Abstract: This part of the paper follows from its Part 1/5 carried in the preceding volume of the IN Despatch, which examined the Maritime Zones of India (MZI) Act 1976, the (Indian) Customs Act 1962, and various gazette notifications issued by the Indian government with regard to aspect of maritime security/ criminal jurisdiction. It identified the key divergences with UNCLOS relating to India’s security jurisdiction in its maritime zones, specifically pertaining to its contiguous zone and the concept of “designated areas” in its EEZ and Continental Shelf, and the provisions of India’s Penal Code. It argued that such divergence could be challenged in international courts, as exemplified by the MV Enrica Lexie case of 2012.

This part of the paper (Part 2/5) analyses the emerging convergences and the remaining divergences between India’s domestic laws and corresponding international maritime conventions with regard to security/ criminal jurisdiction relating to maritime crimes like piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and human trafficking, with specific focus on India’s coastal security. It also examines Indian laws regarding the UNCLOS provision of ‘hot pursuit’. This part will be followed by three other parts sequentially carried in subsequent volumes of the IN Despatch.

Maritime Piracy

Maritime transportation accounts for 95 per cent of India's trade by volume, including all of its energy imports. India is also among the five largest contributors of seafarers to the global shipping fleet. Hence, piracy poses a major threat, not only to India economic development, but also to the safety of its seafarers. Since UNCLOS classifies piracy as Crime Jure Gentium, it authorises warships and other designated vessels to visit, search and seize a pirate ship anywhere in international waters and prosecute the pirates under the State’s own domestic law. This legal provision falls within the ambit of ‘universal jurisdiction.’2 UNCLOS Article 101 (Definition of Piracy) qualifies an act as piracy if it is conducted “on the high seas.” Article 58 (Rights and duties of other States in the EEZ) extends the provisions of UNCLOS pertaining to the High Seas (Articles 88 to 115) to the EEZ (of all coastal States) as well. Besides this, two other essential elements need to be met to qualify an act as piracy; first, the crime must be conducted for private ends; and second, the criminal act must be conducted by the crew or passengers of one ship (or aircraft) against the crew, passengers, or property onboard another ship (or aircraft), which is generically referred to as the ‘two-ship condition.’3

Notably, the definition of “enemy” in India’s Navy Act 1957 encompasses pirates.4 Nonetheless, until December 2022, the UNCLOS provision on universal jurisdiction against piracy was not incorporated into India’s domestic legislation. This resulted in a major challenge for Indian maritime security forces to prosecute the apprehended pirates. In 1999, the 14 pirates arrested for hijacking MV Alondra Rainbow were charged for 11 offences under various Indian laws including the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 1860, Indian Passport Act 1967, Foreigners Act 1946 and Indian Arms Act 1959 and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) 1967. In 2003, these pirates were successfully prosecuted in the trial court for nine of the 11 offences, and convicted for seven-year prison term each.5 However, since India did not have an effective anti-piracy law, the pirates had to be released in 2005 following the appeal in (higher) Mumbai High Court, primarily on jurisdictional grounds.6 Simply put, piratical acts by a foreigner committed outside the territorial waters of India did not constitute an offence under the IPC.

Indian law-enforcement encountered a similar legal challenge for prosecution after the India maritime forces arrested 120 Somali pirates in four separate counter-piracy operations between January and March 2011.7 Since then, the growing pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the increasing involvement of the Indian Navy (IN) in counter-piracy operations in the area triggered the tabling of The Piracy Bill, 2012 in the Indian Parliament. Although the geographical scope of the offence was “high seas”, Article 14(1) of the Bill clarified that it would also apply to the Indian EEZ.8 This provision was in conformity with UNCLOS. However, ostensibly due to political expediencies, the Bill was not deliberated upon by the Parliament, and eventually lapsed.

In 2019, a revised Bill was tabled in the Parliament as Anti-Maritime Piracy Bill No. 369 (2019). It stipulated in its Article 1(3) that “The provisions of this Act shall apply to all parts of the sea adjacent to and beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zone of India.”9 Evidently, the new bill was contrary to the UNCLOS since it implied that India does not intend to apply its ‘universal jurisdiction’ in its EEZ since this maritime zone falls within its domestic security/ criminal jurisdiction. In other words, the Bill was tailored to be in conformity with the MZI Act 1976, which claimed India’s security jurisdiction in the EEZ, albeit implicitly and indirectly, as mentioned earlier in Part 1 of this paper.

Eventually—ostensibly based on New Delhi’s desire to conform to the strict interpretation of UNCLOS and State practice of major western powers—the bill was revised again to conform to the UNCLOS, providing for universal jurisdiction against piracy in all sea areas wherein high seas freedom applies, including in the Indian EEZ. This bill was enacted in December 2022 as the Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, 2022.10 This new domestic law represents a quantum accretion in India’s legal capacity for anti-piracy operations, and therefore, bolsters India’s standing as a ‘preferred security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region. Interestingly, however, since the Act now in consonance with the UNCLOS, it contradicts the provisions of MZI Act 1976.

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism incorporates politically motivated acts of non-State violence from the sea or at sea. The sea-borne terrorist attack of 26 November 2008 (26/11) against Mumbai exemplifies the former. To address such future threats, on the IN’s recommendation, an effort was made to draft a domestic legislation called the Coastal Security Bill 2013. It was meant to lay down the legal doctrine involving the specific non-State threats, specific responsibilities of the Union and (provincial) state-level maritime security forces in the various maritime zones, their law-enforcement powers, and operational coordination among the various agencies involved. In 2015, the Parliamentary Standing Committee report on Defence stated, “The coastal security bill should be proceeded with utmost priority since it concerns with matters as serious as coastal security.” However, the Bill was never enacted as national law.11 The reasons are not known in the public domain, but these could be inferred from the related issues and developments briefly described below, which highlight the complications for India to enact such a law at this stage.

Whereas India’s overall capabilities for coastal security has been bolstered substantially, its organisational architecture is still evolving, particularly in terms of the command-and-control chain involving both the central and state-level forces. The IN has been presently assigned the lead role in India’s coastal security, but this is unsustainable owing to various reasons, as examined below. The first is the doctrinal primacy of IN’s military role, and the attendant fact that the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) cannot be legally placed under the IN’s command for a peacetime task like coastal security.

The ICG cannot be tasked to play the lead role either, since its mandate under the Coast Guard Act 1978 is to preserve India’s interests in its maritime zones bestowed by UNCLOS, rather than guarding the Indian coast against sea-borne terrorism. [Notably, the term ‘coast guard’ is a misnomer. It has been adopted by many countries like India by emulating the US Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG was established in 1915, many years before the UNCLOS assigned sovereign rights to coastal States over their extensive maritime zones. At that time, the USCG was indeed tasked to ‘guard the coast’, but this is not the case today.]

Moreover, alike the IN, the ICG also functions under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which does not have the legal mandate for coastal security. The primary government ministry legally charged with this function is the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Its charter laid down in the (updated) Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 contains the “Management of International Land and Coastal Borders excluding those subjects specifically allocated to Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs.”12 It is for this reason that in 2004, India established the Department of Border Management under the MHA.13 So, coastal security could be legally assigned to the ICG (as its secondary task), only if it is shifted from under the MoD to the MHA. Alternatively, the lead function could be assigned to a new Central Marine Police Force (CMPF) under the MHA, raised to coordinate coastal security functions with the State Marine Police (SMP) of coastal states, with the ICG and IN in support role. This issue has been under deliberation for some years now.14

However, integrating the prevailing legal mandates of Union and (provincial) state-level agencies is not easy in India, due to the nature of its constitutional structure. Hence, unless and until a comprehensive legal framework is formulated, possibly involving a Constitutional reform, the government has perhaps considered it more practical to let the IN take the lead in coastal security under the supervision of a National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), with functional coordination among the various relevant agencies achieved through Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), rather than through a common legal framework. However, this can only work as an interim arrangement.

For securing India’s coastal security imperatives over time, it is becoming increasingly necessary to evolve a national coastal security law to interpret UNCLOS and foster functional coordination among the various maritime law-enforcement agencies. This legal void became palpable when the Indian authorities intercepted and seized MV Seaman Guard Ohio in October 2013 off the Indian coast. It was a foreign ‘floating armoury’ vessel operated by AvanFort—a private US company—to supply weapons and ammunition to private maritime security companies (PMSC), which could potentially be used for terrorist ingress into India.15 In January 2016, the vessel’s 35 crewmembers and security guards were convicted under the provisions Indian law, inter alia the Indian Arms Act 1959 (for illegal possession of arms and ammunition in Indian territory), Essential Commodities Act 1955 (for illegal embarkation of fuel in Indian Customs waters), and IPC 1960. Each one of the accused was then sentenced by the Tuticorin Sessions court to five years in prison.16 However, in November 2017, all were acquitted by the Madras High Court for lack of evidence,17 primarily relating to the precise location of the MV Seaman Guard Ohio during its seizure. As per AvanFort, the vessel was anchored in India’s contiguous zone. Whereas the Indian authorities claimed at the vessel was positioned within Indian territorial sea, no substantive evidence could support this claim, which discredited India’s maritime law-enforcement organisation. This could have been prevented if a Coastal Security Act was in existence, which could lay down the legal provisions for a seamless operational coordination among the various law-enforcement agencies, and with due cognisance to the provisions of UNCLOS, much alike the aforementioned Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, 2022.

To counter non-state violence in international waters other than piracy, in 1988, the IMO adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention (SUA Convention).18 It was triggered by the 1985 MV Achille Lauro terrorism incident19 which indicated that the ‘two-ship’, ‘private ends’ and ‘high seas (including EEZ)’ conditions for defining piracy under UNCLOS Article 101(a) may not be always met to prosecute the criminals involved in violence at sea, including against fixed platforms located in the EEZ and Continental Shelf. With a broad scope in national waters and beyond, it is meant to solicit international cooperation against terrorism and other forms of non-state violence at sea. The Convention goes beyond the traditional ‘personality’ and ‘territorial’ principles of criminal jurisdiction, albeit with cooperation of the States involved. The States parties to the SUA Convention are obliged, either to establish national jurisdiction over the crime or to extradite the criminals.

To codify the provisions of SUA Convention 1988 in domestic law, in 2002, India enacted its Suppression of Unlawful Activities against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act (SUA Act).20 This also led to a rare legislative policy decision to confer law-enforcement powers under this Act to the IN (besides to the ICG). The Act was applied to the MV Enrica Lexie case based on the provisions of SUA Convention 1988.21 Article 6(1)(a) of the Convention extends the security jurisdiction of States beyond their Territorial Sea to cover an offence that is committed against or on board a ship flying its flag (St. Antony in this case), or as per Article 4(2), if when the alleged offender (Italian Marines in this case) is found in the territory of a State party (India in this case), or as per Article 6(2)(b), during the commission of such the offence, a national of that State is killed (the two Indian fishermen, in this case). At a later stage, India dropped the application of SUA Act 2002 since the case was one of concurrent jurisdiction with Italy, with the latter having the first right to try the Marines. Also, eventually, the two Marines were acquitted by the ITLOS on the grounds of sovereign immunity. (Whereas they were paid by a private shipping company, they represented the Italian government.) However, hypothetically, if the accused would have been private security guards and Italy had permitted India to try them, they would have been prosecuted under the SUAAct 2002.

This clearly indicates that there is a mechanism under international law to protect and preserve India’s security interests beyond its Territorial Sea, and India has appropriately incorporated the provisions of SUA Convention 1988 in its domestic law to secure these interests. This scenario may best be exemplified by the increasing Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea since the November 2023 hijacking of Israeli-owned and Bahamas-flagged MV Galaxy Leader during its voyage from Turkey to India.22 Hypothetically, if MV Galaxy Leader was registered in India, Indian maritime forces could lawfully interdict the ship under SUA Act 2002. More specifically, Indian warships engaged in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, with Indian marine commandos (MARCOS) embarked onboard, could be tasked for the boarding and hostage-rescue operation. Thereafter, the hijackers could be prosecuted under SUA Convention 1988 with the internationally recognised Yemen government handing over the jurisdiction to Indian courts. Unfortunately, however, the IN has not yet been empowered under the SUAAct 2002, which is a major impediment for the force for effective performance of its constabulary missions. In the specific case of Houthis, therefore, an alternative legal basis is required. So far, none of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) have authorised the use of force against the Houthis under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nonetheless, UNSCR 2722 of January 2024 authorises States to defend their vessels from Houthi attacks.23 This provision is open to varied interpretations. On one end, it authorises Indian warships to interdict the Indian-flagged vessel hijacked by the Houthis under the ‘inherent’ right of individual and collective self-defence. However, it will be difficult to prosecute the hijackers in this case. (In contrast, the US and British military operations against Houthi platforms at sea and its shore facilities premised on the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter are premised on ‘punishment’ rather than ‘prosecution.’ However, since the UN Charter applies only to relations among States, this contradicts their position that Houthis do not represent the government of Yemen24). Besides, India cannot lawfully invoke the inherent right of self-defence in this case because an Indian-flagged merchant vessel is not considered an extension of Indian territory (alike an Indian warship or a premises of an Indian diplomatic mission in a foreign country), even though India’s domestic law relating to criminal jurisdiction extends the principle of ‘territoriality’ to Indian-flagged vessels. Hence, unless empowered at short note under SUA Act 2002 through a government notification, it may be more appropriate for India to act against the hijackers under the legal mandates of UNCLOS that prohibit any interference in the right of all States to exercise high seas freedoms25 and the exclusive (sovereign) jurisdiction the vessels flying its flag.26

Another relevant issue is the provision of security zones for India’s vital maritime and littoral installations against non-State actors/ terrorism. As noted in the previous part of this paper (Part 1/5), India’s legal provision of (permanent) “designated areas” in its EEZ and continental shelf for security purpose is not in accordance with UNCLOS. However, State practice establishes the legitimacy of establishing safety zones beyond the UNCLOS provision of the 500-metre safety zone around offshore installations. For instance, States frequently promulgate (temporary) operational zones through Notices to Mariners (NTM) and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) during military exercises and weapon-firing tests. Based on similar State practice and the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, international law does not prohibit a State to declare security or operational zones for protecting their military forces and critical infrastructure and against terrorism, if the prevailing circumstances justifies it, and if such a zone is limited in spatial and temporal terms (This aspect will be examined in detail in Part 4/5 of this paper).

Illegal Fishing

During the years when UNCLOS was being negotiated in the 1970s, Indian fisher-folk largely confined their activities to proximate waters within the Territorial Sea. New Delhi’s principal concern was to prevent illegal fishing by foreigners in its EEZ. At that time, this was merely an issue of national governance linked to food security, livelihood of coastal communities and poverty alleviation. Today, it is about sustaining India’s economic growth, and more. With its fishing industry sustains 14.5 million fishers, India is the world’s second-largest fish-producing country accounting for 6.3 per cent of global fish harvest.27 In recent years, India’s rationale to prevent illegal fishing has widened beyond its domestic economic compulsions, with two new imperatives having been added. The first is the geopolitical one. Due to the degradation of fish stocks in the world’s oceans—due to various reasons ranging from overfishing to marine pollution—it became necessary for India to subscribe to various international treaties and agreements against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing ranging from the UNCLOS to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)28 and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 2030 adopted in 2015.29 The second is the maritime security imperative, caused inter alia by the increasing inimical activities of the Chinese distant fishing fleets (maritime militia) in Indian maritime zones.

The conservation of living resources, sustainable fishing and its regulation of such activities within and beyond national jurisdictions is a major provision of UNCLOS.30 UNCLOS Article 73, authorises all coastal States to enforce their laws and regulations relating to exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources in their EEZ by “such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings…”, though it adds that “arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon posting of reasonable bond or other security”, and the penalty for violations are not to include “imprisonment… or any other form of corporal punishment.”31

In conformity with this provision, India enacted the Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 (MZI Act 1981),32 which is still in force. Under this Act, besides the ICG, the IN was also conferred law-enforcement powers since the ICG was in its infancy at that time (having been formed only three years earlier in 1978). The Act regulates foreign fishing (by foreigners or Indians using foreign vessels) in the Indian EEZ through the issue of licenses or permits (respectively) and are strictly monitored in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the MZI Rules 1982 issued by the Indian government.33

However, a pertinent challenge has been to establish if a foreign fishing vessel in Indian EEZ has been engaged in fishing or is merely transiting through these waters. To address this issue, the MZI Act 1981 requires such vessels to have their fishing gear “kept stowed in the prescribed manner.”34 The development of law on the subject indicates that such provision is inadequate for Indian domestic law to bank upon. For instance, in the Monte Confurco Case (Seychelles versus France) of November 2000, the French frigate Floréal boarded a Seychelles-flagged fishing vessel Monte Confurco in its EEZ around the French island of Kerguelen in the southern Indian Ocean. The vessel was stocked with large quantities of frozen toothfish. However, it had no fresh fish onboard. Based on the recovery by French divers, France later alleged in court that Monte Confurco had jettisoned overboard boxes filled with and defrosted sardines (as bait used for longline fishing) before it was seized. Against the allegation of France, Seychelles claimed that its vessel was fishing outside French EEZ and was merely transiting through the EEZ. The case was adjudicated by ITLOS essentially to decide whether the financial bond imposed by the French court was “reasonable” as per UNCLOS Article 73 (the government of Seychelles alleged that it was not). However, while determining the balance of interests between the two parties (France and Seychelles) in accordance with UNCLOS Article 292, the Tribunal was obliged to consider many factors, ranging from the value of the fish and fishing gear seized to the national law of France. The ITLOS assessed that both the financial bond and penalties under French Law were “unreasonable”, and therefore, determined the value of financial bond against prompt release of the fishing boat and its crew by France. However, ITLOS ruled in favour of the French legal position that the Seychelles-flagged fishing vessel had failed to notify France of its passage.35 This ruling was based on Article 2 of French Law of 18 June 1966, which reads that

“Any vessel entering the exclusive economic zone of the French Southern and Antarctic Territories shall be obliged to give notification of its presence and to declare the tonnage of fish held on board to the chief district administrator of the nearest archipelago.”36

Since such court rulings (case law) is among the sources of international law, this aspect of French national law sets a precedence that may be incorporated into India’s domestic law to strengthen its practical relevance. This may be particularly helpful to counter the activities of China’s high-seas fishing fleet (including maritime militia) in the Indian EEZ.

 According to the MZI Act 1981, foreign fishing vessels may engage in scientific research or investigation or experimental fishing in Indian maritime zones only after obtaining a written permission from the Central government.37 The ICG is authorised to apprehend any foreign fishing vessel engaged in unauthorised survey, data collection etc. The prosecution of such foreign offenders can be initiated only after obtaining the approval of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), which was the nodal Ministry for the MZI Acts. This is understandable, also because such foreign activities go beyond the strict purview of illegal fishing to national security and foreign policy, such as Chinese grey-zone operations. (This aspect will be addressed in detail in Part 3/5 of this paper).

The activities of Indian fisher-folk in the Territorial Sea were always regulated by the legislations of India’s coastal (provincial) states through their respective—and often disparate—Marine Fishing Regulation Acts (MFRA). In recent decades, however, Indians have begun fishing increasingly in the EEZ beyond the Territorial Sea. These deep-sea fishing vessels operate on the basis of a ‘Letter of Permission’ from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Fisheries) and its administrative guidelines, without any legislative prescription or punitive regulations for IUU fishing violations committed by them. Therefore, until 2019, the ICG—being a Central government agency under the Ministry of Defence (MoD)—possessed no law-enforcement powers to arrest Indian fishers engaged in illegal fishing within India’s EEZ, which was the charter of the State Fisheries Department functioning directly under the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The lack of any law at the national level to regulate fishing activities by Indians in the Indian EEZ not only contradicts New Delhi’s international commitment to prevent IUU fishing, but is also a major security void, as realised in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack (26/11), when the Pakistan-based terrorists hijacked and used the Indian trawler Kuber to reach Mumbai. In 2009, following the revamp of India’s coastal security organisation, ICG proposed the Maritime Fisheries (Regulation and Management) Bill to regulate fishing by any person or vessel—Indian or foreign—in the EEZ.38 However, the Bill could not be enacted as law due to opposition from the Indian coastal (provincial) states. So, in 2011, the MoD forwarded a proposed amendment to MZI Act, 1976, which sought to empower the ICG and IN to visit, search and seize all such offending vessels in the Indian EEZ, but it was not concurred by the MEA, ostensibly because any such amendment could potentially spark diplomatic protests from other States. Nonetheless, in 2014, the MEA referred the MoD’s proposed amendment to the National Security Council (NSC) for setting up of an inter-ministerial group to examine the proposed revision of the MZI Act 1976.39 The specific findings of the NSC inter-ministerial group are not known in the public domain, but the later development leads to the deduction that the NSC group may have endorsed the revision of MZI Act 1976, as proposed by the MoD/ ICG. Since the such a legislative amendment is a lengthy process, in 2019, the MoD issued a Gazette notification S.R.O. 16(E), which conferred law-enforcement power to ICG officers in the EEZ by invoking Section 121 of the Coast Guard Act 197840 itself. The notification read,

“In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 121 of the Coast Guard Act, 1978…, the Central Government hereby authorize every member of the Coast Guard… to visit, board, search and seize vessel, or arrest any person, or seize any artificial island or any floating or moored object or any underwater object including any maritime property involved or suspected to be used or likely to be used in the commission of any offence punishable under any of the Central Acts… within the area of maritime zone of India extending up to exclusive economic zone…”.41

This notification is amounted to increasing the spatial scope of India’s security/ criminal jurisdiction (pertaining to various aspects like customs and immigration) to the EEZ. As mentioned in the preceding part of this paper (Part 1/5), an earlier MEA notification of 2002, enabled by the executive function of the government, had cause similar effect. However, the 2019 notification resulted in an amendment to India’s Customs Act, 1962. In the revised Act, the definition of “Customs Waters” stretches to the outer limit of the EEZ.42 This change in India’s domestic law is clearly not in conformity with the strictest interpretation of UNCLOS, based on which, India’s “Customs Waters” ought to be restricted to within the 24 nm limit of its Contiguous Zone. Nonetheless, this change has helped India to tide over the more exigent issue of Chinese activities in Indian maritime zone, such as unauthorised survey and data collection, which are detrimental to national security.

However, the broader issue of effective management of marine fisheries remained unaddressed. Therefore, the Maritime Fisheries (Regulation and Management) Bill proposed by the ICG in 2009, as mentioned earlier, was not forgotten or shelved. In 2021, the Department of Fisheries (Ministry of Agriculture) proposed the enactment of The Indian Marine Fisheries Bill 202143 as a uniform EEZ legislation managed by the central government for all coastal (provincial) states of India. It proposes to repeal the existing MZI Act 1981 and place a legal obligation upon all Indian fisher-folk to obtain a license for fishing beyond the Indian Territorial Sea. It also seeks to nationalise the Indian EEZ, prohibiting fishing by foreign fishing vessels.

The Bill also promotes social security and safety at sea for fishermen, including through certification on vessel and manning norms, identification documents and tracking equipment. In doing so, it conforms to safety standards and norms prescribed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The Bill not only proposes a common legal framework for regulation of fisheries and conservation of living resources but is also necessary to meet the IUU fishing-related requirements of the European Union (EU), which is the destination for 30 percent of India’s seafood exports.

The proposed Indian Marine Fisheries Bill 2021 also has provisions to prohibit IUU fishing by Indians, not only within Indian EEZ, but also beyond it. India’s obligation to curb IUU fishing by Indian fishermen in the maritime zones of other coastal States is another emerging issue that needs to be redressed. The UNCLOS provisions do not explicitly state this obligation. UNCLOS Article 58(3) on “Rights and Duties of other States in the EEZ” merely says that

“In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the EEZ, States shall have due regard to rights and duties of coastal State and comply with its laws and regulations.”

Also, UNCLOS Article 62(4) on “Utilization of Living Resources” says,

“Nationals of other States fishing in EEZ shall comply with conservation measures, and terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the coastal State.”

However, the specific obligation of flag-States to prevent their vessels engaging in IUU fishing in the EEZ of other States has lately been incorporated in the development of international law. In 2015, on being asked to provide advisory opinion on this question. ITLOS negated any “liability of the flag-State” for IUU violations by its vessels but upheld its liability arising from its failure to comply with its “due diligence” obligation. This implies that the flag-State bears the “obligation to take necessary measures, including those of enforcement, to ensure compliance by vessels flying its flag with the laws and regulations of the coastal States concerning marine living resources within their EEZ.”44 On the question of what action a flag- State is to take against a captain and crew of the vessel engaged in IUU fishing in another State’s EEZ, it was left to be determined by each flag-State in accordance with its national law.

It is pertinent to note that India has not yet signed the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) constituted by the UN’s FAO. As the first binding international treaty to counter IUU fishing that came into force in June 2016, PSMA is meant to prevent illegally caught fish from entering national and international markets through the ports. It obliges the State parties to deny port entry to a foreign fishing vessel if “sufficient proof” exists that it was “engaged in IUU fishing.” Otherwise, the vessel may be inspected, and necessary enforcement actions taken in accordance with the flag-State’s domestic laws. If the State party allows port entry, but the vessel is suspect, it may be denied use of port services for landing, transhipping, packing, and processing of fish”. PSMA currently has 78 parties, including the EU representing 28 States. State parties in Asia include Bangladesh, Cambodia, Japan the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam.45 India’s non-participation in PSMA could potentially hurt India’s seafood exports, particularly to the EU. Whereas India is willing to join the PSMA, the lack of an enabling domestic legislation (The Indian Marine Fisheries Bill 2021, as mentioned above) is the key impediment. More specifically, India is not yet ready in legal terms to address the PSMA’s obligation on India (as flag-State) to prevent its fishing vessels from engaging in IUU fishing beyond Indian EEZ. The enactment of the Indian Marine Fisheries Bill 2021 could remove this legal hurdle for India to join the PMSA.

The 2021 Bill is still awaiting the due legislative process to be enacted as national law. It is being opposed by some of India’s (provincial) states since it is perceived as against the economic interests of their local fishing communities, who will need to register their vessels and obtain a license for fishing in the EEZ. They allege that the new Act will only benefit the corporate business-houses engaged in fisheries.

Nonetheless, India’s legislative efforts to manage its fisheries and curb IUU fishing in MZI and beyond is progressing in the right direction to conform with the provisions of international law. Whereas the process may be tedious and prolonged, it is important to note that Indian lawmaking is not over-stepping in this regard, such as in case of Indonesia. In 2009, Jakarta enacted a new law on fisheries, which empowers Indonesian “investigator and/or fisheries inspector” to “take any special act in terms of burning and/or sinking of fishery vessel flying foreign flag (in Indonesian EEZ) based on adequate preliminary evidence.”46 Notably however, in terms of preventing its own fishing vessels engaging in IUU fishing in the EEZ of other coastal States, this law places Indonesia in a superior position vis-à-vis India. Its article 27(4) states that “Fishing vessel flying Indonesian flag fishing in the jurisdiction of another country first must obtain approval from the Government.”47

A seminal event occurred on 25 September 2024, when India signed the new ‘High Seas Treaty’, formally known as the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, adopted in June 2023.48 The Agreement, which is yet to come into force, is based on the key principles of UNCLOS like common heritage of mankind (CHM), high-seas freedoms, flag-State responsibility, and inter-State cooperation. However, it seeks to go beyond UNCLOS provisions on the conservation of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) by addressing the emergent challenges of climate change, marine pollution and unsustainable use of marine biological resources. Its provisions based precautionary and eco-system resilience approach, which focus on area-based management through designation of maritime protected areas (MPA) and cater for an equitable sharing of the benefits from marine genetic resources (MGR).49 The Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) is the nodal ministry to administer this treaty, since it is closely linked to India’s deep seabed mineral interests and its outreach to the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

Other Maritime Crimes

Since the UNCLOS is an ‘umbrella’ Convention, it does not specifically address other maritime crimes such as sea-borne trafficking of drugs and humans. For effective response to these crimes, the IMO has helped the international community to codify separate treaty-based conventions and protocols to the existing conventions. These include the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (NDPS Convention), the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) 2000, and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (SOM Protocol) 2000. Likewise in 2002, to ensure the security of ships and port facilities, the IMO adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) as an amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention).50

India is a state party to nearly all these new instruments of international law, and has incorporated most of their provisions in its national laws, either by formulating new laws (e.g. the SUA Act 2002), or by revising the existing ones, for instance, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (NDPS) Act 1985, the Customs Act 1962, the Emigration Act 1983, the Environment Protection Act, and the Wild Life Protection Act 1972. The Emigration Act 1983 already provides legal backing to counter human trafficking by regulating emigration of Indians to work overseas. It addresses the issue of government clearances to ensure inter alia that the working conditions to the destination country are safe and lawful and sufficient financial support is available. It subscribes to government notifications to prohibit emigration to a specified country for reasons of national sovereignty/ security or due to instabilities, disease in the country for specified duration (not exceeding six months at a time). The law-enforcement powers are conferred as per Customs Act 1962 (viz. Customs and ICG). To counter human trafficking, in conformity with the global trends, India ratified the UNTOC 2000, and its SOM Protocol 2000 in May 2011. To give effect to its provisions in its domestic law, it drafted the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill 2021, which is awaiting enactment as national law. This Act will empower Indian enforcement agencies (yet to be to be designated) to interdict Indian-flagged vessels involved in human trafficking and foreign-flagged vessels involved in the trafficking of Indian citizens, besides providing the legal basis for international cooperation against the crime.51

It may be noted that all new IMO conventions and protocols meant to counter various forms of maritime crime (other than piracy) like drug trafficking and human smuggling conform to the overarching UNCLOS principle of flag-State jurisdiction in international waters (which includes EEZ and the high seas). Therefore, even if a State is party to such a legal instrument, flag-State consent is necessary for the seizure and prosecution of an offending vessel.

This principle is also incorporated in Indian laws, such as the NDPS Act1985. Updated in 2021, the Act applies only to the criminal offence of drug-trafficking within Indian territory, including the territorial sea. However, largely based on intelligence inputs, Indian maritime security forces have often interdicted vessels engaged in drug-trafficking beyond the Indian territorial sea. The legal mandate for doing so has usually been the authority under the (revised) Customs Act 1962, whose applicability has been extended beyond the Contiguous Zone to the EEZ by the Government of India (MEA) Notification S.O. 189(E) of February 2002, as mentioned in the previous part (Part 1/5) of this paper. Also, as mentioned above, the MoD Gazette notification of 2019 conferred law-enforcement power to ICG officers in the EEZ by invoking Section 121 of the Coast Guard Act 1978. At times, the right to verification of vessel’s flag (as provided for in UNCLOS Article 11052) is also used for such interdictions. Furthermore, preventive detentions have been made under the PITNDPS Act 1988, which was enacted to strengthen the legal provisions under NDPS Act 1985 (Section 10 of this Act provides for preventive detention for up to two years for those accused for drug-trafficking, including foreigners, arrested within India’s Contiguous Zone).53 Whereas such seizures and arrests are justified by various legal pretexts, the prosecution of drug-peddlers under the NDPS Act 1985 have rarely succeeded. Nonetheless, drug interdictions in Indian EEZ serves as a valuable deterrent for two reasons. Firstly, the charges of drug-trafficking under Customs Act 1962 usually fructify. Secondly, the drugs seized are destroyed by India’s Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). Whereas lawfully, the seized drugs are required to handed over to flag-State, the concerned States rarely acknowledge that the vessel flying their flag was involved in drug-trafficking.

International law is also adapting itself to respond to new maritime threats such as the sea-borne trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which led to the 2005 Protocol amending the SUA Convention 1988.54 However, despite being an active proponent of global disarmament efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, India did not join this protocol since it permits only State-parties to the 1971 (nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to trade in nuclear material. However, as a de facto nuclear weapon State, India has not signed the NPT to preserve its national security interests.

Hot Pursuit

Article 111 of UNCLOS provides for the right of a coastal State to undertake ‘hot pursuit’ of a foreign ship if it has “good reason” to believe that the ship has violated its laws pertaining to any of its maritime zones. The maritime security forces of the state may commence such pursuit when the foreign ship is within the coastal State’s specific maritime zone wherein its applicable law has been violated, and may be continued beyond the zone, and even into the high seas, provided the pursuit has not been interrupted. This right prevails until such time the foreign ship enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.55

India has been using this UNCLOS provision of ‘hot pursuit’ in practice. The provision is also incorporated in the MZI Act 1981. The Act does not specifically mention “hot pursuit”, ostensibly because it was drafted before the final draft of UNCLOS was approved and signed in 1982. Article 9 (5) of the MZI Act 1981 says that,

“Where, in pursuance of the commission of any offence under this Act, any foreign vessel is pursued beyond the limits of the exclusive economic zone of India, the powers conferred on an authorised officer by this section may be exercised beyond such limits in the circumstances and to the extent recognised by international law and State practice (emphasis added).” 56

Furthermore, Article 9 (1) of the same Act defines an “authorised officer” as “Any officer of the Coast Guard constituted under the Coast Guard Act, 1978… or such other officer of Government as may be authorised by the Central Government.”57 The latter category includes the officers of the IN.

The above, however, leads to a pertinent issue. As per UNCLOS, the right of hot pursuit is premised on the employment of warships or military aircraft (or other authorised government platforms), not merely the empowerment of an “authorised officer” for arrest, as provided in the MZI Act 1981. The explicit authorisation to Indian warships and military aircraft (IN and ICG platforms) to undertake ‘hot-pursuit’ is also a void in the other domestic laws of India, notably in the overarching MZI Act 1976.

Conclusion

Since the Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008 (26/11), even while India’s coastal security architecture is still evolving, its preparedness to respond to the threats to its coastal and offshore security has witnessed a quantum improvement since 2008. Among the most notable improvement has been its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), enabled by various measures ranging from technological means to bilateral information-sharing agreements with the regional countries. Such enhanced MDA in its maritime zones and beyond make it unnecessary for India to continue exercising security/ criminal jurisdiction in the sea areas wherein the UNCLOS stipulates high-seas freedoms. In addition, the incorporation of other relevant international conventions relating to maritime security into domestic law could adequately address India’s security concerns as a coastal State. Hence, India’s domestic laws designed to exercise security/ criminal jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea seem archaic and infructuous and may need to be aligned with the UNCLOS.

More specifically, based on the reasoning provided in the previous part (Part 1/5) of this paper), the provision of “security” jurisdiction in India’s contiguous zone may be annulled through a revision of MZI Act 1976. Also, the nomenclature of “designated zones” in the Act may be deleted. Wherever “designated zones” is used to refer to the 500-metre safety zone provided for in UNCLOS, the term “safety zones” may be substituted. Also, the relevant Gazette notifications prohibiting the entry of vessels into the 500-metre safety zone around offshore installations should specifically mention that such prohibition also applies to Indian fishing vessels, and the same enforced. This is considered essential since these fishermen are increasingly violating this “safety zone.”

India would also need to finalise its coastal security organisation, and thereafter enact its domestic legislation to foster legal clarity and functional coordination among the various maritime law-enforcement agencies at the Union and State levels based on the provisions of UNCLOS. Alike land-border management, India’s coastal security should be the mandate of its Home Ministry, rather than its Defence Ministry. The former is already dealing with counterterrorism, firearms/ ammunition, drug-trafficking and criminal law-enforcement. For the purpose, it administers relevant national acts such as the Passport (Entry into India) Act 1920, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1961, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 1967, the Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act 2000, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002. As an imminent policy change, the government is likely to shift the administration of the NDPS Act 1985 (presently under the Department of Revenue under the Finance Ministry) to the Ministry of Home.58 The Home Ministry presently administers the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), the key law enforcement and intelligence organisation tasked to prevent the use and trafficking of drugs. However, the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961 will need to add ‘coastal security’ among the responsibilities of the Home Ministry’s “department of internal security.”59 Thereafter, Coastal Security Act may be administered by the ICG placed under the Home Ministry (alike the USCG, which is placed under the Department of Homeland Security, rather than the US Department of Defense). Alternatively, a new Central Marine Police Force (CMPF) may be raised for the purpose under the Home Ministry.

Finally, the provision of ‘hot pursuit’ in UNCLOS Article 111 will need to be incorporated in the revised Act that supersedes the Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing Vessels) Act, 1981, as well as in the revised MZI Act 1976. The right of hot pursuit for the units of the IN, the ICG and other authorised agencies needs to be formally and legally acknowledged.

Endnotes

  1. Whereas the phrase ‘International Law of the Sea’ (singular noun) is used to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS), the phrase “International Laws of the Sea” (plural noun) is used in the paper to refer not only to UNCLOS, but also to the other treaty-based Conventions relating to affairs of the sea.

  2. UNCLOS Articles 105, 107 and 110.

  3. UNCLOS Article 101(a).

  4. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “The Navy Act, 1957 (Act No. 62 of 1957), December 27, 1957, Article 3(7), https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/NavyAct1957.pdf.

  5. “14 hijackers of Japanese Ship Convicted,” Times of India, February 26, 2003, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/14-hijackers-of-Japanese-ship-convicted/articleshow/38606802.cms.

  6. Ministry of External Affairs, “The Piracy Bill, 2012, Sixteenth Report, para 1.18,” Standing Committee on External Affairs (2011-2012), Fifteenth Lok Sabha, July 2012, https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2012/SC_Piracy_Bill_2012.pdf.

  7. Mazyar Ahmad, “Prosecution of Maritime Pirates in India: A Critical Appraisal,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol 18(1) (31 March 2022): 60-74, https://www.tandfo nline.co m/doi/fu ll /1 0.1080/19480881.2022.2054506.

  8. “The Piracy Bill, 2012, Bill No. 34 of 2012,” Articles 13(1) and 14(1). https:// prsindi a.org/file s/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2012/piracy_bill_text 2012.pdf.

  9. Ministry of External Affairs, “The Anti-Maritime Piracy Bill, 2019, Bill No. 369 of 2019.” http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/369_2019_LS_Eng.pdf.

  10. Ministry of External Affairs, “The Maritime Anti-Piracy Bill, 2022, Bill No. 369-C of 2019 (as passed by Lok Sabha on December 12, 2022),” http://164.100.47.4/BillsTex ts/LSBillTexts/Pas sedLoksabha/369_2 019_ C_L S_Eng12202022102715AM.pdf.

  11. Kalyan Ray, “Coastal Security Bill Caught in Red Tape,” Deccan Herald, May 25, 2015, https://www.deccanherald.com/content/479520/coastal-security-bill-caught-red.html.

  12. Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, (As Amended up to Amendment Series No. 348 dated 05 February 2019), Cabinet Secretariat (Government of India) website, 92, https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/allocationbusinessrule/completeaobrules/english/1_Upload_11 87.pdf.

  1. Government of India, “Archives of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),” https:// www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BM_II_Mandate_18062019.pdf.

  2. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, “Review of Coastal Security,” Lok Sabha U n s t a r r e d Q u e s t i o n N o . 3 0 0 t o b e a n s w e r e d o n t h e 1 9 t h J u l y, 2 0 1 6 . https://www.mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2016-pdfs/ls-190716/300%20E.pdf. Also see, Gurpreet S Khurana, “India's Evolving Coastal Security Architecture: A Case for a New Central Force,” National Maritime Foundation, May 24, 2019. https://maritimeindia.org/indias-evolving-coastal-security-architecture-a-case-for-a-new-central-force/.

  3. Sandeep Unnithan, “Why the Seaman Guard Ohio is a Worry for Coastal Security,” India Today, October 26, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/why-the-seamanguard-ohio-is-a-worry-for-coastal-security-215537-2013-10-24.

  4. A Selvaraj, “US Anti-Piracy Vessel MV Seaman Guard Ohio Crew Members Sentenced to Jail in Tamil Nadu,” The Times of India, January 11, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ us-anti-piracy-vessel-mv-seaman-guard-ohio-crew-members-sentenced-to-jail-in-tamil-nadu/articleshow/50530239.cms.

  5. Indo Asian News Service, “Madras High Court sets free all 35 Crew Members of US Ship Detained in 2013,” Hindustan Times, November 27, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/madras-high-court-sets-free-all-35-crew-members-of-us-ship-detained-in-2013/story-2gun1vYBoiVw46UTeH2X9I.html.

  6. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/conv8-english.pdf.

  1. In October 1985, four members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) hijacked MV Achille Lauro enroute from Alexandria to Port Said in the Mediterranean Sea. They demanded the release of 50 Palestinians in Israeli prison and attempted to divert the ship to Tartus (Syria). When denied entry into Tartus, they killed a disabled Jewish-US passenger and threw his body overboard.

  2. “The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002,” Act No. 69 of 2002 (December 20, 2002), https://www.nia.gov.In/writereaddata/Portal/LawReference/15_1_The_Suppression_of_Unlawf ul_Acts_Against_Safety_of_Maritime_Navigation_Act_2002.pdf.

  3. “The 'Enrica Lexie' Incident (Italy v. India)”, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2015-28, July 2, 2020, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/13647 and https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2020/07/7631768c-pca-press-release-02072020.pdf.

  4. “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Seize Cargo Ship in Red Sea and Call Israeli Vessels ‘Legitimate Targets’,” The Guardian, November 20, 2023, https://www.theguardi an.com/world/20 23/nov /2 0/ yemen-houthi-rebels-seize-cargo-ship-galaxy-leader-red-sea-israel.

  5. “UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024),” International Maritime Orgnization, January 10, 2024, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/Red%20SeaSCR%202722%282024%29%20on%20the%20Red%20Sea%20adopted%20%28 E%29%201.pdf.

  6. “Letter dated 12 January 2024 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Digital Library, 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4034249?ln=en&v=pdf.

  7. UNCLOS Article 87.

  8. UNCLOS Article 91-92.

  9. “India Accounts for 6.3% of Global Fish Production: Fisheries dept,” Business Standard, June 18, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-accounts-for-6-3-of-global-fish-production-fisheries-dept-119061800013_1.html.

  10. UNFSA came into force in December 2001. India acceded to it in August 2003. “The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement,” UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea website, https://www.un.org/oceancapacity/unfsa#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Fish%20Stocks%20Agreement&text=The%20Agreement%20sets%20out%20principles,the%20best%20ava ilable%20scientific%20information.

  11. Goal 14 of SDG-2023 relates to ‘Life below Water’, whose aim is to “Conserve and Sustainably use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs website, https://sdgs.un.org/goals/ goal14#:~:text=Goal%2014.,portions%20of%20the%20world's%20oceans.

  12. UNCLOS Articles 61 to 73.

  13. UNCLOS, Article 73.

  14. “The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981,” https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1817/1/198142.pdf.

  15. Maritime Zones of lndia (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Rules, 1982, Gazette Notification G.S.R. 619(E), Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation), New Delhi, 26 August, 1982, https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?Actid=AC_CEN_23_62_ 00006_198142_1517807326538&type=rule&filename=MZI%20Rules%201982.pdf.

  16. MZI Act 1981, Article 7.

  17. “The Monte Confurco Case (Seychelles v. France),” Court Decisions, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 18 December 2000, InforMEA website, https://www.informea.o rg /en/court-decision/monte-confurco-case-seychelles-v-france.

  18. Article 2 of Law No., “66-400 Concerning Marine Fishing and the Exploitation of the pProduce of the Sea in French Southern and Antarctic Lands,” Government of France, June, 18, 1966 . https://sparc.utas.edu.au/uploads/r/antarctic-documents-database/7/4/f/74f925423966840b07ab94f2bb24fc8498ce27fc13d5a5f9513e56f15e79f7c9e241555f-719b-4c53-a17f-48f7e98750ad-AU-ATADD-1-BB-FR-64.pdf?token=07faf6 8678b2 04dc5b 2a247b cdad91 ee4326 0ead0e b2a206 78d5af799fa0c6fa.

  1. MZI Act 1981, Article 8.

  2. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Role and Functioning of Indian Coast Guard,” (Public Accounts Committee), Fifty-First Report [Action Taken by the Government on the Observations/ Recommendations of the Committee contained in their Twenty-first Report (16th Lok Sabha)], 2015-16, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 14, https://epar lib.nic.in/bits tream/12 3456 789/6 5683/1/16_Public_Accounts_51.pdf.

  3. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Role and Functioning of Indian Coast Guard”, (Public Accounts Committee), Fifty-First Report [Action Taken by the Government on the Observations/ Recommendations of the Committee contained in their Twenty-first Report (16th Lok Sabha)], 2015-16, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 15, https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/ 65683/1/16_Public_Accounts_51.pdf.

  4. “The Coast Guard Act, 1978,” 1978, Section 121. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bit stream/123456789/1734/1/197830.pdf.

  5. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.R.O. 16(E), December 5, 2019, Notification No. 12. (Not available online).

  6. “Customs Act, 1962 (Revised), Act No. 52 of 1962, Section 2 (28),” https://www.indi acode. nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15359/1/the_customs_act%2C_1962.pdf.

  7. “The Indian Marine Fisheries Bill, 2021,” https://dof.gov.in/s ites/default/file s/2021-1 0/Draft_Indian_Marine_Fisheries_Bill_2021.pdf.

  1. “Tribunal Delivers its Advisory Opinion Regarding IUU Fishing Activities,” ITLOS Press Release, April 02 , 2015 , https:// www. i t los. org/ fi l eadmin/ i t los/ documents/ press_releases_english/PR_227_EN.pdf.

  2. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2009) (PSMA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, https://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/en and https://www.wto.org/e ngli sh/trat op _ e/rulesneg_e/fish_e/2009_psma.pdf.

  3. “Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 45 (2009) on Amendment to Law No. 31 (2004) on Fisheries, Article 69(4),” https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins97600.pdf.

  4. “Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 45 (2009) on Amendment to Law No. 31 (2004) on Fisheries, Article 27(4),” https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins97600.pdf.

  5. “India Signs Treaty to Protect Marine Biodiversity on High Seas,” The Assam Tribune, September 26, 2024, https://assamtribune.com/international/india-signs-treaty-to-protect-marine-biodiversity-on-high-seas-1552706.

  6. “Agreement under UNCLOS on Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ),” United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-10&chapter=21&clang=_en.

  7. International Maritime Organization (IMO), The ISPS Code Entered into Force on July 01, 2004, “ISPS Code, 2003 Edition: International Ship & Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendmenst 2002 (Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS Convention 1974),” https://portalcip.org/wp-cont ent/uploads/2017/05/ISPS-Code-2003-English.pdf.

  8. “Survivors' Wait for Composite Law to Tackle Trafficking Gets Longer”, The Economic Times, August 17, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/survivors-wait-for-composite-law-to-tackle-trafficking-gets-longer/articleshow/93611753.cms?from=mdr For text of the Bill, see “The Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2021,” https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/DRAFT%20TRAFFICKING%20IN%20PERSONS%20%28PREVENTION%2C%20CARE%20AND%20REHABILITATION%29%20BILL%202021%20%281%29.pdf.

  1. UNCLOS 1982, Article 110 (1) (d) and (e).

  2. The key aim of “preventive detention’ is to target the main operators (organisers, financiers, kingpins) who operate behind the scenes, and the habitual drug traffickers caught red-handed. See, Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (Act No. 46 of 1988). https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15400/1/pitndpsact1988.pdf.

  3. “Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,” (SUA Convention) 1988, International Maritime Organization (IMO), October 14, 2005, RefWorld (Global Law and Policy Database). https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/imo/2005/en/65866.

  4. UNCLOS, Article 111.

  5. MZI Act, 1981, Article 9(5).

  6. MZI Act, 1981, Article 9(1).

  7. Madhavi Gaur, "Government to Transfer NDPS from Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Home Affairs," Adda 247, June 24, 2022, https://currentaffairs.adda247.com/government-to-transfer-ndps-from-ministry-of-finance-to-ministry-of-home-affairs/.

  8. Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 (As Amended up to 31st January, 2017), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, https://cabsec.gov.in/writerea ddata/allocationb usinessrule/completeaobrules/english/1_Upload_1187.pdf.