INDIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (CMF): STRATEGIC RATIONALE, OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND WAY AHEAD

Abstract: The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) has immense strategic and geopolitical significance as a vital hub of global commerce, energy flows and natural resources. However, the region remains challenged by maritime terrorism, piracy, armed robbery, human and drug trafficking, weapon smuggling etc, necessitating cooperative security frameworks. Since its establishment in 2001, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has emerged as a key multinational initiative to counter such threats. India refrained from joining CMF for over two decades due to various reasons. A pragmatic shift in India’s foreign and security policy, however, led to its association as an Associate Partner in 2022 and full membership in 2023, with contributions through deputation of personnel, ships and aircraft. This paper brings out importance and various dynamics of strategic and geopolitical environment of the region, evolution of CMF, its organisation and operations. It also analyses the strategic rationale for India’s participation in CMF after about two decades of its establishment. The paper further brings out major highlights of India’s participation and outlines opportunities for India, including leadership of task forces, deeper interoperability and institutional linkages, to maximise its contribution in regional maritime security.

Background

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is a 47-member multinational maritime partnership which coordinates maritime Tsecurity operations through its Combined Task Forces (CTF) to uphold International Rules Based Order. CMF was established in 2001, after 09/11, and is fundamentally a US-led initiative that evolved out of its own setting up of the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain in 1995 after the First Gulf War. The US Fifth Fleet existed in the Second World War but was resurrected only in 1995.¹ Over the years, several task forces have evolved out of CMF with different objectives and participants. The Combined Task Forces CTFs carry out operations against illicit non-state actors on the high seas and contribute to maintaining security, stability and prosperity across approximately 3.2 million square nautical miles of international waters, which encompass some of the world’s most important shipping lanes. CMF’s focus areas are counter-narcotics, countersmuggling, suppressing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation and engaging with regional and other partners to strengthen relevant capabilities and improve overall security and stability in the region.²

India joined CMF as associate partner in 2022 and became a member in 2023.³ This paper delves into organisation of the CMF, explores the rationale behind India’s decision to engage with the CMF, opportunities this engagement presents for India’s strategic interests in the Western Indian Ocean and recommendations for future engagement.

Strategic Environment and Geopolitics in Western Indian Ocean

As is already well-known, Western Indian Ocean (WIO) connects West Asia, East Africa with other parts of Asia and Europe. The geography of the region with strategically important choke points like Strait of Hormuz, Babel-Mandeb, Red Sea and Suez Canal make it a contested place for geopolitics. The region is the mainstay of several economies, as it includes Gulf region which possesses about 30 percent of global oil reserves, 21 percent of natural gas reserves and controls around 23 percent of global oil production and 28 percent of oil exports.⁴ African and littoral states located between the Suez Canal and South Africa have also grown in their geopolitical heft due to their geographic location and resource potential.⁵ The Suez Canal is very critical for trade between Africa and Europe as European markets accounts for 26% market for African goods in terms of value. Maritime trade for various East African countries and Red Sea countries is also dependent on the Suez Canal with approximately 31% of for Djibouti, 15% for Kenya, 10% for Tanzania and 34% for Sudan.⁶

The WIO has generally been a crisis- prone region especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869s. The economic vitality and energy potential of this region underscored the strategic importance of WIO in superpower calculations. Britain’s naval withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ in 1967 further intensified the competition between Cold War superpowers and their regional proxies.⁷ The trend has continued even after the end of the US-USSR Cold War in the early 1990s. Several major powers of the world have near continuous presence in the region for purposes of ensuring maritime trade, especially energy supplies, maintaining economic growth and securing military interests. In addition to the complex geopolitical and strategic environment, the region is also marred with maritime security challenges like maritime terrorism, piracy, human and drug trafficking, weapon smuggling and illegal fishing.⁸

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

The CMF construct has been one of earlier cooperative formats to combat maritime security challenges in the region^.9 It was an initiative by the United States to coordinate voluntary naval contributions to maritime security operations in the Western Indian Ocean. Originally, the main purpose was counterterrorism, but with the outbreak of Somali piracy, the focus turned to counter piracy. With decline in piracy, the purpose shifted to smuggling and deterrence of blue crimes. The CMF’s focus areas are counter-narcotics, counter-smuggling, suppressing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation and engaging with partners to undertake maritime operations to facilitate a safe environment for free flow of commerce and freedom of navigation. CMF is an informal navy-to-navy cooperation format to counter maritime security threats.¹⁰ The activities conducted by 10 CMF are within the framework of international law namely 1982 UNCLOS and applicable UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). However, as such, CMF and its constituent Combined Task Forces do not have legal personality, domestically or internationally.

Command and Control. The CMF is headed by Commander CMF, usually a US Navy Vice Admiral, who also holds the positions of Commander, NAVCENT and Commander, US Fifth Fleet.¹¹ The Board of Governors of CMF (Heads of Naval and Joint Operations of member nations) provide various inputs for CMF strategy during the annual Maritime Security Conference (MSC) held at Bahrain. The Deputy Commander is a Royal Navy Commodore who also dual- hats as UK Maritime Component Commander. The Chief of the Staff is a US Navy Captain/ Commander. CMF Headquarters has staff from participating nations and tenure of officers varies from six months to two years. Few of the billets in Headquarters are on permanent basis for specific countries. There are five Combined Task Forces (CTF) under CMF whose command is rotational and normally commanded by an officer of the Commodore/Captain rank. Command of the CTFs is generally rotated every six months. The broad organisational structure is as follows:

Fig 1: Organisation of Combined Maritime Forces

Combined Task Forces. All five CTFs are multinational task forces operating under CMF. The CTFs in addition to their specific operations also provide inputs for Information and Strategic Communications effects, conduct Key Leader Engagements and Maritime Security Enhancement Training (MSET) activities which contribute to deter non-state actors from the use of the high seas for illicit activities, develop capacity for regional leadership and reassure the international community. Following table lists out the CTFs and their functional roles in brief: 

Table 1: CTFs and their roles

Operations

The CMF Area of Operations encompasses the international waters of Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean bounded by 15 ° South and 70 ° East. All task forces carry out operations under their respective mandates with the basic understanding that CMF as an organisation cannot become state- facing and none of its elements would participate in any armed conflict. Based on the ‘tripwires’ as instituted by the CMF, most of the operations are initiated with Flag Verification Boardings (FVB) to find the statelessness of the suspected vessel. On being verified as stateless and after necessary approvals from CMF and national authority, search and seizures are conducted. Units supporting CTF 150 under command of Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), just in the first half of the 2025, carried out more than 40 FVBs and apprehended more than 7000 kg of narcotics (including Methamphetamines, Hashish and Heroin).¹2 The units in support of the CMF operations may provide Direct Support (DS) or Associated Support (AS). Direct Support is the support provided by a surface or air asset working directly under the allocated CMF Task Force. Surface units in DS are to respond to the direction of the CTF Commander (provided such direction is within national permission). Associated Support is the support provided by a surface or air asset which is operating under national command and control and has been provided to a CTF, in addition to their national tasking or during their transit through CMF area of operations. The air ISR support is provided by participating countries by deploying their air assets. Aircraft from TF 57 of NAVCENT¹³ and member nations like India, Seychelles, Germany, Japan, France and Pakistan are deployed regularly in the region.

India at CMF

India did not join the CMF for over two decades and decided to operate independently in the region. Its decision not to join CMF may be attributed to India’s long-standing policy and understanding of avoiding participation in non-UN mandated military coalitions and concerns in respect of Pakistan’s presence and consequent operational interface at CMF. Our cordial relations with Iran and consequent caution in decision to join USlead coalitions would also have contributed to India’s approach. The apprehension of being seen as joining the US military bloc and impacting our ‘Strategic Autonomy’ may also have played the role in India’s past decisions. However, the country’s approach to deal with security aspects including maritime security has seen a shift especially in last decade. The following aspects are likely to have been considered for India’s decision to join CMF: -

• Non-alignment to Multi-Alignment. India’s foreign policy has seen a noticeable shift from non-alignment to multi-alignment with prioritisation of our national interests. This is evident in the more complex engagements at global and regional levels and could be one of the factors for joining the CMF.
• Strengthening India - US Defence Cooperation. India-US relations have evolved to a mature level since the early 1990s with the so-called ‘Kicklighter Proposals’.¹⁴ Defence cooperation between the two countries has further strengthened the relations. Conclusion of arrangements like Defence Policy Group, US-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020 have enhanced cooperation between the two countries. India’s armed forces continue to operate US platforms such as the C-130J, C-17, P-8I, Apache, MH-60R and MQ9B UAVs. Further, India has been engaging with US through multiple bilateral exercises viz Yudh Abhyas, Sangam, Vajra Prahar, Cope India, Tiger Triumph and multilateral exercises like Malabar, Milan, RIMPAC, Sea Dragon, Pitch Black etc). It is assessed that confidence and maturity in India-US defence cooperation, would have made it sensible to join CMF.
• Understanding CMF. CMF is not a military alliance but a flexible partnership of countries that come together in the maritime domain to contribute to “good order at sea.” In a sense it is related to what is also loosely termed international rules- based order (IRBO) by coordinating and conducting maritime operations against non-state actors in international waters beyond territorial water limits. The basic understanding and the most important aspect of CMF organisation is that no operations are undertaken against any state and none of its elements would participate in any armed conflict. The participation in CMF is entirely voluntary, and operations are underscored by the mandate of national permissions. This implies that if any nation’s policies and Rules of Engagement (ROE) do not permit an operation being conducted under CMF authority, the respective nation is free to opt out of it and revert to national tasking. To illustrate, consider with a hypothetical situation involving boarding operations by warship of ‘X’ nationality on a dhow of ‘Y’ nationality. If CMF has approved the boarding and permission has not been granted by the national authority of ‘X’ due to sensitivities and relations between the two nations, the warship will not go ahead with the boarding operations and may revert to national tasking. This flexibility of operations is an important factor for exercising national policies and respecting the sensitivities of other countries with whom one may have better relations than some other member-countries of such groupings. Such participation also supports the IN’s experience in interoperability with other navies while stayingclear of uncomfortable situations, diplomatically speaking.
• Countering Pakistan Influence and One-Sided Narrative. Pakistan joined CMF in 2004 and has been a consistent contributor since. The Pakistan Navy (PN) has had officers in command of CTF 150 and CTF 151, 13 and 11 times respectively so far.¹⁵ Pakistan also has few permanent billets at CMF headquarters. Various operations under CMF have yielded significant benefits to Pakistan Navy like enhanced training, operational experience, stronger naval diplomacy and apparent contribution to maritime stability in region. Pakistan has also used CMF as a platform for extensive media outreach. The antinarcotics operations by PN have been strategically publicised across major social media and other media platforms through CMF, ISPR and local media to propagate Pakistan’s maritime credibility. Naming of CMF Focused Operations by Pakistan in 2024 like Himalayan Spirit¹⁶ and Karakoram Resolve¹⁷ is assessed to be an attempt to progress their one-sided narrative and strengthen their territorial claims in disputed regions. It is important that the Indian Navy, being a major player in the region, is involved in the world’s largest naval partnership combating common non-state maritime challenges in India’s primary area of interest. It is important for us to be there in the organisation and on the table for its own sake and to counter Pakistan’s one-sided narratives.
• Enhancing India’s Contribution to Regional Maritime Security. India’s location in the Indian Ocean necessitates safe and secure seas for its well-being. Being a mature maritime nation, India has been a major contributor in ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. The national vision of MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), aims to promote safety and cooperation in the seas.¹⁸ The IN’s efforts in combating piracy since 2008, including proactive and assertive responses to recent piracy incidents (December 2023 onwards) involving MV Ruen,¹⁹ MV Lila Norfolk,²⁰ FV Iman²¹ and Naeemi, and FV Al Kambar 786,²² apprehending 44 pirates, demonstrate India’s commitment and resolve to maintain free and secure seas. India also provided humanitarian aid and firefighting assistance to various merchant ships hit by Houthi drones or missiles particularly involving MV Merlin Luanda,²³ MV True Confidence,²⁴ and MV Genco Picardy.²⁵ “Since December 2023 till May 2025, in response to shipping attacks and piracy in the Western Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy deployed more than 35 ships in the region, carried out more than 1000 boarding operations and responded to over 30 incidents. The credible and swift actions of the Indian Navy saved more than 520 lives, irrespective of the nationality of the crew and ensured safe passage for 312 merchant vessels carrying cargo worth more than 5.3 billion US dollars”.²⁶ By virtue of convergence of common objectives of both CMF and India’s maritime approach and overlapping area of operations, the decision to join CMF makes sense and enhances cooperation and India’s contribution to regional maritime security.
• Operational and Training Benefits. CMF has armed forces’ officers and personnel from 47 countries of world; it is a large set-up. With their rich experience, each one of them presents a different perspective and approach on common maritime challenges and methodologies to counter them. Because various Task forces of NAVCENT are present in the Naval Support Activity at Bahrain, interacting with them provides an opportunity to observe and learn from them. Further, intelligence inputs provided by CMF through Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) about contacts of interest involved in illicit activities in the region are very credible and have resulted in some significant narcotics hauls by CTF 150 including IN ships. Participation in CMF and presence at various Command briefings and conferences gives an on-ground appreciation in respect of proceedings in the region. CMF also provides the opportunity to learn about the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), terminologies and other practices followed by various nations. Some examples are access control at of the US Base, IT security, procedure for VBSS onboard dhows, approach to integrate with shipping industry and so on. There is no other setup like the CMF (with exception of UN Missions) which provides equivalent opportunity for naval officers to gain experience in operating with multinational forces. The interaction and presence at CMF also give an opportunity to gain insight on the sensitivities of various nations on different aspects. Overall, the CMF is a platform which provides an excellent opportunity for training and enhancing operational experience for the Indian Navy.
• Enhanced Visibility. Such participation provides the IN additional visibility about its capabilities and professionalism, besides furthering its reputation for decades of expertise and accomplishments in constabulary duties that further good order at sea. Specifically, over forty other navies and maritime services get to know and see some part of the IN better and in turn, the IN operates in company with some of them.

IN’s Contribution at CMF. India has been contributing with staff, surface assets (frigates) and air assets (P8I) in Direct/ Associated Support since joining the CMF. Following are the major highlights of India’s contribution at CMF till date:

• Operation Crimson Barracuda.²⁷ On 13 April 2024, INS Talwar, operating in support of Canadian-led CTF 150, apprehended a dhow in the Arabian Sea and seized 940 kg of drugs (453 kg of methamphetamines, 416 kg of hash and 71 kg of heroin). 
• Deputation of IN Staff at CTF 150.²⁸ India deputed IN personnel as part of CTF 150 staff during command of New Zealand from January 2025 to June 2025. This was the first participation of IN staff in any CTF.
• Operation ANZAC Tiger. INS Tarkash and a P8I aircraft participated in the operation in April 2025. Tarkash successfully intercepted a suspicious dhow in the Western Indian Ocean and seized over 2500 kg of narcotics (including 2386 kg of hashish and 121 kg of heroin).²⁹
• Command of CTF 154. India took over command of CTF 154 on 12 February 2026 for the first time wherein Cmde Milind M Mokashi, IN took over as Commander CTF 154 from the outgoing Commander of the Italian Navy.³⁰

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s participation in CMF marks an important milestone in contribution to enhance maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean. India must enhance its participation in the CMF to further good order at sea while it undertakes other constabulary duties elsewhere in the IOR as required. It is assessed that India’s participation would contribute in countering Pakistan’s one-sided narratives, further our relations with Gulf countries, gain operational experience in multinational constructs and enhance India’s maritime contribution to maritime security. Following are recommended for future engagements:

• Participation and Command of other CTFs. It would be prudent that India continues its participation in the CMF despite the recent lows in India-US economic relations, albeit in accordance with Government of India (GoI) policy. India must endeavour to have command of at least one CTF at any given point of time to maintain regular presence in the CMF.
• Command of CTF 151 (Anti-Piracy Operations). The Indian Navy has been very proactive force in the region in combating piracy since 2008 and more recently during resurgence of major piracy incidents from December 2023 to August 2024. Command of CTF 151 would be an opportunity to continue this mission along with presence in the CMF. The modalities of non- participation during Pakistan’s command may be worked out, with India resorting to independent antipiracy operations/ patrol during Pakistan’s command. The command of CTF 151 would also provide an opportunity to command and operate with JMSDF ship and South Korean ships which are continuously deployed in the region in support of CTF 151. Necessary amendments in IN’s mandate with respect to independent anti-piracy operations, if required may be considered.
• Permanent Staff at CMF HQ. India may consider positioning an officer permanently in CMF Headquarters. This would facilitate monitoring of proceedings and enhancing the others’ understanding of the Indian Navy.
• Linkages between IFC-IOR and CMF. Linkage between IFCIOR and CMF would enable unclassified information-sharing, improve collaboration with the shipping industry and contribute in furthering IFC-IOR’s vision, “to be a nodal centre of excellence for promoting collaborative maritime safety and security; towards a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indian Ocean Region”.³¹
• Utilisation of Indigenous Communication Solutions. Utilisation of indigenously built Network for Information Sharing (NISHAR) terminals may be explored for communication between CMF/ CTF Headquarters and units.