LEVERAGING KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASHTRA FOR CONSTRUCTING OUTER SPACE RAJAMANDALA

Significance of Outer Space

The space domain is critical for a nation. The advantage which space provides will drive states to improve their ability to access and operate in space. From a security point of view, space services will continue to proliferate worldwide, due to a fall in technological and cost barriers and increased space-based foreign collaboration, leading to ease of access to space-based data and services for state, non-state and commercial entities. As the number of space-faring nations grows, space and counterspace capabilities will get more integrated into military operations, making strategic and technical autonomy in civil and military space operations an inescapable feature for uncoerced and peaceful existence. Space offers exclusive advantages and is a habitat where, contextually, one or more motives such as defence, conquest, occupation, cooperation and even colonisation could be seen to ensure security and further national interests.

India is regarded as one of the major space powers, and its emergence is attributed to its growing economy, stable political governance supplemented with nuanced international roles, an influential global diaspora and a potent military. India attempts to position itself as a natural global leader, the vijigishu (potential conqueror). The Arthashastra elucidates aspects which augment a state’s permanence and, through it, progress in a broader sense. It also establishes linkages between internal security and external policy realms, all of which are applicable in the context of outer space, towards ensuring freedom of its usage and the possibility of increased control, likely contestation and even dominance.

This article attempts to situate the Arthashastra in the context of the outer-space construct and leverages the text’s strength to bridge India’s conventional territorial concern with its outer-space aspirations. The article aims to progress from the contemporary continental and maritime Rajamandala (circle of states) and to propose an outer-space Rajamandala, which can be gainfully utilised by the vijigishu towards furthering his interests on the global common of outer space.

Strategic Construct

In the Kautilyan framework, the vijigishu must choose his aim between consolidation of acquisitions or enlargement of his kingdom. The chosen aim can then be progressed actively or passively. The chosen sadgunyas (six methods of foreign policy) are implemented using the prakritis (constituent elements of his state) and are expected to elevate the state from a position of decline to status quo and eventually graduating to advancement or progression. India demonstrated its ability for ‘offensive defence’ through Mission Shakti in 2019, which has made it one among the four nations to have achieved this capability.² Subsequently, while addressing the nation on 27 March 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: “The main objective of our space programme is ensuring the country’s security, its economic development and India’s technological progress. Today’s Mission Shakti is another important step in ensuring these dreams, which is important for ensuring the security of all these three pillars.”^3,4 These words reiterate the contours of economy, security and foreign policy, which India, the vijigishu, having projected its space power, needs to adopt to privilege cooperation over contestation in the outer-space environment.

Kautilyan Rajamandala

The Arthashastra is largely premised on the protection, consolidation, sustenance and execution of the foreign-policy needs of a state vis-à-vis other states. In Kautilya’s conception, every sovereign state, polity or ruler is surrounded by many similar sovereign entities (Figure 1). In this collection of states there would always be at least one sovereign who would be a natural adversary to this king or ruler. Further, there would be other states who may be hostile (aribhavi), friendly states and allies (mitrabhavi) or vassals (bhrityabhavi). There may also be a small buffer state between the king and the enemy. However, the king must give the utmost emphasis to the natural enemy or state and do his utmost to defeat it, as one cannot make peace with the enemy.⁵

Fig 1: Kautilyan Rajamandala⁶

Space as a global common

Considering that outer space is a global common, conventional Rajamandala theory, which presupposes the geopolitical and geostrategic assumption that “your neighbour is your natural enemy, and that the neighbour’s neighbour is your friend,” needs to be looked at from a strategic lens. The renewed strategic approach is fulcrumed on the essence of the Rajamandala theory, which alludes to a state having a two-dimensional sovereignty aspect (internal and external). The ability of a state to establish its credibility outside its legally recognised territorial boundaries — by outmanoeuvring, by treaties and alliances, and so on — with friends and foes makes it truly sovereign, as it can then conduct its internal affairs unobstructed. Territory and physical location are central to the Rajamandala theory, but its determining variables need to be assessed in conjunction with the state’s relative strength and disposition, bhavin. In contrast to the territorial realm, outer space is a resource- and technologically intensive domain, and only a few nations have the set of capacities and capabilities to build, assemble, test, launch and operate satellites. These nations are in a true sense space powers, and India is one such nation. Other nations which are dependent on these space powers for one or all of the activities in respect of satellite operations are space-faring, and thus these nations act in tandem with partner countries. The outer-space Rajamandala is thus influenced by several intermeshed factors (Figure 2), as actions on the ground influenced by these factors would, to a large extent, influence outer-space policy.

Outer-Space Rajamandala

In resonance with the essence of Rajamandala theory, a sovereign state must have the capability of exercising authority over its territory and the people living in it (internal sovereignty), and also the ability to wield influence and credence outside its boundaries on other states (external sovereignty). It is this power wielded by a state vis-à-vis other states that shapes its expression of conquest or consolidation of territory. While the former would ensure that the state develops policies and regulations and makes funds available for development of technology pertaining to outer space, the latter would ensure that the state catapults itself on the global stage as a leading space power and uses its position to project its strategic autonomy as well as ensure adherence to rules-based behaviour in outer space.

Considerations

The following were considered towards articulating the outer-space Rajamandala:

• Space, historically militarised, is now witnessing an influx of commercial usage by civilian entities, thereby making significant dependencies on its increased usage as a medium. The fusion of new and existing technology will make space easier to contest.
• Space is not to be literally equated as a global common to the high seas and the oceans, because, unlike the vast interplanetary space (akin to the oceans and the seas), near space and therefore Earth orbit is very much within the reach of counterspace capabilities. Hence it is closer in analogy to that of a coastline.⁷
• There is no space-based civilisation yet. Therefore, as humans are the only known intelligent species, the Earth remains the spatial beginning and end of politics and strategy.
• Command of space does not mean command of the Earth. Command of space determines the extent of denial or usage of space and associated assets to varying degrees in time of war, thereby aiding in furtherance of political ends.⁸
• Human activities on the Earth determine the activities in space. Thus, crippling control centres on the Earth may jeopardise space activities.
• When in space, most activities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, remote sensing, position, navigation and timing, and space weather are centred around human interests on the Earth.
• Outer space is fairly distinct from airspace, and airpower cannot be extrapolated to space power.

Battlefield space: In the event of states waging war against each other, it is most certain in contemporary times that outer space would be an area in which to deny services to ground, airborne and maritime forces, whilst simultaneously affecting commercial use. Hence, it is considered prudent to comprehend the space battlefield for understanding the orbital character of space and how states have used it, are using it, or can use it to undermine or underpin the position of the vijigishu. This, apart from assisting in deciphering the intent of a state, can also equip one in articulating the outer-space foreign policy:

• Unlike land and the oceans, the space battlefield is much vaster. However, almost 70 per cent of all satellites are in low Earth orbit, making the immediate celestial littoral crowded and the far reaches only sparsely populated.^9,10
• Satellites follow predictable paths and can be tracked by dedicated radars and telescopes. Any manoeuvre done to avoid tracking or to evade debris limits the extent of its employability in space.
• Satellites are vulnerable to attack by anti-satellite weapons and directed-energy weapons, and to damage by debris.
• Payload characteristics of satellites can be estimated through rendezvous and proximity operations, which serve a dual-use purpose.
• Satellites are vulnerable to co-orbital attack by orbital craft that can damage or destroy satellites through kinetic means.

Threat continuum: The outer-space threat continuum, ranging from irreversible to reversible threats, is set out in Table 1.¹¹

Table 1: Counterspace Threat Continuum

In the Kautilyan explanation of the territory-centric Rajamandala theory, the Rajamandala is a conglomeration of states loosely divided into two or more hostile factions, with the vijigishu trying to establish his hegemony over the entire conglomeration. The primary relationship amongst states is thus of contestation. However, the outer-space Rajamandala privileges cooperation over contestation and aims to achieve stability and technological and strategic autonomy through cooperation, by employing the tools of alliances, agreements and pacts amongst partner states. Historically, India’s space programme has been civilian-centric, and it is only after the Kargil conflict that it also got a military orientation, leading to the design and development of space assets exclusive to the armed forces. Today, the Indian Space Research Organisation has evolved into the sixth-largest space agency in the world.¹² The position of other space-faring states — those which share territorial boundaries with India and those which do not — in an outer-space Rajamandala, whilst associating them with an appropriate classification, is as follows.

Pakistan

India–Pakistan relations are a prisoner of partition. India has fought three wars with Pakistan (1948, 1965 and 1971) and engaged in a more spatially limited conflict in 1999. Pakistan pursues terrorism as an instrument of state policy against India. From an outer-space perspective, the following are relevant:

• Organisation. Established in 1961, eight years before ISRO, Pakistan’s space organisation, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), has fallen behind ISRO. One of the reasons attributed to the lag in space exploration is Pakistan’s struggle with persistent economic challenges, hindering significant investments in space research and exploration. The country is currently facing its worst economic turmoil in decades, with growth slowing to record-low levels amid soaring inflation and interest rates.¹³
• Space situational awareness. Pakistan does not have any such capability. It is, however, a member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization.
• Position, navigation and timing. It uses the US-based Global Positioning System for US-made equipment and the Chinese navigation system, BeiDou, for both military and civilian purposes.
• Launch port. It has no indigenous spaceport.
• Kinetic and non-kinetic threat. Pakistan has not undertaken any anti-satellite test. However, collaboration with China for non-kinetic interference with India’s space assets cannot be ruled out.

Inference. Pakistan, with its inimical approach towards India, supplemented with ideological predisposition, qualifies as an ari (innate enemy) of India, whilst simultaneously also exhibiting the intrinsic qualities of a ‘weak king’ as per the Arthashastra.¹⁴

China

India has witnessed China swing from a position of mitra (ally) before the 1962 war to ari in that war. While the border issues remained unresolved, the visit of the then Prime Minister of India, P. V. Narasimha Rao, to China in 1993 led to the formal conclusion of the agreement on peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, which has been followed by several other agreements in 1996, 2003 and 2012. Subsequently, China and India entered into sandhi (a peace pact for mutual gains).¹⁵ However, with its growing economy and military might, China undertook a policy switch from sandhi to sandhayana (breach of faith)¹⁶ and elevated itself in the Rajamandala hierarchy to a madhyama king (middle king).¹⁷ In the words of the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal V. R. Chaudhari, “China poses the biggest security threat to India in achieving its strategic goals.”¹⁸ Its recent asymmetrical accumulation of authority challenges India’s extant foreign-policy objective of exercising strategic autonomy. It is pertinent to mention that China approaches its relationship with India from a competitive perspective, with regional balance-of-power politics at the centre. From an outer-space perspective, the following are relevant:

• Organisation. China has a mature and expansive space programme which comprises organisations in the military, political, defence-industrial and commercial sectors. In 2015, China established the Strategic Support Force to integrate cyberspace, space and electronic-warfare capabilities into joint military operations as part of military reforms. The force forms the core of China’s information-warfare force, supports the entire People’s Liberation Army and reports directly to the Central Military Commission.¹⁹
• Acquisition of space technology. China uses technical and cyber espionage, as well as its open-source collection network, to build its knowledge and advance technological modernisation as a supplement to its domestic research. Acquisition of foreign technology is done to circumvent the cost of research and facilitate “leapfrog” development.²⁰
• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. China has more than 250 such satellites, most of which can support monitoring, tracking and targeting of India and its allies. These satellites also allow China to maintain real-time monitoring of regional flashpoint areas such as the Indian Ocean region and the South China Sea. The improved capabilities are also augmented with electronic-reconnaissance satellites to monitor radar and radio emissions.²¹
• Space situational awareness. China has an indigenous capability and leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization.²² The organisation oversees a space-surveillance project, the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System, which has several signatory countries such as Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey and Egypt.²³ China has Yuanwang space-tracking ships and has also established locations worldwide to aid in telemetry, tracking and control of space missions both around the Earth and in cislunar and deep space.²⁴
• Position, navigation and timing. China has its exclusive all-time, all-weather and high-accuracy service, the 35-satellite BeiDou constellation. China also extends BeiDou services to countries participating in its Belt and Road Initiative.²⁵
• Launch ports. China has multiple types of launch vehicles, which are launched from one of its four land-based spaceports. Additionally, in 2020, China demonstrated its ability to launch from sea-based platforms.²⁶
• Kinetic and non-kinetic threats. China undertook its maiden anti-satellite test in 2007, leading to the generation of more than 3,000 pieces of trackable debris. Subsequently, four tests were undertaken between 2010 and 2014 for engaging targets in low Earth orbit. China has demonstrated technology for executing co-orbital attack through space planes which can release objects while in orbit.²⁷ In 2007 and 2008, China undertook cyber interference with US satellites from a ground station in Norway.²⁸ In November 2014, hackers with suspected links to China also forced a temporary shutdown of the US weather-satellite network.²⁹ According to a report by the US-based China Aerospace Studies Institute, China had interfered with Indian satellite communications in 2017.³⁰

Inference. China’s world view is inherently hierarchical, fulcrumed on its historic legacy of relative pre-eminence in a neighbourhood populated by smaller countries. However, as China asserts its economic and military might by deriving its strength from globalisation of its economy, interdependence runs against the hierarchy principle.³¹ China has demonstrated outer-space civil and military capacity and capability superior vis-à-vis India and has gained sufficient momentum towards overtaking the United States in space. China thereby qualifies as the middle king, or madhyama, in the Rajamandala. However, a multipolar world, with its continuing diffusion of economic and military power, is a contradiction being resisted by China, which marries it with a high probability of shifting to the status of ari.

United States

India–US bilateral relations have developed into a global strategic partnership, based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues, which is indicative of India adopting a policy of samavaya (strategic partnership).³² The cooperation between India and the United States extends to diverse sectors, inclusive of trade, defence, education, science, cyber and space, civil nuclear energy, energy and environment, agriculture and health. The state visit of the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, to the United States in June 2023 resonates with the deep strategic ties and interests common to both democracies. India has several key defence-cooperation agreements with the United States, such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (2016), the Memorandum of Intent between the US Defense Innovation Unit and the Defence Innovation Organisation–Innovation for Defence Excellence (2018), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (2018), the Industrial Security Agreement (2019) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (2020). India and the United States have also signed the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology in January 2023.³³ By reviving the Quad in 2017, after the border clashes with China at Doklam, India signals its intent for cooperating with like-minded states in countering China’s push in the Indo-Pacific, and a shift in its foreign-policy posture which in the past saw benefits in remaining non-aligned. From an outer-space perspective, the following are relevant:

• Organisation. The successful launch of Sputnik I in 1957 catapulted the United States to build scientific and engineering prowess, including the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, a civilian space-exploration agency, which is the world’s leading and most successful space agency. It has undertaken several lunar missions, put humans on the Moon and built the International Space Station. The agency has also completed a series of unmanned missions to Mars, most recently in February 2021, when it landed the Perseverance rover to search for signs that life previously existed on the planet. Defence space reforms led to the resurrection of United States Space Command in 2019 and the raising of the United States Space Force in December 2020.
• Satellites. As of January 2023, there are 6,718 satellites in outer space, of which 4,529 belong to the United States. Of these, 3,996 are commercial, 26 civil, 260 government and 247 military.³⁴
• Launch capability. The United States has about 20 launch sites and associated facilities, located on both the east and west coasts. These include four federal launch sites, 12 Federal Aviation Administration-licensed sites and three private sites, supported with a diverse fleet of government and private launch vehicles.³⁵
• Space situational awareness. The United States is the world leader because of significant development and global positioning of sensors — radars, observatories, space-based telescopes and so on — during the Cold War for missile warning and defence, along with recent deployment of geosynchronous infrared-detection satellites under the Space-Based Infrared System.³⁶
• Position, navigation and timing. The United States owns and operates the Global Positioning System. It was the lone system in such services until the beginning of the 21st century. The United States also used it for military operations in Operation Desert Storm, thereby gaining significant advantage over its adversary.³⁷
• Kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The United States does not have a dedicated operational direct-ascent anti-satellite capability. However, it does have operational mid-course missile-defence interceptors that have, in the past, been demonstrated against satellites in low Earth orbit, which could therefore provide the capability if so required. While the United States does not currently have an acknowledged programme to develop co-orbital capabilities, the technology developed as part of its earlier testing and early missile-defence programmes is considered significant enough to allow such a capability in a relatively short period of time. It has an operational electronic-warfare counterspace system, the Counter Communications System, which is deployed globally and has the potential to provide uplink jamming against geostationary communications satellites. An upgrade, codenamed Meadowlands, is underway. The US military also has the capability to jam the civil signals of global navigation satellite services such as the Russian GLONASS and Chinese BeiDou systems.

Inference. From India’s perspective, the United States fits appropriately as the neutral king, the udasina, whose territory is not contiguous to that of the vijigishu, the enemy of the vijigishu or the middle king, and who is stronger than the three and powerful enough to help any of the three, whether united or not, and has the power to destroy them when they are disunited.³⁸

Russia

Russia has been a long-standing and time-tested partner for India. Development of India–Russia relations has been a key pillar of India’s foreign policy. Since the signing of the Declaration on the India–Russia Strategic Partnership in October 2000, India–Russia ties have acquired a qualitatively new character, with enhanced levels of cooperation in almost all areas of the bilateral relationship. During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union had a strong military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited its close relationship with India, which resulted in both nations sharing a special strategic relationship. Under this, several institutionalised dialogue mechanisms operate at both political and official levels to ensure regular interaction and follow-up on cooperation activities. From an outer-space perspective, the following are relevant:

• Organisation. The Russian space agency was established in 1992 and restructured in 1999 and 2004 as the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and the Federal Space Agency respectively. In 2015, the Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) was merged with the United Rocket and Space Corporation, leading to Roscosmos in its current form. Russia has a strong foundation of technical knowledge and expertise fostered by more than 60 years of experience in space. Russia sees over-reliance on space as a vulnerability and has developed territorial redundancies to complement or replace space services in wartime.
• Impact of sanctions. Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, the United States, Australia and Japan imposed sanctions. Therefore, Russia’s dependence on the West for acquiring electronic components has been exacerbated. The issue has been further compounded by its military operation against Ukraine, the decline of its domestic microelectronics industry and its inability to fully execute its import-substitution programme goals.
• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The Russian fleet contains more than 30 satellites providing electro-optical imagery, radar observation, missile warning, and electronic and signals intelligence.
• Position, navigation and timing. GLONASS provides Russia worldwide satellite-navigation services. Russia’s military also uses GLONASS to enable military system deployments, force movement and delivery of precision-guided munitions.
• Space situational awareness. Russia leads the non-governmental International Scientific Optical Network, which is the largest foreign network of ground-based optical space-surveillance sensors. It consists of approximately 100 sensors at 40 observatories distributed over 16 countries.³⁹ The indigenous network is managed by the 821st Main Space Reconnaissance Centre and can search for, track and characterise satellites in all Earth orbits.
• Launch capabilities. Russia has five spaceports and a fleet of medium, heavy and super-heavy-lift launch vehicles.
• Kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. Russia conducted an anti-satellite weapon test on 15 November 2021.⁴⁰ Russia has also developed the Peresvet laser system, which can dazzle satellites, and has fielded a wide range of ground-based electronic-warfare systems in Syria and Ukraine to counter GPS-enabled drone capabilities.

Inference. Russia, with its geography, strategic partnerships with India and exhaustive support, not only in military equipment but also at the United Nations, qualifies as a mitra (friendly state). It is pertinent to mention that the inference drawn here digresses from the classical Rajamandala proposition of an ally whose territory and that of a conqueror are separated by an enemy kingdom. In fact, Russia, which shares its territorial border with China, is not China’s ari and is playing the mitra card with both India and China. However, from India’s perspective, friendship with Russia acts as a counterweight to China’s expansive hegemony.

Achieving Outer-Space Security

For achieving success in the Rajamandala system, the Arthashastra offers courses of action, the sadgunyas (sixfold foreign policy), which the vijigishu must apply to his constituent elements of the circle of states, the prakritis. Space-based assets are now critical to our functioning as modern societies, and their disruption will have dire consequences for the economic and social welfare of mankind. As can be observed from the outer-space Rajamandala, confronted with China and Pakistan as inimical neighbours, who in most circumstances might join forces or provide aid should there be a conflict with India, a ranked multi-pronged outer-space foreign-policy approach is proposed.

Priority 1: Samdhaya Asana, Vigrhya Asana and Samavaya (Cooperation,
Collaboration and Strategic Partnerships).This recommended approach — sandhaya asana, vigrhya asana and samavaya — is fulcrumed on the Kautilyan principle of present and future gain. The Arthashastra suggests that one should consider the overall benefit, which includes immediate gain as well as potential future gain, whilst even forgoing any apparent benefits. India, as a leading space power in the world, needs to factor distribution of outer-space global public goods (for example, the Global Positioning System by the United States) for the benefit of developing and underdeveloped countries, especially in the immediate neighbourhood. In accordance with the tenets of the Arthashastra, internal security and stability is a necessary prerequisite for concentrating efforts on foreign-policy options. Therefore, a prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood is a prerequisite for India’s economic growth, national security and its ascension in the global political order. However, this neighbourhood consists of some of the least advanced countries facing an acute infrastructure deficit. India, by using outer space for establishing both physical and data connectivity in the region, can alleviate this situation effectively and propel its own economic growth given the geography of the subcontinent (samavaya, or strategic partnership). Through projects such as GSAT-9, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System, Megha-Tropiques, Oceansat-1, the setting up of ground Earth stations in Southeast Asian nations, subsidised launch costs for satellites, assistance in development of satellites, and adapting regional projects such as ISRO’s village resource-centre programme to also benefit the immediate neighbourhood, India could showcase itself as a benign alternative (sandhaya asana or vigrhya asana) to the hegemonic approach of China.

When evaluated through the saptanga matrix, India is well established as a space-faring nation. With respect to its adversaries, China and Pakistan, India has relatively less but not insignificant outer-space power vis-à-vis China. Pakistan is quite inconsequential at this stage. However, India needs to be cautious of the China–Pakistan “sweeter than honey” relationship, as Pakistan has the potential of being used as a vassal by China against India. Thus, India needs to be en garde and diligently engage with superior and friendly space powers such as the United States towards elevating extant strategic partnerships — for example, space situational awareness and real-time exchange of imagery and electronic intelligence — to classified levels. In addition, India must continuously pursue the development of the following capabilities (asana) as part of its defence posturing and enhancing its foreign-policy bargaining power (sandhaya asana).

Priority 2: Sambhuya yana (marching together). The advantages that space provides will have spin-offs in technology getting proliferated and becoming accessible to nations. Some of these nations may harbour inimical intent (aribhavin) against India or may act as vassals for India’s enemies. Therefore, apart from establishing bilateral strategic partnerships, India needs also to strengthen its position through pluralistic constructs towards obviating any attempt by a state to exercise its monopoly in space. A few examples by which India can augment its pluralistic approach are:

• The Quad. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017 led to the creation of a space working group amongst the four countries. During the Quad leaders’ summit in May 2022, the four countries agreed to establish the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which involves sharing of satellite data to track illegal activities, for example fishing, on the seas. India must leverage the Quad to enhance technology and capability exchanges, strategic utilisation of geographical locations for space monitoring, launches, training and space exercises.
• The Artemis Accords. India signed the Artemis Accords on 21 June 2023.⁴¹ By signing the accords, India has signalled its divergence from ratifying the Moon Agreement, to which it is a signatory since 1982. Under the Artemis framework, India will undertake collaboration with other space agencies, enable its private sector to work with other Artemis members, and develop legislation that encourages space activities. The Indian space reforms of 2020 and the recent space policy of 2023 provide a platform for India’s private space sector to capitalise on and develop innovative and cost-effective solutions to complex space problems, thereby symbiotically benefiting the Indian civil and defence space sectors.
• Sharing of situational-awareness data. On the sidelines of the India–US 2+2 ministerial talks in April 2022, both countries signed a space-situational-awareness agreement. The agreement involves collating data on orbiting satellites, debris, collision avoidance and conjunction warnings.⁴² While that sharing is not of a classified nature, wherein payload characteristics can also be deciphered, India can graduate to seeking classified collaboration with the United States, France, the European Space Agency and others, on lines similar to the Five Eyes arrangement, and form a conglomerate of nations which can pool space- and ground-based resources — radars, telescopes, ground stations and satellites — to counter the Chinese-led optical observation system.⁴³ The common pool can be modelled on the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region, which has representatives from other nations participating in building and sharing the global maritime-domain-awareness picture.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the strategic significance of outer space, the contours of the space battlefield, the confluence of geography with space ambitions, and the disposition of states’ intent vis-à-vis India (the vijigishu) contribute towards articulating the outer-space Rajamandala (Figure 3), which emerges as an overlap of the continental and space mandalas. Overlapping, whilst reflecting the constant flux of the Rajamandala, underpins the enmeshing of continental and outer-space aspirations, pivoted on intent, capacity and capability, and the consequent decisions governing space activities, thereby subsequently influencing outer-space foreign-policy articulation. The ancient Indian statecraft of the Arthashastra, with its concepts of sadgunya and Rajamandala, is still relevant in contemporary times and can be gainfully utilised towards articulating the outer-space grand strategy and foreign-policy options for India in outer space. As an implication, it can be observed that the Arthashastra, whilst written for a territorial dimension, could be helpful in articulating foreign policies for global commons such as outer space, through suitable modification and reworking of the Rajamandala, which is depicted in the concluding figure.

Fig 3: Outer Space Rajamandala