GEOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN GAINING COMMAND OF THE MARITIME COMMONS: AN ANALYSIS THROUGH THE LENS OF THEORY AND HISTORY

History is replete with numerous contests between nations to control the maritime commons. Economic and maritime geography remain pivotal in advancing a country’s national and economic interests, with seaborne trade accounting for a sizeable portion of global commerce. Therefore, the importance of freedom of movement across the maritime commons cannot be overstated. Theorists and history present an instructive view of geography’s role in influencing command of the maritime commons in peace and during conflict. Naval theorists of yore, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, and contemporary naval theorists like Milan Vego, have invested much scholarly attention in highlighting the importance of geography in shaping great power competition during peace, and sea control during conflict. Historical lessons learnt from various wars further amplify the need for the Indian Navy to focus on geography and exploit its numerous advantages to control the maritime commons.

Geography plays a decisive role in enabling or constraining powers in gaining command of the maritime commons. First, geography provides maritime nations with the advantage of focusing national policy in peacetime towards building and maintaining a strong navy. The resulting naval supremacy enables them to gain command of the maritime commons during conflict. Second, geography constraints powers from achieving the vital Mahanian and Corbettian principle of “concentration” by stretching their lines of communication, which prevents them from gaining command of the commons in war.¹ Finally, geography provides “seaboards,” forward operating bases, and locations for "fleets-in-being” that influence sea control.² Based on these aspects, this article argues that geography plays a pivotal role in enabling nations to gain or dispute command of the maritime commons, contributing significantly to sea power’s influence upon history.

The Whale’s Contextual Advantage over the Elephant

Geography has provided maritime nations, or whales, the contextual advantage of focusing national policy towards building and maintaining a strong navy, which is needed to gain command of the maritime commons. Sir Julian Corbett stated that “the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”³ He emphasised the Navy’s role in gaining or disputing command of the maritime commons during war. Mahan highlighted the “geographical position” of a nation as the first element of sea power and asserted that a maritime power “has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage compared with a people one of whose boundaries is continental.”⁴ Maritime powers rely almost entirely on seaborne trade for economic growth and survival, which inclines them to devote greater focus on maritime security. When this economic aspect - coupled with Mahan’s assertion - is viewed through the Clausewitzian lens, it emerges that a maritime nation enjoys greater cohesion of his “Trinity” - the people, the government and the military.⁵ It allows them to drive national policy towards building and maintaining a strong navy to protect their national interests. Continental powers, or “elephants,” on the other hand, have the geographic disadvantage of land border protection, driving them away from primarily focusing on their navies. The resulting naval inferiority of continental powers allowed maritime nations to command the maritime commons during much of the Peloponnesian Wars, the American War for Independence and the First World War.

Historical case studies have shown that maritime powers enjoyed naval supremacy over continental adversaries, which helped them gain command of the maritime commons during conflict. In the Peloponnesian Wars, maritime Athens enjoyed command of the commons over a stronger land power, Sparta, for most part of the war until the loss at Sicily, since they could maintain a stronger navy. Before the First World War, Germany could not compete with the British Navy due to greater political and military focus on its army, leaving its navy with almost no contributing role when the war broke out. Despite greater participation by the weaker German Navy during the later stages of the war, Britain maintained command of the maritime commons with its stronger navy. It enforced an economic blockade on Germany that eventually broke its will to continue fighting. During the American War for Independence, it took the combined naval strength of the continental French, the Spanish and the Americans’ brown-water capability to contest the British command of the maritime commons.⁶ Despite America achieving independence, the naval battles resulted in a stalemate, albeit with a weakened French Navy that found it hard to recover after the war. On the other hand, Britain recovered and remained the uncontested sea power till the early twentieth century.

Maritime powers have geographic insulation, with the sea acting as a natural barrier, whereas continental powers also need to defend and possibly extend land borders. Geography has afforded maritime powers the advantage of building a strong navy to command the maritime commons. The focus and cohesion of a continental nation’s Clausewitzian Trinity remain divided between its army and navy, preventing them from gaining command of the maritime commons. Clearly, geography enabled maritime powers like Athens, the UK and the US to enjoy command of the maritime commons for varying periods in history.

Geographic Constraints on Force Concentration and Lines of Communication

Geography does not always present advantages; it also thrusts substantial constraints and obstacles upon a nation’s endeavour to control the maritime commons. Geography afforded maritime powers “to be very strong; first in general” - by allowing them to focus on building a strong navy.⁷ However, it also constrained powers from being strong “at the decisive point” by preventing the concentration of forces at crucial periods during wars and stretching their lines of communication.⁸ Mahan wrote that “the geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of naval forces.”⁹ His statement held true during the Russo-Japanese War and the American War for Independence, directly affecting the outcome of both wars.

The geography of continental Russia necessitated a dispersion of its naval forces between the Far East Fleet and the Baltic Fleet. On the other hand, the geography of Japan promoted the concentration of its naval forces, which proved decisive in helping it achieve command of the maritime commons during the Russo-Japanese War. Clausewitz mentioned that “there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated.”¹⁰ Although his focus was on the terrestrial domain, both Mahan and Corbett found his advice to be applicable in the maritime environment as well, emphasising the vital principle of “concentration.”¹¹ Despite Japan’s naval inferiority compared to the Russian Navy’s combined strength, geography allowed it to concentrate its fleet “at the centres which for the moment were important” while exacerbating Russia’s fleet concentration conundrum.¹² Geography stretched the Baltic Fleet’s lines of communications to the limits and plagued them with fatigue by the time they reached the Far East.¹³ The geographical division of the two Russian fleets, coupled with Admiral Togo’s successful strategy to “confine within the Port Arthur zone the main portion of the enemy’s fleet and prevent it’s getting away to Vladivostok,” prevented the Russians from achieving concentration of forces.¹⁴ It resulted in Japan maintaining relative strength locally in the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Korea.

Utilising force concentration, relative local naval superiority and fatigue of the approaching Baltic Fleet, the Japanese Navy defeated the Russians and gained command of the maritime commons after the Battle of the Japan Sea in the Tsushima Strait. In doing so, Japan became yet another maritime power (although inferior overall) that prevailed over a continental adversary in gaining command of the maritime commons.

In the American War for Independence, the British, French and Spanish colonies’ geographical expanse forced these nations to divide their naval forces among many theatres, thereby preventing force concentration. Mahan criticised both the British and the Allied Forces’ strategies, arguing that dividing forces across theatres unnecessarily stretched their lines of communication and precluded the concentration of forces in the primary theatre.¹⁵He was particularly critical of the British for allowing the Allied forces to challenge the British command of the maritime commons by dividing its forces. However, the British Empire’s geographic dispersion necessitated the division of its naval assets to defend the colonies upon which Britain’s economy relied so heavily. Although the division prevented Britain from obtaining the relative superiority needed to retain command of the maritime commons during the war, Britain had little choice but to divide its forces to ensure continued occupation of the colonies and maintenance of communications, which was vital for their Empire.

Examples from the Russo-Japanese War and the American War for Independence showcase how geography constraints powers from achieving force concentration, stretches their lines of communication, and prevents them from utilising naval supremacy, highlighted in the first argument, which is needed to gain command of the commons. Geographic obstacles prevented these powers from gaining command of the commons and in some instances, resulted in the adversary gaining command of the commons.

Geography and Sea Control

Geography’s role in influencing sea control cannot be overstated. Seaboards, forward operating bases, and locations for fleets-in-being allow powers to either gain or dispute command of the maritime commons during conflict. The need for forward operating bases also promotes alliances and partnerships among nations that eventually prove decisive in achieving sea control. Geography enables powers to use seaboards - suitable frontiers at home, to gain command of the maritime commons with greater ease. During the First World War, Britain's strategic geography served as a seaboard to control commerce passing through the English Channel and in waters around Ireland, which allowed it to maintain command of the proximate maritime commons during the war. Later, it also enabled the economic blockade of Germany. Given the unique advantages that seaboards provide to certain countries, their ability to effectively utilise them would play a significant role in determining their influence on the maritime commons.

Secondary bases or forward operating bases are vital for achieving sea control. Mahan said that the “control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy” - highlighted in the first two arguments - and “secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which it can exert its strength.” ¹⁶ He provided further amplification by stating that “communications may be militarily assured” [by the navy], “but to hold it requires the possession of overseas bases.”¹⁷ Mahan further incentivised forward operating bases for control of the maritime commons by noting that “a nation which wishes to assure a share of control on any theatre of maritime importance cannot afford to be without a footing on some of the strategic points found there.”¹⁸ Contemporary naval theorist, Dr Milan Vego, also documented the importance of forward operating bases by including “favourable maritime strategic position, favourable base of operations and an adequate number of naval/air bases” among the most important pre-requisites to achieve sea control.¹⁹ Although Mahan and Vego wrote in two different centuries, their agreement on geography’s role in gaining sea control indicates its eternal importance in influencing command of the maritime commons, which contemporary leaders need to leverage.

Historical lessons learnt from previous wars proved the theorists right in their analysis of geography’s role in influencing sea control. During the Second World War, the use of Malta as a forward operating base allowed the British to defeat a stronger Italian fleet in the Mediterranean. The secondary bases of Hawaii and the Marianas proved to be decisive in enabling the US to gain command of the maritime commons and prevented Japan from achieving it. These bases have arguably allowed the US to retain command of the maritime commons in the Pacific even today. The need for overseas bases also promotes alliances as a positive-sum game, thereby enabling nations to gain and maintain command of the maritime commons at great distances from the homeland. The US-UK-France alliance allowed the US to utilise bases in the European theatre that helped Allied forces gain command of the commons over Germany during the First and Second World Wars. During the Peloponnesian Wars, Athens fostered an alliance with Corcyra partly due to its strategic geography and utilised it as a secondary base to maintain command of the commons in that region; and later, to launch its Sicily expedition. Clearly, theorists and history cement the importance of geography to gain command of the maritime commons in peace and during conflict.

Geography also allows weaker naval powers to dispute command of the maritime commons by preventing stronger navies from achieving sea control. Mahan noted that “it is power plus position that constitutes an advantage over power without position; or, more instructively, equations of force are composed of power and position in varying degrees, surplus in one tending to compensate for deficiency in the other.”²⁰ Geography provides ‘positions’ which weaker navies could use to dispute sea control through “fleets-in-being.”²¹ Mahan agreed with Hermocrates that Syracuse could have had a fleet-in-being at friendly Tarentum to disrupt the Athenian fleet's advance in the Peloponnesian War.²² Although counterfactual, the fleet-in-being at Tarentum may have successfully disputed the Athenian command over the maritime commons during the initial part of the war. During the Russo-Japanese War, the “Russian fleet-in-being at Port Arthur” succeeded in tying down a sizable portion of the locally superior Japanese Fleet, thereby preventing them from gaining command of the commons until the eventual Russian defeat in the Tsushima Straits.²³ The Peloponnesian Wars, the Russo-Japanese War and both the World Wars showcased how nations exploited geography to gain or contest command of the maritime commons. Seaboards; secondary bases, including those of allies; and strategic locations that have allowed weaker powers to use fleets-in-being, have contributed to gaining or disputing command of the maritime commons during war.

Counterarguments

Some would argue that geography does not play an essential role in enabling or constraining powers in gaining command of the maritime commons. Continental powers can overcome their naval inferiority by alliances to achieve relative force superiority. For example, the French-Spanish alliance mitigated Britain’s maritime supremacy in the American War for Independence, while the Sparta-Corinth alliance disputed Athens’ naval superiority in the Peloponnesian War. Also, Russia, being a continental power, had naval superiority over maritime Japan. However, the Japanese gained command of the maritime commons with an inferior force due to geographic advantages that allowed force concentration and shorter lines of communication. The advantage that geography affords to maritime nations of focusing national policy towards their navies is irrefutable. No continental power has ever had prolonged command of the maritime commons, regardless of alliances. On the other hand, maritime powers also retain the initiative of forming alliances, like the Athens-Corcyra alliance or the Anglo-American alliance, to increase the asymmetry of their naval supremacy over continental adversaries, allowing them to maintain command of the commons. Further, geography was a foundational driver of these alliances owing to the requirement of forward operating bases even for continental nations. The US’s partnerships worldwide add contemporary relevance to this historical principle.

Others would argue that bad strategy prevented the concentration of force for the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War and the British in the American War for Independence, not geography. Mahan opined that Russia should have mobilised the Baltic Fleet much earlier and should also have concentrated the ships at Port Arthur and Vladivostok together in one port.²⁴ The British should have concentrated its fleet in Europe to defeat their main naval objective, the French Navy.²⁵ A better strategy would have helped these powers gain command of the commons in the war. However, Russia was a great power of the time as compared to an inferior Japan. While Mahan argues that delaying the Baltic Fleet’s departure was a bad strategy, geography exacerbated the problem as Russia’s European coastal frontier could not be left unprotected. In any case, the Baltic Fleet would have taken months to reach the Far East. As a result, an inferior maritime Japan gained local supremacy and defeated a stronger continental Russia, thereby achieving command of the maritime commons. In this regard, however, it is also pertinent to highlight that the Japanese Army’s occupation of Korea prior to the Russo-Japanese War provided a vital foothold for Japan’s subsequent joint operations that directly aided the Japanese Navy in gaining command of the maritime commons during the war. During the American War for Independence, Britain could not abandon its colonies and risk the future of its economy; a correct decision, as history would later prove, as Britain flourished economically and had command of the commons until the early twentieth century.

Still others would argue that the fleet-in-being concept lacks teeth to adequately dispute sea control. Mahan said that “the fleet-in-being concept exalts the defensive and is erroneous.”²⁶ He opined that the concept is too defensive to dispute command of the maritime commons. However, Mahan had contradictory views on the efficacy of the fleet-in-being concept. He also recognised its “moral and physical effect” like the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur had on the Japanese, which proved successful in preventing Japan from gaining command of the commons until Russia’s eventual defeat at Tsushima.²⁷ Enabled by geography, the fleet-in-being concept would continue to have a solid strategic value in future conflicts.

Contemporary Application

Whilst historical examples in the preceding paragraphs have already underscored geography’s importance in influencing command of the maritime commons, adding a contemporary flavour to highlight the continued importance of these concepts is instructive. In the US-China “competition continuum,” geography would play a pivotal role in deciding the fate of control over the maritime commons.²⁸ Although Beijing is rapidly expanding its naval power, a continental China will always be concerned about the security of its land borders, a problem the US could exacerbate through overt/covert support to China’s neighbours. The UK followed a similar approach to encircle Germany in the First World War through its alliances with France and Russia when the Germans started focusing on their navy. The British strategy worked and brought about Germany’s downfall in the First World War. China, however, does not have a reciprocal option vis-à-vis the US due to the Pacific Ocean insulating the US, a maritime power. Notwithstanding this lacuna, China will have the opportunity to gain command or dispute American command of the maritime commons in the South China Sea (SCS) with a concentrated force and reduced lines of communication compared to the US. Beijing could also utilise possible secondary bases in Taiwan or the SCS islands to hold fleets-in-being, use its land-based maritime strike forces as a fortress fleet, and add teeth to Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) efforts in support of naval forces to gain or dispute command of the maritime commons. The US, on the other hand, could utilise its alliances with countries in South-East and East Asia to operate from forward bases. It would reduce the US’s lines of communication and allow force concentration through shorter lines of operation, directly impacting the US’s ability to gain command of the maritime commons or contest China's command of the commons in the South and East China Seas.

For India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, if properly developed and utilised, could be of similar strategic and operational importance as a forward operating base to that of the US’s Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam of Hawaii in the Pacific. India could, inter-alia, also utilise partnerships like the Quad, to operate from forward bases such as Diego Garcia and the Christmas Islands (if adequately developed by Australia in the future), to improve regional maritime security, enhance deterrence through power projection, strengthen A2/AD, and control the maritime commons more effectively in the IOR.

Conclusion

Geography plays a decisive role in enabling or constraining powers in gaining command of the maritime commons. Theorists and history prove that geography influences maritime powers’ national policies and allow them to achieve naval superiority over continental powers. Analyses of previous wars also demonstrate that, in many cases, geography restricts the concentration of forces by stretching lines of communication, which negatively impacts a country’s ability to gain command of the maritime commons. Geography also promotes the use of seaboards, forward operating bases, alliances, and the fleet-in-being concept, all of which directly empower nations to gain or dispute command of the maritime commons in peace and during conflict. Perspectives from theorists and history on geography’s essential role in achieving command of the maritime commons must inform India’s current and future foreign policy, military strategy, and naval strategy as well as tactics.

Endnotes

Alfred T. Mahan, Mahan on Naval Strategy, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), xix; and Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 128.
Mahan, Op Cit., xxix and Corbett, Op Cit., n. 1, 209.
Corbett, Op Cit., n. 1, 91.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, 31.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
Alfred T. Mahan, The Inﬂuence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 5
Clausewitz, Op Cit., n. 5, 204.
Clausewitz, Op Cit., n. 5, 204.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, 31.
Clausewitz, Op Cit., n. 5, 204.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xix and Corbett, Op Cit., n.1, 128 - 341.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xix.
Julian S. Corbett, Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 386.
Corbett, Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 383.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 6, 20.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xx.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xxvi.
Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), 200.
Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016), 54–55.
Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), 53.
Corbett, Op Cit., n. 1, 209.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, 205.
Alfred T. Mahan, Retrospect upon the War Between Japan and Russia, in Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), 147.
Mahan, Retrospect upon the War Between Japan and Russia ( Boston: Little. Brown, 1918), 167.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 6, Chapt xiv. 20.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xxii.
Mahan, Op Cit., n. 1, xxii.
US Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 1.