Abstract: This article examines India’s evolving Arctic interests, the adequacy of existing legal regimes, and the strategic consequences of Arctic governance for global maritime security. The study uses a doctrinal analysis of the current legal infrastructure including UNCLOS, Polar Code, MARPOL and the Arctic Council agreements, along with a comparative review of Arctic and non-Arctic states’ legal strategies. It also includes a focused assessment of recent normative developments in the region. Together, the study identifies doctrinal and practical gaps affecting baseline determination, continental shelf claims, freedom of navigation, and environmental obligations. It evaluates how instruments such as Article 234, the Ilulissat Declaration, and the IMO Polar Code interact with state practice and how legal ambiguities facilitate strategic manoeuvring in polar waters. The central argument is that India’s scientific presence and observer role must mature into deliberate legal and institutional engagement, to protect freedom of navigation, safeguard climate-linked national interests, and preserve operational flexibility. The article concludes by advocating a coordinated whole of government approach, targeted participation in Arctic Council working groups, and strengthened bilateral partnerships to mitigate legal and operational vulnerabilities.

Introduction

When Karen Carpenter sang in 1972 of being “on the top of the world, looking down on creation,” few could have imagined that her words might one day evoke associations with the Arctic in the minds of listeners. Today, the phrase aptly captures the region’s growing prominence in international affairs. The Arctic has changed and in fact it is changing. As climate change accelerates the melting of Arctic ice, the Arctic Ocean, once characterised by perennial ice cover and relative isolation from global maritime activities, has emerged as a theatre for international strategic competition. The changes in the Arctic are widely acknowledged and extensively debated. What is less apparent, however, is the transformation of the legal landscape. The established legal frameworks such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and related instruments increasingly struggle to address contemporary complexities, while emerging threats exploit institutional and normative gaps. Current international legal infrastructure, while foundational, contains significant gaps enabling strategic ambiguity. Divergent approaches adopted by Arctic states generate further uncertainty, while non-Arctic states are developing increasingly sophisticated strategies of legal and diplomatic engagement. At the same time, grey zone operations challenge the application of traditional operational law by exploiting legal ambiguities to advance strategic objectives. Operational law in Arctic maritime contexts represents a complex intersection of international humanitarian law, international maritime law, and international human rights law, governing military and civilian maritime operations while addressing environmental protection and indigenous rights considerations.

Arctic and non-Arctic states have developed different legal strategies that reflect their varying interests, capabilities, and geographic relationships to the region. These strategies range from sovereignty-centred to collaborative engagement models, creating a complex mosaic of legal positions that sometimes conflict with established international law principles. India, as an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013, actively participates in discussions on sustainable development, scientific research and environmental protection in the region, reflecting its growing interest in polar affairs. For India, meaningful engagement in Arctic affairs also requires a deliberate examination of the operational legal dimensions that underpin maritime security in the region. The rules governing navigation, security operations, and resource use in polar waters are still in flux, and the way they evolve will directly affect India’s freedom to operate, trade, and safeguard its interests. If India remains absent from these legal architectural debates, it risks inheriting a framework shaped exclusively by others, one that may constrain its naval deployments, complicate commercial ventures, and erode its strategic flexibility. Analysing these dynamics from a legal perspective is therefore not an academic exercise but a strategic necessity, enabling India to anticipate challenges, assert its rights, and secure an equitable role in shaping the future order of the Arctic.

Existing Legal Infrastructure

The legal architecture governing Arctic maritime security comprises multiple layers of international law, from global conventions to regional agreements, bilateral treaties and customary international law. UNCLOS, as confirmed in the Ilulissat Declaration adopted in 20081, serves as the foundational legal framework for Arctic maritime activities, despite being negotiated before the region's current strategic significance was apparent. UNCLOS defines the various maritime zones from internal waters to extended continental shelf, that form the basis for Arctic states' jurisdictional claims in the region (Art. 2−33, 55−85 etc.) and governs the freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea in the region. For India, UNCLOS also provides the normative basis for its Arctic engagement, ensuring legal safeguards for freedom of navigation, freedom of scientific research and resource access under universally accepted maritime principles.

Art. 234 of UNCLOS provides coastal states the authority to regulate vessel source pollution in ice covered areas within their EEZs, representing one of the few Arctic specific provisions in international maritime law. This provision illustrates how environmental protection and freedom of navigation intersect, a balance that holds particular significance for India’s future polar operations. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)'s Polar Code2 establishes mandatory safety and environmental protection requirements for ships operating in polar waters, including vessel certification, crew training, and voyage planning obligations. Recent amendments adopted in 20233 extend these requirements to fishing vessels, pleasure yachts, and smaller cargo ships, addressing gaps in the original framework. These regulatory developments enhance maritime safety and create a more predictable operating environment for non-Arctic participants such as India. The July 2024 Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) prohibition in Arctic waters4 marks a critical environmental milestone, though exemptions and delayed implementation limit immediate impact. This highlights the continuing tension between economic activity and environmental stewardship; a dynamic India must consider in framing its Arctic policy.

The Arctic Council, established in 1996, serves as the primary regional forum despite deliberately ambiguous legal status.5 The Council's observer system has evolved into a significant component of Arctic governance, with thirteen non-Arctic states granted observer status. The Council has produced three legally binding agreements addressing search and rescue, marine oil pollution response, and scientific cooperation.6 For India, participation as an observer state allows it to align its scientific diplomacy with principles of responsible governance and coastal state sovereignty. Various bilateral and multilateral treaties like the controversial 1990 United States of America-Soviet Union Maritime Boundary Agreement, 2010 Norway Russia Barents Sea boundary treaty and 2018 Central Arctic Ocean fisheries moratorium affect Arctic maritime security. These agreements reinforce the importance of stable legal boundaries and cooperative mechanisms, an approach consistent with India’s preference for rule-based maritime governance. Environmental protection principles have gained customary law status through consistent state practice and international agreements. The precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management approaches, and indigenous rights recognition represent emerging customary obligations, though their precise scope remains contested. Collectively, these principles support a governance model centred on sustainability and inclusivity, complementing India’s broader maritime outlook. The principle of peaceful use, while not as firmly established in the Arctic as in Antarctica, has emerged as a customary expectation through decades of cooperative state practice.

Gaps in the Arctic Legal Infrastructure

The existing Arctic legal infrastructure reveals significant gaps in both scope and effectiveness. While UNCLOS provides the overarching framework, its application to Arctic waters raises practical and doctrinal difficulties. Baseline determination rules, formulated with stable coastlines in mind, are ill suited to a region characterised by shifting ice cover and changing geography. These uncertainties complicate submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as seen in Russia’s 2015 revised claim over the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges7 that overlaps with Danish and Canadian claims.8 Freedom of navigation is similarly contested, with Canada asserting sovereignty over the Northwest Passage (NWP)9 and Russia imposing restrictive measures in the Northern Sea Route (NSR)10, positions widely viewed as inconsistent with UNCLOS transit passage rights. Environmental obligations under Art. 192 also struggle to accommodate emerging threats such as black carbon, underwater noise, and invasive species.11 Parallel institutional frameworks provide only partial remedies. The IMO has not mandated reductions in black carbon emissions, while the Polar Code’s search and rescue provisions do little to address the lack of Arctic infrastructure. The 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement12 offers a framework for cooperation but remains hampered by vast distances, resource constraints, and its deliberate avoidance of sovereignty disputes. Similarly, the Arctic Council, limited by the Ottawa Declaration to a high-level forum13 without legal personality, has produced only a few technical agreements. Its effectiveness has been weakened further by Russia’s suspension since 2022 and by tensions over the participation of non-Arctic observers. Other bilateral and multilateral treaties, such as the 1990 United States of America - Soviet Union maritime boundary agreement and the time bound 2018 Central Arctic Ocean fisheries moratorium, underscore the fragility of cooperative arrangements.

Beyond these treaty-based regimes, customary international law has limited capacity to evolve in a region with scarce historical practice and rapid transformation. The absence of a comprehensive treaty framework comparable to Antarctica, places greater reliance on state practice and opinion of law, yet Russia’s militarisation and reciprocal responses by other states blur the boundary between defensive and offensive operations, challenging the principle of peaceful use. Novel issues such as dual use activities, where research vessels, fishing fleets, or commercial shipping may serve strategic purposes, remain inadequately regulated, creating exploitable vulnerabilities. Likewise, the underdeveloped governance of emerging technologies, including autonomous vessels, subsea infrastructure and polar navigation systems, leaves critical gaps in maritime safety and security. The United States of America, despite being an important Arctic power, is yet to ratify UNCLOS, thereby weakening universal adherence to its dispute settlement and governance mechanisms. Consequently, while UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures are formally available, the high political and strategic stakes of Arctic disputes often preclude their use, highlighting the need for specialised mechanisms capable of addressing environmental, technical, and security concerns in an integrated manner.

Comparative Analysis of Arctic States’ Legal Strategies

The eight Arctic states pursue legal strategies that reflect their geography, strategic priorities, and interpretations of international law, yet certain common themes emerge. The United States of America stands apart as the only Arctic state not to have ratified UNCLOS, relying instead on customary law to justify freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) against what it considers excessive claims, such as Russia’s NSR restrictions and Canada’s NWP assertions. Its 2024 Arctic Strategy14 reflects a “monitor and respond” approach that emphasises domain awareness, rapid deployment, and the strategic use of environmental protection as both marine conservation and strategic positioning tools, though domestic pressures from Alaskan resource industries temper its initiatives. Russia, by contrast, adopts the most assertive posture, combining straight baselines, expansive continental shelf submissions and stringent control of the NSR with a programme of military expansion framed as defensive but clearly projecting capabilities beyond territorial defence.15 Russian measures often use environmental protection as a justification for sovereignty assertions, while selective exemptions from the 2024 HFO ban16 illustrate the blending of environmental rhetoric with national interests. Canada occupies a middle ground, framing its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act17 and ecosystem-based management approaches as necessary for environmental stewardship while reinforcing sovereignty over the NWP through historic title, baseline claims, and the recognition of indigenous use.18 It has demonstrated a preference for negotiated maritime settlements, as in the 1973 delimitation with Denmark and the peaceful resolution of the Hans Island dispute19, but remains constrained by obligations to consult indigenous communities on development.

The European Arctic states adopt strategies shaped by their treaty obligations, alliance memberships, and political traditions. Norway’s approach20 is conditioned by the Svalbard Treaty, leading to tensions over fisheries regulation in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, though it has successfully secured continental shelf extensions and resolved its maritime boundary with Russia in 2010. Norway positions itself as an environmental leader while continuing petroleum development and balancing its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commitments with a cautious stance towards Russia. Denmark’s strategy21 is mediated through Greenland’s autonomy, combining extensive continental shelf claims with environmental initiatives such as the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries moratorium, while managing the uncertainties created by Greenlandic self-determination aspirations.22 Iceland leverages its central location, fisheries expertise, and role in the Arctic Council to maintain influence disproportionate to its size, though climate change threatens the very fisheries that underpin its maritime economy.23 Finland and Sweden, traditionally cooperative actors, have seen their Arctic strategies reshaped by NATO accession, which ties their Arctic postures more closely to Baltic security dynamics. Finland builds on European Union (EU) membership, ice navigation expertise, and scientific cooperation to amplify its influence,24 while Sweden combines indigenous rights leadership, advanced research capacities, and NATO security guarantees with its Nordic traditions of environmental cooperation.25 Taken together, these strategies demonstrate that while the Arctic states share interests in resource development, environmental protection, and security, their legal approaches diverge sharply, producing overlapping claims and tensions that test the resilience of the current international legal framework.

Comparative Analysis of Non-Arctic States’ Legal Strategies

Non-Arctic states have developed increasingly sophisticated strategies to establish presence and influence in Arctic governance, often framing their engagement in terms of global stakes such as climate change, freedom of navigation, and sustainable development. China stands out with the most ambitious approach, self-designating as a “near Arctic state” and embedding Arctic engagement within its Belt and Road Initiative through the Polar Silk Road.26 Its strategy blends economic partnerships, exemplified by heavy investment in Russian Arctic energy projects, with scientific diplomacy and dual use research activities that legitimise its presence while advancing strategic capabilities.27 China also uses lawfare techniques to challenge restrictive interpretations of Arctic governance while promoting broad readings of non-Arctic rights under UNCLOS.28 The EU’s approach is shaped by its mixed membership of Arctic and non-Arctic states. The EU emphasises environmental leadership, sustainable development, and institutional strengthening, leveraging regulatory power through mechanisms such as shipping emission standards and new Emission Control Areas to influence Arctic activities indirectly.29 Its support for multilateral governance and indigenous rights aligns with smaller Arctic states’ positions, though Brexit has shifted EU Arctic policy more narrowly toward continental European interests. India, though newer to Arctic engagement, has articulated a comprehensive six pillar strategy in its 2022 Arctic Policy,30 grounded in scientific research, environmental protection, and observer participation in the Arctic Council. Its Himadri station, IndArc observatory, and focus on climate linkages with the Indian monsoon provide legitimacy for its presence, while emerging economic interests in shipping and energy are tempered by resource constraints and caution about the China-Russia strategic alignment.

Other Asian states have pursued strategies that combine advanced technology, scientific cooperation, and security linkages. Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy31 emphasises rule-based governance and scientific cooperation, supported by its technological edge in ice class shipbuilding and navigation systems. Japan balances commercial interests in Arctic shipping and energy with environmental concerns and alliance obligations and its 2024 Defence of Japan White Paper32 explicitly acknowledges the relevance of Arctic Sea routes. South Korea similarly leverages its shipbuilding expertise and scientific research, with its Dasan station in Svalbard and experimental Arctic shipping transits demonstrating long term commitment.33 Its approach balances commercial opportunities in Arctic shipping and resources with alliance driven security considerations, especially regarding China-Russia cooperation. The United Kingdom (UK), post Brexit, has reframed its Arctic strategy around science, environment, and security.34 Building on world class polar research, the UK has strengthened military cooperation with Nordic partners through NATO and pursued commercial opportunities in Arctic resources and shipping, though these interests often sit uneasily with its climate leadership role. Singapore’s approach to the Arctic is shaped by its dependence on global shipping patterns. While it has not issued a formal Arctic policy, Singapore seeks to preserve its role as a major maritime hub through technological innovation, commercial partnerships, and regulatory expertise. Its engagement in Arctic Council working groups and investments in Arctic logistics underscore a pragmatic effort to remain relevant as Arctic trade routes evolve. Taken together, these strategies demonstrate that non-Arctic states, despite lacking territorial claims, are reshaping Arctic governance through a mix of scientific legitimacy, economic engagement, regulatory influence, and alliance frameworks, thereby complicating the traditional dominance of Arctic coastal states.

Existing Roadblocks for India

India's Arctic engagement faces significant structural and political constraints that have intensified following Russia's suspension from Arctic Council activities and heightened United States of America - Russia tensions over Arctic militarisation. Geopolitical rivalry among Arctic states could compel India to navigate carefully between competing spheres of influence, particularly as China's assertive Arctic presence through the Polar Silk Road has heightened Western sensitivities towards further non-Arctic involvement, with some Arctic states now viewing China as a potential security threat.35 Domestically, resource limitations pose substantial obstacles. Arctic operations demand specialised ice class vessels costing more than conventional ships, year-round Himadri station operations require sustained investment competing with India's other strategic priorities, while the lack of indigenous ice breaking capabilities and dependence on Norwegian logistical support makes long term commitment politically challenging given fiscal constraints and limited Arctic trained personnel. Environmental and indigenous rights standards, particularly Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) protocols and IMO's prohibition of HFO in Arctic waters creating additional operational costs, could restrict Indian commercial ventures and require adaptations in business practices that exceed traditional regulatory frameworks. Finally, legal limitations significantly narrow India's scope of action. As an Arctic Council observer, India lacks decision making authority. Decisions require consensus among eight member states, restricted participation in subsidiary body meetings with no accreditation rights, and bilateral cooperation ultimately depends on Arctic states' willingness to extend meaningful access and partnerships. China's experience demonstrates how observer status brings more obligations than rights in a governance system increasingly polarised by great power competition.

Way Ahead for India

India's Arctic engagement, though initially anchored in scientific research and environmental collaboration, must now mature into a coherent policy framework that integrates strategic, legal, and economic dimensions. As India deepens its participation in Arctic governance, it must align its national objectives with established principles of international law governing polar regions. The Arctic experience offers valuable insights into balancing sovereign rights, environmental stewardship, and global commons governance. These lessons can guide India in articulating a balanced approach to its interests across both the Arctic and Antarctic domains.

The first and foremost requirement is a comprehensive legal framework that simultaneously strengthens its institutional presence, builds bilateral partnerships, and leverages scientific and commercial opportunities. As an Arctic Council observer since 2013 and re-elected in 2019, India has actively participated in various projects across various working groups36 viz. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working groups.37 However, India must move beyond passive participation towards targeted engagement in these working groups. Engagement in the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group, would be particularly significant, as it could support the operational deployment of Indian naval ships in the Arctic. The recently concluded Arctic Circle India Forum 2025 in New Delhi38 marked a significant milestone, bringing together over 80 speakers from 16 countries under the theme "The Polar Order: The Arctic and Asia," with India's External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar emphasising the Arctic's emerging role as a theatre of power competition.39 India's constitutional experience with indigenous rights and extensive work in community based natural resource management aligns with the Council's emphasis on indigenous knowledge systems. The 2022 Arctic Policy, designed around six pillars, viz. science and research, environmental protection, economic development, transportation connectivity, governance cooperation and national capacity building provide the strategic framework for enhanced engagement.

Climate research provides the strongest foundation for Indian presence in the Arctic, particularly through studies on Arctic monsoon linkages that are critical to national interests. The Hindu Kush Himalayan connection to the Arctic establishing India as a legitimate stakeholder in Arctic governance.40 Expanding India's Himadri research station operations to year-round presence since December 2023 and the landmark 2025 agreement with Norway to codevelop India's first indigenous Polar Research Vessel41 demonstrate long term commitment. Collaborative projects with Arctic states integrate India into the global Arctic scientific community. The operational Chennai Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC) and India's strategic engagement with the NSR, position India advantageously in Arctic shipping networks. Opportunities also arise from Russia's complex position in Arctic Council activities, positioning India as a constructive partner capable of facilitating cooperation in less politically contentious areas while maintaining pragmatic energy partnerships. However, such engagements should remain consistent with global sanctions frameworks to protect India’s neutrality and uphold its maritime credibility.

Bilateral agreements with Arctic states must complement this institutional approach. Norway42 remain central to India’s Arctic engagement through joint feasibility studies for NSR operations, Arctic navigation collaboration and Research & Development in Arctic shipping and ice class vessel construction.43 Iceland offers complementarities in renewable energy, environmental protection and polar research. Carefully calibrated cooperation with Russia allows India to retain access to critical Arctic knowledge, while maintaining traditional strategic ties. Similar opportunities also exist with Canada and other Nordic states, particularly in technology transfer and maritime domain awareness. India’s Arctic Policy must align bilateral efforts with institutional engagement that respects coastal state sovereignty while securing national interests. Building on its existing ice class shipping capabilities, India should pursue commercial partnerships in energy, minerals, and technology to reduce strategic vulnerabilities. India's active participation in Arctic environmental governance through marine conservation, pollution response initiatives including plastic pollution mitigation, and renewable energy initiatives, would further reinforce its credentials as a responsible stakeholder. India’s Arctic strategy should integrate with broader Indo Pacific priorities through coordination mechanisms like the Quad. These mechanisms can extend cooperation on climate, environment, and maritime security into the Arctic. Arctic shipping lanes, in turn, can complement Indian Ocean connectivity through established corridors like the CVMC. Finally, India must draw lessons from both Arctic and non-Arctic state strategies, avoiding perceptions of overreach while adopting partnership-based approaches.

Conclusion

The Arctic may appear distant, but in truth, the region exerts a significant influence on India’s climate, economy, and security. The effects of the thinning Arctic ice sheets reverberate in the Indian monsoons, accelerate the erosion of Himalayan glaciers and contribute to rising sea levels along India’s coasts. Today, what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. It comes home in the form of erratic rainfall, flooding, drought, and disrupts the ecological balance on which millions of Indian lives depend. The Southwest Monsoon of 2025 witnessed 14 Western Disturbances, far above the usual frequency.44 These tropical systems intensified rainfall and triggered flash floods in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, contributing to extreme rainfall events across the Himalayas, China, Nepal, and Pakistan.45 Scientists have attributed the anomaly to Arctic and West Asian warming, which is shifting jet streams northwards.46 According to a World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) study on climate change in Asia47 and various Global Assessment reports of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction’s (UNDRR)48, Asia is hit the hardest with highest number of flood related deaths and economic losses worldwide. The majority of Asian countries host vast populations that are heavily dependent on monsoon rains and river systems, both of which are acutely vulnerable to altered weather patterns and rising sea levels. The melting of Arctic ice has a disproportionate impact on Asia, influencing regional weather systems such as the Asian monsoon, intensifying extreme weather events, and heightening the risks faced by densely populated coastal regions. Given these interconnections, greater participation of Asian nations in Arctic affairs is not only desirable but critical.

Beyond this climatic chain reaction, the Arctic is swiftly becoming the new theatre of geopolitics, where major powers are redrawing maritime strategies, securing transpolar routes, and positioning for resource dominance. The opening of the Northern Sea Route would offer India transformative opportunities for improving trade efficiency and strengthening energy security while advancing the MAHASAGAR vision and blue economy objectives. The access to Arctic shipping lanes through the operational Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and potential engagement with transpolar routes, position India advantageously within evolving global maritime networks. Arctic mineral resources, hydrocarbon reserves, and fisheries represent significant economic opportunities that India cannot afford to ignore as global supply chains reconfigure around polar accessibility. India's year-round Himadri research station operations since December 2023, the 2025 bilateral agreement with Norway to co-develop an indigenous Polar Research Vessel, and the IndArc observatory reflect a sustained commitment to polar research. These scientific investments provide a legitimate and sustained scientific presence in the Arctic, deepen understanding of Arctic–monsoon linkages vital to national food and water security and through enhanced satellite surveillance and domain awareness, strengthen India’s contribution to environmental monitoring, maritime safety and responsible participation in polar governance. Strategic imperatives require India to play an active role in shaping the evolving legal and governance framework for Arctic maritime operations. With the rules determining freedom of navigation, security, resource use, and environmental protection still fluid, non-participation could leave India subject to norms shaped by others, constraining strategic and commercial flexibility. Engagement in Arctic Council working groups such as the EPPR can enable operational presence and demonstrate India’s contribution to maritime safety and environmental protection. The Arctic Circle India Forum 2025, underscoring Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s view of the Arctic as a theatre of power competition, reflects India’s recognition of these emerging strategic stakes.

Safeguarding India’s Arctic interests requires a coordinated whole-of-government approach that integrates diplomatic, scientific, and operational capabilities. Arctic should therefore be incorporated within the MAHASAGAR Vision framework, with its existing mechanisms and initiatives correspondingly extended to meet India’s strategic and developmental objectives the Arctic region as well. The Ministry of External Affairs should lead engagement through the Arctic Council and bilateral partnerships with key Arctic states, while the Ministry of Earth Sciences must expand research infrastructure and strengthen climate monitoring on Arctic–Himalayan linkages. The Indian Navy’s expertise is vital for translating policy into operational presence. Multi-ministerial initiatives involving the ministries of External Affairs, Earth Sciences, Defence, Ports Shipping and Waterways, Fisheries and other ministries of the government concerned with maritime governance are essential to ensure policy coherence, promote technology partnerships for polar operations, and align India’s Arctic initiatives with its broader Indo-Pacific connectivity strategies. To ignore the Arctic is to ignore the convergence of climate vulnerability, economic opportunity and strategic competition that will fundamentally define the 21st century international order. To engage comprehensively through coordinated diplomatic, scientific, and operational efforts, is to safeguard India’s future security, prosperity, and influence in an increasingly interconnected and contested global maritime environment. The Arctic is no longer peripheral to India's national interests, it is central to India's climate resilience, economic vitality, and strategic autonomy.

Endnotes

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  2. International Maritime Organization, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) (London: International Maritime Organization, 2017),https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf

  1. International Maritime Organization, Resolution MSC.538(107): Adoption of Amendments to the Polar Code, June 08, 2023, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MSCResolutions/MSC.538(107).pdf.

  2. International Maritime Organization, Resolution MEPC.329(76), “Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV, and VI concerning Arctic matters,” June 17, 2021, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDocuments/MEPC.329(7 6).pdf.

  3. Evan Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” American Journal of International Law 93 no. 3, (2019): 712–722, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/212368.pdf.

  4. Arctic Council, “About the Arctic Council,” https://arctic-council.org/about/.

  5. Andrey Todorov, “Russia’s Arctic Shelf Bid and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Explained,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 02, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/russias-arctic-shelf-bid-and-commission-limits-continental-shelf-explained.

  6. Durham University, “IBRU releases new maps reflecting CLCS recommendations on Russian continental shelf , ” IBRU Centre for Borders Research, March 06 , 2023 , https://www.durham.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/ibru-borders-research/news-and-events/boundary-news/new-arctic-maps-reflecting-clcs-recommendations-on-russian-continental-shelf/.

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  8. Government of Russia, “Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route,” April 18, 2013, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, https://rg.ru/documents/2013/04/19/pravila-dok.html.

  9. Xinli Qi et al., “Environmental impacts of Arctic shipping activities: A review”, Ocean & Coastal Management, vol 247 (January 01, 2024): 106936, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ abs/pii/S0964569123004611?via%3Dihub.

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  11. Arctic Council, Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, September 19, 1996), Arctic Council Open Access Archive, 1996, https://library.arcticportal.Org/1541/1/00_ ottawa_decl_1996_signed.pdf.

  12. United States Department of Defence, DoD Arctic Strategy 2024, (Washington DC: Department of Defence, June 21, 2024), https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF.

  13. SpecialEurasia OSINT Team, “Russia’s Arctic Forum 2025 Underlined Moscow’s Strategy in the Region,” SpecialEurasia, March 29, 2025,https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/03/29/russias-arcticforum-2025m#:~:text=This%20report%20examines%20Moscow%E2%80%99s%20Arctic%20strategy%2C%20drawing%20on,on%20Putin%E2%80%99s%20recent%20state ments%20and%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20geopolitical%20positioning.

  14. High North News, “Russia and Canada Opt Out of Voluntary Heavy Fuel Oil Ban in the Arctic,” High North News, November 15, 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-and-canada-opt-out-voluntary-heavy-fuel-oil-ban-arctic.

  15. Government of Canada, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12, https://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/A-12/FullText.html.

  16. Government of Canada, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, 2019

  17. Government of Canada, “Boundary dispute,” Global Affairs Canada Press Release, June 14, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/fr/affaires-mondiales/nouvelles/2022/06/differend-frontalier.html.

  18.  Government of Norway, “The Norwegian Government's Arctic Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2021, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/arctic_policy/id2830120/.

  19.  Government of Denmark, “Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,” Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, https://arcticparl.org/wp-content/uploads/2 022/02/3.1-Kingdom-of-Denmark-Arctic-Strategy.pdf.

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  12. Government of the Republic of Korea, “Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea 2018,” Seoul: Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, 2018, https://www.uaf.edu/caps/resources/policy-documents/korea-arctic-policy-of-the-republic-of-korea-2018.pdf.

  13. Government of the United Kingdom, “Looking North: The UK and the Arctic – The UK’s Arctic Policy Framework,” London: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e38ed3e90e0762637e30d0/looking-north-the-uk-and-the-arctic-the-uks-arctic-policy-framework.pdf.

  14. Multiple Arctic States are cautious of Chinese presence in the region and China finds mention in their respective Arctic policies.

  15. Veselova D.N., “Participation of India in the Arctic Council,” Arctic and North, no. 58, (2025): 117–135, https://arcticandnorth.ru/upload/iblock/8ad/y1uen3k9ltqejmua5due6u2215o3p8sr/ 58_117_135.pdf.

  16. Veselova D.N., “The China and India’s Activities in the Arctic Council: A Comparative Analysis”, Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, Politics, 18, no. 4 (2024):153-164, https://www.eijournal.ru/jour/article/view/1384.

  17. Arctic Circle, “Arctic Circle India Forum,” https://www.arcticcircle.org/forums/arctic-circle-india-forum.

  18. Akanksha Singh, “Insights from the Arctic Circle India Forum 2025,” PSI News, May 13, 2025, https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/insights-arctic-circle-india-forum-2025.

  19. Dagfinnur Sveinbjörnsson, “The Arctic and the Third Pole – Himalaya: Science and Collaboration,” Arctic Circle Journal, January 19, 2022, https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/the-arctic-and-third-pole-himalaya.

  1. “Monsoon 2025: Anomaly Surge in Western Disturbances Intensifying Himalayan Disasters Driven by Warming,” India Today, June 04, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/information/sto ry/india-norway-mou-polar-research-vessel-grse-kongsberg-2735563-2025-06-04.

  2. Press Information Bureau, “India’s Arctic Policy Launched,” Government of India, March 17, 2022, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2133875.

  3. Press Information Bureau, “Indian maritime firms bag shipbuilding deals, secures green tech & knowledge partnerships at Nor-Shipping in Oslo,” Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, June 05, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx? PRID=2134150.

  4. Akshit Sangomla, “Monsoon 2025 anomaly: Surge in western disturbances intensifying Himalayan disasters, driven by warming,” Down To Earth, August 21, 2025, https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/monsoon-2025-anomaly-surge-in-western-disturbances-intensifying-himalayan-disasters-driven-by-warming.

  5. PARIMA, “Climate on the Rise: Asia’s Monsoon Floods in 2025,” PARIMA, August 14, 2025, https://parima.org/climate-on-the-rise-asias-monsoon-floods-in-2025/

  6. Down to Earth, "Monsoon 2025 Anomaly."

  7. World Meteorological Organization, “State of the Climate in Asia 2023,” WMO, April 2024, https://library.wmo.int/viewer/68890/download?file=1350_State-of-the-Climate-in-Asia-2023.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1.

  8. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR),” https://www.undrr.org/gar.