Introduction

In Ismail Merchant’s classic The Remains of the Day, set in 1930s Britain, the host, Darlington, a British Lord, welcomes his German guest by raising toasts about “peace and prosperity.” His American guest, oddly, states, “Days when you can act out of noble intentions are over, Europe has become the arena of realpolitik, the politics of reality.”1 Within a few years, this realism was widely witnessed, as nations blatantly broke pacts of ‘friendship’ and ‘non-aggression’ and the Second World War engulfed the globe. In the aftermath of this war, multipolar institutions emerged in the globalised world, leading to the liberal international order during the latter part of the 20th Century.

Covid-19 has emerged as the greatest disruptor of this international order, creating economic and political upheaval. Owing to acute economic distress, the ‘pre Covid-19’ divisive trends have accelerated, with sharp polarisation in domestic and international politics. Additionally, as democratic powers have been overwhelmed by medical and economic distress, resurgence of nationalism has led to an increase in authoritarianism. The pandemic has exposed the weaknesses of multilateral institutions in tackling the disorder, leading to a trend of retreating globalisation. Further, the US-China rivalry will ensure that the ‘post Covid-19,’ world will likely be dominated more by confrontation and competition than cooperation and collaboration.

India needs to evolve an integrated strategy to navigate through the Covid-19 induced disruptions in geo-economics and geopolitics, if it hopes to emerge unscathed and stronger. Bilateral and multilateral alliances, in addition to deft defence planning and reforms, will be critical factors in India’s strategic calculus to transcend the Covid-19 times.

Global Challenges for India

In the emerging post Covid-19 international order, the Indo-Pacific has replaced Europe as the most significant strategic theatre. Therefore, owing to its central geostrategic location, India is poised to shoulder increased role in the emerging global order. Given India’s relations with other principal regional and extra-regional actors, Covid-19 is bound to have a profound bearing on India’s future.

Economic Challenges

Covid-19 has deeply affected the world economy. A sharp drop in global demand has resulted in devastating impact on world trade. The western world has suffered more than the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR), further denting its precarious economic situation prevailing since the 2008 financial crisis. This weakness in ‘Washington Consensus’ economies will be exploited by China through its alternative model of financing. However, with debts soaring and trade collapsing, even the export-based Chinese economy would be beset with unpredictable, and yet unforeseen, challenges. The US-China trade wars, coupled with tariff barriers being raised by individual countries, could create further setbacks to prospects of a quick, global economic recovery.

India’s Covid-19 triggered GDP fall has been one of the worst amongst leading economies, with further dismal predictions for 2020-21. The economic downturn and a rapidly shrinking GDP is bound to affect India’s geopolitical stature adversely. Economics may also blunt India’s ability to maintain its strategic autonomy, due to increased necessity of attracting foreign capital. A weak economic foundation may, thus, push India towards protectionism and isolationism which is already evident in India’s reluctance to join economic blocs, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The economic decline in the ‘Gulf,’ due to fall in oil prices, could further adversely impact dwindling remittances and India’s strategic holdings in the Middle East.2 Further, the ongoing crisis has created a resource crunch, which could adversely affect Indian defence modernisation plans, as well as its outreach to other countries through investment promises. However, on the other hand, India could take advantage of the situation by becoming a hub for global supply chains, which are showing signs of moving away from China. Further, India’s demographic advantage could also be leveraged to achieve its long standing goal of vitalizing the manufacturing industry.

China’s Rise

Beijing has evidently viewed India as an impediment to its hegemonic ambitions and has, historically, not shied away from using military force, as part of its grand strategy, to exert influence. China has also employed diplomatic engagement along with military coercion to engage India, based on its own strategic calculus. In line with Sun Tzu’s dictum, “All warfare is based on deception,” Beijing has utilized the tactic of ‘two steps forward and one step back,’ to slowly and steadily nibble Indian territory. The Chinese strategy against India ‘blows hot or cold’ based on its domestic situation and global compulsions. In consonance with this strategy, the stand-off in Doklam was followed by the ‘Wuhan and Mamallapuram spirit’ to lull and soften India’s stand, including on the ‘Quad’ policy framework. However, at the core of the Chinese policy is Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ to re-assert itself as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the world - through incremental strategic gains.3 As the world remains embroiled with fighting the Chinese Covid pandemic, China’s opportunism has resurged, to conceal its domestic anxieties, through an offensive posture in the international arena. The PLA’s incursions in eastern Ladakh are intended to impose costs on India for its deepening ties with USA and to force acceptance of Beijing’s primacy in Asia and beyond. In consonance with its global ambitions towards ‘Pax Sinica,’ the Chinese juggernaut is rolling through South Asia - challenging India’s regional primacy in its own backyard.4 China will keep testing the resolve and determination of the Indian establishment, and will simultaneously try to nudge New Delhi away from Washington’s embrace, using a combination of force as well as diplomacy. India’s struggle to balance the rising hegemon will be a key part of its strategic calculus for a long time to come.

India’s Priorities – the Need for a Defined, Integrated Strategy

India’s idealism post-independence led to a ‘risk-averse strategy,’ resulting in minimal tangible rewards from its foreign policy.5 Further, disjointed civil-military relations ensured that role of military force was relegated as a measure of last resort, upon failure of the delinked foreign policy and segregated strategic calculus. The result has been the absence of a defined and integrated strategy, emboldening India’s adversaries and creating significant risks, despite India’s material strengths.

Owing to a ‘reactive strategic culture,’ major policy changes in India have occurred only during or after major crises. Covid-19 presents one such opportunity, wherein the current crisis could be utilised to bring about the required changes in the modus operandi for India’s national security planning. China’s actions, during this economic crisis, have forced India to balance its developmental and security goals, against the possibility of a severe resource crunch. Diverse budgetary demands for meeting national medical care requirements, economic stimuli and defence modernisation, will force the government to prioritize some expenditures over others. A proactive analysis towards defining and prioritising such goals is the need of the hour, which can be accomplished through formulation of a National Security Strategy (NSS) document. The NSS would be the blueprint through which diverse economic, foreign and defence policies could be prioritized, based on strategic goals and an assessment of available resources.

Defence Planning

The emergency procurements undertaken post Galwan bring to fore the long pending, and now urgent, requirement for effective and coherent defence planning - an aspect which is intrinsically linked with other instruments of national power. Even though India’s military spending is the third highest in the world, its defence modernisation hasn’t kept pace with the changing contours of global threats. A shortage in defence capital outlay has already curtailed modernisation plans of the Indian Armed Forces. Unexpected cuts due to the Covid-19 crisis would further jeopardize modernisation, with each service jostling for its share of the pie. As the Indian Army prepares itself for a long winter on the eastern Ladakh border, its budgetary requirements will further balloon. The increased expenditure may, per force, be at the cost of the Navy’s modernisation, whose budget allocation is already less than 15% of India’s defence expenditure. Such a development would be in China’s interest - for India to remain mired in continental conflicts and stunt its maritime growth. Beijing, in contrast, through its defence reforms, has substantially reduced the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) manpower and provided a sharp focus to modernisation of the PLA Navy (PLAN), which has now emerged as the world’s largest navy.6 Therefore, in order to overcome a myopic and reactive approach, defence reforms are an inescapable requirement for India, with effective defence planning as the foundation.

Geopolitical Focus Areas

The essence of any strategy is the efficient linkage of resources and capabilities to achievable objectives. India has unobtrusively assumed a place on the high table, as a stakeholder in the new emerging global order. However, as India faces a Covid-19 induced GDP contraction, it needs to re-evaluate and redefine its focus areas based on its present capacity assessment. Therefore, while the US Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) vision expects India to play an active role in the South China Sea impasse, the increasing Chinese influence in India’s immediate neighbourhood is of greater concern to New Delhi. While India has positioned itself as the ‘Preferred Security Partner’ for the Indian Ocean Region, the ‘two front scenario’ on its continental borders is a fast approaching reality. In such a vexed and fluid environment, India would need to formulate a policy to realise its primary interests by leveraging its strategic partnerships with other pivotal actors in the region and beyond. In line with Lord Palmerston’s dictum, nations have no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only interests that are eternal and perpetual. India must utilise its unique position in the Indo-Pacific to utilize available opportunities for obtaining technology transfer, economic investments, defence equipment and collaborations from willing partners.7

The Indo-US Alliance: A Natural Response

Post the Galwan Valley clash, many analysts have commented on the urgent need to strengthen the Indo-US alliance and leverage the ‘Quad’ as a counter to China’s expansionism.8 In US President Donald Trump’s words, “India and the US share a natural, beautiful and enduring friendship.” USA, with its ‘Rebalance to Asia,’ recognized the need to support India against the hegemonic ambitions of China, in military, economic and diplomatic terms. India views Washington as a key strategic partner and supporter of the global rules-based order. USA also views India as a key player in its vision of a FOIP, and has strengthened this strategic partnership with the signing of three key foundational agreements since 2016. The fourth significant agreement, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial cooperation (BECA), was signed in the recent Indo-US ‘2+2’ Ministerial dialogue in October 2020.

However, the US insistence on fighting the ‘New Cold War’ - on lines similar to the Cold War – has some inherent disadvantages.9 This strategy, based on ‘containment’ through multi-national alliances, primarily focuses on the geopolitical and military domains. But, unlike the erstwhile USSR, China’s economic might makes it a powerful player in today’s global financial and economic system. It has the capacity, capability and will to use economic leverage to create fissures in the US alliance system, while enhancing its own influence. Beijing has also calibrated its strategy to harass opponents through hybrid warfare - in maritime, cyber, economic, and information domains. Its military interventions remain below the threshold of war, making it difficult for existing alliance systems to be invoked.

The Trump administration’s focus on ‘America First’ has affected its alliance system due to the following factors: -

  • Instead of ‘shared interests,’ Washington has been focused more on its ‘prime interests,’ which may not be aligned with its partners. The changing ‘goal posts’ of its own strategy have led to divergent interests - e.g. the ‘U-turn’ on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.10

  • The end of ‘strategic altruism’ from the US side has taken away a key binding factor of its alliance system. Its demand for shared costs or the unilateral decision to withdraw troops, e.g. from Germany because “…they’re not paying their bills,” forces each partner to undertake its own cost benefit analysis.11

  • The Trump administration’s withdrawal from international institutions (latest being WHO), as an act of ‘unilateral diplomatic disarmament,’ created a void to the advantage of Beijing’s increasing influence in the ‘global commons.’12

Strategic alignment with USA could entail several tangible benefits for India, even as there would likely persist several areas of disconnect and disconcert for some of India’s long-held and strategic interests. The US pressure to wean India away from Russia, its unilateral peace talks with Taliban (against India’s interests), removal of India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), protectionism through cancellation of H1B visas, etc., demonstrate that India should endeavour to maintain its space for strategic manoeuvre, balancing necessities and parallel interests. In a post Covid-19 world, with all countries suffering a resource crunch and heightened nationalism, this space would be critical for India to protect and pursue its interests.

India’s Other Strategic Partnerships

In order to optimally utilize its resources and maintain momentum, New Delhi’s strategic engagements with partners should focus on coalescing benefits in domains of economy, technology and military. These strategic partnerships should be in the form of concentric circles, with the most critical ones at the core, as proposed in succeeding paragraphs.

The Indo-Pacific Triad

Despite having geographically separated and mutually exclusive spheres of influence in the IPR, India, Japan and Australia find themselves in a similar geopolitical situation due to the following factors: -

    • A hegemonic China exerting influence in their respective spheres of influence, through territorial aggression and economic leverage.

    • Necessity of working together to balance a rising, aggressive China.

    • A determined quest to reduce economic dependence on China.

As middle powers, the ‘trio’ could align efforts for mutual benefit, including to harness Japan’s technological prowess, Australia’s material abundance and India’s demographic dividend. Working together will also generate greater trust and cooperation. The trio’s geographically dispersed spheres of influence could also turn out to be an advantage, by extending mutual support for common interests over a larger area. While the trio may not be able to balance China, even together, a stronger partnership would engender confidence and strengthen a rules-based order that is inclusive and focused on the common good. Therefore, it is important that this trilateral partnership forms the core of India’s strategic relationships. The recent trilateral Supply Chain Resilience Initiative and India’s logistics agreements with both, Japan and Australia, are important steps in this direction.13 Further, the Indo-Australia strategic partnership could be a game changer in the IPR, by attracting other like-minded nations.

The Big League Partnership

India’s larger strategic circle should focus on the big league - USA, Russia and Europe. USA, with its military might and global leadership, could assist India in several domains, especially in the fields of high-end technology and military hardware.

The Indo-Russia strategic partnership is a unique example of Indian realism, which has paid rich geopolitical as well as geo-strategic dividends. Russia has continued to supply India with vital military hardware, as also extended support in multilateral institutions. As Russia also looks upon the ever growing Chinese influence in its Far East, India should continue to nurture this time-tested relationship and harness Russian influence in world affairs.

India’s relations with Europe remain strong, and offer increased possibilities. France is a key Indian Ocean partner and a ‘resident power’ in the IPR. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron’s proposal for an India, France and Australia strategic partnership has already started taking shape.14 Germany has, recently, promulgated its Indo-Pacific strategy, endorsing FOIP and tacitly noting the rising threat from China.

Bilateral Vectors

In addition, India’s strong bilateral relationships across the globe could continue to provide strength and resilience to its geopolitical heft. India’s unique relationship with Israel, in particular, could boost India’s defence and niche technology capability. Similarly, strong bonds with the Gulf countries, which host about 10 million Indians and contribute about 60% of India’s oil imports, are vital to India’s growth and development.

ASEAN in general, and Vietnam, Indonesia in particular, also play an important role in India’s strategic calculus. This region has been least affected by Covid-19 and is increasingly attracting a share of the global supply chains, as some manufacturing shifts out of China. With their own territorial disputes with Beijing, they are also threatened by the rising Chinese juggernaut, and would be strong beneficiaries of a ‘rules-based order’ in the IPR.

Conclusion

In the post Covid world, the key to success is economic resurgence, rapid development and diplomatic resilience. India, as a strong emerging power, has a key role in the ‘new world order.’ In order to leverage its strengths, India must set clear aims and formulate cohesive strategies to achieve them. Fast paced economic recovery with Atmanirbhar Bharat, accelerated defence reforms and an “understanding that strategic autonomy should not be confused with strategic ambiguity...” provide the essential way forward.15 An overall strategy, in the form of an NSS, needs to be promulgated at the earliest to shape, guide and protect our core interests.

India’s resolute military response to Beijing’s ‘salami-slicing,’ while continuing talks “to find an equilibrium or reach an understanding to establish a steady relationship” displays the alignment of all instruments of power in India’s strategy.16 Through such firm and determined actions, India can develop ‘strategic partnerships’ towards a multi-polar world order, which could withstand the uncertainties of the China-US rivalry. India’s ‘soft-power’ resonates around the globe - exemplified in the Covid-19 times by medical aid initiatives, Op Samudra Setu and Vande Bharat missions. In the words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “India will stand for shanti, suraksha and samriddhi (peace, safety and prosperity)…India’s experience will strengthen the way for vishwa-kalyan (good for the world).”17

Endnotes

  1. The Remains of the Day, Netflix Movie, 21 September 2020. https://www.netflix.com/in/title/60011325, accessed 07 October 2020.

  2. Rejimon Kutappan, “Indian Migrant Workers in Gulf Countries are Returning Home Without Months of Salary Owed to Them,” The Hindu, 19 September 2020.

  3. Samir Saran and Akhil Deo, “Xi dreams: A Roadmap for Pax-Sinica,” Observer Research Foundation, 17 May 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/research/xi-dreams-a-roadmap-for-pax-sinica/, accessed 05 October 2020.

  4. Jyoti Malhotra, “Here’s What China is Doing in Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan: it doesn’t Look Good for India,” The Print, 25 August 2020.

  5. Speech by Minister for External Affairs, on 14 November 2019, 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture 2019. https://mea.gov.in/

  6. John Grady, “Pentagon Report: China Now Has World’s Largest Navy as Beijing Expands Military Influence,” USNI News, 01 September 2020.

  7. “Morality: Does National Interest Always Come First in Foreign Affairs?,” BBC News, Open Politics.

  8. Sreemoy Talukdar, “Galwan Valley Clash: Five Short-Term and Three Long-Term Ways in Which India can Contain the Chinese Threat,” First Post, 23 June 2020.

  9. Natalie Huet, “UN Chief Warns Over Threat of New Cold War Between US and China,” Euronews, 22 September 2020.

  10. AFP, “Europe Opposes US Motion to Restore all UN Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Deal,” Euronews, 21 August 2020.

  11. Ashley J. Tellis, “The U.S.-India Relationship Under Trump and Modi,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 May 2017.

  12. “Coronavirus: Trump Moves to Pull US Out of World Health Organization,” BBC, 07 July 2020.

  13. Pranab Dhal Samanta, “India-Japan-Australia Supply Chain in the Works to Counter China,” The Economic Times, 19 August 2020.

  14. Shishir Gupta, “Strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis gets off to a Flying Start Amid China Tension,” Hindustan Times, 09 September 2020.

  15. S. Jaishankar, “Book Discussion the India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World,” Observer Research Foundation, 03 September 2020.

  16. Elizabeth Roche, “India and China Need to Find an Equilibrium: External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar,” Livemint, 31 August 2020.

  17. “Till When to Wait for UN Role: PM,” The Pioneer, 27 September 2020.