NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY FOR INDIA IN SOUTH ASIAN ‘COMPLEX SITUATION’

Deterrence in a ‘Complex Situation’

In nuclear deterrence theory, a ‘Complex Situation’ occurs between three or more players when actions by one player, against the actions by a second player, result in adversely affecting the security of a third player. And this cause-effect situation results in an ‘affected third party,’ irrespective of the combination. To illustrate, the nuclear weapons programme of Pakistan is ostensibly to neutralise the conventional arms superiority of India. India, on the other hand, develops its own nuclear weapons and delivery programmes to address the threats emerging from the Chinese nuclear and delivery programmes, which aggravates the situation for Pakistan, triggering further instability in the Indo-Pak nuclear equation. Thus, an action by any one of the players causes an effect on the second, triggering instability in the equation between the second and third players. When a fourth player, say USA, enters the fray, leading to China developing its weapon and support programmes to counter the US threat, India needs to pay heed to those developments, leading to further instability in its equation with Pakistan. Thus, the ‘Complex Situation’ that obtains in the sub-continent is unique. It needs to be addressed comprehensively to maintain deterrence stability among the three, and any other additional player that may get involved.

The relevance of ‘deterrence’ and the application of deterrence theories to the ‘Complex Situation’ of the India-Pakistan-China triangle merits review. Pakistan and China have an established relationship of military, technological, nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation. Pakistan professes a ‘First Use’ doctrine, ostensibly to counter India’s superiority in conventional forces, while India and China adhere to a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) doctrine and pledge non-use against non-nuclear states. It is perceived that China needs more nuclear weapons than those required to deter India, as it is involved in a global power competition with USA, and India needs more nuclear weapons than those required to counter Pakistan, as it also has to manage its nuclear equations with China.

Conventional military forces are usually evaluated in relative terms, i.e. five Armoured Divisions are inferior to ten Armoured Divisions, but superior to one Armoured Division. Nuclear forces are different - their power is absolute, because they could threaten to destroy the enemy’s cities rather than only military forces.⁴ If a country has 100 survivable and deliverable nuclear weapons, it can destroy 100 of its adversary’s cities, regardless of the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the enemy.

Another ambiguity in nuclear balance, despite the availability of a framework to determine complicated issues related to nuclear balance of power, is with respect to the quantity itself. What, as an example, would be ‘good enough’ numbers of nuclear weapons for the first disarming strike? This could be defined as the capability to destroy enough of the enemy’s deliverable nuclear weapons, such that the remaining arsenal is too small to inflict ‘unacceptable’ retaliation. This raises the question of quantifying the term ‘unacceptable’ - which would depend on circumstances. To preserve its physical survival, a country may consider retaliation with a certain number of weapons to be ‘acceptable.’ But, if the country has to defend ‘less important’ national interests, like defending the homeland of an ally, the view may be different. The chance that the same number of weapons may fall on its own cities may deter any decision maker from considering a nuclear first strike. ‘First Strike Capability,’ therefore, is not a concrete category, but one that depends on the circumstances of the crisis. The decision makers have to determine for themselves if they have a reasonable first strike option, which promises them victory at acceptable levels of risk and cost.

Deterrence theory, which originally developed in the wake of development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, dealt almost exclusively with relations between two main players - the defender and the initiator. Even in the case of Extended Deterrence, where the deterrent was not the potential victim of the challenger, it still referred to two actors. However, in the South Asian context, relations of threat, coercion and deterrence always involved more than two actors and, hence, come within the ambit of a ‘Complex System’ as defined in strategic parlance. Their individual strategic weights, calculations and moves were important factors in the nuclear strategic scenario as it unfolded, right from its inception in 1964 when China exploded its first fission device, to 1967 when it followed up with a thermonuclear device, to 1974 when India surprised the world with a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ to May 1998 when India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear, to date as Cold War 2.0 is well and truly underway.

The dynamics of deterrence in the South Asian ‘Complex System’ is, therefore, very different from the erstwhile two-player game of the Cold War, since the recipe for successful deterrence - rational actors, credible and clear deterrence threats, and a defender that has a reputation for not always realizing its threats - all contribute to possible failure of deterrence theories, with possible cataclysmic results.⁵ The war in Kosovo, events of ‘9/11,’ war in Afghanistan, the Gulf Wars and the war in Syria, as well as the ongoing tussle in the South China Sea, are all examples of ‘Complex System’ wars. These are likely to be the model of future conflicts in the international arena. The South Asian strategic waters have been further muddied by the conduct of ‘sub-conventional war under a nuclear overhang.’ Hence, the relevance of nuclear deterrence in a complicated ‘Complex System’ in South Asia gains urgency.

In the ‘Complex Deterrence’ situation in South Asia, where both China and Pakistan have an adversarial relationship with India, it is necessary to develop a deterrence strategy that avoids expensive and overt nuclear weapons race between the three players, as seen during the Cold War between USA and USSR, provides stable nuclear deterrence even in conditions of rising military tensions between either two, or all three, nuclear armed neighbours, and ensures India’s national security and insurance against nuclear blackmail by either one, or both, the neighbours.

South Asian Geopolitics

Nations are divided into ‘status quo’ powers and ‘revisionist’ powers. It is impossible for any nation to be neither. But while viewing the world through their respective glasses, idealists and realists will always desire changes and re-arrangements. The idealists may like the re-arrangements to be permanent, while the other powers would like ‘some more re- arranging.’⁶ This tussle between status quo and revisionist powers constitutes the game of power politics. Despite all pretences and efforts to be an idealist, at independence, Nehru was realist enough to see the world as an unequal place with residual colonialism, ideological imperialism and Cold War power politics in place. As mentioned earlier, nuclear weapons are all about power politics. To illustrate, at the end of the Cold War, USA was the only power that mattered in world politics and no country targeted it, but that did not lead to USA de-nuclearizing or reducing its weapon holdings below 2,500 residual weapons. The arsenal was being retained for power, influence and to meet any possibility of threat from potential competitors for global dominance, even after a couple of generations. The emergence of China as a global competitor proves them right.

In the South Asian context, India is a status quo power, happy with the state of the political environment. Pakistan on the other hand, is a revisionist power, which would like changes in the political environment, with the Kashmir issue settled in its favour and a reduction in the national power of India, if feasible. China is also a revisionist power with dissatisfaction in the unipolar world order and desirous of usurping the status of leading global power from USA. All actions of the three powers at play in the region must, therefore, be seen from this context.

Governments of India and Pakistan had crossed the nuclear rubicon in end 1980s, without overt declaration. While they coined this deterrence as ‘Recessed Deterrence’ or ‘Non-weaponised deterrence,’ its stability was suspect. The established wisdom on nuclear deterrence required: -

• Beliefs that nuclear weapons must deter.

• To deter, they must be in sufficient numbers to be credible.

• They must be renewed when their technology decays.

• The nation must have an effective command and control system to ensure weapon launches and physical safety.

• Delivery capability must be proven to eliminate misperception on credibility and vulnerability.

• Effective and reliable communication arrangements between the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) of both protagonists to be used in a crisis.

• • The large populations in value targets.

  • There are economic limits to a nuclear arms race.

  • Technological restrictions exist on at least two protagonists, leading to restrictive capabilities in launching platforms, command and control means, prevention of unauthorised launch, secure communications, etc.

  • Geographical locations, resulting in reduced reaction times.

Options for India

The introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) into the ‘Complex System’ in South Asia throws up new challenges, and when sub-conventional operations are mounted under a nuclear overhang, it turns the situation even more complex. The Chinese have also been writing about the need to move from ‘minimum deterrence’ to ‘limited deterrence,’ which envisages counter-force and counter-value targeting with tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear forces.⁷ The Chinese introduced this concept to deter its nuclear adversaries from conflict escalation, should deterrence fail.

While the Chinese have never openly acknowledged their tactical nuclear weapons programme, the development of shorter range missiles and deploying them against specific threats like Japan, Taiwan, India and some parts of eastern Russia, drives home the fact that their doctrinal positions with regard to their tactical weapons will remain hazy. Their capacity and capability to develop TNWs is never in doubt, and their deployment and potential for use remains officially unacknowledged. However, considering their Taiwan contingency and South China Sea (SCS) dilemmas, TNWs will remain essential tools for deterring intervention by USA and its allies. Clearly, the trajectory of Chinese nuclear weapon developments is based on China-US relations and the development of the Chinese arsenal is based on the need to deter USA. However, this development directly impacts India’s security, and India’s weapon and system advancements will need to factor the Chinese trajectory. Notwithstanding, the continued relevance of second-strike capability and minimum deterrence policy will remain relevant in an India-China equation, provided survivability of the second-strike elements is ensured. Development of Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVs), Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGVs) may be necessary merely to adapt the technologies, but are largely irrelevant to nuclear stability and deterrence.

Considering the fact that China needs to retain some of its nuclear weapons to deter others, and India needs nuclear weapons beyond deterring Pakistan, there is a need for reaching an understanding with China and Pakistan on nuclear weapons. RAdm KR Menon (Retd) actually proposes a nuclear Confidence Building Measure (CBM) with China in his book, Nuclear Strategy for India, which would be completely different from a similar measure with Pakistan. He concedes that, while it would be helpful for India and China to identify what part of the nuclear arsenal is meant for other parties, and if a geographical separation between those meant for India and the others could be examined, it is a difficult but not an impossible proposition. He recounts that this was attempted even during the Cold War between East and West Europe, where Soviet SS 21 missiles were permitted in East Europe but not in West Europe, as demanded by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). But, this initiative may have to come from Beijing, while India works out nuclear CBMs for South Asia.⁸ Underlying the India-China nuclear calculus would be an indestructible second-strike capability, which would enhance deterrence. India could recognise that China has national interest needs beyond South Asia and, therefore, would not need to match Chinese nuclear weapons numbers, as long as India’s second-strike capability, with hardened or mobile arsenals or both, which could ensure its survival after a first strike and an NCA that remains impermeable to a first strike, was ensured. This diplomatic arrangement with China, if feasible in the long term, could enhance deterrence.

Nuclear weapons capability has provided Pakistan with a safety umbrella, under which it could pursue its core national agenda, viz. to avenge the 1971 defeat that led to the bifurcation of the country, an embarrassment the Pakistan Army (PA) has tried very hard to camouflage and even deny. The PA, being the lone national authority within Pakistan, in order to own and run its national security agenda, began to replicate the success of jihadi elements in defeating the mighty Soviet Army in Afghanistan to similarly launch sub-conventional operations, using these ex-Afghanistan jihadis, in Kashmir and other parts of India. Pakistan has laid down four ‘red lines,’ without formally articulating them but through leaks by persons in authority, which covers territorial loss, significant military loss, economic strangulation and loss of internal stability.¹¹ The nuclear umbrella aims to deter India from using its larger armed forces to retaliate against the repeated actions by the PA sponsored jihadi groups. Terrorism under the nuclear umbrella has been a foreign policy tool and a primary strategy for the PA.

South Asia’s ‘Complex Situation’ has been worsened by the proliferation in nuclear weapons technology between China and Pakistan, and exchange of missile technology between China, Pakistan and North Korea. Ambiguity over the capabilities and ranges of the delivery systems and the multiplicity of views, analysis and releases over the types, sizes and yield of its warheads, are all deliberate and designed to enhance deterrence.¹² Thus, emerged the ‘Complex Situation,’ where Pakistan draws its rationale for nuclear weapons from the Indian ‘existential threat,’ while India seeks nuclear weapons citing the Chinese nuclear sword hanging over it.

However, deterrence in the India-Pakistan equation is underscored by deliberate ambiguity in Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, and its stated policy of First Use even against a conventional attack by India, qualified by a space threshold, force threshold, economic threshold and domestic threshold.¹³ The introduction of TNWs in the discourse is intended to further lower the threshold, deterring India from launching even shallow or minor operations against Pakistan’s continuous sub-conventional strikes, which has been euphemistically termed ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ by Pakistan. However, this incredulous first strike posture actually points to self-deterrence in a nuclear confrontation, since from among the three parameters that determine deterrence, viz. balance of interests, balance of capabilities and balance of resolve, in at least two, India stands to advantage. By its NFU posture and propounded doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ and treating use of any nuclear weapon against its forces, without distinguishing between strategic or tactical, as a nuclear attack, India has strengthened deterrence in the India-Pakistan equation. India would only carry out a nuclear strike ‘in response,’ thereby strengthening its resolve. Since India is a far larger country in size and capabilities, it can absorb physical damage of a first strike, but Pakistan could well cease to exist consequent to such first strike. This strengthens balance of interest in India’s favour. Pakistan has been repeatedly using the nuclear card while supporting sub-conventional attacks against India. But, recent incidents, including India’s responses to Kargil, Uri and Balakot, have called its bluff. Nuclear deterrence, thus, remains stable and effective in the Indo-Pak equation.

India can continue to adhere to its hitherto propounded nuclear doctrine of ‘NFU’ and ‘massive retaliation’ with a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ policy, notwithstanding the introduction of TNWs into the nuclear equation. This deterrence stability can only be destabilised in the event of an ‘irrational actor’ taking possession of a Pakistani nuclear weapon, which would threaten not just regional but probably global security. It is in the interest of continued nuclear stability, therefore, that all concerned regional and global players pool their resources together to ensure safety of Pakistani nuclear weapons from falling into jihadi elements in the Strategic Forces Command or the PA, and ensuring immediate retraction of nuclear warheads from Pakistan should the political stability and its leadership be threatened by internal turmoil or externally accentuated circumstances.

Conclusion

The currency of power that nuclear weapons provide to their possessors is unquestionable. However, in the South Asian crucible, the use of the erstwhile Cold War templates of deterrence are unlikely to manifest for various reasons, the major one being wisdom in hindsight! Denial strategy is unworkable, as has been adequately learnt from the experience of the Cold War. Open-ended competition would be unsupportable by the economies and populace of the region. A ‘Punishment Strategy’ requires lesser force levels and may be workable. ‘Flexible Response’ is not conducive to being accommodated in the region. ‘Minimum Deterrence,’ as a spin-off to the ‘Existential Deterrence,’ with number of warheads that would cause ‘unacceptable damage’ to the adversary identified, would be the most suitable, considering the ‘Complex System’ prevalent in the region.