COMMAND AND CONTROLAT SEA: INSIGHTS ON NAVAL STRATEGY

Indian Naval Despatch Spring 2023 - Vol 4 No. 1 “Command of the Sea, Sea Control and Sea Denial in Contemporary Naval Warfare” by Cdr Prakash Gopal (Retd.) and Indian Naval Despatch Vol 4. No. 2 (Monsoon 2023). “Putting Sea Control and Sea Denial to Work” by Captain Raghvendra Mishra (Retd.) and “Clarifying Presence and Power Projection” by Captain Suraj James Rebeira.

It is remarkable to see the quality of engagement on “Both Watches,” as a forum for discussion and debate. It is heartening to see that such a platform like INDES is available, and importantly, being gainfully utilised for healthy debate.

I thank Captains Raghvendra Mishra (Retd.) and Suraj James Rebeira for their erudite comments and amplifying thoughts on my essay in the Spring 2023 issue of the Indian Naval Despatch. While agreeing with most of their thoughts, I have a couple of differing views and additional comments on some points.

The essays under discussion are “Command of the Sea, Sea Control and Sea Denial in Contemporary Naval Warfare,” by Cdr Prakash Gopal (Retd.), in Indian Naval Despatch, Spring 2023, Vol. 4 No. 1; and, in Vol. 4 No. 2 (Monsoon 2023), “Putting Sea Control and Sea Denial to Work,” by Captain Raghvendra Mishra (Retd.), and “Clarifying Presence and Power Projection,” by Captain Suraj James Rebeira.

There are two points of difference with Captain Mishra. The first is his assertion that “sea control need not be seen through a binary prism where one side has it and the other side doesn’t.” He makes this point in seeking to define the “ends” that are served by sea control and goes on to say that sea control is relative between two adversaries and that each may exert some degree of sea control concurrently, in the same area. However, I argue that if a naval force is not able to conduct the mission for which it sought sea control, then it doesn’t have it.

A naval force (say Blue Force) could seek to obtain sea control in an area for a specific mission, let’s say the safe passage of a ship or ships carrying critical cargo through a submarine probability area. Its efforts to establish sea control in that area could be contested by the adversary (Red Force). In some instances, Blue may not know if Red is contesting its effort to achieve sea control, but Blue has to assume and plan for such contestation. If, in these circumstances, the Blue Force can ensure the safe passage of its high-value asset, then it has sea control in the area, as evidenced by the achievement of its operational objective. If safe transit is jeopardised, then Blue’s efforts for sea control failed, and Red will succeed in its sea-denial mission if, for its purposes, Red did not need to use that area in time and space and it was adequate to merely deny or dent Blue’s degree of sea control. The success or failure of a sea-control mission will be governed by the fulfilment of the objective that sea control seeks to enable. In my view, Blue’s success does not mean it enjoyed a “relatively higher degree of control for operational purposes,” as suggested by Captain Mishra. I would characterise such a situation as Blue having achieved sea control and defeated Red’s efforts to deny the same.

The related point he raises is an important point of distinction, between two sides competing for sea control in the same area at the same time, versus one side attempting sea control and the other trying to deny it. It is in the case of the former that he suggests the notion of relative sea control. In the example quoted earlier, if Red had sought sea control in the same area and at the same time as Blue, and in doing so had thwarted (denied) Blue’s mission while succeeding in its own, it is then obvious that Red achieved sea control and, in the process, denied the same to Blue. But what if both Red and Blue succeeded in the missions for which they sought sea control? Did both sides achieve relative sea control? I am not sure if relativity is a consideration when both sides achieve their objectives. From the inevitable tactical engagement that would ensue in this scenario, one side may have emerged worse off than the other, which would impact the force’s ability in subsequent missions. But for this specific mission, both sides achieved what Milan Vego characterises as “disputed sea control” and maintained it long enough to complete their missions.¹ However, I think it is unlikely for two comparable naval forces to achieve sea control simultaneously in the same area. It is more probable that both sides will deny the use of that space to each other while engaging in a battle of attrition.

In the Second World War, I would posit that the Kriegsmarine was pursuing a strategy of denial through its “small war” approach, denying the Royal Navy the freedom of manoeuvre in northern Europe. While Hitler would have desired for his navy to prevail over the British, Admiral Raeder, his Commander-in-Chief of the navy, was under no such illusions.² The Kriegsmarine was contesting the Royal Navy’s command of the sea (not sea control) through this strategy, and both forces may have obtained and denied sea control on numerous occasions throughout the conflict (for instance, during each of the Allied convoy missions in the Atlantic and the German raids on them).

My second point of difference is with Capt Mishra’s assertion that command of the sea cannot be a peacetime entity, but instead is a theoretical “condition of absolute sea control from a binary standpoint.” I would argue that it may be theoretical only in times of conflict, but it is a valid state of being in peacetime. The Royal Navy enjoyed command of the sea through the colonial period and up to World War II. The US Navy enjoys command of the sea in the Atlantic and, arguably, in most of the Pacific Ocean. China is contesting the US Navy’s command of the sea and may have succeeded in the Western Pacific. What this implies is that the US Navy can operate freely, with little or no resistance, in all oceans except possibly the Western Pacific, where an increasingly belligerent and capable PLA Navy is beginning to challenge it. The difference between command of the sea and sea control is that the former is a passive, latent state of being that can certainly exist in peacetime, whereas the latter is an active wartime effort. We may consider command of the sea to be irrelevant if its exercise is relatively benign, as is the case now. However, if a state that enjoyed command of the seas was disruptive, as England was with its colonial exploits, or as China could be, should it get there, the presence and effects of command of the seas may be more discernible. Capt. Mishra refers to Milan Vego and states, “The ability of a navy to shape events and perceptions in a region stems not only from its qualitative and quantitative indicators but also from its presence, inter alia, including reach and sustenance, politico-strategic congruence and operational compatibility in terms of functional interoperability and equipment compatibility.” I submit that a navy that can demonstrate these facets would enjoy command of the sea in its maritime area of interest.

I agree entirely with Capt. Suraj James Rebeira’s discerning analysis of the difference between presence and power projection. I would only add to this the dangers of extrapolating presence to deterrence in peacetime. Deterrence is far more complex and operates at the political level, with naval presence being just an operational aspect of it. The will and ability to punish if deterrence fails requires to be communicated through multiple means, of which naval presence is a small facet. The ability to translate naval presence into effective sea control or sea denial operations is critical, and a vital measure of a naval force’s effectiveness.

Endnotes