Abstract: The paper, based on a comprehensive thesis written during the author’s NHCC, analyses issues of maritime trade warfare with respect to the possibility of a conflict with China. The article leverages the deeper historical research during the course and covers the characteristics of the battlespace and utilises various aspects of China’s maritime trade, including its dependencies, exposure and resilience to arrive at the considerations for India to execute maritime trade warfare against China. The Pakistan factor, though highlighted, has not been covered in detail. The article brings out the vulnerabilities of China’s trade in the IOR that could be exploited by India, taking advantage of its geography. At the same time, it has also emerged that maritime trade warfare alone may not yield the desired results and would require enormous resources, time and effort for useful outcomes especially in a prolonged conflict. The article also examines Chinese counter-measures to reduce its own vulnerability and improve its resilience to withstand possible effects of trade warfare. It relies on open-source data and does not go into what may be internal thinking and planning in this regard by the Indian Navy.

Introduction

There are higher levels of concern at the continuing stresses not only along the borders, but also in several other ways. The possibility of war between the two nations in the backdrop of long-pending territorial disputes, strategic and economic rivalries, geopolitical ambitions and internal political pressures cannot be ruled out. Among several areas for preparation and planning, it is also important to analyse aspects of trade warfare against China as part of the maritime domain within a conflict. A brief assessment of findings from historical case studies could provide a useful start-point for further examination.

Broad Inferences from Case Studies

Maritime trade has been the central factor in international trade. Trade with other states has been a major contributor to most nations’ prosperity. This reality has often resulted in the evident logic of targeting an adversary’s or adversarial coalition’s sea-going trade as part of maritime and overall strategy for the conflict being planned or at hand. While history provides a mix of outcomes in wars which had maritime trade warfare as a fairly major activity, two inferences seem to stand out. These are the relatively long durations it took to show palpable effects on the enemy’s overall situation and the great commitment of effort needed for trade interdiction. During World War I, in an early demonstration of the U-boat as a major instrument of trade disruption and merchant ship destruction, Germany lost 178 submarines while taking a high toll on trade by sinking 11,153,000 tonnes of Allied shipping.1 The data for World War II also demonstrated the much higher losses in submarines in that the Germans lost 785 U-boats while sinking 21.57 million tonnes of Allied merchant shipping.2 A few more examples from the pages of history (Table 1) may enable a quick look at aspects of effectiveness and outcomes.

Table 1: Outcomes of wars with trade warfare4

With globalisation, evolution of technology and increased interdependencies, it would be prudent to pay heed to the more than a century old words of Julian Corbett: “Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have in fact so profoundly modified the entire conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of the strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more prone to error.”5 While changes in volume of trade, number of ships on international sea routes and coastal trade, port, insurance, crewing, gaps between flag state, flag of convenience, ship ownership, cargo ownership, multiple ports of charging and discharging are now more complex than during Corbett’s time, his fundamental observations ring true more than a century later. It is, therefore, considered important for any strategist and tactician to evaluate the practicality of maritime trade warfare within the framework of his own contemporary period. In that context, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, 1982–1988 Tanker War and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war do provide considerable insights about maritime trade warfare.

1971 Indo-Pakistan War. This provides a successful precedence in the field of maritime trade warfare by India. In 1971, the planning by the Indian Navy in coordination with national agencies resulted in the sinking of “100,000 tonnes of ships in the sea and river ports of East Pakistan mainly on 14/15 August 1971 and then at a less spectacular tempo until December 1971.”6 This was augmented by seriously impacting the flow of trade to Pakistan on both eastern and western seaboards. Significantly, the Eastern Fleet bottled up East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the sea to hasten the final defeat of the Pakistani forces and surrender by 16 December 1971.7 Though this sets a successful precedence for India, maritime trade warfare against China would need a deliberate execution to level the playing field against a much more capable enemy than faced in 1971.

Tanker War. The “tanker war” between Iran and Iraq continued from 1982 to 19888 and, in spite of at least 10 Western and eight regional navies patrolling the Gulf by the end of the 1980s, both combatant (including of the USA) and neutral shipping were targeted.9 Reflagging emerged as a viable option and Kuwait re-flagged its oil tankers to the USA (neutral).10 Iran and Iraq used anti-ship cruise missiles effectively in more than half of all attacks on shipping. These missiles accounted for 23 percent of completely sunk or damaged petroleum tankers.11 Despite the considerable numbers of tankers damaged or sunk, the oil market adapted to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia–Ukraine War. The conflict commenced on 24 February 2022. Russia has termed it a “special military operation” and, despite its continuation for more than a year and a half, the outcomes are still not clear for either of the two belligerent sides. Along with shaking the myth about wars being short,12 the crisis in Ukraine has disrupted food, energy, automobiles and chip-making sectors.13 To obviate the food shortages in countries dependent on Ukraine, the United Nations has had to intervene to bring an agreement, the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’, which has fitfully enabled shipments since 1 August 2022.14 In the case of a possible India–China armed conflict, similar interventions from the UN and other nations, individually or as a group, are also likely to pressurise both countries even if to differing levels. This may involve some kind of a “peace-keeping force,” reflagging, and so on, as has been seen earlier. Another important, but not really unusual, angle of the Russo-Ukraine war is that both belligerents are being supplied with military hardware and other assistance. Quite a few Western nations, including the US, are assisting Ukraine,15 while there are reports that Iran, China and North Korea are sending hardware, including some types of ammunition, to Russia.16 It is likewise possible that in case of a war between India and China, one or both may receive military assistance from those that are friendly to them or seeking some other leverage.

Other Considerations in a Likely India–China Conflict

Both countries are users of not only the IOR but also the SCS for their trade and other economic interests, while diplomatic, economic and certainly military tensions continue to simmer. With “China viewing India as an obstacle for its economic interests and grand geopolitical strategy,”17 border clashes are likely to occur with both sides augmenting troops and military assets along the border regions. Further, India is ramping up a few bilateral and multilateral partnerships primarily with the US but also the Quad as such. While these partnerships are not quite anti-China, they could serve to balance China’s growing economic and military influence and could contribute towards deterrence. If we have to go by Thucydides, wars between two or more nations have typically been sparked by “fear, honour, and interest,”18 and then a rising or risen China and emerging India could find themselves somewhat close to the analogy of a ‘Thucydides trap.’

The Maritime Dimension. The significance of trade flow statistics, and the importance of choke-points around the IOR, is generally well appreciated by geo-strategists as well as operational planners. In times of likely conflict — or if engaged in one — these considerations are of great value. The table below provides a summary:-

Table 2: Details of Choke Points in IOR24,25

Gauging the Enemy

Over 60 per cent of China’s trade in value comes by sea.26 This includes the transit of about eighty per cent of its oil import through the Malacca Strait.27 It would thus be prudent to analyse vulnerabilities of China’s trade in the IOR while also understanding its potential and assessing resilience against trade interdiction. To safeguard these maritime interests, China has already created a certain degree of influence and dependency within quite a few nations in the IOR through imports and exports, major infrastructure developments, diplomatic and economic influence, and military and financial assistance. There are 17 ports in the IOR which have some degree of Chinese involvement in construction and operations.28 Some of these nations could support or even assist China in small but probably significant ways, both before and during a conflict. Not limiting itself to diplomatic means alone, China has continuously flexed its military might to gain experience of the IOR through the deployment of its warships, including nuclear and conventional submarines, capitalising on the opportunity in the name of the Anti-Piracy Escort Force (APEF) since 2009.29 Data has been gathered by Chinese survey ships.30 Surveillance vessels also have done the same and would facilitate the effective deployment of PLA(N) assets in the IOR.31 Cumulatively, these are indicators of China’s reach, stance and improved understanding of the maritime battlespace in the IOR.

Military Capabilities / Modernisation. China’s spending has grown for 27 consecutive years.32 China is now poised to have 440 ships by 2030.33 In addition, 76 submarines (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs and 55 SSs) are also expected to join the PLA(N) by 2030.34 The number of assets that China can gradually deploy in the IOR would depend on operational imperatives and warrants continuous vigilance by Indian intelligence agencies and the defence forces. Furthermore, the land-based capabilities it is creating as part of its ‘active defence’ (or A2/AD — anti-access / area denial), supported by vastly improving ISR efforts over the IOR as is estimated over the Western Pacific, also are factors to be considered.

Shipbuilding and Fleet of Merchant Vessels. China’s shipbuilding sector topped the global market in 2022 with 45.5% of the global market in vessel completion and 53.1% of new orders.35 China has 19 modern shipbuilding yards pumping out commercial and naval ships. One of China’s shipyards is so large that its capacity surpasses that of all US shipbuilders combined.36 From this one may infer that even in a prolonged conflict where, say, the US may be involved, China starts from a relatively secure position. Moreover, its ability to regenerate via its capacity to repair and replace the tonnage interdicted by others, including India, would be an important factor, especially in a protracted conflict. Table 3 highlights the existing status of China in terms of ownership of merchant vessels.37

Dependencies and Vulnerabilities

China is the number two economy in terms of GDP, first in total exports and second in total imports.38 To define the dependencies, we need to look closely at the critical requirements for its manufacturing and shipbuilding sector, food and energy security, military sector and enablers of the economy. Once that is established, efforts to more efficiently address their vulnerabilities through maritime trade warfare or other supporting means can be determined. Table 4 brings out these critical requirements of China.

Table 4: Critical Requirements of China

The Resilience of China Against Interdiction of Crude Oil

China imported 10.3 million bpd of crude oil and its consumption was about 15.44 million bpd in 2021.45 Its ability to be resilient to interdiction of its oil in the IOR is dependent on a few factors which include its indigenous crude oil production capacity (3.98 million bpd in 2021).46 China’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves (equivalent to 90 days of imports) are also likely to have been maintained since the end of 2021.47 Re-routing of oil from the IOR; spot purchases; shipments from Russia and Kazakhstan through pipeline, rail, road and even seaborne; and construction of additional pipelines from Russia add to the available options. However, in case supplies of crude oil could be seriously disrupted along the IOR routes, China could be forced to consider rationing and other measures to reduce domestic consumption of petroleum products. In theory, it could stave off rationing a little beyond the first hundred days, and it could be possible that rationing could be introduced earlier in a conflict that could be assessed to be protracted.

Considerations for Trade Interdiction by India

India’s Trade with China and Through the SCS. India’s trade worth nearly US $200 billion passes through the South China Sea every year, which is about 19.3% of India’s total trade.48 Out of this, around 11.2% accounts for trade with China. With the likely termination of trade with China, India would be required to protect about 8% of total trade transiting through the SCS, which is likely to be also disrupted by China. There could be some options available, as has been seen in other wars (the tanker war, for example), involving reflagging and so on. Of course, this will require diplomatic preparation and agreements from nations which are committed to freedom of the Indo-Pacific. There would also be the factor of Indian resilience and alternate arrangements of re-routing, rescheduling and so on. Further, India would need to reduce or adjust dependency on other countries through self-reliance and alternate supplies, to avoid severe implications of higher insurance and freight rates during periods of conflict.

Ships and Shipping Industry. Though India had 1,463 merchant vessels as of 31 December 2021, these contributed just 1.2% of the world’s fleet in terms of capacity and carried only 7.8% of India’s export-import (EXIM) trade.49 The 28 Indian shipyards account for only 0.5% of total yard capacity worldwide. If we compare the induction of warships, China has built 138 warships in the last 10 years against the commissioning of 28 ships and submarines into the Indian Navy over the last seven years.50

To address these shortcomings India has listed 10 key themes through ‘Maritime India Vision (MIV) 2030’ to secure its place at the forefront of the global maritime sector. These include strengthening of policy and institutional framework to support all stakeholders to enhance global share in shipbuilding, repair, and recycling.51

Diplomatic Considerations. As briefly mentioned earlier, diplomacy would play an important role for India while preparing for and, if required, in waging maritime trade warfare against China. As also flagged earlier, China is heavily dependent on Australia and Indonesia for two of its main imports of iron ore and coal respectively. Disruption of these would require more diplomatic efforts with these exporting nations, who do share concerns related to China’s belligerence, as well as Indian or cooperative military means if that becomes necessary. Further, countries which are heavily dependent on imports from and exports to China are likely to experience domestic problems and diplomatic protests about staying out of other people’s affairs (in this case, a China–India conflict) and keeping their economy buoyant.52 This may lead to a slowing down of the efforts required to make maritime trade warfare effective. For instance, in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Tsarist Russia, fearing consequences after numerous protests from the British and American governments, restricted its maritime trade warfare.53 Slowing down of efforts by Britain for trade warfare (mainly ‘non-kinetic’, to use current jargon) against Germany in the First World War after protests from neutral nations and domestic protests is also a similar example from history. As far as the question of continuity of trade goes, maritime trade and ISLs would continue at some level with and without some re-routing, even in a belligerent situation, as has been the experience of several prolonged conflicts and disruptions.

Military Considerations. For maritime trade warfare to be effective to the desired levels, countering China’s ships at sea and in port would be essential.54 This disturbance or damage to Chinese trade cannot be similar to peacetime abruptions like delays due to weather, port closures, availability of berths, handling of cargo or even collisions, which can be absorbed or ignored by the adversary.55 The measure of China’s vulnerability through its trade would be directly proportional to the percentage of degradation that India can cause, and it may not serve much purpose until and unless the quantum of efforts and numbers are considerable. Any perceived aim to utilise trade warfare to exploit Chinese sensitivity that is centred upon the concept of ‘loss-of-face’ by just commandeering a Chinese-flagged oil tanker may not yield the desired results.56

With the findings of Tables 3 and 4, and ISR inputs available from military and non-military sources, the factor of ‘what is to be targeted’ can be arrived at. Amongst that, taking crude oil as a primary target, Table 5 provides the possibilities which China may explore for transhipment of its 8 million bpd of oil through the IOR.57 This would also determine the quantum of resources — platforms and ammunition (Table 6) — which India would be required to allocate for interdiction of oil for China.

able 5: Number of Oil Tankers for Trans-shipment of Oil to China


Note*: China can also utilise services of tankers registered in ‘flag-of- convenience’ countries or spot purchases in SCS to meet its requirements to a certain extent.

Table 6: Ammunition Required to Interdict Crude Oil for China

Note*: The calculation is indicative and only for targeting the crude oil carriers. Ammunition requirements would further increase to cater for other MVs like container carriers etc. The depletion of ammunition for this purpose would need to be optimised catering for requirements for a naval battle against weapon-dens warships of China.

After arriving at ‘what and how many’, the next important aspect for India would be to conceptualise the ‘where’ aspect of targeting to take advantage of India’s favourable strategic and operational geography. This is something that would be an assessment anyone, including adversaries, would make, as has been the case in several earlier conflicts. This would also clarify, to an extent, the factors of time (including timing), space and force for the Indian Navy. It can be expected that China may divert its shipping (flagged or owned) originating from the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden to merge with its trade following the Cape of Good Hope to the Lombok, Ombai and Wetar Straits (refer to Fig. 1). Factoring these adjustments, China’s trade would be most vulnerable on the Persian Gulf–Gulf of Aden–Cape of Good Hope route and thereafter up to the Lombok, Ombai and Wetar Straits.

Fig. 1. Likely re-routing of China’s trade.58
 Credit: Google Maps. The map itself is not reproduced in this transcription.

SLOC Protection by India. Lessons from history have indicated that the government, people, and corporations would expect the Indian Navy to safeguard trade, and, therefore, SLOC protection would also remain an important constituent of what the Navy and other cooperative instruments would also need to do. According to naval theorist Dr Milan Vego, “a blockaded country often resorts to commercial counter-blockade.”59 This is akin to how Germany increasingly countered the British blockade with commerce warfare using submarines during both World Wars.60 While China would have an array of options to respond, the threat to Indian trade and SLOCs would also be significant. In Corbett’s very relevant words, this threat would manifest at the “terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and to a secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge.”61 In terms of geographic locations, this threat would imply disruptions to Indian trade both in the IOR and the East and South China Seas. In practice, safeguarding India’s trade and assets in the East and South China Seas could be problematic in the near term.62 Additionally, Pakistan is also likely to increase the threat to Indian trade in the IOR by deploying its submarines (being augmented with eight Yuan-class submarines from China) to target merchant vessels mainly in the Arabian Sea and even possibly close to Indian coasts.63 Finally, in addition to its importance for the Indian economy, SLOC protection would also be critical for the continuity and sustenance of war supplies from friendly countries for all three services, especially in case of a prolonged armed conflict.

Conclusion and Recommendations

China’s dependence on maritime trade for meeting its declared goals by 2049 is well established and even declared in its white papers. This analysis of China’s trade flows has brought out some of their vulnerabilities in the IOR which India can exploit during a war. Certainly, world trade through the IOR would continue and adapt to the war through re-routing and augmentation of warships of respective nations. At a national level, it would require diplomatic effort, economic adjustment and reorientation, and military efforts to be dovetailed for effective execution. While it can be deduced, in an echo of Mahan, that maritime trade warfare need not be the primary line of effort, it can be an important “secondary” operation in contributing to the overall objectives of a war with China.64

Taking advantage of favourable military-maritime geography in the IOR and other diplomatic and economic means, India needs to prevent China’s crude oil, iron ore shipments and a reasonable number of LNG carriers from reaching or exiting Chinese ports to create an impact in China, followed by the adverse effects on its economy. If coal shipments from Indonesia and iron ore supplies from Australia are also part of the squeeze, this too would impact China because coal is an important part of their energy generation and steelmaking. This would require significant and difficult diplomatic efforts.

To tide over the concerns of protection of our trade through the East and South China Seas, India may like to think of possibilities of re-flagging, leveraging relationships with friends who are Western Pacific players for ISR, and even considering the possibility of escorts. It is not for nothing that even at the summit levels of Quad leadership, freedom of the Indo-Pacific, cooperative maritime security for all, MDA, and so on are being regularly flagged. A final recommendation would be for the Indian Coast Guard to be part of the SLOC interdiction and protection framework, especially in waters of the Indian littorals. This would provide flexibility to the Indian Navy to meet the challenging requirements for SLOC protection and SLOC interdiction in other areas, particularly under the circumstances of the likelihood of collusion between China and Pakistan.

Endnotes

  1.  RH Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914-1918 (UK: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 333.
  2.  Michel Thomas Poirier, Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of WWII, October 1999, 3.
  3.  “Russia-Ukraine War 2022-2023 - Statistics & Facts,” Statista Research Department,15 February 2023. https://www.statista.com/topics/9087/russia-ukraine-war-2022/#topicOverview, accessed 19 February 2023.
  4. Bruce A. Elleman and SCM Paine, “Commerce Raiding Historical Case Studies: 1755–2009,”Naval War College Newport Papers 40 (October 2013), 272-290.
  5.  Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (UK: Naval and Military Press, 2009), 266.
  6.  Subir Bhaumik, “Operation X: The Untold Story of India’s Covert Naval War in East Pakistan 1971,” 03 October 2019. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/operation-x-india-covert-naval-war-east-pakistan-1971/, accessed 26 March 2023.
  7.  N Krishnan, No Way But Surrender-An Account of the Indo-Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal, 1971 (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980), comments are endorsed in the Preface of the book.
  8.  William J. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade shaped the World (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 369.
  9. William J. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade shaped the World.
  10.  Strauss Center, “Tanker War,” August 2008. https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-tanker-war/#:~:text=%5Bviii%5D,and%2034%20percent%20of%20freighters, accessed 23 January 2023.
  11.  Martin S. Navias and ER Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980-1988 (London: Tauris Publishers, 1996), 183.
  12.  Sudarshan Shrikhande, “There’s No Such Thing as a Short War,” The Times Of India,21 February 2023. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-short-war-one-year-of-ukraine-conflict-shows-where-russia-went-wrong-too-little-internal-debate-down-history-thats-been-the-lesson-for-political-executi/, accessed 21 February 2023.
  13.  UNCTAD Report 2022, 17.
  14.  UNCTAD Report 2022, xxiv.
  15.  Greg Myre, “U.S., NATO Countries Announce Massive Weapons Package for Ukraine,” NPR, 20 January 2023. https://www.npr.org/2023/01/20/1150264976/u-s-nato-countries-announce-massive-weapons-package-for-ukraine, accessed 22 February 2023.
  16.  Michael Drummond, “Why Isn’t Russia Running Out of Ammunition in Ukraine?” Sky News, 05 September 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/why-isnt-russia-running-out-of-ammunition-in-ukraine-12955439, accessed 06 September 2023.
  17. Bruno Macaes, “Understand China’s India strategy: Nibbling Territory Isn’t the Point of It. It is to Condition India’s Mind and Tie its Hands,” The Times of India, 20 June 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes .com/blogs/toi-edit-page/understand-chinas-india-strategy- nibbling-territory-isnt-the-point-of-it-it-is-to-condition-indias-mind-and-tie-its-hands/, accessed 13 December 2022.
  18.  RB. Strassler ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 43.
  19.  Justine Barden, “Bab el Mandeb – Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipment,” US Energy Information Administration, 27 August 2019. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ detail.php?id=41073, accessed 24 January 2023.
  20.  Lejla Villar and Mason Hamilton, “The Strait of Malacca, a Key Oil Trade Chokepoint,” US Energy Information Administration, 11 August 2017. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32452, accessed 24 January 2023.
  21. “Malacca Straits-Significant Regional Challenges to Securing the Maritime Domain,” Dryad Global Report, https://dg.dryadglobal.com/south-east-asia-straits-of-malacca#:~:text= The%20Straits%20of%20Malacca%20are,closest%20alternative%20sea%2Dbased%20route,accessed 24 January 2023.
  22.  Syaiful Anwar, “Establishment of Lombok Strait TSS and its Impacts on Maritime Security,” Researcgate, 20 December 2021. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358745990_ESTABLISHMENT_OF_LOMBOK_STRAIT_TRAFFIC_SEPARATION_SCHEME_AND_ITS_IMPACTS_ON_MARITIME_SECURITY, accessed 25 January 2023.
  23.  Rumarth Bulafo, “Maritime Security of Mozambique Channel,” Academia, 2020 https://www.academia.edu/43836627MARITIME_SECURITY_OF_MOZAMBIQUE_CHANNEL, accessed 25 January 2023.
  24.  IMSS 2015, 20-21.
  25. Mohd Hazmi Bin Mohd Rusli, “Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?” RSIS Commentaries No. 024/2012, 10 February 2012.
  26.  “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” China Power, 25 January 2021 https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/, accessed 30 October 2022.
  27. Julian Weber, “China’s Expansion in the Indian Ocean Calls for European Engagement,” Merics, 11 October 2019. https://merics.org/en/analysis/chinas-expansion-indian-ocean-calls- european-engagement, accessed 03 February 2023.
  28. Saeeduddin Faridi, “China’s Ports in the Indian Ocean,” Gateway House, 19 August 2021. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/CHInvstPorts-04.png, accessed 02 February 2023.
  29. Anurag Bisen, “Delegitimising China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean Region,” IDSA, 30 August 2022. https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/Delegitimising-China-Naval-Presence-in-the-Indian-Ocean-Region-abisen-300822, accessed 05 February 2023.
  30.  Swarajya Staff, “Explained: What Are Chinese Survey Ships Up To In The Indian Ocean,”Swarajya, 01 April 2021.https://swarajyamag.com/defence/explained-what-are-chinese-survey-ships-up-to-in-the-indian-ocean, accessed 13 February 2023.
  31.  Rahul Singh, “Navy Tracks Chinese Surveillance Vessel in Indian Ocean Ahead of Missile Test,” Hindustan Times, 04 November 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/navy-tracks-chinese-surveillance-vessel-in-indian-ocean-ahead-of-missile-test-101667579151529.html, accessed 13 February 2023.
  32.  SIPRI Fact Sheet April 2022, “Trends In World Military Expenditure, 2021,” SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/fs_2204_milex_2021_0.pdf, accessed 07 January 2023.
  33.  Report to Congress by US DoD on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2022, 160. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF, accessed 03 January 2023.
  34. Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress,” 01 December 2022, 20. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, accessed 05 February 2023.
  35.  “Chinese Shipbuilding Sector Tops World Market in 2022,” Global Times, 29 December 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202212/1282921.shtml, accessed 03 January 2023.
  36.  Xiaoshan Xue, “China Expands Its Fleets,” VOA News, 23 September 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/as-China-expands-its-fleets-us-analysts-call-for-catch-up-efforts- /6746352.html#:~:text=China%2C%20South%20Korea%20and%20Japan,naval%20ships%2C %22%20Hendrix%20wrote, accessed 02 February 2023.
  37. UNCTAD Report 2022.
  38. OEC Report on China. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow0, accessed 07 January 2023.
  39. “Country Analysis Executive Summary: China,” US Energy Information Administration, 08 August 2022. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/China/China.pdf, accessed 07 January 2023.
  40.  Alfred Cang, “How and Why China Is Centralizing Its Billion-Ton Iron Ore Trade,” The Washington Post, 25 July 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/how-and-why-China-is-centralizing-its-billion-ton-iron-ore-trade/2022/07/24/7d9fdbee-0bb4-11ed-88e8-c58dc3dbaee2_story.html, accessed 02 February 2023.
  41.  Alfred Cang, “How and Why China Is Centralizing Its Billion-Ton Iron Ore Trade.”
  42. 42 Alfred Cang, “How and Why China Is Centralizing Its Billion-Ton Iron Ore Trade.”
  43. Alfred Cang, “How and Why China Is Centralizing Its Billion-Ton Iron Ore Trade.”
  44. Salina Li, “China’s Soybean Imports Have Peaked and Will Keep Falling as Beijing Stresses Food Security,” South China Morning Post, 10 January 2023. https://www.scmp.com/economy/China economy/article/3206301/Chinas-soybean-imports-have-peaked-and-will-keep-falling-beijing-stresses-food-security-report-says, accessed 02 February 2023.
  45. “Oil Consumption in China from 1998 to 2021,” Statista Research Department, 31 January 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/265235/oil-consumption-in-china-in-thousand-barrels-per- day/, accessed 02 February 2023.
  46. Report on China Crude Oil Production, 1960 to 2021. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/crude-oil-production, accessed 26 January 2023.
  47.  “Country Analysis Executive Summary: China,” US Energy Information Administration.
  48.  Premesha Saha, “India Calibrates its South China Sea Approach,” Observer Research Foundation, 19 July 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-calibrates-its-south-china-sea-approach/, accessed 23 February 2023.
  49.  “Economic survey 2021-22,” India Budget. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey
    /ebook_es2022/files/basic-html/page324.html, accessed 03 March 2023. 
  50.  Vishal Thapar, “China Adding 14 Warships A Year Against 4 By India, Admits Navy Chief,” Businessworld, 03 December 2021. https://www.businessworld.in/article/China-Adding-14 Warships-A-Year-Against-4-By-India-Admits-Navy-Chief/03-12-2021-413765/, accessed 23 February 2023.
  51. Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways Government of India, “Maritime India Vision 2030,” International Maritime Organization, 22 February 2021. https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Air%20pollution/Maritime%20India%20vision%202030.pdf, accessed 23 February 2023.
  52. Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (London: Frank Cass Publishers,1998), 86.
  53.  Bruce A. Elleman and SCM Paine, “Commerce Raiding,” Naval War College, Newport Papers 40, 133.
  54.  Milan Vego, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” cited by Christopher J. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 70 : No. 3 Article 3, 25.
  55. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 276.
  56. RK Dhowan, “Two-Front War: What Does it Imply? – A Maritime Perspective,” Colloquium, National Security vol. I no. I, (August 2018). https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/nationalsecurity-vol-1-issue-1-colloquium.pdf, accessed 29 March 2023.
  57.  Julian Weber, “China’s Expansion in the Indian Ocean Calls for European Engagement,” Merics 11 October 2019. https://merics.org/en/analysis/chinas-expansion-indian-ocean-calls-european-engagement, accessed 03 February 2023.
  58.  “Indo Pacific Region: Detailed Overview,” AspireIAS, 26 November 2021.https://www.aspireias.com/current-affairs-news-analysis-editorials/Indo-Pacific-Region-Detailed-Overview, accessed 24 January 2023.
  59. Milan Vego, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” 21.
  60.  Milan Vego, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” 26.
  61.  Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 262.
  62.  Sudarshan Shrikhande, “Harnessing Indian Sea Power Post-Galwan: Considerations of Time, Space and Force,” Observer Reseach Foundation Issue Brief, 10 July 2020. https://www.orfonline.org/research/harnessing-indian-sea-power-post-galwan-considerations-of-time-space-and-force-69573/. accessed 29 March 2023.
  63.  Report to Congress by US DoD on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 160.
  64.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (US: Little,
    Brown and Co., 1890).