You are a naval aviator, shot down over enemy territory, injured, abused and incarcerated. This is not a normal jail or an accepted system of a POW Camp under the Geneva conventions, but a political prison, an extortion and propaganda factory. You are denied all rights, treated like a common criminal, clapped in leg-irons, locked up in solitary confinement in a tiny hole of 1m by 3m size and frequently tortured. The aim of your captors is to paralyse you with fear and polarise you with guilt, to dangle enticements of comfort, to appeal to your reason, to chip away at your core values. All this to lead you down a one-way street littered with small compromises and broken promises, from tacit deals to acceptance of favours and finally to full-blown collaboration, culminating in propaganda videos denouncing your government and their unjust war. How do you resist? What qualities do you need?

This alas is no tale of fiction, but a true story of Commander (later Vice Admiral) James Bond Stockdale, USN. It may be quite an irony that even as the “reel-life” Commander James Bond was slaying imaginary villains on screen in the 1960s, his real-life namesake was conquering internal demons in captivity. Stockdale, who was later awarded the Medal of Honour, was shot down over Vietnam in 1965 and spent close to eight years in prison, four of those in solitary confinement, enduring torture and degradation. Vietnam was the first modern war where prisoners were considered prime political assets and key ammunition for the propaganda battlefront. Stockdale’s refusal to capitulate and almost superhuman strength of will have made him an exemplar of moral and physical courage. As the senior-most officer in prison, he organised a culture of defiance and fought the manipulative efforts of his captors. He even slit his own wrists deliberately to convince his jailors of his willingness to die rather than capitulate.

How did he do it? How did he emerge with his sanity and dignity intact? In his own words, it came down to “pride, dignity, an enduring sense of self-worth and that enigmatic mixture of conscience and egoism called personal honour.”1 He had attended a two-year Masters in Political Science at Stanford University as a Lieutenant Commander and had elected to study philosophy as an elective. He attributed his study of classical Greek Stoicism and a book on military ethics called Enchiridion by the Roman philosopher Epictetus on the ‘endurance of the soul’ that allowed him to keep his conscience clean in the coercive environment of a POW camp. “...when supported with education, a person’s integrity can give him something to rely on when his perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when he’s faced with hard choices of right and wrong.”2

I recalled VAdm Stockdale’s story as I read the thought-provoking article by Lt Cdr Rajiv Lochan in the Winter 2021 edition of the Indian Naval Despatch, An Appetising Wrong or an Insipid Right. Moral dilemmas on the battlefield have always been part and parcel of warfare and our Academies and basic training institutions do try and lay the foundations to tackle such questions, even though as described by Lt Cdr Lochan, over-zealous training officers can sometimes be part of the problem instead of the solution. But overall, cadets and trainees are put through the grind during pre-commissioning training, their judgement calls and behavioural traits are analysed and ‘officer like qualities’ graded, with ethical outcomes being emphasised, even though the ‘win at all costs’ competitive spirit of Academies and Indian fascination for ‘Jugaad’ does tend to set us off course periodically.3 Such missteps are but part of the training process provided the trainee is corrected and the right lessons learnt. After all, good judgement is the product of profound experience, but profound experience often follows from poor judgement!

Emphasis on the nuts and bolts of ethics continues into post commissioning training as well, with Sub Lieutenants (SLts) placed under the supervision of the Navy’s Centre for Leadership, Ethics and Behavioural Studies (CELABS) during their courses with the Training Command in Kochi. Thereafter, the Navy assumes that, a sturdy foundation having been laid, the officer is well equipped to navigate the shoals of ethical decision making in the years ahead, with more senior officers and sometimes even senior sailors acting as mentors and role models through personal example and counsel.

Whilst military ethics as a theme for study is sometimes covered in subsequent mid-career and higher command training courses, it is more in the nature of a ‘blink and you miss it’ refresher capsules rather than a deep dive into the subject. This is the system that has served the Navy for decades now, for better or for worse and begs the obvious question: are we doing enough to prepare both our junior and senior leaders for the ethical challenges of modern warfare? Are all of us prepared like Admiral Stockdale for the brutal and unpredictable environment of combat where the slightest chink in our ethical armour might accelerate our downfall?

Development of the Laws of Armed Conflict

Some elements of ethical conduct in battle have been part of a ‘Warrior’s Code’ for millennia, but it was only the onset of industrial age warfare and the invention of more indiscriminate weapons in the Twentieth Century that heightened the sense of urgency to prescribe written laws for armed conflict. The UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Protocols and the Nuremberg Trials were all landmark milestones that established the broad contours of ‘customary’ international law in this regard. The core concepts of jus ad bellum or ‘Just War’ and jus in bello or ‘Rightful conduct in war’ are now well accepted principles of the post WWII international order, albeit often criticised as ‘Western’ or ‘Christian’ constructs.

Whilst there is no denying their genesis from the teachings and writings of Western and Christian scholars such as St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius, closer study of the rationale contained in the jus ad bellum criteria of ‘legitimate authority,’‘just cause,’ right intention,’‘war as last resort,’ ‘proportionality of response’ and ‘reasonable hope of success;’ or jus in bello conditions like ‘discrimination in targeting’ and ‘restraint whilst prosecuting war’ would reveal that they resonate more or less with almost all the classical philosophies of the Ancient World. These span thoughts of thinkers including Greek, Indian, Chinese as well as Jew and Arab. It would be worthwhile to digress briefly to examine the historic norms of behaviour in war, especially given that, “war is as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.”4

War as our Ancestors Saw It

In their important work, The Ethics of War in Asian Civilisations, Torkel Brekke and others have attempted to provide a perspective of whether there are universal standards in the ideologies of warfare across all the major cultures of the world.5 The Greek Iliad and Odyssey as well as the Hindu Ramayana and Mahabharata represent the Vedic or Epic age and are moral, philosophical as well as historical tales, although the latter is debatable. Since these epics were updated over time (the Ramayana of Valmiki in the 4th century BCE, for example, evolved into the Tulsidas Ramayana by 1200 CE), they can be said to represent multi-layered materials from different eras. They represent the classic ‘Heroic’ way of war, with Gods in human form interacting with the cast of characters and determining winners and losers. It is said that Alexander, the epitome of the heroic leader, slept with the Iliad at his bedside. The Mahabharata states “there is nothing higher in the three worlds than shaurya (heroism).”6 Arjuna’s change of heart on first sighting the Kauravas on the battlefield of Kurukshetra is the source of the Bhagwad Gita, probably the most influential scripture on morality and higher purpose on the Indic civilizational canvas history.7

Whilst power, especially battlefield prowess, is emphasised in the Indian epics, those with power also have an obligation to protect, which could be considered an ancient validation of Just Cause for war. Similarly, Judaism distinguishes between Milhemet Hova (Obligatory war) and Milhemet reshut (Optional war), with the wars of Joshua allegedly falling in the former category and the expansionist wars of David in the latter. This resonates with the Roman concept of bellum justum, with a defensive war being obligatory, a pre-emptive war less so and an expansionist war frowned upon.8 Similarly, in early China, Yi Bing was the phrase for righteous war during the Warring States period (481-221 BCE) and placed the legitimate authority of the ruler and proper intentions as vital justifications for war. Yi Bing doctrine also stipulated that since war is designed to bring peace to the people, the people themselves must not participate, thus qualifying as non-combatants and immune from attack.9

The Islamic tradition of Sharia reasoning also provides insights into the right conduct of war. The foundational work of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (circa 804 CE), one of the early masters of the Hanafi school, cites the Prophet issuing directions to Muslim fighting forces, both in command and in the Army. The text establishes clear precedent that resort to war requires legitimate authority, just cause and righteous intention. It also requires issue of an invitation to the enemy, very similar to the Taoist canons of the Chinese theoretician Sun Tzu (541-482 BCE) that urge the ruler to use economic wealth, social power and politics before resorting to war. These arguments have similarity with the jus ad bellum criteria of ‘war as last resort.’10

Many ancient texts also provide for protection of the innocent and those immune from attack, in line with the jus in bello requirement of discrimination. In the Greek and Roman traditions, everything that belonged to the Gods, including sanctuaries, temples, priests, flock and lands, were out of bounds. The Christian thinker, St Augustine, exhorted his followers to show “mercy towards the defeated and the captive.” The sayings of the Prophet include prohibitions of cheating, treachery, mutilation and killing of children as well as direct targeting of slaves, women, old people, the lame and the blind. In the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, a soldier who has thrown down his weapons, the aged, children and women, must not be killed.11

Dharmayuddha Vs Kutayuddha in the Indian Tradition

In his in-depth study of ethics and war in the Indian sub-continent, Between Prudence and Heroism - Ethics of War in the Hindu Tradition, Torkel Brekke has shed light on the numerous interconnections between religious ethics and warfare through antiquity.12 In the Mahabharata, Bhishma extols the principle of Karmayoga, where every battle is in itself a sacrifice. Similarly, in the Bhagwad Gita, Lord Krishna tells Arjuna to see the fighting itself as the end, and not the fruits of battle. Thus, in the Rajadharma or kingly duty tradition, reasons for just war or Dharmayuddha were seldom spelt out and warfare was part of the duties of kingship. Since kingship was assumed to be bestowed by the Gods, it is taken for granted that the Gods fight on the kings’ side, making war justifiable. Thus, these epics, with their view of heroism and dharma, can be considered a forerunner of the ‘Deontological’ school of ethics, espoused by western philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, which is about following absolute rules, regardless of consequences.

Unsurprisingly, such idealistic views of battle did not survive long in the Indian tradition. By the 3rd Century BCE, the Arthashastra (‘science of worldly gains’) by Kautilya presented a whole contrary ultra-realist view of war, ‘Kutayuddha’ (or “concealed warfare” as translated by Ranganathan). Treachery, duplicity, secret attacks, assassination, abrogation of treaties, sowing dissension in the enemy ranks and amongst neighbours were all legitimate components of the ruler’s toolkit. In this world view, war is but a means to achieve security and prosperity and since war is dangerous, prudence is called for. In that sense, Kautilya was an early proponent of the Clausewitzian maxim, “War is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means.”13

Kautilya could be considered a classic ‘Consequentialist,’ a rival school of ethical philosophy to the Deontologists, articulated by western thinkers like John Stuart Mill, which states that ‘the ends justify the means’ and ethical decisions should aim to achieve the best consequences, or the ‘greatest good for the greatest number.’ This tension between deontology or dharma and consequentialism or artha is writ large in the Indian literature of the pre-Islamic period, with Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Kamandaki’s Nitisara professing the realist approach and later texts such as Subandhu’s Vasavadatta and Kalhana’s Rajatarangini extolling heroic virtues, an indication that chivalry had returned to favour by the 10th Century CE.14

One can safely say that across antiquity, many of the core principles of jus ad bellum or Just War find traction, whether through the perceived legitimate authority of the ruler or religious leader, the exhaustion of other means before declaring war, or the emphasis on self-defence over expansionism, for the most part. However, the jus in bello criteria of discrimination and restraint have been seen to ebb and flow, being more common when chivalry and dharma are considered predominant virtues of the ruling and warrior classes and noticeable by their absence when realism and kutayuddha have flourished. Wars over religious and ethnic identity have always seen the most indiscriminate killing because the enemy has been dehumanised and seen as the ‘heathen’ or the ‘infidel.’ This has led to the modern emphasis on delinking the state from the faith and religion from war, not always successfully. In the few instances where this has failed, such as in East Pakistan and the Balkans, horrific consequences have ensued.

However, some elements of Kutayuddha such as manipulation, deception, treachery and duplicity, best exemplified by the Arthashastra’s classic adage “Saam, Daam, Dand, Bhed,” have all found favour across the ages and can be considered essential elements of statecraft in any era.15 Even the classical epics condone calibrated deceit and treachery in battle, especially against a dangerous and unscrupulous enemy, provided the war is righteous - witness the ‘Ashwathama is Dead’ episode in the Mahabharata, Rama’s killing of Vali from hiding in the Ramayana and the use of the ‘Trojan Horse’ in Greek mythology. However, immunity of non-combatants and humane treatment of prisoners and the wounded have been universally accepted in consonance with the jus in bello norms. It must also be understood that works of realism such as the Arthashastra and its later kindred text The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli are primarily treatises on statecraft and grand strategy and are not much concerned with morality. We must accordingly, be careful not to ‘oversell’ Kautilya as a role model for our junior officers in our Academies.

What’s in it for Me?

At this stage, the reader is probably asking himself whether the case for ethical conduct in modern warfare is overstated. After all, the words, ‘All is fair in Love and War’ are much bandied about. Accordingly, it is necessary to differentiate between Fair Play and Ethical conduct. The former is much prized in the various field and racquet games made popular by the British across the length and breadth of its former colonies, but has nothing to do with war. War is best described as a no holds barred street fight to impose one’s will on the adversary, and only a fool would attempt to play fair in battle with an evenly matched adversary. Clausewitz put it succinctly, “War is such a dangerous business that mistakes of kindness are the worst.”16

Ethical conduct, on the other hand, is a code of behaviour expected from every military professional by virtue of the fact that “the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem under an unlimited liability.”17 In the book Redefining the Modern Military - The Intersection of Profession and Ethics, a contributor, Jo Brick, has postulated that since the military profession is entrusted with the use of force in pursuit of national interests, the linkage between the military and the state is elevated to a special status, commonly referred to as a fiduciary relationship. This relationship is critically dependent on public trust, wherein the military professional is bound by legal and ethical standards to utilise his or her monopoly over the use of force for the interests of society as a whole and not to further self-interest. In situations where the law and ethics are opposed, the professional is expected to apply his or her deep knowledge and experience to make a decision.18 In short, it is the ethical code that differentiates the military from a band of thugs.

We Disregard Ethical Conduct in Battle at our Peril

Propaganda as a tool of warfare is nothing new, but the 24x7 visibility of the modern battlefield, the reach and influence of social networks and mass media, and large-scale manipulation of the cyber domain by all adversaries has substantially enhanced what could be called the ‘Ethical Friction of War’ - the possibility that ethical missteps at the tactical level could derail the operational plan and even affect the strategic conduct of war. After all, the actions of a Private rank soldier in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq caused the entire US administration to scramble for cover and decisively turned domestic public opinion in the US against the war.19 Much of the same is being seen in the ongoing Ukraine conflict, where Russia is definitely on the wrong side of the Information War and is being consistently accused of ‘war crimes,’ although it remains to be seen whether Russian actions are by design or by default. One only needs to recall the consequences of the sinking of the RMS Lusitania in WWI.20 This will help understand the risk of implementing ‘Mission Command’ and encouraging aggressive intent in frontline Commanders, without also toughening their ethical sinews and fostering greater understanding of the consequences of possible actions that may be construed as unethical and lead to unforeseen strategic consequences like hastening American resolve to enter WWI on the side of the Allies to Germany’s ultimate detriment.

Moreover, the most important reason for ethical conduct in conflict is simply that it substantially increases the chances of mission success. Morale of one’s forces is directly proportional to public support for the conflict, especially in a democracy. Napoleon’s famous words “In war, the forces of morale are to the physical as three is to one” resonate even more today in the age of ‘media wars.’21 A ‘Just War’ or ‘Dharmayuddha,’ seen to have been conducted only as an act of last resort, coupled with rightful conduct in battle, is most likely to keep public sentiment firmly behind our soldiers even in the face of initial reverses. The examples of the Kargil conflict and the First Gulf War are testimony to this.

A fresh impetus to ethical conduct on the battlefield has been provided by the growing usage of autonomous systems in war. Rapid Artificial Intelligence (AI) advances now promise induction of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) in the near future. Whilst limitations in AI until now have resulted in ‘man in the loop’ being mandatory for such systems, LAWS are not outlawed and it is but a matter of time before they are fielded in earnest.22 It is important that a universal consensus on the applicability of the laws of armed conflict and rigid protocols for system programming of LAWS be arrived at before it is too late. It is thus time to reignite the debate on ethical warfare so that strict norms of behaviour for LAWS are established sooner rather than later.

What Can We Do Better?

We must first recognise that ethical conduct in the chaos of conflict and even in time-critical peacetime missions is not easy. On many occasions, ethical dilemmas are incorrectly interpreted and consequentially, mishandled. In his thought-provoking article in the May 2021 edition of the USNI Proceedings, Moral Reasoning in Seven Questions, Captain Roger Herbert, USN has suggested a framework of questions to differentiate between routine moral choices and a genuine ethical dilemma. There is another related practical approach to ethical decision making in real life situations that is known as Ethical Triangulation. Having identified an ethical dilemma using some of the tools recommended by Captain Herbert, the war fighter could triangulate the problem across three axes - the laid down rules or accepted norms governing this situation (deontological approach), the likely consequences of each action (utilitarian or consequentialist outcomes) and the virtuous paradigm (how would a role model of exemplary character address this?) before finally arriving at a desired compromise solution that must be underpinned by practical wisdom arising from insight and experience.

Imagine you are the Commanding Officer of the latest MH-60R ‘Romeo’ helicopter squadron deployed onboard INS Vikrant, operating in the Indian Ocean. You are an admired professional and the Squadron is much feted for its ability to push the envelope. The weather has packed up with winds at 45 knots and waves and swells over 7m and all aircraft are grounded. However, you have been asked to keep two helos on deck in fully strapped down condition, for SAR and ASW contingencies, since a detached task force is currently replenishing from the tanker and it had also reported a possible submarine contact the previous day. Suddenly, INS Talwar on advanced screen reports reports ‘Man Overboard.’ When the Captain (Air) calls you for a recommendation, you mentally run through flight envelopes, launch and recovery parameters and qualifications of the crew. The image of a fellow sailor in the water trying to survive causes you to quickly agree for emergency launch of the helo.23

Within 20 minutes, helo 615 is airborne and disappears into the clouds. The helo establishes communication with Talwar and commences search. It soon radios back that visibility is 15m and the odds for success are low, but a human life is at stake. Then the phone in the Ready Room rings and the Air Boss tells you that the helo appeared to see something and had descended; now Talwar thinks the helo is down and out of communication for 5 minutes. The Air Boss now asks you the inevitable question, “Romeo, do you want to launch 715 to go after them?”

Time seems to stand still; questions assail your mind. Should you risk another crew to save the first? Maybe you should declare it unsafe to fly? Conditions are well outside flight parameters and you have a responsibility to the Squadron and the ship. But your squadron pilots would definitely want to make an attempt. How can they tell the families that they didn’t try and save their loved ones? But what if you launch the helo and lose that crew as well, then how will you explain to their families that you flew in these conditions - twice? What about the ‘warrior ethos’ that says ‘leave no one behind?’ What about the possible impact on your reputation as the CO who left his crew to die? What is the right thing to do?

Your gut instinct and warrior training tell you that you should fly the sortie yourself to demonstrate your concern for the crew and take personal responsibility for the risk. After all, didn’t Captain Rajkumar fly a sortie in similar conditions and rescue a mariner, for which he was awarded the Shaurya Chakra?24 But ‘Virtue Ethics,’ as first espoused by Aristotle, cautions against both bravado and cowardice and advocates the path of ‘moderation or temperance.’ Isn’t flying a second sortie after possibly losing the first helo subject to the law of diminishing returns and nothing, but bravado? Is your skill set and flying experience anywhere close to Captain Rajkumar’s?

Deontological or rules-based analysis of the situation reveals that your duty to comply with SOPs and Risk Matrices as well as flight safety considerations possibly outweighs the cardinal rule of the warrior ethos of to leave no one behind. And a consequentialist examination of the problem will show that risking another multi-million dollar helicopter and one more set of highly trained crew on a mission with extremely low chance of success, does not add up, even if it leads to opprobrium from the next of kin and a blow to your reputation. All in all, the morally correct decision would appear to be to keep the helicopter on deck and use all surface ships available to conduct the search, whilst steeling yourself to explain yourself to the squadron and the families in case the search is unsuccessful. Leadership demands moral courage as well as physical courage in good measure; sometimes the former is much harder than the latter.

We must also understand that our modern focus on technical education and technological prowess is not well suited to an understanding of ethical theory. Whilst the former deals in black and white, zeros and ones, the other is all shades of grey. Ethics is best understood by a reading of history and philosophy, both subjects of social studies, which can never compete for time and attention with the core studies of strategy, technology and operations that dominate the curriculum in our training institutions. However, the Navy’s core values of ‘Duty, Honour, Courage’ will remain just slogans unless we understand the ethical underpinnings and historical context that make us do the right thing because we want to do so and not because we are compelled to do so.

Ethics Can be Taught and Learnt - At Any Age

Based on his experiences, VAdm Stockdale introduced an elective subject at the US Naval War College called Foundations of Moral Obligation when he was the Commandant in the 1970s. Plato’s Dialogues, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Immanuel Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, as well as famous ‘desperate situation’ works of literature such as Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, Herman Melville’s Billy Budd , Albert Camus The Plague, Joseph Conrad’s Typhoon and Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny were all part of the syllabus that continues to this day.25 The US Army War College offered a 40 hour, 10 Session elective study of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War that included an analysis of the moral dilemmas faced by the Athenian and Spartan leaders at various junctures.26

On my part, I hesitate to advocate a further addition of syllabus at our War Colleges because of the ethical dilemma that would pose to the faculty already struggling to juggle a complex curriculum! However, I do feel that Ethical training and education needs emphasis at every stage of an officer’s career. As brought out in Lt Cdr Lochan’s article referred to earlier, the basic training phase warrants a more prescriptive approach to Ethics, with the erring trainee being confined to the ‘straight and narrow’ path by dint of good example and deterrent punishments. In mid and late career, at our Staff Colleges and War Colleges, it is important to expose the same officer to more complicated ethical dilemmas so that the shades of grey in conflict scenarios are anticipated and analysed. An elective subject or a mandatory capsule course could be considered at these institutions similar to the ‘Stockdale Course’ at the US NWC.

I also propose that our military Reading Lists could include seminal works on the foundations of moral philosophy to encourage contemplation of the higher purpose of the military professional. In addition to the classic works from Western philosophers/authors suggested above, we could consider Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas and the Law of War and Peace by Hugo Grotius, which are the parent documents for European ‘Just War’ theory.

We may also examine works on morality from the Indian and Asian traditions. Brekke, Kaushik Roy and other scholars of the Asian ethical tradition have suggested the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the Bhagwad Gita, Manusmriti, Arthashastra, Nitisara, and even works of literature such as the Panchatantra and the later Kathasaritsagara as well as the Harshcharita, Vasavadatta and Rajatarangini dating back to the medieval period. The Yashastilaka and the Nitivakyamrita by the Jain monk Somadeva as well as the Adipurana by Jinasena have also been singled out for special mention. The Chinese treatises Xunzi by Xun Kuang (310-238 BCE) and Lu Shi Chun Qiu by LuBuwei, Chief Minister to the Emperor in the Qin period, are both influential works on kingship and Yi Bing or righteous warfare.27

Can virtue be taught? This question is as old as life itself. We must believe that it can be and that if we do not emphasise ethical conduct at every level of warfare, the military covenant between the soldier and the state could be fatally compromised. However, the pedagogy of ethics requires proximity and repetition and is best achieved through military leaders as role models and mentors. Moulding these leaders of ‘ethos’ and conviction cannot end at initial officer training, but needs attention both at higher command courses as well as through self-improvement by the ‘Great Books’ approach of structured reading. The warfare of tomorrow will be as dependent on the character of our leaders as it has been for millennia. Leaders with a historical perspective and knowledge of the higher purpose of the military would have a better chance of success.

Endnotes

  1. James B. Stockdale, A Vietnam Experience: Ten Years of Reflection (US : Hoover Institution, 1984), 128.

  2. Ibid., 120

  3. ‘Jugaad’ is a colloquial Hindi word for a non-conventional, frugal innovation, often termed a "hack". It could also refer to an innovative fix or a simple work-around, a solution that bends the rules, or a resource that can be used in such a way.

  4. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (US: Yale University Press, 2001), preface.

  5. Torkel Brekke ed., The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations: A Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2009).

  6. Ibid., 117.

  7. Mahatma Gandhi referred to the Gita as his ‘spiritual dictionary’ according to the Encyclopaedia Brittanica

  1. Norman Solomon, The Ethics of War: Judaism (London: Routledge, 2016), 44.

  2. Mark E. Lewis, The Just War in Early Chinas (London: Routledge, 2005), 186.

  3. John Kelsay, Islamic Tradition and the Justice of War (London: Routledge, 2005), 88.

  4. Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 26.

  5. Torkel Brekke, Between Prudence and Heroism: Ethics of War in the Hindu Tradition (London: Routledge, 2009).

  6. Torkel Brekke, “Wielding the Rod of Punishment: War and Violence in the Political Science of Kautilya,” Journal of Military Ethics vol. 3, no. 1 (2004), 40-52.

  7. EWA, Op Cit., 123.

  8. Saam, Daam, Dand, Bhed is Kautilya’s advice to the ruler to use Manipulation or Advice, Bribery or Corruption, Power or Threat and Blackmail or Dissension to overcome the enemy.

  9. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

  10. John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 202.

  11. Nathan Finney and Tyrell Mayfield, ed. Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics (US: Naval Institute Press, 2018).

  12. During the early stages of the 2003 Iraq War, members of the United States Army and the CIA committed a series of human rights violations and war crimes against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, including physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and killing. The abuses came to public attention with the publication of photographs of the abuse by CBS News in April 2004. The incidents caused shock and outrage, receiving widespread condemnation within the United States and internationally.

  13. The RMS Lusitania was a UK-registered ocean liner that was torpedoed by an Imperial German Navy U-boat during the First World War on 7 May 1915, with 123 US citizens onboard, almost precipitating the early entry of the USA into the war and decisively turning American public opinion against Germany.

  14. Arthur Upham, “The Importance of Morale,” The Journal of Educational Sociology vol. 15, no. 4, (1941), 195–205. https://doi.org/10.2307/2262466, accessed 14 May 2022.

  15. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/02/us-rejects-calls-regulating-banning-killer-robots, accessed 04 April 2022.

  16. William R. Rubel, “Leave No One Behind,” Journal of Military Ethics vol. 3, no. 3 (2004), 252-256. http://doi: 10.1080/15027570410006228, accessed 15 April 2022.

  17. Captain P Rajkumar (Retd) is a legendary Indian naval helicopter pilot famed for heroic helicopter rescue missions in natural calamities. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for a daredevil night time rescue mission off Kochi during Cyclone ‘Okhi” in 2017.

  18. Stockdale, Op Cit., n.1, 118.

  19. Martin Cook, “Thucydides as a Resource for Teaching Ethics and Leadership,” Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 5, no. 4 (2006), 353-362.

  20. Mark E. Lewis, The Just War in Early China (London: Routldge, 2005).