Introduction

The contemporary context of the two ocean space of the Indo-Pacific has been an engaging dynamic of evolving international relations. Well past the bipolar Cold War era and the transition through the multipolar decades, international geopolitics has now turned into regional, sub-regional and trans-regional interactions. At the same time, Indian maritime resurgence has played out concurrent with the rise of China and the progress of a ‘Quad’ coalescence that is inherently maritime, as is the region. A specific frame of reference is the historical evolution of the Malabar exercise series, which could be seen, perhaps, as representing a barometer of the shifting geopolitics and the changing India’s international relations (IR) approach in the Indo-Pacific region. What began as a tentative naval interaction between India and USA off the Malabar coast, took the form of serious effort to shape the maritime order in the larger region and constructively evolve as a reinforcement exercise in the global space. It’s shifting from the Malabar coast to the Bay of Bengal, and alternating between the latter and the western Pacific region, suggests a strategic convergence between India and USA in the Indo-Pacific. This convergence later extended to Japan, Singapore and Australia, and in varying degrees to the other South China Sea littorals. Recognising the resumption of Australia’s participation in Exercise Malabar 2020, this article delves into the growing discourse of maritime synergy in a rules-based effort to good order at sea.

However, the wider Indo-Pacific relationship goes way beyond the present circumspection. The western coast of India and the Malabar region was a thriving maritime space in history of the Indian Ocean and beyond. The late VAdm Manohar Awati (Retd), Founder Chairman of the Maritime History Society, shared these thoughts on Malabar at a keynote address in 1995, “… almost every merchant and every member of trading communities of the Indian Ocean littoral, from the Arab and the Persian of the West, the indigenous Gujarati both, banya and muslim, the islanders of the Maldives, the Tamil and the Bengali, the Melankars and the Javanese, were to be found here, trading peaceably in a whole range of the produce of India and overseas.” The Malabar coast was dotted with ports that carried on a thriving commerce in the markets of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It evolved into a confluence of maritime trade routes, whether going westward or sailing east. A culturally diverse identity of the IOR, the Malabar was historically a melting pot of communities, religions and languages, with a social tapestry as a unique maritime anthropology. Malabar is an apt emblem of an oceanic confluence that was distinctly Indian and yet global, at the same time. That is an apt locale to begin this review.

Beyond commonality of nomenclature, medieval Malabar as a hub of Indian Ocean connectivity, and the Malabar exercises have a strong foothold in the concept of collaborative maritime convergence of ideas, influence and integration. The Malabar coast had a significant impact on maritime trade in the IOR, with its geographical advantages enabling maritime activities that enhanced its commercial fortunes. Malabar exercises have endeavoured to expand their role beyond the immediate periphery and establish significance in the Indo-Pacific.

Medieval Malabar as the Spice Garden of the World

Malabar pepper from the Indian state of Kerala was a singular commodity of Indian influence for more than three millennia across the face of this globe. Reported to have been used in the embalming process of the Pharaoh Ramesses II in the year 1224 BCE, it is safe to deduce that peppercorns would have been shipped off to Egypt from the coast of Malabar for ensuring the blue blooded incumbent a place in the pantheon of deities. The much haloed spice of Malabar was also known to the Greeks as early as the fourth century BCE.1 It was called by its generic name ‘Piper,’ which was also the name of its nearest cousin the ‘Piper Longum’ that, like the black pepper, also originated from India. These spices were used sparingly and were high-ticket commodities, meriting a scholastic mention by Greek botanist Theophrastus. Much later, the Romans took a fascination to this spice. The Emperor Domitian 81-96 CE also stored up pepper in the national treasury.2 Later, when the Visigoths captured Rome, 1.4 tons of pepper was paid to Alaric, the King of the Visigoths, as ransom along with gold.3 The spice trade with India did cause some lacrimation to the Romans. The chronicler of this trade, Pliny, lamented at the gold drain it inflicted on Rome.

Europeans of the medieval ages too were inflicted by the same addiction for pepper. The pepper of Malabar would help them keep their meats preserved for long and enhance the flavours of their cuisine. This time around, the direct trade between the Malabar coast and the markets of Europe were hindered by the rising power of the Ottomans, who tried to spread their tentacles in the lucrative Indian Ocean maritime trade. The Portuguese devised a plan to reach India by an alternative route, by rounding the Cape of Good Hope and accessing the markets of Malabar on the other side of the Arabian Sea. Like their Roman predecessors, the lure of the black gold would entice them to discover an alternative route.

Journey to Proto Globalism

Burgeoning trade in the IOR led to a spurt in the peaceful migration of populations, largely motivated by brighter economic prospects rather than involuntary jettisoning as seen in continental settings. The Harappans were the first to have a non-resident population, as they established villages and granaries and contributed to the textile economy of the Sumerians. A thousand years later, another batch of Indians, mostly from the port town of Bharuch and the north western frontiers, made their enclaves in the northern extremities of the Island of Socotra.4 This island was situated on the maritime trade route that connected the Indian subcontinent to the ports of Egypt on the Red Sea. This was the same route that was used by the early Romans to fetch the precious spice of Malabar - pepper. Pot shards bearing Tamil Brahmi etchings found in Oman and Egypt show that traders from Kerala, which were then part of greater Tamilakam, traded in these stretches.

Malabar wasn’t merely a launching pad for the dispersion of Indian culture throughout the known world, it was more a symbiosis of many cultural, religious and ethnic identities. With the pullulating maritime trade, Malabar became the focal point of traders from the far East and the far West of the known world. The IOR was an arena for many players. The Indians, Arabs, Jews, Syrians, Romans, Indonesians and Africans often operated in these waters. In its time, the Indian Ocean was one of the busiest maritime circuits in the history of mankind. This was possible because the production centres were all stacked in the eastern hemisphere while the markets were situated in the West. Having a staging point in the centres of production was the most viable thing to do when time between arrival and departure was as long as three months.The Jews were one of the early traders to set up tents on the soil of Malabar. A copper plate inscription circa 1000 CE was issued by the Chera King Bhaskara Ravi Varma, granting the Jewish merchant Joseph Rabban 72 proprietary rights, which was normally devolved on high ranking nobles of the kingdom. Another community that called Malabar their home was the Syrian Christians who, like their Jewish counterparts, were subjected to hostility in their home land. However, in the fertile land of Malabar, they managed to preserve their unique form of Christianity, which was widely practiced in the Middle East at one point of time.

The Arabs were another major group to take shelter in the palm laden coast of Malabar, much unlike the arid landscape of the Arabian Peninsula. Within the socio-cultural landscape of Kerala, the Arabs managed to integrate with the host population. The prevalent system of Marumakatayam allowed many Arab traders to develop nuptial bonds with local women. The marriages were solemnized in the Islamic system of Muta, which allowed traders to contract short term relationships while on voyage. The children born of this wedlock were called the Mappilas, who played an important role in the maritime history of Malabar region.

The Economic Convergence

Trade in the IOR and beyond was carried on by multinational establishments. Two important corporations in the Malabar coast were Anjuvanam and the Manigramam. The former was a conglomerate of foreign merchants with a looming presence on the coast of Kerala. They included people from diverse ethnicities, like the Jews, Syriac Christians, Parsis and Arabs. It is interesting to note that communities that were hostile to each other in the land of their origin, harmoniously worked together other under the banner of the Anjuvannam. Not just West Asia but also East Asia, especially the Chinese, actively traded with the King of Malabar coast. Marco Polo describes several Chinese ships at Kozhikode, with crews of 200-300 each, carrying 5,000-6,000 baskets of pepper. The Chinese exchanged silk, gold, silver, copper, porcelain, clove, spikenard, etc., on the coast of Malabar.5 Marco Polo describes the pearl fishing of Malabar in great detail, where several large vessels were dispatched with expert divers skilled in the art of picking oysters with pearls.6 He also describes the pepper fields were not wildly grown but domestically cultivated.7 Such literary references are backed by several archaeological finds of Chinese porcelain in several parts of Malabar.

Contestations Challenge Freedom of Seas

Mare Liberum was a defining feature of the Malabar confluence long before its 17th Century articulation by Hugo Grotius. As Vasco Da Gama sailed to India, accompanied by two smaller vessels laden with ammunition, this was to lay the seed for weaponization of maritime trade in the IOR. Following the Portuguese came the Dutch and British. Soon, their domestic scores began to be settled on the coast of Malabar. From this period onwards, the freedom, prosperity and security of Indians across the IOR was steadily lost to the rapacious hand of colonial ingresses, until the dawn of India’s independence.

Even today, the Malabar coast is an important staging point on the maritime routes across the IOR. Its importance has only increased with the meteoric rise of China, which seeks to intensify and monopolize trade in the IOR. It is from this staging point that India can monitor and control the flow of traffic, and keep a keen watch on manoeuvres by the Chinese or any other power that threatens Indian interests, in a deja vu moment of history. India’s strategic interests dictate the need to shape a maritime order that supports its socio-economic and technological progress. The growth in India’s economy has been accompanied by growth of its maritime interests, across proximate seas and also adjacent oceanic spaces. In a measured balance between multilateralism and collaborative partnerships, there is an oceanic philosophy to the emerging canvas of India in the Indo-Pacific.

Confluence of Naval Interaction: Malabar Series

The genesis of Malabar Exercises became a key driver in the evolution of India’s international relations and view of its neighbourhood, from a territorial centric to a more holistic perspective that encompassed the broader IOR. Throughout history, the maritime domain has been vital for shaping regional dynamics and the larger security architecture, establishing new and emerging powers. Since the late 1990s, India’s endeavour to strengthen its maritime posture has gathered decisive pace. Following a post-Cold War initiative from the US side, the Indian Navy (IN) and the US Navy (USN) instituted the annual Exercise Malabar in 1992, as a token Passage Exercise (PASSEX). From 1992 to 2007, the scope of the exercises progressively increased, in terms of participating units, exercise area, and the complexity of naval missions. After India’s nuclear tests of 1998, there was a brief hiatus till 2002, whereupon the exercises regained their regularity.

Exercise Malabar 2003 graduated to a three-dimensional exercise, involving surface, sub-surface and air platforms, and also included Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) missions against suspect vessels.8 Exercise Malabar 2006 included expeditionary operations, which have immense applicability to ensure regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. The 2006 edition focused on involvement of the US Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) USS Boxer and US Marines forces operating in conjunction with Indian Army troops and Indian Marine Commandos (MARCOs). This was a valuable lesson for the IN to emulate the concepts of operating expeditionary platforms and stand-off amphibious operations. Three months later, the IN inducted the USS Trenton, renamed as INS Jalashwa.9 Apart from multilateral nature and complexity enhancement, the location of the series evolved over time. Exercise Malabar April 2007 was conducted outside the Indian Ocean.10 It included maritime strike missions, Dissimilar Air-Combat Training (DACT) and ‘buddy-refuelling’ between the Indian Air Force (IAF) Jaguars, IN Sea Harriers and the US F-18 Super Hornet aircraft.11

In 2007, the bilateral accord also expanded in participation to include Australia, Japan and Singapore.12 A parallel diplomatic development of a nascent ‘Quadilateral initiative’ encountered Chinese opposition and quickly defrayed.13 However, Malabar continued, as did the regular expansion of the exercise to the western Pacific, every alternate year, with Japan being invited to the same therein, in 2009, 2011 (did not participate, in aftermath of the tsunami), and 2014.14 A dedicated India-Japan bilateral maritime exercise, termed JIMEX, was also instituted in 2012.15 Japan finally became a permanent participant in Exercise Malabar in 2015.16 From carrying out bilateral naval exercises, there was an aperture in conducting trilateral exercises between India, USA and Japan.

The rationale to have Malabar Exercises as a multilateral confluence has been harnessed on the basis of ‘cost-effectiveness’ and ‘resource optimisation.’ India’s decision to include Japan and Australia in different editions of Malabar was enabled by the commonality of operating philosophies between the navies. Exercise Malabar 2020 has witnessed a resurgence of the confluence, notwithstanding restrictions imposed by the Chinese-origin Covid-19 being still prevalent, indicating the evolving philosophy of naval operations amidst a larger maritime construct.

 

                                         Table 1 - Malabar Exercises from 1992 - 202020

Evolving Indo-Pacific Narrative

The Malabar narrative and naval activity in the Indo-Pacific region flash four trends that merit attention. First, India is encouraging other states and their navies to conduct multilateral naval exercises, which clearly suggest that coalitions are evolving to address multiple, common challenges. According to former US Secretary of Defence, Mark Esper, “bilateral relationships are good, but multilateral cooperation is better.”21 Accordingly, USA is encouraging Indo-Pacific countries to “expand their own intra-regional security relationships and networks of like-minded partners.”22 Secondly, the geography of these exercises have shifted from the usual comfort zones (home waters) to seas close to ‘hotspots.’ Thirdly, the participating ships in these exercises have been high-end combatants, including aircraft carriers, nuclear and conventional submarines, and missile destroyers and frigates, capable of power projection. Lastly, the aim and scope of Malabar exercises is different from the previous decade, when navies focused on cooperating against asymmetric and sub-conventional threats, such as piracy, terrorism, gun running and drug smuggling, to more contemporary, conventional challenges.

US-India-Japan Relations: Indo-Pacific Narrative

India, USA and Japan have moved towards a closer maritime partnership, regardless of the China factor. Yet these countries have reasons to be concerned about China’s intent and growing power projection capabilities in the region. The scant respect Beijing has paid to international rules of conduct in its dealings with countries like the Philippines have also prompted other countries in the Indo-Pacific to reassess their capabilities vis-à-vis China. In this context, the growing importance of the Malabar exercises afforded the three nations the opportunity to build collaboration and interoperability between their naval forces. In August 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his landmark speech to the Indian Parliament on “Confluence of the Two Seas” was prescient in noting that, “the Pacific and Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity.”23 His words are now ringing true on the high seas of the Indo-Pacific region.

Interoperability amongst the participating navies has evolved steadily over the past decade. The normalisation of Self Defence Forces of Japan enabled the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force to conduct military operations abroad. Japan is naturally concerned about China’s rising assertive military presence in the South China Sea and East China Sea. It has been open and positive towards expanding its strategic relations with India into the military, particularly maritime, realm. The US Navy has readily fielded its latest weapon platforms and show-cased its abilities and best practices. The Indian Navy has also reciprocated with participation of its latest and most potent platforms, enabling the Malabar exercises to develop to the highest levels of complexity and across all dimensions. The political willingness for Australia’s return to the Malabar series marks a significant step in cooperation and collaboration amongst the resurgent ‘Quad 2.0’ navies, which has the potential for addressing common challenges and threats in support of maritime security of the global commons and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Malabar Confluence of Security and Interoperability

In dealing with contemporary complex situations and to maintain credible consistent influence in the Indo-Pacific, India is creating partnerships to plug critical gaps. The neighbourhood policy is well enshrined in the territorial space, but with aggrandizing the strategic reach of Malabar exercises, India is engendering a new international relations approach in the Indo-Pacific, i.e. its Maritime Neighbourhood Policy. In doing so, military exercises and mature interoperability will hold the key in establishing military-to-military linkages. It can also be leveraged for joint surveillance and information sharing, as well as mutual logistics support for USA, Japan and Australia enhanced reach and sustenance. Thus, the Malabar exercise can be seen as a routine, regular, professional interaction amongst the navies of India, USA, Japan, and now Australia, which will strengthen mutual trust and confidence by developing and honing operational capabilities in a shared, cooperative framework. These exercises will not only enhance interoperability, but will also provide exposure to Indian planners about the latest technologies, tactical trends and best practices in the advanced partner navies.

On a larger scale, it is a reflection of the intertwining of strategic interests, and nuanced message of broader coalescence of perspectives and approach amongst the political leadership of these countries. It also highlights, in the evolving strategic milieu and challenges in the Indo-Pacific, the centrality of the maritime domain as the common interest-point and veritable lynchpin of strategic engagement. Hence, Malabar holds significance not just as a naval activity, but also as it underscores India’s cooperative and collaborative approach to maritime security, and commitment to a free, open, inclusive and rules-based international maritime order. As such, it defines India’s evolving International Relations (IR) approach towards its maritime neighbourhood.

Conclusion

Naval cooperation between India, USA and Japan has epitomised the strong and resilient relationship that has developed between the three democracies. The Malabar exercises, initiated in 1992 between the Indian and US Navies, have steadily grown in scope, complexity and participation, which has expanded to include Japan and, now, Australia. China’s growing military strength and increasing presence in the IOR, against its assertive, aggressive and expansionist posture in recent years, has underscored the vital importance of promoting a rules-based international order and the

need for strengthening cooperation amongst countries with such common interests, for mutual support and convergence of efforts. In this evolving, dynamic strategic landscape, Exercise Malabar has assumed greater importance. It has been a demonstration of joint commitment and collaborative approach of these nations to address common maritime challenges, across the spectrum of operations. It will play a substantive and significant role in maintaining and enhancing maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, which would be of benefit to the global maritime community.

Exercise Malabar enhances India’s credibility in the maritime domain and prioritises collaborative effort towards realising the vision of Prime Minister Modi for Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). It also defines India’s evolving IR perspective in the Indo-Pacific, with focus on two major maritime security objectives - of being the ‘Preferred Security Partner’ in the IOR and for promoting ‘Collective Maritime Competence.’ Accordingly, India has shown its readiness to promote cooperation in the maritime domain. These include efforts at building capacity, augmenting capability, exchanging information and improving interoperability with a number of security partners. Truly, the etymology of Malabar in the medieval framework, as a confluence of cultures and connectivity in the maritime domain, has evolved into a contemporary Malabar Confluence of maritime power, for peace, good order and security in the Indo-Pacific.

Endnotes

  1. Andrew Dalby, Dangerous Tastes: The Story of Spices (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000), 91.

  2. Jeong Su-Il, The Silk Road Encyclopedia (Irvine, CA: Seoul Selection, 2016).

  3. Ibid.

  4. Abraham Eraly, The First Spring: The Golden Age of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2011), 249.

  5. M Raghav Varier, “Trade Relations between Kerala and China 1200-1500 AD,” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress vol.51, 1990, 690-698. www.jstor.org/stable/44148316.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Ibid.

  8. Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Malabar Naval Exercises: Trends and Tribulations,” Issue Brief, National Maritime Foundation, 05 August 2014. http://www.maritimeindia.org.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Ibid.

  11. Gurpreet S. Khurana, “High End in the Pacific: Envisioning the Upper Limits of India-US Naval Cooperation in Pacific-Asia,” IDSA Journal of Defence Studies vol.11, no.4, December 2017, 51-71.

  12. Harsh Pant and Anant Singh, “India's Malabar Dilemma,” ORF Issue Brief No. 393, August 2020. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-malabar-dilemma/

  13. Yogendra Kumar, “The Malabar Exercises and Maritime Security,” Ministry of External Affairs, 08 August 2017. https://mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?691.

  14. Sandeep Dikshit, “Japan to take part in India-US naval exercises again,” The Hindu, 16 February 2011.

  15. Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (New Delhi: IHQ of MoD (Navy), 2015), 87.

  16. Huma Siddiqui, “India's concept of Indo-Pacific is inclusive and across oceans,” Ministry of External Affairs, 08 November 2019. https://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/32015/Indias_concept_of_IndoPacific_is_inclusive_and_across_oceans.

  17. “Exercise Malabar commences in Bay of Bengal/North Indian Ocean,” Ministry of Defence Press Release, 10 July 2017.

  18. “Malabar 2018: All you need to know about the trilateral naval exercise,” Business Standard, 15 June 2018.

  19. “Exercise MALABAR 2019,” Ministry of Defence Press Release, 25 September 2019.

  20. Pant, Op Cit., n.12

  21. Vijay Sakhuja, “Indo-Pacific in a Churn: Too many Naval Exercises,” Vivekananda International Foundation, 28 July 2020. https://www.vifindia.org

  22. Jim Garamone, “Esper Discusses Importance of Indo-Pacific,” U.S Department of Defense, 21 July 2020. https://www.defense.gov.

  23. Rupakjyoti Borah, “Malabar 2018: Why Is It Important?” Geopolitical Monitor, 31 July 2018.