Prologue

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is home to 2.5 billion people, one-third of the world’s population. Importantly as well, 60% of world trade passes through the Indian Ocean. Consequently, strategic interest in the IOR has seen increasing involvement of extra-regional powers. Coming years will most likely see the IOR as a theatre for convergence and competition for influence from some extra-regional players making it an arena for greater issues of safety and security.

Maritime security threats (other than traditional security) mainly involve terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, human trafficking, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), etc. Although attempts have been made to subdue IOR threats through relevant regional policies, traditional and non-traditional challenges in the maritime domain continue to prevail and affect the region’s economic development. Great power competition in IOR has further upended the security scenario, putting the whole region into a cataclysmic state. Besides, illegal migration through the Indian Ocean (IO), mostly by Rohingya refugees to escape persecution, has become a long standing problem. Drug trafficking and IUUF have been historically commonplace in the region.

The trans-border nature of these threats points to the need for a region wide cooperative architecture as a viable instrument to counter them. This article briefly examines the main sources and root causes of maritime security challenges faced in the region, especially by Northern IOR littoral states and suggests some implementable recommendations.

Types of Security Threats

Let us begin with the term security threat, which could be both traditional and/or non-traditional. This paper will try to address Non-Traditional Security (NTS). Although the line between the two is indistinct, an NTS threat could lead to a Traditional Security (TS) threat. NTS threats are mostly trans-border, with possible consequences on the high seas and countering them often requires naval forces, possibly leading to a transition to more traditional threats.

Types of Maritime Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Challenges and their Sources

The most critical threats in the IOR are illegal migration and trafficking of narcotics and drugs, mainly ‘Yaba’ (methamphetamine or meth). Most drug production traditionally is in two regions: the “Golden Crescent,” comprising illicit opium production areas in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the “Golden Triangle,” the second-largest opium production region globally, covering Myanmar, Thailand and Laos.1 Unlawful activities such as IUUF, human trafficking and drugs smuggling are known to take place in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) waters. Notwithstanding, the Indian Ocean (IO) has become the epicentre of both Yaba smuggling and human trafficking.

A new phrase ‘maritime mixed migration’ as shown in Fig 1 refers to those groups of people of mixed nationalities seeking refuge from a conflict zone, persecution, hunger and thirst, climate change, or simply a better life, etc. These are true mainly for the Mediterranean, but some littoral states of IOR are also highly susceptible to these threats. According to a US based research study by Climate Central, the projected effects of climate change by 2050 is that almost 20 million people are likely to be displaced in Bangladesh, and a further 36 million Indians could lose their homes due to sea-level rise.2 According to recent reports, NTS threats have made the IOR more vulnerable with diverse impacts.3

The root source of meth/Yaba is apparently the ‘failed state’ of Shan in Myanmar, which produces the drug in collaboration between Tatmadaw and Myanmar's largest ethnic armed group United Wa State Army (UWSA).4 With 135 ethnic groups including seven major armed groups (each now having their own states: Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan), Myanmar remains a major source of both NTS and TS threats in the IOR. Even law enforcement agencies have minimal access in these states to thwart these groups.

The precursor chemicals for producing meth are coming mainly from China, and the United Nations Drugs and Crime Office valued the meth trade in the region at $60 billion. This enormous amount of illegal money is enough to stimulate any trans border threat. In previous years, a vast trade of Yaba through Rakhine State to Bangladesh and India has been identified. Using Indian Ocean routes, these drugs are also reaching Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN countries.

Fig 1: Flow Chart of Maritime Security

Such insurgent groups allegedly use drug sales to purchase arms and ammunition. This further becomes intertwined with arms smuggling and the easiest route is through the various rivers on to the BoB. Drug traffickers then find an easy way to use the Rohingya refugees to carry these drugs to different locations across IOR littoral states.

Illegal Migration through IOR

Myanmar has pushed more than 1.1 million Rohingya people into the Bangladeshi coastal belt. To avoid atrocities and persecutions, these people resort to various means to migrate to different destinations through the Indian Ocean. These people, mostly women and children, are impoverished, take great risks and often die while escaping in overcrowded boats. Those who are lucky, survive if rescued. To support the veracity of this statement, examples are given below:

  • In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, United Nations agencies called for South-East Asian governments to show compassion to boats full of vulnerable people adrift in the BoB and the Andaman Sea. At least 5,000 people were abandoned en masse by smugglers at sea; they eventually disembarked in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.6 Some of them have travelled up to Australia too.

  • The New York Times, in its issue of 14 May 2015, stated that “the boat's plight provided a dramatic example of the migration crisis confronting the region: An estimated 6,000 to 20,000 migrants are at sea, fleeing ethnic persecution in Myanmar and poverty in Bangladesh, while countries are pointing fingers at one another and declining to take responsibility themselves.”7

ASEAN and Australia have deployed their Coast Guard to prevent illegal people landing on their coasts. It indicates that the IOR has become a region of illegal human trafficking, which is substantiated by another report that almost a third of all reported maritime incidents in the Indo-Pacific occurred in the Bay of Bengal.8

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

Another crucial area of NTS threat is the IUU fishing in the IOR, which is considered the most significant maritime NTS threat. While it is a fact that most of the weak littoral states carry out IUU fishing, China leads this field. Most weak littorals have no Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleet and remain within coastal areas. However, China has 17,000 DWF trawlers, making it the world’s largest DWF fleet owner.9 According to IUU Fishing Index 2019, China has ranked the worst for IUU fishing.10 The annual IUU fishing cost as estimated by The Financial Express is in the region of $23 billion.11

 IUU fishing by the Chinese DWF fleet has raised concerns of fish stock scarcity besides creating environmental challenges. Allegedly, Chinese flagged vessels are increasingly seen involved in illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of other countries. The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Karl L. Schultz rightly voiced his concern for littoral states. He said that, “IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. If IUU fishing continues unchecked, we can expect deterioration of fragile coastal States and increased tension among foreign fishing Nations, threatening geopolitical stability around the world.”12

To add to her assertive behaviour, China has started arming these DWF fleets with a view to gain strategic advantage at sea. This maritime militia is considered part of China’s Navy, which now creates the possibility of confrontation with other littoral states. Disregard for territorial integrity by Chinese and other IUU fishing fleets not only threatens the stability of nations, but is also a direct violation of international rules based order,” said the Coast Guard Admiral.13

China’s research vessels and DWF fleets are often sighted prowling in the IOR region in spite of being a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In recent times, China has been flouting rules based international order despite having acceded to SDG No 14.6.1 (Sustainable Development Goal, Life below water, IUU Fishing).

Rules Based International Order

From the above, it is amply clear how IUU fishing and maritime migrated refugees are intertwined with drug smuggling, making the IOR a vulnerable zone. Myanmar is the second-highest drug-producing country after Afghanistan and the main cause of illegal migration through the IO. Yet, China and Russia have pledged to defend Myanmar in international fora to protect their strategic interests. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they can veto any attempts to pressure or sanction Naypyidaw.14

World leaders want to ensure ‘rules based international order’ at sea and they have criticised China for not following the same.’ In some cases, the USA has also been reluctant in obeying ‘rules based international order’ or has flouted international forums - threatening to withdraw from ‘Paris Agreement on Climate Change’ and World Health Organisation (WHO). Bobo Lo placed it correctly, who said that “the concept of a ‘rules based international order’ has become increasingly devoid of substance. It is no longer clear what the rules are, who sets them, what moral authority underpins them, and, most important, who follows them.”15 The scenario gets further complicated when NTS challenges are also thrown in for action under rules based international order.

Though the advent of globalisation has obfuscated the definition of NTS challenges, there is a common understanding of such issues, termed ‘maritime NTS challenges.’ Unfortunately, all possible security threats, both TS and NTS, have started to converge in IOR along with the great power competition. This great power competition has made the IOR a most challenging region in terms of security, especially as their strategic interests have led to further proliferation of the NTS threat.

Great Power Competition in IOR

The convergence of great powers in the IO should not be viewed separately from NTS threats. Their own strategic and economic interests in the IOR have compelled some littoral states to align themselves with the great powers, and that has created a wide chasm amongst the littoral states. Taking advantage of the littoral states’ anaemic relationship, China has taken the opportunity to push through enormous economic investments with most littoral states on a bilateral basis.

Other than the littorals of the IOR, China has the maximum strategic interest in the IOR. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao coined the term ‘Malacca Dilemma’ in 2003 for China. Malacca Strait carries China’s 80% oil and cargo, making it China’s vital supply route. Its blockade would be a potential objective for any Chinese adversary in the IOR to paralyse China's economy. To avoid this situation, China has already invested billions of dollars in connecting IO through the South and Southeast Asian region, under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, the protection of Chinese maritime infrastructure in the IOR may also lead to traditional threats or ‘short-of-war’ incidents.

China started projects worth $60 billion in Pakistan through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) via Gwadar Port to link China to the Arabian Sea. It also started work on the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which will connect China to the BoB through Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar. In addition, Sri Lanka has leased Hambantota Port to China for 99 years. Further South, China leased one of Maldives’ Island - FeydhooFinolhu - near Male for 50 years; China has a naval port at Djibouti and many more.16

All these projects are being done by China through a bilateral agreement with each country. Allegedly, port construction in Pakistan and Myanmar resulted in local populations being evicted from their homes, which has also possibly added to ‘maritime migration.’ China’s strategic interest in the IOR has dragged other maritime powers into the theatre to counter its influence.

Regional Forums of IOR

Bilateral ties for mutual economic betterment do raise hopes. However, this does not necessarily mean that contentious issues emanating from trans-border maritime security threats go away. Regional issues need to be solved by regional leaders through a regional multilateral approach. In fact, there are many regional organisations in the IOR and most of them seek to address maritime security on priority (Table 1):

Table 1: Some Indian Ocean Regional Forums

Out of many other forums, the ones mentioned above are based/focused in the IOR, and their main agenda is to ensure security among the countries. Despite the platitudes from leaders, maritime security has remained a low priority area that has seen little palpable improvement. SAARC and BIMSTEC have become insipid, as leaders have flinched from taking proactive actions. NTS threats are real and could become very serious in the coming years. Yet, it may seem only a slight exaggeration to say that regional forums’ initiatives seem to have taken the issue lightly.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

To reduce NTS threats, we need to know who is out at sea at any given time, and this requires better MDA. Such awareness is not only about the position, but is also about the intention of actors in a given maritime environment. The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain is a cornerstone that could impact security, safety, economy or environment. Littoral countries need to track the movements of all vessels and have a real time report of all events occurring in their zones to maintain maritime awareness.

In 2005, the USA launched a national project called the National Plan to accomplish MDA as part of its maritime strategy. At the IORA Summit in Jakarta in 2017, India proposed establishing a regional MDA hub based in India called the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). India kept its pledge and the Indian Navy offered to share real time commercial data and intelligence inputs with 10 countries of the Indian Ocean littorals during the regional maritime conclave held in Goa in 2019. The offer was made to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Maldives, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Australia has posted a liaison officer at the Indian Navy’s Gurugram-based IFC. This could be a tremendous boost for the centre as Australia has probably the most sophisticated national MDA system of any Indian Ocean state. A key element of Australia’s MDA system is the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS) and IFC can benefit from the technology used by Australia. IFC has now built linkages with 18 countries and 15 multinational/maritime security centres.18

MDA procedures do not come cheap and demand enormous resources, as shown in Fig 2. Each step needs the involvement of technical expertise and platforms to track, and if necessary, interdict specific vessels at sea. Moreover, as more and more national centres come into existence MDA gets more complex and requires fusion, which needs increased cooperation among littoral states.

Fig 2: MDA Procedure Complexity (Table is Author’s Copyright)

Way Ahead

Maritime security issues in the IOR are deeply interconnected, but too often, these are discussed in isolation. As discussed earlier, illicit maritime activities are intrinsically linked to land based issues and while we address the NTS threat at sea, we must look to the land from where the root cause originates.

As such, the imperative is to enhance maritime safety and security; and for the leaders to address peace and stability, respect sovereignty, aim for sustainable economic growth and development in the IOR. Most importantly, it demands regional issues to be solved altruistically by regional leaders.

Every country has the sovereign right to make a deal with any extra-regional power and that needs to be done without thwarting regional congruity. Unless littoral states are united, extra-regional powers will take advantage of their vulnerabilities and their lack of unity will be a dividend for other powers in the IOR.

The success of ASEAN could be an example for other regional forums in the IOR. Despite having little or no similarity in caste, creed, religion, and having different political ideologies, ASEAN has been considered a tremendously successful economic forum. There should be no reason why forums like SAARC, BIMSTEC or IORA should not be equally successful. Through webinars/seminars, littoral states of IOR may start to propagate the importance of having safety and security, both at land and sea, for the ultimate aim of economic emancipation.

USA led IPS and Quad countries also have strategic interests to ensure the Indian Ocean trade route's safety and security. The littoral states have the right to ask these countries to build and enhance capacity to combat IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean. The best way is to form a Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) consisting of all littoral navies. Thereafter, IPS and Quad may enhance capabilities by providing expertise. In natural disasters, the same initiative could very well address Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

By eliminating differing opinions among regional leaders, all could cooperate with IFC-IOR to establish an effective MDA in the region to proactively utilise limited naval resources in the IOR.

Endnotes

  1. “Global Maritime Crime Programme: “Indian Ocean East,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/indian-ocean-east.html, accessed 20 August 2021.

  2. Urmi Goswami, “Sea-level Rise Could Put 300 Million People at Risk by 2050,” The Economic Times, 30 October 2019. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sea-level-rise-could-put-300-million-people-at-risk-by-2050/articleshow/71822608.cms, accessed 20 August 2021.

  3. Chelsea Harvey, “Sea Level Rise Won’t Just Cause Flooding: These 5 Other Impacts of Rising Oceans are Just as Bad, Business Insider Australia,” Business Insider, 18 February 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/5-terrifying-impacts-of-rising-sea-levels-2015-2, accessed 21 August 2021.

  4. Anthony Davis, “Why Asia is Losing its War on Drugs,” Asia Times, 19 November 2020. https://asiatimes.com/2020/11/why-asia-is-losing-its-war-on-drugs/, accessed 20 August 2021.

  5. Mizzima, “Myanmar’s Illegal Drug Crisis a Serious Issue Says Expert,” Mizzima, 24 August 2020. http://mizzima.com/article/myanmars-illegal-drug-crisis-serious-issue-says-expert, 20 August 2021.

  1. “Amid COVID-19 Pandemic Thousands Stranded in Bay of Bengal 'Unable to Come Ashore',” UN News, 06 May 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/10634027, accessed 01 September 2021.

  1. Thomas Fuller and Joe Cochrane, “Rohingya Migrants from Myanmar, Shunned by Malaysia, are Spotted Adrift in Andaman Sea,” The New York Times , 14 May 2015 . https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/world/asia/burmese-rohingya-bangladeshi-migrants-andaman-sea.html, accessed 20 August 2021.

  2. “Bay of Bengal,” Stable Seas, January 2020. https://www.stableseas.org/sites/default/files/stable-seas-bay-of-bengal-executive-summary.pdf, accessed 15 August 2021.

  3. Amruta Karambelkar, “Chinese Involvement in IUU Fishing,” Vivekananda International Foundation, 25 September 2020. https://www.vifindia.org/print/8092?via=Azure, accessed 15 September 2021.

  1. G Macfadyen et al., The IUU Fishing Index (Switzerland: Global Initiative, 2019). https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IUU-Fishing-Index-Report-web-version.pdf, accessed 25 August 2021.

  2. Huma Siddiqui, “Chinese Trawlers on the Prowl in the Indian Ocean: IUU Pose the Greatest Maritime Threat,” Financial Express, 08 December 2020. https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/chinese-trawlers-on-the-prowl-in-the-indian-ocean-iuu-pose-the-greatest-maritime-threat/2145847//, accessed 01 September 2021.

  3. “Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook,” The United States Coast Guard, September 2020. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_2020_FINAL.pdf, accessed 15 August 2021.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Bertil Lintner, “Rohingya Refugees Becoming Palestinians of Asia,” Asia Times, 26 August 2020. https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/rohingya-refugees-becoming-palestinians-of-asia/,accessed 15 August 2021.

  1. Bobo Lo, “Global Order in the Shadow of the Coronavirus: China Russia and the West,” Lowy Institute, 29 July 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/global-order-shadow-coronavirus-china-russia-and-west, accessed 15 August 2021.

  2. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Chinese Company Bags Maldivian Island on a 50-year Lease,” The Economic Times, 30 December 2016. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/chinese-companies-bags-maldivian-island-on-50-year-lease/articleshow/56245729.cms, accessed 12 August 2021.

  3. Rahul Roy Chaudhury, “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation and Security in the Indian Ocean,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 06 September 2018. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/09/maritime-cooperation-indian-ocean, accessed 02 September 2021.

  4.  Dinakar Peri, “India starts sharing maritime data,” The Hindu, 09 October 2019. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-starts-sharing-maritime-data/article 29611936.ece, accessed 02 September 2021.