Introduction

Attempts to reduce the ongoing tension on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, which started in May of 2020, have not yet yielded the desired result. Even after the 11th round of talks at the level of the military commanders, the restoration of status quo ante in places like Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang has not taken place. Besides, there has not been any apparent reduction in the troop levels since the height of the stand-off.1 The tension on the LAC is likely to impact the overall relationship between India and China.2 While the events on the LAC have received adequate attention at the international level, the global community does not seem as perturbed with the increase in force levels at the border between two nuclear-armed neighbours. There is little doubt that a similar standoff between India and her other nuclear armed neighbour viz. Pakistan, would have seen hectic efforts by the global community to urge an early resolution.

China and India are the two most populous nations on the earth. With both countries possessing nuclear weapons, a nuclear exchange between the two will undoubtedly have catastrophic consequences. China’s current action of opening up several fronts simultaneously, especially at a time when the world at large is dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic (which itself allegedly originated in China), has lowered its international standing. On the other hand, India currently enjoys sufficient goodwill within the global community. Yet, the current global discourse on the border tension between India and China seems to point to a degree of assurance that the crisis will not lead to a nuclear exchange. This of course may be seen in a positive light, and no nuclear threat has been issued by either side.

This restraint on nuclear signalling between the two countries is in stark contrast to the behaviour of India’s western neighbour who has made it a habit of frequently threatening India with nuclear war.3 Pakistan reinforces the global perception that South Asia is one of the most dangerous nuclear flashpoints. The perception relies on two factors. First, the lack of trust between the competitive political leadership and the extremely high suspicions prevalent among the military leadership. Second, given the proximal geographic distance between India and Pakistan, the escalatory potential of a war could be very high in view of the short flight distances of missiles and greater exposure of counter-value targets i.e., the civilian population, who are critically held hostage to the aggressive and acrimonious political rhetoric. These two factors have inevitably given India and Pakistan the perennial tag of being ‘unstable’ - although in operational experience, both sides have exercised caution and restraint.

India’s Nuclear Neighbourhood

Four of the current nuclear powers - USA, UK, France, and Israel - do not share a land border with any other nuclear power. While Russia shares a large border with China, her border with North Korea is very small. Therefore, India, Pakistan and China are currently the only three nuclear armed countries in the world, which have more than one nuclear armed country as a neighbour. A comparison of the size of landmass, coastline, and their armed forces, as obtained from the CIA World Factbook is tabulated below.

Table 1: Comparison between China, India and Pakistan4

It is interesting to note that the ratio between the size of India to Pakistan is 3.9:1, and 1:3.1 between India and China. There is near parity between the size of the ground forces of China and India, while the naval / marine forces of China are about 3.8 times larger and the Chinese Air Force enjoys a numerical superiority of 2.5 times. On the other hand, the Indian ground, naval, and air forces are about 2.2 times that of Pakistan.5 An analysis of the conventional balance between India and Pakistan from a quantitative standpoint for the period 1972 - 2002 by Kapur concluded that India’s advantage varied from 2.79:1 for the 70s, 2.53:1 for the 80s, 2.17:1 for 90s, and 2.7:1 for the period from 2000 to 2002.6 Thus, the overall conventional superiority of China over India is greater in magnitude than that of India over Pakistan.

The nuclear postures adopted by countries have, to a large extent, been influenced by the superiority or otherwise of their conventional forces. It is clear from the above comparison that the equation of conventional military power is not in India’s favour, in the Sino-Indian context. Yet, India has steadfastly refused to raise nuclear threats during the ongoing tensions between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, such a level of restraint has never been exhibited by Pakistan when tensions rise with India. Let us therefore, examine the nuclear doctrines of the three countries in brief. Before doing that, a quick recap of the Theory of Deterrence may be useful.

Deterrence Theory

The horrific effect of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 spawned research in the realm of International Relations to find, inter-alia, ways of avoiding a nuclear conflict. Bernard Brodie, in his book The Absolute Weapon published in 1946, said that henceforth, the chief purpose of the military establishment will be to avert wars.7 Nuclear weapons, it is largely agreed, enable deterrence in a way that conventional weapons cannot match.

Nuclear weapons, if and when used, are very likely to result in a ‘total war’ due to their immense destructive power. Interestingly, Clausewitz, the 19th Century scholar-warrior remains relevant even in the nuclear age. In his seminal work, ‘On War,’ he had written that war is merely an extension of state policy by other means. He had identified war to be made up of a‘fascinating trinity’ comprising violence, hatred and enmity as one element, ‘chance’ and ‘probability’ as the second element, and being based on ‘reason,’ as the third element. Thus, rationality dictates that a war, which cannot have any possible rational end, is best avoided. This can be achieved by pursuing a strategy of deterrence.

Over the years, a range of theories of deterrence have been propounded. These range from existential deterrence, rational deterrence, to perfect deterrence. Delving into these theories is beyond the scope of this article. Based on these theories, many countries practise a strategy of nuclear deterrence. To put it in a nutshell, nuclear deterrence is a strategy that ‘deters’ an adversary from indulging in an action by making him believe that the cost of his action would invite appropriate, if not excessive, response of a kind that would cause far more damage than any gain that he would make. It is aimed at highlighting a cost benefit analysis of a nuclear exchange, and is essentially a mind game. Quite obviously, this belief has also led to nuclear proliferation, as a number of countries, including Pakistan, believe that the possession of nuclear weapons provides them leverage to counter nuclear threats.

However, the possession of nuclear weapons, ipso facto, is not adequate to ensure nuclear deterrence. For deterrence to work, the threat to use nuclear weapons must be ‘credible.’ This credibility is determined by the nuclear capabilities of the nation, including its ‘willingness’ to use it, if required.8 Therefore, countries in possession of nuclear weapons draw up and follow their own nuclear doctrines, which dictate the types and number of nuclear weapons they aim to possess, and their use for warfighting, or deterrence. Let us now examine the nuclear doctrines of India and her nuclear neighbours.

China’s Nuclear Doctrine

The People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949, and was in the Soviet camp during the initial stages of the Cold War. During the Korean War, USA issued nuclear threats to China. This underscored the importance of nuclear weapons to the Chinese leaders, who then sought nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union, resulting in the agreement signed between the two countries in 1955.9 Subsequent events, such as threats by USA such as during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, and the halting of nuclear cooperation by the Soviet Union in 1959, apparently strengthened the Chinese resolve to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, they developed their own nuclear weapons and conducted 46 tests, including thermonuclear tests between 1964 and 1996.10

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, with its conventional superiority, adopted a posture of ‘No First Use,’ (NFU) but after the end of the Cold War, rescinded it in its avatar as Russia. China, however, was an early exception when it declared a policy of NFU soon after conducting its first nuclear test in 1964. At that time, the rift between the Soviet Union and China was increasing, while the eventual rapprochement with the USA occurred almost a decade later. Without speculating about the reason for China’s adoption of this policy, it is important to note that official Chinese statements continue to ascribe to a NFU policy, but leave some confusion about the scope of the policy and its conditions. A 2005 Chinese Foreign Ministry White Paper reiterated the pledge of NFU by stating that, “the Chinese government has solemnly declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstance,” and that this policy “will remain unchanged in the future.” In addition, the paper reiterated that “China has committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”11

Although China does not use the word ‘deterrence,’ preferring to use ‘self-defence’ as the rationale for developing nuclear weapons, the primary purpose of China’s nuclear weapons may indeed be surmised to be deterrence.12 China is believed to maintain a posture of minimum nuclear deterrence against the USA, and an offensive-oriented approach of limited nuclear deterrence towards India. It is also believed to be in possession of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, which does appear at odds with its policy of not using nuclear weapons for warfighting.13

China does not consider India to be a legitimate nuclear weapon state. Moreover, the NFU pledge is believed to be conditional. Therefore, there can be a question whether the NFU policy would be applicable against India. Besides, the unconfirmed inclusion of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in China’s arsenal and their strong belief in the principle of ‘deception,’ provide adequate reason for India to be cautious.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Since partition, Pakistan has always looked at India as an adversary. While the liberation of Bangladesh, in 1971, with India’s help provided Pakistan the impetus to develop its nuclear programme, it apparently started considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons soon after China conducted her first nuclear test in 1964. It was believed that China’s test would result in India developing its own nuclear weapons, and therefore, it was necessary for Pakistan to follow suit for its own security.14

Pakistan strives to maintain military parity with India. However, unable to match India conventionally, Pakistan has leveraged nuclear weapons as a deterrent against conventional war. The political objectives of Pakistan in pursuing a nuclear weapons programme have been identified as a security guarantor in the absence of alliance support for military adventurism; as a tool for nation building and prestige; an instrument to legitimise military power, and as leverage for gaining leadership of the Islamic World.15

While Pakistan has not formally declared its nuclear doctrine, there is little doubt that the doctrine is India-centric, and includes credible minimum deterrence and First Use of nuclear weapons as its tenets. In 2002, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, the then head of the Strategic Plans Division of Pakistan, mentioned four red lines, which if crossed, would make Pakistan launch its nuclear weapons. These were its space threshold, military threshold, economic threshold, and domestic destabilisation threshold.16 The use of nuclear weapons being construed as a means of war fighting is reinforced by its development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. In its efforts to deter India, Pakistan also rationally resorts to exploitation of its ‘irrationality’ through the frequent declaration of threats by various Pakistani leaders to use these weapons. Thus, Pakistan attempts to leverage its possession of nuclear weapons to deter India by holding out the threat to neutralise India’s conventional superiority through the use of nuclear weapons, while continuing a proxy war at the sub-conventional level.17

India’s Nuclear Doctrine

The Atomic Energy Commission of India was established in 1948. The reasons ascribed for India’s decision to start a nuclear programme include, “combination of traditional defensive security concerns, ideology, domestic political calculations, and a desire for prestige or great power status.”18 The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose to aid in the development of the nation is also an important factor which appears to have been considered.19

However, there is little doubt that subsequently, India’s nuclear programme has been influenced by the China-factor. China’s size, proximity, and India’s experience at the hands of Chinese in 1962, have made her wary of China’s military might. In fact, about one week prior to the nuclear tests of 1998, India’s then Defence Minister, George Fernandes, called China “enemy number one” in a television interview.20

Despite, Pakistan conducting its own nuclear tests as an immediate response to India’s in May 1998, India has adopted a mature nuclear doctrine which includes building and maintain a credible minimum deterrent. It unequivocally adopts a posture of ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons, stating that  nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian soil, or on Indian troops anywhere, or a strike with any other weapons of mass destruction. Such retaliation will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. It rules out the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The principle of civilian control over the nuclear weapons is also included in the doctrine, as is the aim of universal nuclear disarmament.21 It is also necessary to highlight that India’s policy of No First Use has remained unchanged even though the current NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government’s main constituent party had promised to review the nuclear doctrine in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections in 2014.22

Conclusion

A comparison of the doctrines of the three countries reveals that there are significant differences between Pakistan’s doctrine on the one hand, and that of China and India on the other. While Pakistan sees its nuclear weapons primarily as ‘weapons,’ India tends to emphasise the ‘nuclear’ characteristic of such weapons.23

China projects an approach similar to that of India and both countries believe in ‘credible minimum deterrence,’ and in keeping their nuclear weapons in a de-mated condition. With both countries committed to the ‘No First Use’ principle, it is not surprising that the nuclear aspect has been kept out of the discourse between the two nations, even during the ongoing crisis. A recent study of relevant Chinese literature and interviews with Chinese experts, conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has concluded that, “Chinese analysts maintain a dismissive attitude about the relevance of nuclear weapons in China-India relations.”24

With Pakistan’s perpetual animosity against India, and the presence of an increasingly hegemonic China on its border, India has a complex deterrence problem. While deterrence between India and Pakistan may be said to be in place, and working, the deterrence relationship between India and China is yet to be defined formally.

The China-factor has been one of the important reasons for India to start its nuclear weapons programme. Nonetheless, India has, in keeping with its behaviour as a responsible nuclear power, adopted a more mature approach. Further, we may keep in mind key factors such as the present standoff being limited to the border areas, the overall relationship with China and India’s hope for an early and peaceful resolution of the crisis. Therefore, raising the nuclear card, especially at the time of heightened tensions last year, would have signalled a higher step in the escalation matrix. This has correctly been averted in this crisis.

The question is whether India is likely to continue with this approach even if the situation escalates into a limited conflict, perhaps on a scale similar to that in Kargil in 1999. Taking various factors into account, it may be safe to conclude that despite China’s conventional superiority, India is unlikely to discard its NFU policy against China. Further, notwithstanding the ongoing tension on the border, the restraint shown by India in this matter is likely to continue. However, it is necessary to recall that in the recent past, two defence ministers of India including the incumbent, have expressed their view that the NFU policy could be reviewed in the future.25 Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that if India is involved in an intense war on two-fronts due to collusion between China and Pakistan, it may not be feasible for India to dogmatically adhere to the ‘No First Use’ policy.

Endnotes

  1. “The Big Story: China-India Brief,” Takshashila PLA Insight no. 99, 21 May 2021. https://mailchi.mp/326ba9189412/china-india-brief-china-in-the-space-mars-and-moon-scs-taiwan-tibet-elections-and-white-paper-plan-in-2035-plas-pandemic-diplomacy-hq-9?e=85d6a85833, accessed 24 May 21.

  2. Shubhajit Roy and Krishn Kaushik, “Global Politics Competitive India will use all Tools to Stay Strong: Jaishakar,” Indian Express, 21 May 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/global-politics-competitive-india-will-use-all-tools-to-stay-strong-jaishankar-7323722/, accessed 24 May 21.

  3. Press Trust of India, “Pak can Target Delhi in Five Minutes: AQ Khan,” ABP Live, 30 May 2015. https://www.abplive.in/india-news/nuclear-armed-pak-can-target-delhi-in-5-minutes-a-q-khan-352931, accessed 24 May 2021.

  1. “CIAWorld Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency,Washington.https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries, accessed 30 May 21.

  1. This is of course, a somewhat simplistic comparison of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the three nations. However, the military power of a nation depends not only on the numerical strength of its armed forces, but also on the quantity and level of technology of the hardware, the quality of tactics and procedures being followed, and also by the morale of the forces. Determining the relative combat power is beyond the scope of this article.

  2. S Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 23.

  3. Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 76.

  4. Satish Chandra, “Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is It Necessary,” IDSA Issue Brief, 30 April 2014, 3. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/RevisitingIndiasNuclearDoctrine_schandra_300414,accessed 30 May 21.

  1. KN Ramchandran, “China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues,” Nuclear Myths and Realities: India’s Dilemma, ed. K Subrahmanyam (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983-84), 40.

  2. Robert S Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Pursuits,2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 68, no. 94 (2012), 96.

  3. “China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,” Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 01 September 2005, 9-10. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/armscontrol.html, accessed 07 October 2020.

  4. “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995. http://prop1.org/prop1/chwp.htm, accessed 07 October 2020.

  5. Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrent (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2009), 95-102.

  6. Ibid, 46.

  7. Sethi, Op Cit., n.13, 52-56.

  8. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta,” Pugwash, 14 January 2002, http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm, accessed 01 June 21.

  1. India has, through the surgical strike of 2016, and the air strike of 2019, demonstrated that there is scope for certain conventional action below the nuclear threshold with respect to Pakistan.

  2. Kapur, Op Cit., n.6, 83.

  3. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), 79.

  4. Press Trust of India, “China is Potential Threat Number One,” Indian Express, 04 May 1998. http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/fe/daily/19980504/12455554.html, accessed 06 September 2018.

  1. “CCS reviews progress in operationalising India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Prime Minister Office, 04 January 2003. http://pibarchive.nic.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html, accessed 04 October 2020.

  2. “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Election Manifesto 2014,” Ek Bharat Shreshta Bharat, 39. http://library.bjp.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/252/1/bjp_lection_manifesto_english_2014.pd f, accessed 24 May 21.

  3. Ashley J Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 279.

  4. Toby Dalton, and Tong Zhao, “At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, August 20. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Dalton%20Zhao%20-%20China-India%20Nuclear%20Relation.pdf, accessed 04 October 20

  5. Prakash Menon, “Rajnath and No First Use: Tainting India’s Image as a Responsible Nuclear Power,” The Wire, August 19. https://thewire.in/security/rajnath-singh-no-first-use-nuclear-policy, accessed 24 May 21.