In 2017, the word ‘Jugaad’ officially made an entry into the Oxford English dictionary and was defined as “a flexible approach to problem solving that uses limited resources in an innovative way.”1 This art of problem solving - using limited means but an innovative mindset is increasingly gaining global recognition as a valid approach to innovation. Jugaad epitomises frugal ‘work-arounds,’ which can lead to outstanding results and is largely driven by the end-users themselves. The term was detailed in the Harvard Business Review Blog in 2010 and described as “a creative improvisation - within a framework of deep knowledge and experience.”2

The Indian Navy recently launched the Naval Innovation and Indigenisation Organisation (NIIO) in August 2020.3 The expectations from the organization are high. The Indian Navy’s foray into indigenisation in the 1960s - when a decision was taken to construct a frigate indigenously - reaped rich dividends, not only for the Navy but, indeed, at the national level. Hundreds of thousands of jobs today are a direct outcome of that decision over half a century ago. Therefore, this conscious effort by the Navy to inculcate innovation and target the ‘to fight’ component is obviously being closely watched.

Whether the fledgling organisation can deliver on the promise and sustain in the long term, or whether it will degenerate into a ‘self-licking ice cream cone,’ would largely depend upon how well we recognise our strengths and weaknesses.4 We need to put in place processes to build upon our strengths whilst managing to overcome the limitations. The biggest strength of the Indian Navy when it comes to innovations is, arguably, jugaad. Yet, it is a term that we ourselves are not comfortable with, and which is also sometimes perceived as having negative connotations.

When the presentation on the aims of the NIIO was being prepared, to brief the apex naval leadership during the Naval Commanders’ Conference, ‘promoting a culture of jugaad and grass-root innovation’ was listed as one of the aims. The word was initially placed in italics and eventually removed as the presentation went through multiple rounds of review before being shown to the intended audience. Diffidence in recognising an Indian concept that has been our core strength need to be, similarly, overcome. Even if there are certain negative connotations to the word, the elements that suit us can be refined and put to use. The word itself needs to be accepted, not only in our lexicon, but also in our quest for innovation. Jugaad needs to be de-italicized!

The placement of the word in italics and its eventual removal from the NIIO presentation are, both, also indicative of what may, perhaps, be our biggest weakness - ‘The Frozen Middle’(the term is used to describe the impediment to innovation by middle level management. The effects of the same in the Indian Naval context have been discussed in detail later). This article aims to take a look at our strengths and weaknesses, not only within the Navy but also at the larger national level, to make a case for unshackling the NIIO to permit it to work both, ‘within’ and ‘outside’ the system.

Understanding Jugaad - A Core Strength

Historically, the Indian Navy has used jugaad gainfully and many examples can be cited of how it has helped to give us an operational edge. Jugaad is not limited to technology alone and can indeed be in operational planning, and even execution. Towing the missile boats to launch the famous attack on Karachi harbour in the 1971 War was jugaad at its best.

To take another fine example of jugaad, we can study the placement of sonobuoys atop the masts of ships, which was undertaken during Op Parakram in 2002 when an India-Pakistan military standoff took place, after the terrorist attack by Pakistan raised terror groups on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, on 13 December 2001. Since the problem this jugaad aimed to solve has since been removed through institutional mechanisms, the story can now be told. The Indian Armed Forces - including the Navy - field equipment from a number of countries. Interoperability and compatibility between equipment is, thus, often a challenge. During Op Parakram, the issue of incompatibility between the IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) of Russian and Western origin was a major constraint. A simple, yet effective, ‘hack’ was to place sonobuoys atop ships. Since the Russian origin Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) could receive the position of the sonobuoys, they would be able to identify ships so fitted as friendly! Other than the negligible cost of the sonobuoys (which are disposable as it is), all that this jugaad required was a power source to be plugged-in to keep the sonobuoys transmitting even when not in water. A seemingly insurmountable technical problem had been instantly solved, at virtually no cost, with results which could match the expectations of the users. This is creative thinking. This is jugaad!

US-based French innovation strategist of Indian origin, Navi Radjou, who popularised the term in the West and is one of the authors of the book Jugaad Innovation: Think Frugal, Be Flexible, Generate Breakthrough Growth, said in an interview, “Everyone says we need to produce more PhDs. We need the PhDs, but we need to also be comfortable with the MacGyver stuff. The term is based on the title character of a 1985 television series.5 Angus "Mac" MacGyver, the protagonist of the series, is often shown finding simple yet elegant solutions to problems using existing resources. The term "MacGyver" in colloquial American English lexicon is the equivalent of the Indian Jugaad.”

As per Radjou, the three key weaknesses of the US innovation system are that it is expensive, elitist (only a few scientists innovate) and inflexible (taking very long to deliver).6 There is, nonetheless, little doubt that the US system has produced some outstanding results. Equally, there is little doubt that replicating the same in the Indian context may prove to be difficult - if not impossible - as the underlying factors that make the US system successful may be missing in the Indian context. Therefore when we debate whether a ‘Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-like’ organization is feasible in India, we must first acknowledge that our R&D budget (to take just one factor) may never match up. It would, therefore, be prudent for us to look for a methodology more suited to our context. This could possibly include harnessing jugaad, which has been our strength - not only in the Navy but at the national level.

Jugaad as an approach to innovation need not imply concentrating only on low-level modifications or cutting-corners. Jugaad can equally effectively be utilized for big projects as well. Again, to take an example, Computational Research Laboratories (CRL), a subsidiary of the Tata group, developed Eka (meaning the number one in Sanskrit) in 2007, which was then the fourth fastest computer in the world. Using standard components, a novel near circular design for the computing core, off-the-shelf servers, dual data rate fiber-optic technology and the Linux operating system, the supercomputer achieved the same result as the best in the business, but at a fraction of the cost.7 The jugaad did not end at the hardware itself, but was carried forward to the use that the computer was put to. CRL was one of the first organisations to offer superconducting as a service, with over 40 companies, including Boeing and Tata Motors, renting the capability.8

On the flip side, the word jugaad may also have the connotation of compromising on quality. Detractors of jugaad claim that, “It is an instinct of someone living in scarcity and in a survival mode.”9 This is certainly true to an extent, but it is debatable if the underlying themes behind jugaad (low cost, broad-based, result-oriented) are worth discarding on this basis alone. CK Prahalad (former Paul and Ruth McCracken Distinguished University Professor of Strategy at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business) and RA Mashelkar (former Director General of India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) writing on the subject stated that they preferred the term ‘Gandhian Innovation’ to jugaad, since the latter may have negative connotations of compromising on quality.10 The twin traits of ‘affordability’ and ‘sustainability,’ which were valued by the Mahatama, are an integral part of the jugaad methodology.

Building on Our Strengths

Other than jugaad, there are some other factors that we can use to our benefit. These offer us an advantage and, coupled with our inherent innovative streak, can be game-changers in the years to come.

The changing nature of warfare itself may be an advantage for us. It is often said that India transitioned from the agricultural age to the information age without spending enough time in the industrial age. We never developed the requisite expertise in manufacturing to the level desired, to be able to produce state-of-the-art weapon systems. Even when we had the know-how as well as the know-why, we sometimes lacked the infrastructural base that was necessary to achieve the level of precision in manufacturing. Even Transfer of Technology (ToT), therefore, often remained only on paper. Limitations in our metallurgy (to take an example) just did not permit us to produce some systems. That is now changing to our advantage. As the world discovers that the next wars will increasingly be fought with Artificial Intelligence, autonomous systems and in the cyber domain, the gap between us and the most advanced nations has suddenly narrowed. It is important that we do not let this become another missed opportunity.

Proliferation of technology, which is more accessible to all nations and not limited to a select elite club, is another factor that can be an advantage for India. Swarm drones can produce the same results (or possibly even better) than could hitherto be produced only by high-end missiles. The technology is not only easier to develop indigenously, and customisable for specific user requirements, but is also relatively cheaper and has a much shorter development cycle. Technology as an equaliser is an advantage.

The involvement of ‘end users’ in innovation has been well established in the Indian Navy. The term ‘users’ is, however, difficult to define. As far as the industry or even the DRDO is concerned, any naval officer would be an ‘end user.’ The actual young officer or sailor specializing on a particular system would probably understand the ‘pain-points’ better than the more senior uniformed personnel at Naval or Command Headquarters. Whilst experience and seniority have no substitute, neither does ‘hands-on’ and ‘current-on-the-job’ experience. Fortunately, the Navy has had a culture of grass root level innovation. With the shift to the operator-maintainer concept and the emerging new breed of technologically aware operators, this advantage will only become more pronounced in the days to come. We need to put in place the correct systems to capitalise on this.

Next, we have the advantage of scale. Any innovation needs numbers to be commercially viable. Innovations undertaken in-house by the Navy, or even by the private sector companies in India, have a large market within the country. If the technology is dual-use and has civil applications as well, it is even better. This is a major advantage, but one that we have not yet fully capitalised on. The large market size itself provides scope of partnering with foreign firms with niche technology, who may prefer ‘Make in India’ not only for the lower manufacturing costs but also as a means to enter the huge market. This infusion of technology, even whilst not directly being innovation by itself, can nonetheless indirectly benefit us and help build the ecosystem that has been lacking.

Lastly, the early thrust on indigenisation by the previous generations of naval officers has created an ecosystem that is relatively well developed as compared to the sister services. Even after the shift away from the industrial age, highlighted above, some manufacturing capability would be required. The Navy has a clear advantage here, in the public as well as the private sector.

Limiting the Bottlenecks

The biggest bottleneck to in-house innovation in our context would possibly be the procedures, which are by design ‘risk-averse.’ Failure is inherent to innovation and no ‘High Powered Committee’ will put money in a risky proposition. The ‘L1’ bidder may not be the ideal choice when it comes to problem solving. Even the limited budget available for R&D can often not be optimally utilised due to procedural bottlenecks. This is a major limiting factor, which must be addressed on priority. The other major disadvantage, could be the ‘frozen middle.’ The term is often used in the context of corporate innovation, and is also increasingly being used by the US Department of Defence (DoD) to describe barriers to innovation.11 This is not unique to the Indian Navy. The US Navy Chief of Naval Operation’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), for example, which was set up to fast track induction of technology in the Navy and also build a culture of innovation, was only partially successful, despite being steered at the very apex level. The ‘frozen middle’ was possibly to blame.12

In any organisation, the apex leadership would be keen on innovation as they desire the benefits that can accrue. The innovators themselves would be keen on innovation since the idea originated from them. Their ideas can often not ‘bubble up’ to the apex level due to the ‘frozen middle,’ who are often risk-averse and career oriented. Innovation carries an element of risk and is, therefore, not suited to the ‘staff process.’ This must be acknowledged and systematically mitigated for innovation to succeed.

The ‘middle,’ by definition, are the personnel who both give - and implement - orders. This would, of course, be true at any level in the officer cadre. The ‘middle’ may, therefore, be seen as the officers who can push through the actual implementation of a new idea or, conversely, nip it in the bud. In hierarchical organizations like the armed forces, this ‘middle’ is very often quite senior in rank. Again, this is not something unique to the Indian Navy. In the US Naval context, for example, it has been opined that, “Without exception, those who have a tendency to resist innovation, and the power to do something about it, are the senior managers in the Navy. This group is the ‘frozen middle’ of the Navy. It is both the group that is most resistant to change, and also the group that is most needed to carry forward change.”13 This military bureaucracy is a strong proponent of routine, repetitive, orderly action, which goes against the very spirit of innovation.14 The frozen middle is used to giving (also taking and implementing) orders. Innovation, on the other hand, “is outside this capability. The order to innovate is likely to be ambiguous because what is being ordered is not some familiar, well-defined task, but something that has never been done before.”15

The three tiered structure envisaged for the NIIO will hopefully help overcome the problem of the ‘frozen middle.’ The only other option would be to identify key individuals within the ‘frozen middle’ who are not frozen. Such people can not only act as technology evangelists but also facilitators for innovation. They may not be innovators themselves, but can be useful enablers for the innovators. The nominated members of the NIIO (who will be individually selected regardless of rank) may be useful for fitting in this role.

Learning from History

NIIO is not the first organisation the Indian Navy is setting up with a focused aim. Many other organisations have been set up - including for innovation - and have shown good results, albeit to varying degrees. Weapons and Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE) and Directorate of Network Centric Operations (DNCO) are two such examples that have delivered beyond expectations but which, possibly, also became victims of their own success as they evolved.

Some of the initial successes and the most outstanding achievements of WESEE - when it was set-up - centred on jugaad. The problem of interoperability between systems from disparate sources, for example, was solved by WESEE through initiatives such as the Modular Interface for Shipborne Systems (MISS) Box, which converted between inputs and outputs for various different systems within a ship. The Indian Navy’s official website, today, takes pride in stating that “WESEE is the first defence service organisation to achieve CMMI Maturity Level 3 Rating for software development and maintenance projects. This has demonstrated our ability to deliver world class systems complying with international standards.”16 In our quest for complying with standards, did we also lose the inherent maverick streak which has served us so well? Is it desirable, or even feasible, to put ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking into a neat organizational box? There may be no easy answers.

Another organization that took birth from the culture of jugaad was the DNCO. The history of the Indian Navy records that, “the Navy’s yearning to graduate to network centricity spurred a band of young Indian naval officers to innovate through self-education and experimentation.”17 It further acknowledges that, “Trigun changed the way the Indian Navy operated at sea (Trigun was the name given to the Sensor Grid Application designed in-house by a team of naval officers at DNCO).” Given that the organisation had achieved success beyond what was imagined at the time of its creation, this should have been reason enough to nurture the innovative spirit of self-education and experimentation that led to the creation of DNCO. Did that really happen?

NIIO is another organization created with the aim of harnessing the innovative streak - or, to put it bluntly, the demonstrated ability of jugaad at the individual level. Whether it will sustain depends on how it is handled now and in the future. Institutionalising jugaad is good, but it comes with its own drawbacks.

We have to acknowledge, and guard against, what Williamson Murray commented on in the US context, “Courses on innovation, or offices of innovation, or even the creation of innovation specialties within the services will only draw individuals interested in a safe ‘career’ niche, rather than the driving, imaginative crusaders for innovation. If anything, such efforts to institutionalize innovation will inhibit rather than foster the process...The bureaucratization of innovation - particularly in the current framework of the US military - guarantees its death.”18

Conclusion

It must be accepted that whilst innovation is often enthusiastically discussed, and terms like Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are bandied about in militaries worldwide, they are “tradition-bound and rather conservative with regard to (major) military innovations and are, therefore, not quick to adopt new technologies.”19 The initial attempts to introduce wireless communication into the US Navy (in 1899), which were resisted for over 15 years, amply show how a technology that is radical will be resisted, even when its benefits are - or at least ought to be - obvious.20 On the other hand, it is also true that, “militaries that have failed to innovate have often suffered at the hands of competitors who have more effectively developed and employed new warfighting abilities.”21 We have to make a choice. The liberty of making a wrong choice may not be with us.

The NIIO has just been setup. It remains to be seen how the new organisation will develop. Keeping its focus on the aim identified and systematically removing the bottlenecks would be the key. We also need to build upon our strengths. The problems being faced and the changes required should be openly and honestly debated. It is time that these are handled upfront.

With apologies to Lewis Carroll, 

The time has come, the Walrus said,

To talk of many things:

Of innovation- and ships - and sealing-wax -

Of cabbages - and kings-

And, how the frozen middle must be dismantled

- And, whether Jugaad is such a bad thing!

Endnotes

  1. https://www.lexico.com/definition/jugaad, accessed 28 September 2020.

  2. Navi Radjou, Jaideep Prabhu and Simone Ahuja, “Jugaad: A New Growth Formula for Corporate America,” Harvard Business Review, Blog Network, 25 January 2010. https://hbr.org/2010/01/jugaad-a-new-growth-formula-fo, accessed 28 September 2020.

  3.  Press Information Bureau, Government of India press release.https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1645549, accessed 28 September 2020.

  1. S. Pete Worden, “On Self-Licking Ice Cream Cones,” Cool stars, stellar systems, and the sun, Proceedings of the 7th Cambridge Workshop, ASP Conference Series, vol. 26 (ASP: San Francisco, 1992), 599.

  2. Philip McClellan, “Is Jugaad Going Global?,” The New York Times, India Blogs, 11 October 2012. https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/is-jugaad-going-global/, accessed 28 September 2020.

  3. Ibid.

  4. CK Prahalad and RA Mashelkar, “Innovation’s Holy Grail,” Harvard Business Review, Blog Network, July–August 2010. https://hbr.org/2010/07/innovations-holy-grail, accessed 28 September 2020.

  5. Ibid.

  6. Rahul Balyan, “India needs to abandon the ‘Jugaad’ mindset,” Reflections - A marketer's worldview blog. https://www.rahulbalyan.com/2012/11/india-needs-to-abandon-the-jugaad-mindset/, accessed 28 September 2020.

  7. Prahalad and Mashelkar, Op Cit., n.7.

  8. Jason Knudson, “The Frozen Middle and the CRIC,” USNI Blog, 19 February 2016. https://blog.usni.org/posts/2016/02/19/the-frozen-middle-and-the-cric, accessed 28 September 2020.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Ibid.

  11. SP Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2.

  12. Ibid., 10-11.

  13. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/wesee-achieves-cmmi-maturity-level-3-rating, accessed 28 September 2020.

  14. VAdm Anup Singh, Blue Waters Ahoy! – The Indian Navy 2001-2010 (Noida: Harper Collins India, 2018).

  15. W. Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. W. Murray and AR Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300-328.

  16. Haico te Kulve and Wim A. Smit, “Novel naval technologies: Sustaining or disrupting naval doctrine,” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77, 2010, 999–1013.

  17. SJ Douglas, “Technological Innovation and Organizational Change: The Navy's Adoption of Radio, 1899–1919,” Military Enterprise and Technological Change, ed. MR Smith, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 117–173.

  18. John J. Garstka, “A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development,” Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation Interactions and Innovations among People, Organizations, Processes, and Technology, Derrick Neal et al. (Washington: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2009), 21-54.