NURTURING INNOVATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

Disclaimer: This essay was the prize-winning essay in the IN’s Commodore Nott Annual Essay for 2020. As such, it has been only slightly reformatted and edited for publication here with the permission of the Directorate of Naval Education, IHQ of MoD (Navy), New Delhi.

“Failure is an option here. If things are not failing, you are not innovating enough.”

- Elon Musk

Introduction

The above quote from Elon Musk sums up his progress in the 21st century.¹ His core business code has been innovation and in a short time of 20 years he has been able to send NASA astronauts in his rocket to space.² He has also built mass - selling electric cars and installed a neuralink chip in a pig’s brain to create a working brain-to-machine interface.³ Pertinently, all the above and many more ventures have been done through private enterprise. Till the end of the 20th Century, Armed Forces were often at the

vanguard of technological breakthroughs, as they had a direct impact on the affluence and stability of the kingdoms, countries and consequently, their citizens. Even after World War II, the US and Russia’s arms race was a catalyst in the innovation cycle, which resulted in many breakthroughs that form the bedrock of how we aim to fight today. These developments further cascaded into various other sectors and became a part of the culture of its citizens. Significant examples have been the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Internet, developed by the US Department of Defence (DOD), which have since been absorbed commercially in an unprecedented manner.⁴

Understanding Innovation

Literal Connotations. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.”

 -Isaac Newton⁵

He was right. Innovations and the ideas which shaped history were carried forward by those who followed. Innovation means different things to different people and entities. In its truest form, it is an act to enhance, to find a solution to an existing or likely future problem. This concept is as applicable to science as it is to commerce and predictably to the Armed Forces as well.

Differentiating Creativity, Innovation and Invention. Innovation is often spoken in tandem with creativity and invention. While the co-relation in common parlance is not unjustified, there are key differences. Creativity is the ability to think beyond existing rules, processes and reasoning and is at the heart of innovation. Innovation is creativity realised through the sobriety of scientific process and feasibility leading to an improved product or process or a new one. A wheeled suitcase is an example of an innovation where a simple modification led to an enhanced value to the proposition. When the product/process is uniquely new, (function, form or fit) it is termed an invention. Inventions also have a cascading effect on other developments because they introduce a previously unavailable product, process or technology and fuel the innovation cycle.

Military Innovation. In 2004, Terry Pierce, an ex-USN captain, proposed a framework applicable to military innovation.⁶ He defined military innovation as incremental, modular, radical and architectural. While theorists may argue on the exact segmentation or nomenclature, it does bring about discernible separation on various types of innovation. They have been amplified as under (Fig 1):

Incremental. Incremental innovation is widely seen in Armed Forces. It encompasses minor improvements in the software/hardware components through iterations and field level feedback. It results in better efficiency and convergence with the stated capacities without any major enhancement to the overall efficacy of the system itself.

• Modular. Modular innovation occurs when the components or technology are replaced with an improved version, but the overall system remains the same. Changing to better pumps, addition of sensors, automating partial processes, etc. fall in this category. While it happens less frequently than incremental innovation, it is more visible and given greater focus from a service level perspective.

• Radical. Unlike incremental and modular innovation, radical innovation results in a considerably unique product which accomplishes different tasks and alters the operating environment around it. There are significant entry barriers to radical innovations such as cost, time and effort and therefore, it is considered to be at the pinnacle of military innovation. The development ecosystem of a radical innovation has several elements outside the government and services themselves.

• Architectural. Over time different innovations allow a new set of processes to come about which change the way militaries operate and conduct operations. Network centric warfare is such an example, that sits upon many kinds of innovations involving communication and satellite based developments. Architectural innovations in certain cases have the potential to create a distinct advantage in the battlefield and can be transformational in nature. They are then sub-classified as Disruptive Innovations.

• Disruptive Innovations. Sometimes architectural innovations lead to significant advantages on the battlefield which become decisive in nature and are termed disruptive innovations. These will most certainly lead to doctrinal changes and give a distinct competitive advantage to the military adopting it and force the hand of the adversary to mitigate its effects in order to sustain.

System Linkages

Fig 1: Military Innovation Framework⁷

Military Innovation : A Global Perspective

The Function of Governments. An incredibly important distinction to be made here is that the militaries themselves don’t innovate at the higher level. They ideate, suggest and lay down the direction for the future. Radical military innovation is the function of the respective government departments responsible for it and incentivising military innovation has been a Key Result Area (KRA) for global powers. For example, the US Department of Defense (DOD) aggressively pursues military innovation supremacy as a doctrinal approach to maintain leadership in world affairs. For the purposes of this essay, we will briefly discuss the innovation ecosystems of USA and Israel contributing to military innovation in the 21st Century. China too has shown remarkable progress in modernisation. However, it has been on the back of incredibly high R&D expenditure in real terms and as a percentage of defence expenditure and a large manufacturing eco-system.⁸ In that sense the Chinese approach is too expensive. It has also not yet exhibited any major disruptive military technological innovations.⁹ The lack of transparency also attributes to this observation. It has however, shown great organisational effectiveness in adopting and translating new technologies into military products and quickly fielding them across a large military enterprise due to a highly centralised structure, areas where India has struggled. For these reasons, China’s innovation ecosystem has not been discussed in detail this essay.

United States of America

Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The US DARPA, a Department of Defence (DOD) agency was set up in 1958 to be at the forefront of cutting edge military innovation globally. The agency over time was instrumental in establishing the much quoted US Defence Industrial Base (DIB) and led the technological innovation cycle. On 21 Aug 20, DARPA announced the results of the Alpha Dog Fight programme in which an AI system beat a US military pilot in a five round challenge and demonstrated that autonomous computer systems could operate fighter jets.¹⁰ This was part of the long successful journey for DARPA programme in the last 60 years, which ensured that USA stayed ahead of the curve as far as military innovation is concerned.

Developments in US Innovation Ecosystem. Despite the success of DARPA’s projects, various studies have indicated that since the end of the Cold War, much of US defence R&D has plateaued (Fig 2). A major indication was the acquisition of Boston Dynamics by Google in 2013, which was a DARPA funded organisation and created the world’s most innovative Robots.¹¹ The acquisition brought to fore the increasing trend of the shifting centre of gravity of major research outside the government to new, yet cash rich companies. Another clear indication has been the spending by the top US defence companies in Independent Research and Development (IRAD), which dropped by one third as a percentage of sales from 1999 to 2012.¹²

Defence Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). To address the issues of the slack in Military Innovation, in 2015, the US DoD founded DIUx, to assist the military in making faster use of emerging commercial technologies. DIUx aims at moving away from the traditional Defence Industrial Base (DIB) and engage private partners to rapidly prototype and field advanced commercial solutions that address national security challenges.¹³

• Niche Specificity. Defence markets have the deepest pockets but they are also the toughest customers. The barriers to entry are immense and specifics very unique. There is little certainty of procurement and it’s a matter of time before a new/different idea becomes more enticing.

• Agility. Culturally, there is a distinct difference in the agility of a startup and well calculated, often invisible, movement of a defence organisation’s decision making even for minor issues. This has the potential of creating a chasm between the two and more significantly play spoil sport for others.

• Scaling Up. The major issue while dealing with start ups and MSMEs is their ability to rapidly scale up production for large scale induction. This is a point where commitments of larger financial resources have to be made and government processes are often too tedious, long and risk averse, while start ups don’t have the capability to take that risk.

The Indian Scene

The Indian military innovation ecosystem mirrors the classical system of a Closed Innovation Model, wherein dedicated defence development agencies obtain government funding for their activities. Even the US DIB consists of only few semi-autonomous and commercial entities which are long standing partners of these agencies. The Indian defence acquisition and production system is centralised and has an exceptionally long lead time. The entire ecosystem has suffered from inordinate delays in the decision making process and an abysmal performance in post contract execution of Transfer of Technology (TOT) and offset clauses.

Failure of Offset Clauses. Recently the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, indicted firms like Dassault Aviation and MBDA in the Rs 59,000 Cr contract for 36 Rafale fighter jets for their failure to transfer technology to DRDO under the offset clause.²⁴ The offset policy was first adopted in 2005 and for all capital purchases above Rs 300 crore made through imports, the foreign vendor was required to invest at least 30 per cent of the value in the Indian defence and aerospace sectors.²⁵ The report further stated that foreign vendors made various offset commitments to qualify for the contract, but were not earnest about fulfilling these commitments.²⁶ Even in the structured TOT clauses there has been little success to boast about. Pursuant to this, the GOI’s Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP -20) scrapped the offset clause in Govt to Govt and Single Vendor cases.

Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO). The DIO was formed in 2017 by HAL and BEL with a total initial corpus of Rs 100 Crores.²⁸ This funding of DIO will subsequently come from profits and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure of the DPSUs. DIO members consist of Secretaries of various departments in MoD, the Vice Chiefs of all three services, CISC and representatives of HAL, BEL and concerned DPSUs. The mandate of the organisation was to fuel and oversee the defence innovation ecosystem in the country.

Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDex). The launch of Innovation for Defence Excellence (iDex) in Apr 2018, as an independent commercial entity under the aegis of DIO, has been a a major milestone for the Indian Armed Forces.²⁹ The DIO is modelled on the NATO innovation hub created in 2013 and the US DIUx set up in 2015, which essentially moves towards the concept of Open Innovation.³⁰ iDEX is set to act both as a Venture Capitalist (VC) and an Intermediary.

Fig 3: Schematic Diagram of iDEX³¹

Pitching Competitions: Defence Innovation Startup Challenges (DISC). One of the key activities which was started by iDEX was the DISC. DISC1 was launched on August 2018, DISC2 in January 2019, DISC 3 in December 2019 and DISC 4 in September 2020. Each challenge included areas of significance for the defence forces and applicants in the form of start ups, MSMEs and R&D institutes participated with product designs and plans for prototyping. The winning entries were then given equity support to develop the product. iDEX in this role acted as Venture Capitalist (VC). During the first three rounds of DISCs, 18 problem statements from Armed Forces, DPSUs and OFB were put out and over 55 start ups/individuals were identified to receive innovation grants in technological areas.³² After the DEFEXPO 2020, MoD published the first edition of “Footprints,” which is a directory of 250 companies dealing with aerospace solution, fabrication, precision components, artificial intelligence, communication engineering solutions and med tech. It also features success stories of 20 MSMEs and 40 start ups. In DISC4, some of the areas where applications have been sought are as under:-

• Autonomous Underwater Swarm Drones

• Predictive, Preventive & Prescriptive Machine Monitoring

• Super Resolution for Improving Spatial Resolution

• AI based Satellite Image Analysis

• Foliage Penetration Radar

• Reduction of RCS of Naval Warships

• Target Detection in Chaff Environment

iDex4 Faujis. Another initiative launched in September 20 as part of the iDEX initiatives was “iDEX4Faujis” (‘Fauji’ is the Hindi word for warrior). This was intended to tap into the 1.3 million personnel of the Armed Forces and spur the innovation initiative.

Nurturing Innovation : Way Ahead

The history of modular, radical or architectural defence innovation in India is far from inspiring. The technology development and adoption track record in defence is also a cause for scepticism amongst all stake holders. However, it does not mean that the Armed Forces should not play their part in the ecosystem with optimism, sincerity and belief. Considering the recent developments which have taken place in the defence innovation ecosystem, it is imperative that the Armed Forces align themselves and fully leverage these initiatives. Nurturing innovation in the Armed Forces has to be a top-down approach with a clear focus on the fact that military will drive the defence innovation ecosystem and will take the centre stage in giving direction and purpose to all participants. While history is against us, the future should not be.

Indian Navy Innovation Team (INiT). To optimise various initiatives, and nurture innovation in Armed Forces, the services need to create teams of specialists in various fields at Services Headquarters (SHQ) level, proposed to be called the Indian Navy Innovation Team (INiT), which will form the core within the services driving the Military Innovation Ecosystem. Innovations in this regard are required to be radical and architectural in nature and not merely modular or incremental. The teams will serve the purposes for identifying gaps, areas of concern and carry out academic research to help suggest the framework of problems and possible solutions. Like the Talpiot programme, these specialists (both in executive/ operational and technical branches) should be identified based on academic merit in technical courses, process of interviews and adequacy of field experience. Some of these billets must also be integrated in the career progression plans of the officers prior to coming up for consideration for the first select rank with a tenure of 24-36 months. These teams should directly provide inputs to VCNS/equivalents, which can then be routed to iDEX through the mechanism of DIO. The teams must be large enough, adequately staffed and resourced. Some of the primary functions of this innovation team are now discussed.

Problem Area Identification. One of the primary responsibilities of this innovation team would be to identify areas where there is a thought for solutions. The identification process must be in terms of operational requirements of the future, irrespective of the technology component. The team must explore the ways forces want to operate across domains and environments and produce clear and coherent concepts to challenge the technologists. They must be genuinely aspirational, pushing boundaries beyond what the technology can deliver now to what it might achieve.

Integration in Evaluation of DISCs. The teams should be integrated in the evaluation process of various DISCs from operational viability and feasibility point of view. They should be involved in the framing of the evaluation parameters for various solutions and introduce objectivity in the process. For example, one of the areas identified in DISC4 is reduction of RCS (Radar Cross Section) of ships. This problem has to be given a context and expectation range for results. Without context it remains an open ended direction for any start up. The INiT team’s role will be particularly important in contextualisation of the problems and consequently in the identification and evaluation of the proposed solutions.

Accepting a Dead End. A unique aspect of Defence research historically has been the fixation with a solution despite high cost and time runs. The quantity of resources invested become a hindrance to call it quits and the programmes drag on. Accepting failure or non-feasibility is a key feature of agile systems and the INiT teams should be able recommend project closures rather than flogging a dead horse across finish lines. This would mean objective target setting in time and deliverables.

Formulating Project for Specialists Courses. The INiT team should also be able to tap the training schools and officers undertaking specialisation training and PG/Masters courses in the form of allocating projects in emerging operational/technological issues. This process will enable sharing of valuable feedback, ideas and also identification of new problem definitions and directions.

Selection of Personnel. Assessing the aptitude of an officer for innovation and research cannot be based on the traditional Annual Confidential Report (ACR) system. Some of the methods, which can be used are as under:

• Recommendation for R&D in ACRs (already existing in IN) can be a good start point, subject to the sensitisation of the appraiser of the significance of the recommendation.

• Identification of Cadets displaying a flair for applied research and creativity in academies.

• Identification and recommendation of officers in training schools with due deliberation.

• Seeking volunteers and subjecting them to a process of aptitude and technology based examinations and interviews.

Identification of Leaders. Similar to the identification of the team members, it will also be imperative to identity team leaders who can take projects and programmes further. Provisions in service rules should be made for participants with demonstrative results in INiT and a high achievement quotient to continue in the programs. This will ensure not only a sense of belonging to the project, but institutional continuity as well.

Integration with Indigenisation Initiatives. The IN efforts and focus on indigenisation have been mandated for equipment supportability in terms of maintenance and spares. The success or failure of the indigenisation efforts of IN can be debated. However, the experience is of great learning value. The intricacies of vendor management and procedural challenges faced are unique and can become a great contribution to innovation efforts. The integration of Directorate of Indigenisation (DOI) with INiT will be a logical step to further both the causes.

Training Alternatives: Technical Officers. In the present pattern of training, a large number of technical officers are nominated for an MTech degree of two years duration. This is a long term commitment with the understanding that the degree shall enable and equip the officer with advanced knowledge to handle the technical infrastructure within the Navy. However, the post course utilisation of the degree is a moot point. This observation is applicable for all courses, which are done outside the services set up either in India or abroad. There is a requirement of greater rationalisation of the MTech courses and to improve post course utilisation. The projects of such courses should also be aimed at ‘Application of Technology.’

Non-Technical Officers. Officers with 8-11 years of service are at the peak of their specialist knowledge with feet firmly on the ground. These specialists should be identified on the selection criteria discussed above and should be nominated to undergo specific courses prior being inducted in the innovation teams. At this stage of their careers, officers will be able to make the maximum impact in furthering the aims of the organisation.

Integration With Staff Requirements (SR). During the finalisation of staff requirements for capital acquisition, the selection of technology is done from industry inputs through a Request for Information (RFI) and open-source information available on internet. There are also touch points with DRDO and in certain cases, the DOI. The procedure has its merits, but also has limitations. However, in the ecosystem of innovation, integration with SRs will be vital so that as a service we are coherent and demonstrate commitment to innovation.

Amendment: Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020. While the DAP 2020 has catered for iDEX, it has still not given any clear waivers to any of the steps involved to undertake procurement.³⁴ This essentially manifests into a lengthy procedure in spite of the vendor and the product coming through iDEX. Dispensation in the procedure in terms of timelines must be sought by the MOD for such products certified by the services to meeting the stated staff requirements. The certification by military will be through participation during the development and subsequently, the field evaluation trials.

Conclusion

From the point of view of the Indian Armed Forces, the strategic shifts in the policies of the government have been encouraging. The initiatives have been a welcome step and there is much promise of intent. The long held aspirations of an indigenous innovation ecosystem providing for the needs of the Armed Forces in a timely manner seem to have finally seen the light at the end of the tunnel. This has, not co-incidentally, come at a time of the mounting pressure of the defence import bill and the security considerations of an increasingly treacherous neighbourhood we find ourselves in.

However, the road towards an agile defence innovation ecosystem is complex and difficult. It requires unparalleled resolution, agility and responsiveness from all stake holders and the Armed Forces will have to be at the centre stage of this new environment. Our ability to exploit the new organisations will hinge on our focus towards military innovation and in turn, on who and how much we make available to take the will and requirements of the forces ahead. Armed Forces will have to immerse themselves fully in these initiatives and ensure success of iDEX and DISCs. We cannot lie back, hope and pray for success. We need to encourage and nurture the best minds in the Armed Forces who can interface with these organisations and provide direction for development and sustenance. We must be the bridge between the agile start up and slower government processes and ensure that there is a common meeting place.

Nurturing Innovation in Armed Forces is the New Reality. It is no longer an internal activity, but a necessity to exploit the avenues which the government is making available. These developments have been unprecedented in our history and a failure for the ecosystem to take off would largely affect real lives at the borders, at sea and in the skies. It is our responsibility to ensure that we converge as a single entity and make this the turning point in the history of defence innovation.

Endnotes

1. Nivedita Bangari, Elon Musk becomes the second richest person in the world, 29 Nov 2020 https://technosports.co.in/2020/11/29/elon-musk-becomes-the-second-richest-person-in-the-world/ . Accessed on 30 Nov 20

2. NASA press release, NASA Astronauts Launch from America in Historic Test Flight of SpaceX Crew Dragon, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-launch-from-america-in-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon/. Accessed on 30 Nov 20

3. Neuralink: Elon Musk unveils pig with chip in i t s brain, 29 Aug 20 , https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53956683 , Accessed on 30 Nov 20

4. Vint Cerf, A Brief History of the Internet & Related Networks, https://www.internetsociety. org/internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet-related-networks. Accessed on 22 Nov 20

5. Popova, M. (2016, February 16). Standing on the shoulders of giants: The story behind Newton's famous metaphor for how knowledge progresses. https://www.brainpickings.org/ 2016/02/16/newton-standing-on-the-shoulders-of-giants/Accessed on 13 Nov 20

6. Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation, London: Frank Cass, 2004

7. Ibid

8. R&D Expenditure Comparison, 4th report: Ordnance Factories, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Directorate General of Quality Assurance and National Cadet Corps, Standing Committee on Defence, Dec 2019, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/ 17_Defence_4.pdf Accessed on 30 Nov 20

9. Andrea Gilli, MauroGilli, pp 141–189 “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43, no. 3 (Winter 2018–2019) Accessed on 30 Nov 20

10. Martin Alexander, AI system beats US military pilot in F-16 dogfight, Sky News Report, 22 Aug 20, https://news.sky.com/story/ai-system-beats-us-military-pilot-in-f-16-dogfight-12053815 .Accessed on 22 Aug 20

11. Google acquires military robot-maker Boston Dynamics, 16 December 2013 https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-25404545, Accessed on 13 Nov 20

12. Zachary and Weisberger, “The Global Innovation 1000: Top 20 R&D Spenders 2005-2013, http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/global/home/what-we-think/global-innovation-1000/top-20-rd-spenders-2013 , Accessed on 13 Nov 20

13. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), https://www.diu.mil/aboutAccessed on 22 Nov 20

14. Jaruzelski, Chwalik, and Goehle, What the top innovators get right, 30 Oct 18, https://www.strategy-business.com/feature/What-the-Top-Innovators-Get-Right?gko=bdbc7 Accessed on 13 Nov 20

15. George M. Dougherty, Accelerating Military Innovation: Lessons from China and Israel Joint Force Quarterly 98, https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2342531/ accelerating-military-innovation-lessons-from-china-and-israel/Accessed on 13 Nov 20

16. Ibid

17. Abigail Klein Leichman, The IDF incubator for Israel’s future CEOs, 19 Sep 2020, https://www.israel21c.org/the-idf-incubator-for-israels-future-ceos/ Accessed on 13 Nov 20

18. Gary Peacock, How Good Are You at Creative Thinking?, 28 September 2018, https://www.gordianbusiness.com.au/blog/2018/9/26/how-good-are-you-at-creative-thinking accessed on 13 Nov 20

19. Henry William Chesbrough, pg51, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology, Harvard Business Press, 2003

20. Deep Tech Is Where Engineering Meets Scientific Discovery, https://www.techworks.org.uk/ about/what-is-deep-tech, (accessed on 22 Nov 20) : Deep tech is defined as technology often set apart by its profound enabling power, the differentiation it can create and its potential to catalyse change

21. Von Hippel, pg 1 Democratizing Innovation, MIT Press 2005

22. 29th Report: Preparedness of Armed Forces- Defence Production and Procurement”, Committee on Estimates, July 25, 2018, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Estimates/16_ Estimates_29.pdf. Accessed on 13 Nov 20

23. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php, accessed on 22 Nov 30

24. TOI Report, Deliver offsets: Foreign defence vendors must not be allowed to escape technology transfer obligations, 24 Sep 20, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/deliver-offsets-foreign-defence-vendors-must-not-be-allowed-to-escape-technology-transfer-obligations/ . Accessed on 30 Nov 20

25. Defence Ministry scraps offset clause in Rafale-like deals in aftermath of CAG report https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/defence-ministry-scraps-offset-clause-in-rafale-like-deals-in-aftermath-of-cag-report-1726343-2020-09-28Accessed on 30 Nov 20

26. Ibid 29

27. 4th report: Ordnance Factories, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Directorate General of Quality Assurance and National Cadet Corps, Standing Committee on Defence, Dec 2019, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/17_Defence_4.pdf Accessed on 30 Nov 20

28. Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) to be launched by Defence Ministry https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/defence-innovation-organisation-dio-to-be-launched-by-defence-ministry-3700705.html

29. Innovations For Defence Excellence (iDEX), https://www.makeinindiadefence.gov.in/ pages/innovations-for-defence-excellence-idex-, (Accessed on 13 Nov 20

30. Merindol and Versailles, The (R)Evolution Of Defence Innovation Models: Rationales and Consequences, Jul 2020 , Armament Industry Research Group Policy Paper

31. iDEx ibid

32. Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh launches Defence India Startup Challenge-4, 29 Sep 20 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1660033, accessed on 13 Nov 2020

33. Footprints : Pioneering Defence Innovations in India, MoD, Department of Defence Production publication, Mar 2020

34. Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020