Introduction

Information is a vital instrument of National Power. Nations pursue Information Operations (IO) towards achieving their operational and strategic goals. Given the rapid rise of China and its growing hegemonistic moves, the question arises if it is time for the US to undertake ‘Cooperative Information Operations’ (CIO) with allies and like-minded nations to challenge it. This question and the overall issue are considered important as Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea (SCS) and Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) could adversely affect the littoral nations and US interests in the region.

The fact that IO are pursued individually by nations to achieve their national interests makes the concept of CIO unique. However, it has been in practice across the globe, in various situations, but has never been publicly acknowledged as such. The article explores CIO via collaborative use of the information domain executed through intelligence operations, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and psychological operations to counter Chinese state-sponsored propaganda and information manipulation. Effective utilisation of information as a weapon is the heart of the argument. However, contrary to the standard concept of information operations, CIO would include collective application of the whole gamut of instruments of national power by the participating nations. This could be with a specific focus on information to counter China’s employment of military, economic and information instruments of power to progress its narrative for its domestic audience as well as for the broader audience in the IPR. The ‘participating nations’ could include like-minded nations currently undertaking their version of such operations at strategic and operational levels like the US, India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, etc.

Background

China’s mindset of innate superiority, territorial expansion and hegemony have historical linkages. Chinese emperors considered themselves godly creatures destined to rule the world. In the modern era, since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has been embroiled in about eighteen border disputes, both maritime and land. These are with its immediate neighbours including India, erstwhile USSR/ present-day Russia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, etc.1 The SCS disputes, arising out of Chinese maritime ambitions in the region and essentially at the cost of its maritime neighbours, further demonstrate its hegemonic trait.2 China’s rejection of the Arbitration Tribunal’s ruling on the dispute with the Philippines, construction of artificial islands, claiming of all waters within the nine-dash line, etc., are indicators of China’s aggrandizement. Regional nations that are affected seem to be pursuing their distinct ways of countering these expansionist tendencies. While a few seem to have reconciled to the situation, nations like India, Japan and Vietnam have openly made their displeasure with Chinese high-handedness known. They are pursuing numerous ways of countering it by employing various instruments of power. While the United States may be considered an extra-regional power, it is irrevocably interlinked with the events and situation in this vital region and is hence also affected by growing Chinese hegemony.3

The Chinese have effectively implemented a strategy of incrementally changing geography in the SCS by coercive tactics and fortifying disputed island structures. China aims to advance its sphere of influence in Asia by exploiting these territorial gains as pressure points to seek favourable outcomes on contentious economic or diplomatic issues by leveraging its power through international initiatives and institutions. Beijing’s economic power, the export of its politico-economic agenda, and its influence within international organisations also impede the foreign policies of regional nations like India and Vietnam. Importantly, as part of its information campaign, China showcases its political model as the “most successful and best-run” system and an alternative to democracy for increasing prosperity in the IPR.4

The strategy to counter Beijing’s predatory advances in the region should primarily employ means short of war coordinated amongst regional actors in the IPR. One of the strategies could be the effective use of the information instrument of power to gain a strategic advantage over China and regain confidence in the littorals. A key tool towards this strategy could be gainfully employing IO, particularly the novel concept of CIO, integrating the collective strength of information operation tools of allies and partners in the IPR.

Cooperative Information Operations (CIO)

Information Warfare (IW) is a complex form of warfare with different strategies, techniques, weapons, and defences.5 At the heart of IW is that information or data is used as a weapon. It requires modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content to shape perceptions, manage opinions and control behaviour. The availability of low-cost, high technology permits non-governmental organisations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own and facilitates damaging cyber-attacks on computer networks and infrastructure.6

CIO, as a concept, as far as can be discerned, is yet to be applied in national strategies against potential adversaries. The standard component of strategic information operations like disinformation, narrative campaigns, propaganda, etc., can all be applied collectively by nations against a common adversary. Collaborative Operations using various tools available within a country like social media and other online tools can influence target audiences amongst the civilian population.7 The limited scope of utilising internal resources ‘collaboratively’ against a target audience could be extrapolated to a broader concept of CIO across various sectors amongst allies/partners in the IPR against a targeted audience within the PRC.

Within the scope of IO, influence operations set the ‘narrative’ for the target audience’s consumption. The effects of influence operations are vital in determining the victor in future wars through the ability to shape perceptions and, therefore, the opinions of a target audience, which could be as critical as the ability to deliver kinetic energy.8 Sound influence operations include the protection of our own civil audience against the enemy’s narrative campaigns. Simultaneously, effective narrative campaigns against the enemy’s civilian audience must also be planned and mounted. In addition to the intelligence community, it is vital to empower civil audience with better sense-making tools. These arguments form a critical line of effort for collaborative influence campaigns that can be pursued against China by allies/partners of the US in the IPR.

China’s Information Warfare Campaign

China aims to achieve its national interests and strategic goals using information warfare based on its strategic heritage. China is engaging in a long-drawn strategy in the information warfare domain, with an abundance of patience and deception intertwined. It seems to believe in the philosophy of “unrestricted warfare” - attack, subvert, destroy the enemy by any means possible, loosely based on Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ of ‘playing the enemy without actual combat while advancing own interests and capabilities.’ Further, China’s policies advocate using political warfare, defined as ‘compelling an opponent to do one’s will,’ and involve operations to influence an opponent’s government, people, individuals, organisations or groups. The Chinese government is known to be employing this tool effectively over the past decades and more recently while propagating the multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, China has been actively employing coercive psychological warfare comprising discrediting national leadership, isolation of a nation and spreading chaos.9

In tandem with this approach, it also spends vast monetary resources on disinformation campaigns through the media. Disinformation can threaten democracy, mainly when perpetrated through social media platforms with broad reach and visibility. Malicious actors can mount disinformation campaigns with a systematic approach to target key vulnerabilities of social media platforms. Within the IPR, the Chinese are known to sponsor fake news through Chinese social media apps in regional countries, like India, to spread religious disharmony and in Taiwan to create unrest.

Further, the Chinese IW strategy employs extending and asserting its influence over various institutions like political parties, politicians, social media and media outlets, universities, research institutes, etc., by funding them and eliciting pro-China narratives and outcomes through them. China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), described by Xi Jinping as China’s “magic weapon,” is at the heart of China’s actions. Through the UFWD, American schools, businesses, politicians, and civil society institutions become unknowingly susceptible to Beijing’s malign hand.10 Further, the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA), sponsored by the Chinese government, politically mobilises Chinese students studying abroad at various campuses in support of Beijing’s foreign policy.11

Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese government has expanded its footprint in the region through influence operations. For example, in India, it has effectively advanced its influence to various institutions and sectors like financial markets, academia, NGOs, media, tech industry, films, and political parties, mainly through its money power and economic institutions. China uses this extension of its soft power diplomacy to weaken the Indian state from within.12 Similar strategies are known to be used by the Chinese in other countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, etc. Australia as an American ally in an increasingly contested IPR, made it an attractive target for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By side lining Australia from taking an active part in efforts to constrain its maritime behaviour, China could sharply undercut American regional leadership and strengthen China’s hand in pursuing its ambitions in the IPR.13

All these strategies align with China’s steadfast pursuit of its vision of becoming a superpower by 2049, its centenary year. That China is willing to achieve this feat at the cost of other nations is well supported by facts and trends. The primary victim of this strategy is the United States due to its pre-eminent position as the global leader in various spheres.14 Thus, in a way, China poses an existential threat to the US through its relentless IW campaign and hence the critical importance for the America to successfully counter this threat by identifying, deterring, and defeating China’s campaign.15

Opportunities for a Cooperative Approach

The current response to the threats of Chinese IO by the affected nations, except Australia, has been insignificant. The potential impact of IO would form the basis for evolving a strategy to counter Chinese influence operations. For example, when the media widely circulated the extent of Chinese influence operations in Australia, a vibrant public debate arose, and public opinion shifted starkly against China. On the political front, Australia acted swiftly. Campaign finance, counter-interference and espionage laws were enacted in 2018 that banned foreign donations, created transparency and disclosure requirements for lobbyists or others acting on behalf of foreign governments, and led to toughened sanctions and enforcement provisions.16 Alongside the counter-interference laws, strategy formulation helped negate emerging cases of foreign interference. Australia’s strong democratic culture and political will effectively countered Chinese influence operations.

The real potential of IO is more powerful and comprehensive than currently appreciated. The United States should lead the effort in bringing amicable allies and partners in the region together for a comprehensive CIO. It needs to use its enormous IO advantage to deal with complex national security issues in swaying global opinion and influencing other populations.17 It should execute IO to counter the false Chinese narrative that the US is engaged in a “win-lose” great power competition to stop China’s manifest destiny of becoming a superpower. This crucial instrument seems to be missing in the existing approach of US strategic competition. As an authoritarian regime, China fears losing control over an expanding middle-class population and expectations for better jobs, freedom, and living standards.18 Another Chinese concern is keeping the CCP in power by sustained economic growth.19

A combined communications strategy paradigm should be synergized to counter China’s information domain and its three warfare principles of psychological, public/media and lawfare to pressure China to moderate its behaviour. These efforts could undermine China’s legitimacy in international and domestic circles and increase the political costs of its continued predatory activities. Moreover, the buy-in of the “China threat” theory, especially among the coastal nations on the rim of the Indian Ocean, is critical to deterring China from expanding its influence in the IPR based on authoritarian and predatory policies. Consequently, by cooperating in niche domains like cyber, information and space, the United States would remain preeminent in the IPR and take the leading role in maintaining and expanding security in the region.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the US, India, Australia, and Japan, has been a strategic dialogue between the nations since 2007. While the construct was dormant, with intermittent meetings in the initial years, the engagement has intensified in the last 5-6 years, owing to the hegemonic rise of China. While a few see the Quad as an anti-China alliance concentrated explicitly in the Indo-Pacific region, the member nations have never explicitly named China in their public statements. The Quad summit held in Sep 2021 in Washington DC focused on common issues like the COVID-19 pandemic, infrastructure, global health and climate change. It also looked at enhanced level of security partnerships and the increasing complexity of the Malabar naval exercise, an enhanced interest and collaboration between the member nations.20 There is a perceptible overhanging manifestation of China in the Quad’s core initiatives, with the palpable Chinese presence in all issues, whether diplomatic or military. Quad provides an alternative to smaller states in the Indo-Pacific region which currently are faced with a dilemma of ‘China or nothing’.

Counter-influencing, which involves promoting unhelpful information, prepositioning or making intrusions into an adversary state’s digital and information infrastructure, is another tool that could be collaborative and aid in effective IO against China. Vietnam-based ‘Force 47’, a highly potent and apparently the largest and most sophisticated influence network in Southeast Asia, could be harnessed towards cooperative influence operations within the domain of information operations.21 Similarly, India’s vast IT talent pool resident needs to be harnessed efficiently in the stance against China in the information domain. With its advanced IT infrastructure, Japan could contribute effectively to this initiative by providing requisite IT foundations. Other like-minded nations like South Korea, the Philippines, etc., could participate in these efforts by contributing towards intelligence operations, media activities, etc.

Way Ahead

To counter Chinese IO, a strategy of CIO would need to be developed which is proactive, affordable, practical, amenable, and of course, effective. The first step towards countering Chinese IO would be reciprocity, reviving which is stated as a fundamental step by the US Department of State.22 The US and its regional allies and partners need to reinforce the perception that any adverse effects on their interests by any country would not be accepted and that the favour would be returned in kind. For the CIO strategy to be long-term and effective, actions would need to be holistic, comprehensive and all-encompassing, rather than being restricted to counter IO in order to build resiliency amongst all affected nations. A four-pronged strategy is recommended within the domain of CIO to include the following: -

  • Building/Strengthening alliances and partnerships

  • Defensive IO

  • Offensive IO

  • Engaging from a position of strength

Building/Strengthening alliances and partnerships. The most vital aspect of the CIO is building and strengthening alliances and partnerships to counter the Chinese IO collectively. Deterrence can be achieved when affected nations present a united front against Chinese aggression. Responding to Chinese IO starts with the will and ability to resist it. The US needs to take the lead and encourage and extol like-minded nations in the IPR to respond to the emergent situation collectively. Alliances and partnerships could deepen and expand into areas of cooperation like intelligence sharing, collective defence against cyberattacks, and AI/ML. Nations should cooperate with specialisations based on each of their strengths and weaknesses. Examples of the Five Eyes nations renewing their focus on countering China could be emulated in the region with other like-minded nations like India, Japan, China, Vietnam, South Korea, etc. Informal ‘alliances’ like Quad with other littorals are recommended to progress such collaborations into various relevant spheres.

Defensive IO. A significant step towards achieving an efficient level of CIO is the proverbial ‘setting own house in order’ by each nation of the alliance/ partnership. Domestic resilience and vigilance are the most robust defence against IO. The primary step would be to identify vital domestic vulnerabilities and address them, be it technological enhancements to counter offensive IO, domestic counter-narratives, educating domestic populations, strategic narratives, etc. A cooperative way of undertaking this would be most efficient as nations can leverage each other’s resources and strengths and also in identifying and addressing their critical vulnerabilities against Chinese IO. Nations could also harness the efforts of private organisations and companies within their own countries or their alliance or partner countries.

Cyberspace is a major source of Chinese IO, through which the CCP creates disinformation and injects it into public discourse. By taking the help of social media companies like Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc., disinformation and fake news can be tagged and deleted before infiltrating the general public. Further, nations could collaborate with social media companies and other like-minded nations to share nation-specific information and experience with Chinese IO for better awareness and counteractions. While such interactions between governments and social media companies have not always been fruitful, it is a line of action that should be pursued in right earnest for the concept of CIO to be successful.

Offensive IO. It is premised that the Chinese IO intends to export its governance model and push new norms for a new international order. However, CCP’s efforts seem to mix exuding outward confidence with inherent inner apprehensions. In that sense, China’s IO and domestic politics of suppression are two sides of a coin. The aim of offensive IO should be to expose China’s coercive and manipulative behaviour, disrupt CCP’s narrative about a benevolent China, and provide access to credible news and information sources to counter CCP’s narrative. The initiative should focus on the Chinese audience, namely domestic and global Chinese speaking youth and the disenfranchised.

The first step would be breaching the Chinese ‘Great Firewall’ to reach out to the domestic audience, strengthen critical Chinese opinions and enable truthful information about internal affairs and proceedings within China to be heard domestically. China’s widespread human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet are unfamiliar to the Chinese public. Publicising the truth about the CCP’s control over public discourse would aid in debunking myths about its leadership, who deny fundamental rights to their citizens while stacking their wealth overseas and sending their children to elite universities abroad. Externally, the offensive IO must expose to the international community the truth regarding the CCP’s domestic strategy and its ongoing genocide in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Outer Mongolia to destroy non-Han speaking cultures. In addition, it should expose the CCP’s rejection of a rules-based international order, including the UNCLOS provisions in the SCS, in order to build diplomatic pressure on China towards stalling its gray zone activities in the SCS.

Engaging China from a Position of Strength. The overall aim of the CIO strategy should be to effectively blunt Chinese IO and not to destabilise China internally. The goal is for a rule-based region, with an amenable China enhancing the overall prosperity in IPR. For that ideal situation to develop, it is imperative that nations collectively engage with China from a position of strength. This position is deemed achievable by developing and implementing this strategy of CIO to counter the current, IO by the Chinese. Achieving a position of strength individually would be a tedious, resource-draining and long-drawn effort for any nation, including the US. However, collectively achieving this position of strength would be relatively more straightforward, provided like-minded nations resolve to deliberate, evolve, and implement this strategy collectively.

It is pertinent that CIO be undertaken with a few rules of the road as guidance to ensure meeting of the prescribed objectives and preventing an overkill. While subject matter experts would chart a detailed course to steer, it could be prudent to consider target-audience vulnerabilities. The other rules of the road should include sticking with facts, taking responsibility for the facts, and calling out censorship/information manipulation. Further, sharing as much information as possible, not overreaching and mistaking goals for target-audience interests, not lying or shifting blame, not demonising, and not compromising the integrity of the overall operations would enhance the effectiveness of the IO. The underlying principle of CIO should be reaching out to the intended audiences through a process encapsulating truth, transparency and trust.

Conclusion

The rise of an increasingly hegemonic and authoritarian China under Xi Jinping is a direct challenge to the United States in the 21st Century and for several countries of the Indo-Pacific region. The US needs to pursue a strategy focusing on China’s domestic, economic, and institutional weaknesses, which must be fully coordinated with regional allies and partners to unite in response to China’s information warfare campaign. The need of the hour is to neutralise aggressive and unacceptable behaviour, counteract Chinese state’s inimical activities and prevent Chinese technology, currency, economy, and fake narrative from negative global influences. It solidifies the argument for a collaborative and cooperative approach to counter Chinese hegemony in the IPR.

China’s coercion should be targeted by employing the Information instrument of national power through the unique concept of cooperative information operations (CIO). Cooperating in the information domain will rob China of any competitive advantage and asymmetry upon the onset of a crisis. It is thus prudent for the US to undertake CIO with like-minded nations and allies in the IPR to challenge Chinese hegemony effectively. Adopting an asymmetric approach to nurture relationships with allies and partners would offset an authoritarian Chinese policy in the region.

The concept of CIO needs to be implemented through a deliberate four-pronged strategy: of building alliances and partnerships in the region, by undertaking defensive IO by each constituent nation of the partnership to build resiliency collectively and individually against Chinese IO and counter it through calibrated and efficient offensive IO. A cooperative and collaborative response can thus, be the best way for the US to protect its vital interests in the region and for the countries in the region to counter Chinese hegemony effectively.

Endnotes

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  1. Abhijit Singh, “Line in the Waters: The South China Sea Dispute and its Implications for Asia,” Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/line-in-the-waters-the-south-china-sea-dispute-and-its-implications-for-asia/, accessed 22 July 2022.

  2. Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China won’t Map the Future (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2020), 8-9.

  3. Editorial Board, “Exporting Xi Jinping Thought: How the Party Trains Foreign Politicians,” The Economist, 12 December 2020.

  4. “Information Warfare: What and How?”. https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~burnsm/InfoWarfare.html, accessed 22 June 2022.

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  2. Kate Starbird, Ahmer Arif and Tom Wilson, “Disinformation as Collaborative Work: Surfacing the Participatory Nature of Strategic Information Operations,” Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3, no. CSCW, 07 November 2019, 127, 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359229, accessed 25 July 2022.

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  3. Connor Fiddler, “A Strategy to Counter Chinese Influence Operations,” RealClearDefense, 17 December 2021. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/12/17/a_strategy_to_counter_chinese_influenc e_operations_808360.html, accessed 21 July 2022.

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  1. NC Bipindra, Mapping Chinese Footprints and Influence Operations in India (New Delhi: Law and Society Alliance, 2021).

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  4. Kerry Gershaneck, “To Win Without Fighting: Defining China’s Political Warfare,” Expeditions with MCUP, 17 June 2020. https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2020. 04.

  5. Op Cit., n.13.

  6. E Leigh Armistead, ed. Information Warfare: Separating Hype from Reality (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

  7. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations, 25 November 2019.

  8. Sally Paine and Bruce A. Elleman, Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644 to the Present (London: Rowman Littlefield, 2019), 315-316.

  9. Saheli Roy Choudhury, “The Quad Countries Pledge to Promote an Indo-Pacific Region That is ‘Undaunted by Coercion,” CNBC, 27 September 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/27/quad-leaders-summit-us-india-japan-australia-statement-on-indo-pacific.html, accessed 20 July 2022.

  10. James Pearson, “How Vietnam’s ‘Influencer’ Army Wages Information Warfare on Facebook,” Reuters, 09 July 2021.https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-vietnams-influencer-army-wages-information-warfare-faceb ook-2021-07-09/, accessed 20 July 2022.

  11. “Covert, Coercive, and Corrupting: Countering the Chinese Communist Party’s Malign Influence in Free Societies,” United States Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/covert-coercive-and-corrupting-countering-the-chinese-communist-partys-malign-influence-in-free-societies/, accessed 20 July 2022.