Abstract: As India takes to the centre-stage of geopolitics in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region, and even at the global level, New Delhi’s adherence to the established rules-based international maritime order is a subject of immense relevance. Towards this end, this paper analyses the increasing convergence of India’s policies, positions and domestic laws with international maritime public laws, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). Such analysis is not only germane to national policymaking, but also relevant for commanders at sea for conducting maritime operations during peacetime. The result of the analysis is presented in five parts that sequentially deal with India’s security jurisdiction in the maritime domain; peacetime military issues, including navigational freedoms; and aspects relating to promulgation of maritime baselines and India’s boundary delimitation. This part of the paper (Part 1/5) introduces the subject and analyses the key divergences between India’s national law and the UNCLOS relating to criminal/ security jurisdiction at sea. The key argument in this section is supported by the MV Enrica Lexie case of 2012. Other parts would be sequentially carried in subsequent volumes of the IN Despatch.

Introduction

The overarching objective of the Indian State may be deduced from the Constitution of India as the economic, societal and material well-being of its citizens.2 The spatial scope of national policymaking to attain this objective is not limited to India’s territorial confines, but is closely linked to its geopolitical and geo-economic interests in its expanding geo-strategic frontier. It was only in 1976 that the 40th Amendment to the Constitution expanded India’s interests to its tentative maritime zones, while these zones were still being negotiated at the international level.3 Today, India’s geostrategic frontier has dilated further across the Indo-Pacific region.4

To protect, preserve and progress India’s geopolitical interests, its Constitution lays down certain pathways, which comprise inter alia to “promote international peace and security; maintain just and honourable relations between nations; foster respect for international law and treaty obligations…(and) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.”5 This Constitutional provision is based on the understanding that as a status quo power, India cannot secure its geopolitical aims without upholding the established maritime order. Maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region provides the broader framework for India to formulate its policies and domestic laws to address the growing threats to its maritime and overseas interests, ranging from terrorism and maritime crime to the traditional military threats at sea (or from the sea), and collaborate with like-minded maritime partners to mitigate these threats. Of particular significance is India’s adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS), which is the umbrella convention based on the traditional doctrine of Mare Liberum (freedom of the sea). Accordingly, India’s Maritime Security Strategy document of 2015 lays a key emphasis on “the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal regime at sea, particularly the UNCLOS.”6 India is also party to most other treaty-based conventions, which address specific—though inter-related—aspects like safety at sea, security of shipping and ports, responding to maritime crime and preserving the marine environment. These are being translated into policy formulation and domestic legislative outcomes in consonance with India’s core values and national-strategic imperatives. While India’s core values have been perennial and steadfast, its strategic imperatives have been dynamic, conditioned by the prevailing geopolitical environment at various points in time.

After India attained its independence in 1947, it was actively involved in the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I, II and III), beginning in 1958. During the UNCLOS III deliberations in the 1970s, that eventually led to the UNCLOS treaty in 1982, India was still a weak and vulnerable developing country amidst the Cold War power play, seeking to insulate itself and its immediate maritime environs of the Indian Ocean from the bipolar naval rivalry, and to secure its territorial sovereignty and resource-related maritime interests. Even by 1995 when India ratified the UNCLOS, the Cold War had ended, India’s insecurities and developmental needs had mitigated only marginally. Hence, whereas India always stood by the Mare Liberum doctrine like most other major maritime powers, some of India’s legal positions based on the interpretation of UNCLOS were not consonant with those of the other maritime powers. However, this was hardly an anomaly since India was not alone. In a world where national policymaking is driven by the realist theory of international relations, all countries interpret the specific provisions of international law, including UNCLOS, in a manner that suits their respective interests, whether in terms of strategic and security considerations, or to maximize their maritime jurisdictions. On both counts, India had also interpreted the UNCLOS to preserve its interests as perceived at that point in time.

Today, India finds itself in a radically changed geopolitical environment. More than three decades since the end of Cold War, although not devoid of insecurities, caused by both State and non-State entities, India has emerged as a more reassured and self-confident country. It is the fastest growing major economy in the world. In context of the ‘rise of Asia’—indeed, the ‘rise of the more oceanic Indo-Pacific region’—India is being perceived as an emerging global power, and certainly a regional power of consequence. In contrast to the Cold War era, India’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific now converge with most other major powers. Whereas India is likely to adhere to its long-standing principle of strategic autonomy and avoiding military alliances, it is clearly in its national interest to coordinate its naval operations with these powers, such as in counter-piracy operations in the northern Arabian Sea since 2008.7 In fact, in 2023, the Indian Navy even joined the US-led Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF) as a full member, and in April 2024, it conducted its first successful maritime interdiction operation as part of CMF’s Task Force 150.8 Adversities like the Mumbai terrorist attack of 26 November 2008 (26/11) have resulted in a quantum improvement in India’s ability to ensure its coastal and offshore security. As India further strengthens its capacity to preserve its maritime security interests and also its contribution to regional security as the ‘first responder’ and a maritime security partner, New Delhi may need to re-appreciate its domestic legislations and national practice relating to maritime affairs for their conformity with the international law of the sea. India has achieved some headway in this direction through national policy and legislative reviews, but some inconsistencies remain unaddressed.

Structure of the Paper

This paper aims to examine India’s relevant laws and national positions/ policy documents vis-à-vis the UNCLOS and other relevant international maritime conventions to identify existing convergences and divergences. For the sake of clarity and objectivity, the paper is divided into five parts. The first two parts of the paper pertain to India’s security/ criminal jurisdiction at sea, including in its maritime zones. Part 1 addresses the major divergences with international law on the subject. Thereafter, Part 2 will examine the emerging convergences and the remaining minor divergences. Parts 3 and 4 analyse the military issues that are likely to manifest at sea during peacetime, and related issue of navigational freedoms of military platforms. The final Part 5 addresses aspects relating to the promulgation of maritime baselines and delimitation of India’s maritime zones.

The analysis is primarily meant as an input to national policymaking, but it applies equally to the Indian maritime security forces. Whereas the Indian Navy’s Handbook on the Law of Maritime Operations (INBR-1652) addresses some of these issues, it does not analyse them in detail.9 This paper is meant to provide public policy insights to commanders at sea as part of their professional military education (PME), and also help them—directly or otherwise—in their conduct of maritime operations during peacetime.

PART 1: Security/ Criminal Jurisdiction at Sea (The Divergences)

During the UNCLOS III negotiations in the 1970s, the developing coastal States were very concerned about their security against crime in the seas around them, ranging from traditional (economic) smuggling to avoid taxes and other anti-national criminal activities, to armed robbery at sea. Their insecurities extended to the military activities of major powers, and this aspect is addressed separately in the Part 3 of this paper. However, since security was antithetical to navigational freedom, the major powers, who were more interested in their military mobility across the seas, did notpermit the Convention to focus on security of the coastal States. Hence, although the UNCLOS does address the aspect of maritime security, specific security issues are not addressed by the Convention, barring some exceptions pertaining to Crime Jure Gentium (crime against humanity) such as for repression of piracy.10 Of course, if the definition of ‘security’ is considered in its comprehensive sense of the present times, the UNCLOS did address aspects of economic security and environmental security in the new resource-related regimes of the EEZ and the extended Continental Shelf. However, these were not the major sources of insecurity for coastal States in the 1970s.

To address the aspect of economic smuggling and other anti-national criminal activities, UNCLOS does provide Contiguous Zone jurisdiction to coastal States relating to customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary issues, but the States can only punish violators if the related crime is committed within its territory or territorial sea.11 The lack of emphasis of UNCLOS on the more germane security issues also left some other legal voids, such as for responding to sea-borne trafficking of drugs and weapons, and violence against ships at sea that does not qualify as piracy. These voids are being filled up progressively through the other treaty-based conventions, albeit in consonance with the UNCLOS provision of flag-State jurisdiction in international waters. To counter these maritime crimes, therefore, India’s approach has been to accede to as many other international treaties as national policy constraints permit, such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention (SUA Convention), 1988 and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, and incorporate their provisions in the domestic laws so as to undertake the criminal proceedings effectively.

In any case, barring exceptional cases, the prosecution of criminals does not fall within the purview of international public law. Such law, codified in treaty-based conventions, can only regulate the relations and interplay among States, rather than provide the legal basis for criminal prosecutions. The only exception pertains to some grave cases of genocide or war crimes, which may be tried in the International Criminal Court (ICC) based on the ICC Statute.12 Hence, criminal prosecutions of individuals largely need to be done by States themselves, based on the provisions contained in their national laws.

What follows is an examination of the development of key Indian laws on criminal prosecutions relating to maritime security in the context of the provisions of the UNCLOS.

Maritime Zones of India (MZI) Act, 1976

As mentioned earlier, at UNCLOS III, India was among the weaker coastal States that had greater concerns about their national security rather than about navigational freedoms. Even as the UNCLOS III negotiations were in progress in the 1970s, India began to draft its domestic legislation pertaining to its maritime entitlements and related issues, which culminated in the enactment of the Maritime Zones of India (MZI) Act in 1976.13 After UNCLOS was signed in 1982, this Act was revised to cater for its final outcomes defining international law of the sea, but the security provisions in Indian laws (examined below) were not revised to conform to the UNCLOS.

Security Jurisdiction in Contiguous Zone

At UNCLOS III deliberations, the international delegates did discuss the aspect of ‘security jurisdiction in contiguous zone’ of coastal States, but this was not accepted due to pressures from the major maritime powers, who sought their navigational freedoms. Thus, this aspect does not figure in the UNCLOS. However, Article 4 of MZI Act 1976 explicitly provides for security jurisdiction in India’s contiguous zone. Furthermore, to address the specific national security concerns relating to the ingress of goods (like weapons and drugs) into India, Section 11 (1 and 2) of its updated Customs Act 1962 says that “If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do for (inter alia) the maintenance of security of India…, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit either absolutely or subject to such conditions… as may be specified in the notification, the import or export of goods of any specified description.” Section 106(1) of the same Act (Power to stop and search conveyances) says that “Where the proper officer has reason to believe that any aircraft, vehicle or animal in India or any vessel in India or within the Indian customs waters (Contiguous Zone)14 has been, is being, or is about to be; used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any goods which have been smuggled, he may at any time stop any such vehicle, animal or vessel or, in the case of an aircraft, compel it to land…”15

Notably, in February 2002, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a Government of India Notification S.O. 189(E) extending the application of the Customs Act 1962 beyond the Indian Contiguous Zone to the entirety of its EEZ and Continental Shelf,16 which may be interpreted to contradict the UNCLOS, both in letter and spirit.

“Designated Areas” versus “Safety Zones” in EEZ

Since the EEZ is a sui generis (unique) zone meant to accord economic rights to coastal States while preserving the high seas freedoms of the other States, the question of security jurisdiction in this zone (beyond the territorial sea) may be construed as contradicting the freedom of seas doctrine embodied in the UNCLOS. MZI Act 1976 does provide for security jurisdiction in India’s EEZ, albeit indirectly. Besides, as mentioned earlier, extending the provisions of Customs Act 1962 to the EEZ the implicit reference to India’s security jurisdiction in this zone is in the form of the concept of “designated areas” in the EEZ and the Continental Shelf. This concept, originally meant for the security of coastal States, did figure in the draft text during the UNCLOS III negotiations, but was not accepted. For the EEZ, therefore, the negotiators could agree only to ‘safety zones’ around artificial installations at a distance not exceeding 500 metres around these structures.17 Given the purely economic dimension of the EEZ and the objections by major maritime powers, these zones could not be named as (permanent) ‘designated areas’ or ‘security zones.’ Nonetheless, the concept of “safety zone” was also meant for protection of the offshore artificial installations.

However, MZI Act 1976 still contains the provision of “designated areas” in the EEZ and, by extension, the later stipulations of the Continental Shelf. The purpose of these areas stated in the Act goes beyond the safety or protection of artificial installations, and even beyond economic or resource-related aspects to customs and fiscal matters.18 Furthermore, in 1986, the MEA issued a Government of India notification S.O. 429(E) of 18 July 1986, which notifies the locations of its offshore installations, and declares the areas extending up to 500 metres from these facilities as ‘designated areas.’19 A few days later, the MEA issued a follow-on Government of India Notification No S.O. 435(E) dated 23 July 1986, which prohibited the entry of any ship within designated areas except the Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) ships or other ships authorized by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG).20 On 13 January 2009, a new government (MEA) notification S.O. 135(E) published the updated locations of offshore installations. The notification reiterated the same prohibitions of entry within 500 metres from these installations and repeating the term as “designated areas” for these areas, which are “safety zones” as per the UNCLOS.21 Based on these government notifications, doctrinal documents of the IN have deduced that these “designated areas” refer only to the ‘safety zones.” This argument cannot be substantiated since it makes little logical sense to use different terms for the same zone.

Besides the “safety zones” (referred to in MZI Act 1976 as “designated areas”), India not yet declared any specific “designated area” for security purposes. The aforesaid leads to the logical deduction that India’s use of a separate nomenclature of “designated areas” is to keep the Indian government’s option open to notify specific areas in Indian EEZ,22 as and when it may be required for the purpose of customs, and possibly other security issues not related to customs, and to enforce necessary measures therein. Whatever be the rationale, this provision of “designated areas” in the MZI Act of 1976 is clearly not in consonance with the provisions of UNCLOS.

India’s Penal Code and Passive Personality Jurisdiction

As customary law, the domestic law of States for criminal prosecutions in the maritime domain has been developed largely based on ‘Territoriality’ and ‘Personality’ principles, which conforms to the provisions of UNCLOS. The only exception provided by UNCLOS is ‘Universal’ jurisdiction for prosecutions for Crime Jure Gentium, as mentioned earlier. However, on occasions—such as the MV Enrica Lexie Case (examined later)—Indian law seems to have incorporated the ‘passive personality’ principle, based on ‘consequence clause,’ as provided for in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)23 and the follow-on Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The text of CrPC (Section 179) says:

“Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.”24

If read in conjunction with the ‘consequence’ clauses in IPC, this provision in CrPC indicates that the Indian criminal law based on IPC and CrPC has been developed many decades ago to prosecute criminals within the territorial confines of India. If applied in context of the UNCLOS and MZI Act 1976 without due regard, it complicates issues since the maritime domain is an international medium, wherein international law on the maritime interface among States (UNCLOS) has developed only in recent decades.

The ‘passive personality’ principle for criminal jurisdiction for incidents in the maritime domain and other issues relating to international relations does exist, but it is highly controversial. Its genesis may be traced to the SS Lotus Case of 1927. It refers to the Turkey versus France case instituted in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) after the collision between a French vessel SS Lotus and a Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt on the high seas, which caused the death of eight Turkish citizens. When SS Lotus docked in Turkey with the 10 remaining survivors of Boz-Kourt, Turkish authorities arrested Lieutenant Demons, the French officer-of-the watch (OOW) of SS Lotus and charged him for manslaughter in Turkey. French authorities protested and insisted that the case be tried in France on the basis of flag-State jurisdiction (Territoriality principle). The PCIJ verdict said that “Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings against Demons, did not violate international law.” The court held that since the offence produced its effect on the Turkey, Boz-Kourt may be equated to Turkish territory, and therefore, the case falls within the purview of Turkish criminal jurisdiction.25 The archaic ‘Passive Personality’ principle of criminal jurisdiction was adopted by many major powers, but is no longer valid with the development of international law, since it was based on sweeping proposition that everything that is not prohibited in international law is permitted. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on various later cases—notably, in the case on the prohibition of nuclear weapons—have not abided by the SS Lotus Case judgement.26 The subsequent codification of law of the sea—ranging from the 1958 High Seas Convention to the UNCLOS—is based on flag-state jurisdiction, and has thus veered away from the concept of ‘passive personality’ jurisdiction, leading to the principle that a State cannot exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory unless an international treaty or customary law permits it to do so.

Case of M.V. Enrica Lexie

The divergence between India’s domestic law and UNCLOS on India’s security jurisdiction in its EEZ could become conspicuous when it comes under the lens of an international court, as it did when Italy instituted arbitral proceedings against India under UNCLOS in the MV Enrica Lexie Case of 2012.27 In February 2012, two Marines employed by the Italian-flagged tanker MV Enrica Lexie—operating 20.5 nm off Kerala coast, within India’s Contiguous Zone), mistook an Indian fishing vessel called St. Antony as a pirate vessel, and fired at it killing two innocent Indian fishermen. The Supreme Court of India upheld India’s criminal jurisdiction over the incident based on two key provisions of India’s domestic law:

First, Section 7(7) of the MZI Act, 1976, which says:

“The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette,

  • extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment for the time being in force in India or any part thereof to the EEZ or any part thereof; and

  • make such provisions as it may consider necessary for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the EEZ or the part thereof to which it has been extended is a part of the territory of India.” 28

To that effect, the Indian government (Ministry of Home Affairs) issued a Gazette notification (No. SO 671/E) on August 27, 1981, extending the provisions of IPC and CrPC to the Indian EEZ.29 The notification specifically expands Section 188 of CrPC to incorporate a new Section 188A, which reads:

“When an offence is committed by any person in the EEZ described in section 7(1) of the MZI Act 1976… such person may be dealt with (tried) in respect of such offence as if it had been committed in anyplace in which he may be found or in such other place as the Central Government may direct under section 13 of the said Act.”30 (Section 13 of MZI Act 1976 relating to “Place of trial”).31

Second, the Constitution of India, Article 245(2), expressly states that “No law made by the Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it will have extra-territorial operation.”32

When the Supreme Court examined the UNCLOS, it discovered that MZI Act 1976 was not in conformity with UNCLOS Art 97 (1), which said that “in the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the State of which such person is a national.” This draws from the negation of the ‘passive personality’ principle upheld by the PCIJ in the 1927 SS Lotus Case (as mentioned earlier). However, since UNCLOS Art 97 was only applicable to incidents of navigation rather than criminal cases, the Supreme Court dismissed its applicability in Enrica Lexie Case, and held that India was entitled to prosecute the Marines even if Italy had concurrent jurisdiction over the case.

The case was then handed over by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for investigation of the offence under the IPC and India’s Suppression of Unlawful Act against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002 (SUA Act). The eventual recourse to trial under SUA Act is indicative of the India’s acceptance of the inadmissibility of other domestic laws (MZI Act 1976 and IPC) to try the case. Later, India was compelled to forego its trial under SUAAct, which is examined in Section 2 of this paper. Eventually, the case was taken over by Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). During the international proceedings, India insisted that:

“While the case has been labelled the ‘Enrica Lexie Incident’, it should more accurately be referred to as the ‘St. Antony Incident.’ The consequences of the incident all related to the St Antony. The shots fired by the Marines killed two Indian nationals…The centre of gravity of the incident thus rests with India…”33

The above leads to two key deductions. First and ostensibly, India sought to apply the ‘Passive Personality’ principle, rather than ‘Territoriality’ principle, to establish jurisdiction over the case. In context of prevailing international law, this is unlawful for the reason examined earlier. Secondly, India’s MZI Act 1976 and its 1981 notification were incompatible with UNCLOS, which was also mentioned in Italy’s petition. Whereas the PCA steered away from the issue of this incompatibility,34 it is something to be considered by the Indian policymakers.

In context of UNCLOS and other relevant international treaty-based conventions, the succeeding part of this paper (Part 2/5) will examine the increasing convergence between India’s national positions and domestic laws with the international legal framework relating to maritime security/ criminal jurisdiction to respond to maritime crimes like piracy, terrorism, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, and drug trafficking. It will lay a specific emphasis on India’s coastal security and will also examine the UNCLOS provision of hot-pursuit. It will conclude the first two parts of the paper by offering recommendations for Indian policymaking.

Endnotes

  1. Whereas the phrase ‘International Law of the Sea’ (singular noun) is used to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS), the phrase “International Laws of the Sea” (plural noun) is used in the paper to refer not only to UNCLOS, but also the other treaty-based Conventions relation to affairs of the sea.

  2. Constitution of India, Part IV ( Directive Principles of State Policy), https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2023/05/202305 0195.pdf.

  3. Constitution of India, Article 297,The Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act 1976, 27 May 1976.

  4. India’s geostrategic frontier is defined by its officially articulated geographic scope of Indo-Pacific region, viz. “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”. Prime Minister's Office “Text of Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,” Press Information Bureau, 01 June 2018. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179711.

  5. Constitution of India, Directive Principles of State Policy, Art 51(a) to (d).

  6. Indian Navy, Naval Strategic Publication (NSP) 1.2: Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 2015, 5-6.

  7. “Indian Navy coordinating with navies of partner nations’ amid a resurgence of piracy attacks: Navy Chief,” The Print, 18 January 2024, https://theprint.in/india/indian-navy-coordinating-with-navies-of-partner-nations-amid-a-resurgence-of-piracy-attacks-navy-chief/1929161/.

  8. “Indian Navy carries out maiden operation as CMF member, seizes 940 kg drugs in Arabian Sea,” The Print, 16 April 2024. https://theprint.in/defence/indian-navy-carries-out-maiden-operation-as-cmf-member-seizes-940-kg-drugs-in-arabian-sea/2043900/.

  9. Handbook on the Law of Maritime Operations (INBR-1652), 2013. Volume 1 (Laws of Peacetime Naval Operations). The Handbook was originally compiled by the author at Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC), Mumbai in 2012-13.

  10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Articles 100-107. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

  11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 33.

  12. India is not State Party to the I Statute.

  13. Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, Act No. 80 of 1976 [MZI Act, 1976], August 25, 1976. The Act was enacted under Article 297 of the Indian Constitution, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1484/2/A1976-80.pdf.

  14. Section 1(28) of Customs Act, 1962 defines “Indian customs waters” as the contiguous zone of India under Section 5 of the Territorial Waters Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 and includes any bay, gulf, harbour, creek or tidal river, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15359/1/the_customs_act,_1962.pdf.

  15. The Customs Act, 1962, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15359/1/the_ customs_act,_1962.pdf.

  16. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.O. 189(E), 07 February 2002, Notification No. 157, https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?actid=AC_CEN_10_10_00002_197680_15178073184 55&type=notification&filename=2002%20Notification%20on%20The%20T erritorial%20Wate rs,%20Continental%20Shelf,%20Exclusive%20Economic%20Zone%20and%20Other%20Mar itime%20Zones%20Act,%201976.pdf.

  17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 60.

  18. MZI Act, 1976 provides for ‘designated areas’ not only in the EEZ, but in the Continental Shelf as well. MZI Act, 1976, Sections 7 (6) and 6 (5).

  19. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.O. 429(E), Notification No. 292, 18 July 1986, https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?actid=AC_CEN_10_10_00002_197680_15178073184 55&type=notification&filename=Notification%20regarding%20Declaration%20of%20Exclusi ve%20Economic%20Zone%20of%20India%2018%20July,%201986.pdf.

  20. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.O. 435(E), Notification No. 296, 23 July 1986, https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?actid=AC_CEN_10_10_00002_197680_15178073184 55&type=notification&filename=Notification%20regarding%20prohibition%20of%20entry%2 0of%20ships%20of%2023%20July%201986.pdf.

  21. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.O. 135(E), Notification No. 83, 13 January 2009, https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?actid=AC_CEN_10_10_00002_197680_15178073184 55&type=notification&filename=SO135E%20Prohibition%20of%20any%20ships%20(13.01.2 009).pdf .

  22. MZI Act, 1976, Section 7(6).

  23. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 , Act No. 45 of 1860 , 06 October 1860 , https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4219/1/THE-INDIAN-PENAL-CODE-1860.pdf.

  24. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15272/1/the_code_of_criminal_procedure%2C_1973.pdf.

  25. France v Turkey, ICGJ 248 (PCIJ 1927). See DR Gunaratne, “Lotus Case (Summary)”, Public International Law, 27 July 2012, https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2012/07/27/lotus-case-summary/.

  26. Hugh Handeyside, “The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?,” M i c h i g a n J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w , v o l . 2 9 , n o . 1 ( 2 0 0 7 ) , https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=mjil.

  27. The case was instituted under UNCLOS Article 287 and Annex VII, Article 1. The 'Enrica Lexie' Incident (Italy v. India), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/117/.

  28. MZI Act 1976, Section7(7).

  29. Republic of Italy and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, Supreme Court Reports, 18 January 2013, https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/SupremeCourtReport/2013_v4_piii.pdf.

  30. The Gazette of India, New Delhi, S.O. 671/E, Notification No. 396, 27 August 1981.

  31. MZI Act 1976, Section 13.

  32. Constitution of India, Part XI, Article 245(2).

  33. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2015-28, The Italian Republic versus The Republic of India Concerning the “Enrica Lexie” Incident, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/16500.

  34.  34 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2015-28,.66, 77, 81 and 98.