than 26 SAR, 11 HRSAR and 4 Infreometric SAR satellites, 24 HSI and three advanced HSI satellites are available.

Acquisition. The major players will be the commercial Jilin and PLA’s Yaogan EO constellations. As per the Jilin firm claims, “every three satellites will revisit the target at different latitude at least once per day. For latitude 60°, the revisit number will be up to twice.”³³ Hence, with more than 138 satellites in operation, they should be able to revisit any spot 35 to 37 times per day which during the daylight time, will nearly correspond to >12 minutes. Dahm highlights that the latest PLA’s LEO ISR satellites, mainly Yaogan 35, 36, and 39, whose payloads are not exactly confirmed, probably integrate multiple collection methods into a train of three satellites traveling in a line in the same orbit. This innovative automated “tipping and cuing” facilitates confirming decoys and false targets. The first satellite, normally ELINT satellite, detects and geolocates a signal of interest and automatically cues the trailing satellites, having EO, IR, or SAR payloads, to image the area concerned to positively identify the emitter. These satellites travel in a line, separated by between 400 to 1000 km.³⁴ If the other constellations are added particularly military types 4 VHREO satellites of Ludi Kancha Weixing constellation, >9 Yaogan MREO and >10 Yaogan HREO, and civilian Superview, Taijing etc, the collaborative revisit time would be less than 10 minutes. A report by Chinese researchers to maximise IMINT strip management by multiple constellations provides details of revisit times of their 10 satellites over PRC’s provinces near Indian and Myanmar Border – Sichuan and Yunnan.³⁵ The number of revisits within a province by just 10 satellites will get multiplied minimum twenty times for purely EO payload if only EO satellites are to be counted.

Table 1: Revisit Times of 10 PRC’s Satellites Over PRC’s Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces

(Source-Feng Li et al, ‘Multi-Satellite Imaging Task Planning for Large Regional Coverage,’ Changchun Institute of Optics, Chinese Academy of Sciences)³⁶

Intelligentisation / AI Enablement. Chinese earlier faced GEOINT processing bottleneck which they are trying to overcome by AI enablement. This desire to shift from Earth Observation System to “Earth Observation Brain” by AI enablement of PNTRSC satellites³⁷ is leading to Intelligentisation of all new satellite constellations. The commercial Taijing-4 03 satellite is confirmed to be equipped with AI processors for quick detection and identification of targets at sea. Various blog photos revealed the satellite having captured detailed images of 3 US aircraft carriers, 2 Arleigh Burke-class warships, and four other ships at the Norfolk US Naval Station. PLA’s Space Engineering University researchers in March 2022 claimed significant improvements in precision with AI-enabled Jilin-1 satellites which can detect small objects like planes in the air and cars on the street in videos with 95 percent accuracy.³⁸ One more such intelligent satellite LuoJia 3-01, as per the Chinese company claims, could complete the task of providing a processed image to the user’s mobile terminal within 8 minutes of the image demand being generated by the user.³⁹

Fig 8: Chinese Claims of Comprehensive Integration Demonstration and Verification process of LuoJia 3-01 Intelligent RS satellite

(Source-Mi Wang et al, ‘Luojia 3-01 Satellite-Real-Time Intelligent Service System for Remote Sensing Science Experiment Satellite⁴⁰)

The capabilities of 12 ocean observation including 8 Haiyang, 2 Hainan satellites, 26 mapping including 16 Tianhui satellites further strengthen the detection and acquisition capabilities.

Tracking. The acquisition satellites could also be exploited for tracking. The 16 video satellites including 11 Jilin and 4 Zhuhai satellites strengthen the tracking capabilities. In case of EM emissions by acquired target, ELINT satellites will play an important role. Dahm testified in March 2024 that when compared to the Yaogan-30 series ELINT satellites, “Yaogan-31 and -40 provide global ELINT coverage with a much lower daily revisit rate. However, they can track targets high into the northern and southern latitudes.”⁴¹

Communication to Sensors for Engagement. Assured 13 military (5 strategic types- Shentong / Zhongxing, 4 tactical - Fenghuo and 4 Shijian) and minimum 64 civil satellites (54 G60, 10 Guowang) will ensure near real-time transmission of targeting information. The 50 plus Beidou satellites have SMS communication capabilities in addition to positioning and navigation capabilities. 20 GeeSAT satellites, 9 launched in 2022 and 11 in 2024, not only augment navigation but also have significant satellite communication capabilities.⁴²

Fig 9: Assessment of PLA’s Space Based Kill Web’s ISR and Communication Capabilities

(Source-Author’s Research)

In near-space domain, High Altitude Pseudonymous satellites (HAPS) and high-altitude balloons, cover the gaps left by PLA’s space capabilities to track targets. PRC’s SOE AVIC’s Morning Star 50 HAPS platform, with maiden flight in September 2022, can supposedly fly in near space for periods lasting months. Another AVIC product, the high-altitude, high-speed UAS WZ-8, flies at supersonic speeds in near space, with a combination of SAR and EO payload for surveillance over targets.⁴³

In the air domain, PLAAF and PLANAF together have a variety of ISR aircraft. The airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft series include the oldest Y-8J of 1990s vintage, first generation KJ-2000 of 2000s vintage, KJ-200 (GX-5) with a large SAR “balance beam” radar, and KJ- 500 (GX-10, Y9 based). They together provide capability to detect adversarial ships and aircraft up to 400 km. The latest development KJ-600, carrier-based version, will extend the ISR reach of the PLA’s AEW&C capabilities into the Indo-Pacific region. The Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities include the old Y-8X, KQ-200 (Y-8Q/GX-6) inducted with PLANAF in 2015, and the latest induction Y-9Q (GX-154). With airborne LIDAR, maximum detection capabilities being claimed by the Chinese is 160m below sea-surface. PLA’s ELINT aircraft include the Y-8CB inducted in 2005, Y-8JB, Y-9JB, and Y-9G (GX-11) which is the newest ELINT aircraft in service. The Y-9DZ (GX-12) most probably has both SAR and ELINT payloads. PLA’s major ISR UAVs are BZK-005 with multiple payloads of EO, SAR, and ELINT sensors; GJ-1/2 Wing Loong having FLIR and SAR alongside its air-to-surface weapons, all variants of the CH series. The latest Xianglong ISR and TB-001 strike UASs have EO/IR sensors and SAR.⁴⁴ Its claimed that Y-9 aircraft have a reported range of nearly 5,000 km with approximately ten hours of mission endurance.⁴⁵

On land, PLA has utilized X-band, VHF, UHF, and AESA technology to have a balanced mix of ground-based radars with air surveillance of nearly 500 km. The HF over-the-horizon (OTH) radars operated by the PLAAF are likely be able to detect ships and aircraft to ranges up to 3000 km from the Chinese coast. As per Michael Dahm, the known skywave OTH radar transmitter and receiver sites are located 1000 km inland and can probably detect ships and aircraft between the First and Second Island Chains^.46 Similarly, on ships PLAN has tried to overcome reliance on Russian technology. PLAN’s Type 366 radar is the most advanced surface search radar with 450 km range.⁴⁷

In the case of EM domain, most other domains i.e.space, near-space, air, land and sea have already been discussed, highlighting the ISR part of multi-domain kill web. PLA’s combat array of Anti-Radiation Weapons include the Russian AS-17 anti-radiation missile (ARM) imported in 2000 and reverse-engineered into the YJ-91 ARM, indigenously-produced ARM TL-30 first noted on a PLAAF aircraft in 2022 with a range of 280 km, and ASN-301 anti-radiation UCAV inducted in 2017. As per Dahm, Chinese defence industry has also produced anti-radiation seekers for PLARF ballistic missiles.⁴⁸

Conclusion

While theoretically it can be assessed that PLA has gained the minimum essential capabilities to conduct precision strikes both on static and mobile targets, only crisis and battles can test the actual capabilities. This is, of course, as applicable to China as it would be to any country and its armed forces. Furthermore, PLA’s claimed propaganda of ‘Four Chains, One Network’ has also not been proven as tested. Hence, the strike assets available with PLARF, PLAGF, PLAAF and PLAN would have to be closely integrated with ISR assets of all four services and the three arms doctrinally, organisationally and networked to establish an enmeshed kill web to execute MDPW, as an integral component of PLA’s MDIJO. However, the PLA’s proficiency displayed during various International Military Competitions, from information available of the exercises and wargames they conduct, or during standoffs, indicate that they could be able to achieve these objectives. They will have a multitude of other battlefield challenges to manage: multi-domain battlespace management, frequency bandwidth, air space management, Identification Friend or Foe, talent for managing complex systems, complex logistics, combat sustenance for long attrition battles, adversary’s counter ISR and Air Defence capabilities etc.

To conclude, PLA’s two ocean strategy has ensured that PLA is combat ready always for its primary direction, the Taiwan Strait and secondary direction, the Indian border, South China Sea, or Japan. PLA is closely watching Russian performance during the Ukraine war and picking up lessons. Its commercial space and small drones’ capabilities have got adequately tested during the battle. Hence, Xi Jinping has pressed the accelerator button for 2027 as PLA’s Centennial goal for modernising its strategic capabilities. The PLA is being tested as realistically as possible during various Taiwan Strait exercises. Thus, the PLA will be focussing on improving all shortcomings noticed. In any case, it is always better to prepare for the worst and hope for the best. Hence, it would be better for Indian defence forces to prepare for the contingency wherein PLA is able to conduct Multi-Domain Precision Warfare along our Northern borders as well as in Indian Ocean Region.

Endnotes

1. Xi Jinping, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects,” Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 16, 2022, http://dm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/20 2211/P020221101112630789457.pdf.

2. Xinhua, ‘Military Theory Work Conference,” 16 October 2024.

3. Xinhua, ‘Xi Urges Building Strong, Modernized PLA Airbone Force,” November 05, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20241105/f4b3953b4b8b4431bc3df1ffdbfc910b/c.html, accessed on 06 November 2024.

4. Research Department of Military Strategy, “The Science of Military Strategy,” Military Science Press, Pp 93-94; Mingda Qiu, “China’s Science of Military Strategy: Cross-Domain Concepts in the 2013 Edition,” (September 2015), https://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_files/ C h i n a s % 2 0 S c i e n c e % 2 0 o f % 2 0 M i l i t a r y % 2 0 S t r a t e g y % 2 0 C r o s s - Domain%20Concepts%20in%20the%202013%20Edition%20Qiu2015.pdf, accessed on 01 May 2019.

5. Ren Zehua and Jing Bing, “The Curtain on Intelligentised Warfare Gradually Raised,” PLA Daily, March 09, 2018.

6. “The Science of Military Strategy,” (Revised in 2020).

7. “The Science of Military Strategy,”.

8. China Military Network, “PLA’s Concept of Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (IJO)把握多域联合作战特性要求,” June 13, 2023, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/, accessed on 14 June 2023.

10. China Military Network, “PLA’s Concept of Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) 把握多域联合作战特性要求,”.

11. The Science of Military Strategy,” (Revised in 2020).

12. Chinese Society of Surveying and Mapping, “From Earth Observation Satellites to Earth Observation Brains: An Interview with Li Deren, An Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering,” https://www.the paper.cn/newsDetail for ward_9856223, accessed on 01 January 2021.

13. “Science of Military Strategy,” (Revised in 2020).

14. “Science of Military Strategy,” (Revised in 2020).

15. Chinese Military, “Understanding Key Military Theory Topics in 2024,” October 30, 2024, https://military.cnr.cn/nrjx/20241030/t20241030_526957856.shtml, accessed on 31 October 2024.

16. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Military Balance 2024,” February 2024, ISBN 978-1-032-78004-7.

17. US Department of Defence, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,’ December 2024.

18. Xinhua, “Military Theory Work Conference,”.

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