“It’s not what you upload, it’s the strategy with which you upload”

Will Kenan

Introduction

Over the last six hundred years, developments in the field of Communication and Information Technology have seen significant transformation and exponential innovation. From the time of invention of the first printing press in 1440 in Germany, followed by the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th Centuries, to the advent of the Information Revolution in the 20th Century, communication and dissemination of information has metamorphosed in its reach, speed and content, representing the very essence of ‘globalisation’ and the ability to connect ‘every corner of the globe’ through concomitant development of mass media. Communication techniques, platforms, strategies, etc., have become the new buzzwords, which have been intertwined and integrated into the very fundamentals of doing business, be it in governments, public sector or private corporations. The ability to disseminate ideas, communicate effectively and influence public opinion have gained equal, if not more, importance than the core task of an organisation itself.

Amongst these rapid changes, and development of new information/ communication techniques and platforms, which are occurring at a blistering pace, armed forces across the world are facing constant change and transformation, and grappling with dilemmas of developing a relevant and suitable communication strategy between the ‘old’ closed, restrictive model of communication and the ‘new’ open and expressive one. These conflicting ideologies, therefore, pose significant challenges, which are more pronounced in large armed forces of democratic nations, as opposed to those of non-democratic nations where narratives are spun, thrust and weaved by the authoritarian power.

Large and Complex Structure and Organisation

One of the foremost challenges to developing a coherent communication strategy in armed forces is their size and complex structure, with units and personnel distributed across a vast geographic expanse. A study of the media organisation of the US Armed Forces would reveal the colossal network and organisational challenges, as well as magnitude of content coordinated by the Defense Media Activity (DMA) of the US Department of Defense (DoD). While the DMA handles the overall communication and information load of the DoD and the US Armed Forces, individual services (viz. US Navy, Army, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard) concurrently have their own media channels pollinated and managed through respective websites, Facebook pages, Twitter handles, Instagram, Snapchat Accounts, etc.

As another template, in the Indian context, the Directorate of Public Relations of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has 29 Defence Public Relations Officers (DPROs) or spokespersons (three at the respective Army, Navy, Air Force HQs, and 26 in the field), who are embedded in various formations across the country. These DPROs are representatives of the MoD, who are authorised to interact and coordinate media activities of the armed forces by leveraging strengths of both, national and international media. In summary, expansive military organisations result in creation of intricate channels of communication, with underlying hierarchical levels of authority, to clear content before it can be posted or shared. This has a bearing on the speed and efficiency demanded by modern communication and media handling.

The Challenge of Creating a Story for the Armed Forces

Communication strategy in the world of products and services deals with ‘branding’ and their associated stories. In the 21st Century, successful products have transcended from assessment parameters related to quality, durability, satisfaction or robustness, to being associated with their ‘story’ or the ‘values’ they stand for or represent, which goes deeper than judgements based on core utility of the product. Audiences now link and connect with products, which epitomize a narrative, a message or an idea. Therefore, the 21st Century content and communication strategies are now focussed on creation of narratives as the new form of mass communication.

This is evident from the campaigns associated with successful products like Apple, Coca Cola, Volkswagen, Toyota, Ikea, Walmart and many others, which have inspiring and appealing concepts, mantras and stories connecting them to their followers. Captive consumers of these products patronize them not only because of the qualitative satisfaction derived from their use, but also the values or essence that the brand projects or stands for.

Creation of the aforementioned stories and narratives in respect of a product or a service has quantifiable gains in monetary/ non-monetary terms. However, creation of a similar story for the armed forces, in accordance with the theory of the ‘Golden Circle’ posited by Simon Sinek, a British-born American author and motivational speaker, is quite a challenge. Simon’s Golden Circle theory deals with how great leaders communicate and inspire action, or how a company markets itself, and is based on three critical facets. ‘What’ an organisation does, ‘how’ it does it, and ‘why’ it does it.1 Sinek professes that leaders or organisations that communicate with target audiences on the ‘why’ component are likely to meet with greater success, as opposed to organisations that focus primarily on the ‘what’ and ‘how’ components. An illustration of this concept is ‘Apple,’ whose success can be attributed to the fact that it focusses on the ‘why’ component, which is “challenging the status quo” as its inspiration, when communicating with its buyers and captive consumers.

What are the end-products of an armed force, and how do we assess its quality in peacetime, when there is little or no threat to a nation (like the relevance or question on requirement of maintaining large armed forces being raised in European nations)? Why do we have an armed force, at all (beyond the standard national security question) and what does it represent or stand for? Since the what, how and why components of the armed forces lie in the surreal domain, attempting to align them with the Golden Circle Theory poses a considerable challenge. Notwithstanding the lack of quantifiable assessment of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ components in respect of armed forces, the ‘why’ component can still be effectively utilised by military leaders to motivate, encourage and inspire their followers. This was demonstrated by Martin Luther King Jr with his ability to influence huge masses in USA, utilising the ‘why’ component of his beliefs and ideologies, while linking leadership and communication.

Consequent to the challenges highlighted above, the material distributed by armed forces on their media platforms tend to be a well-produced narrative (in terms of content, quality, editing) of their daily activities, operations, initiatives, campaigns, messaging from senior leadership, contribution to civil society, except when the media managers and PROs are undertaking ‘risk communication’ with a targeted audience or segment of society, albeit without focus on a narrative, story or philosophy.

Another associated facet, linked to the size of armed forces, is the ‘number of stories’ that can be created for each individual service and organisation, unlike the ‘one specific story or narrative’ for ‘one product’ in the civil world. Further, since the armed forces in democratic countries are answerable to civilian leadership, the narrative or story of the civil administration and the armed forces have to be in consonance, to bring out a common and legitimate media product. The recent disconnect displayed between the higher echelons of the US Navy, particularly the Commanding Officer of the Theodore Roosevelt (Aircraft Carrier with Covid-19 cases) and the Acting Secretary of the Navy, is a burning example of inconsonance and clash of narratives between involved players. These have a direct bearing on the morale of men in uniform, and impact the image of the service and its internal management. Accordingly, this media consonance and synergy have to be accorded the highest care and attention, especially in the age of modern social media communication.

Predominance of Social over Conventional Media

An analysis of the media and communication strategies of armed forces with respect to utilisation of platforms would indicate that information and content distribution is predominantly based on web based/ social media platforms as opposed to conventional media, viz. television, print, audio, etc. One of the primary reasons for this is the reluctance of armed forces to utilise paid media, due to prohibitive costs as well as not owning a dedicated media channel. A study of communication platforms by armed forces across the world would indicate proliferation of web based/social media platforms as their primary channels of communication due to negligible cost, deeper penetration of the targeted audience and primary control over content. Since both, the web based and social media, largely remain unregulated fields, in contrast to conventional media, armed forces face the associated challenges of complexity, with every single smart phone and its owner having the potential to become a news generator.

Who is the Audience for Armed Forces?

The public and social marketing strategies of renowned and well-known products or services invest significant energy, science, time and effort in identifying the target audience for their deliverable products, with the aim of creating a captive market in an environment surfeit with competition and competing market strategies. Deep analysis of potential, available and penetrated markets is undertaken to formulate the story or narrative of a product that will appeal to the identified market. And finally, sales or market share are quantifiable milestones on assessing the success of the marketing strategy. Unfortunately, in the absence of methodology and wherewithal, except for probably population surveys or analysing number of hits, views or downloads of hosted material, there are no means to ascertain or infer the success, or lack thereof, of communication strategy of armed forces. The communication strategy of armed forces is aimed at three types of audiences:-

  • Internal Audience. This audience comprises policy makers at the apex level in the government involved with ‘matters defence’ as well as serving personnel in uniform. The focus is to keep abreast of developments, operations, initiatives, communication from senior leadership, as well as shape and educate the official environment.

  • External Audience. This audience comprises the general public as well as veterans of the armed forces. The messaging is focussed on all of the above, including ‘risk communication.’

  • International Audience. This segment comprises friendly foreign countries as well as adversaries, and the messaging strategy could be utilised for information warfare or strengthening of deterrence.

Content Challenges

As was illustrated in the challenges emanating from the size of an armed force, an associated problem area is ‘content.’ With the reduction of attention spans of audiences, emergence of new stories by the hour, proliferation of platforms, concept of “just enough information - just in time,” the ability to occupy the air waves in terms of both, volume and pace; all pose significant considerations in devising and formulating communication strategies in the armed forces. How much information to share, when to share, and at what pace to share, remain dominant aspects, while balancing the requirement between attracting ‘eye balls’ and risking ‘over exposure.’ Different services within the armed forces also have different communication strategies. Some may follow an ‘aggressive’ media doctrine, while others may choose to remain ‘low key,’ which may result in a virtual ‘competition of visibility’ between the services. The doctrine is also not inked in stone and the media philosophy of individual services witnesses ‘ebbs’ and ‘flows’ with frequent changes in the top leadership, who shape the direction, rate and magnitude of media engagement based on their own cognitive judgement and bias.

Even if a service develops a cogent, comprehensive and well-coordinated media strategy, issues with respect to censorship, control, verification and vetting of what can be said and what cannot, will remain a prime consideration. The underlying inhibition pertains to ‘when does information become intelligence’ and assist the adversary in ratifying information that may have already been obtained through traditional intelligence gathering sources and mechanisms.

Civil - Military Cohesive Communication

Media and communication strategies that are ‘in-sync’ with Government policies, narratives, initiatives and programmes tend to assist individual services in expansion and realisation of their future ‘force structuring’ and ‘capability’ as well as ‘capacity development plans.’ This strategy is being successfully utilised by the Indian Navy in supporting the Indian Prime Minister’s vision for Security And Growth for All in the Region (acronym SAGAR, which also means ‘Ocean’ in Hindi).2 It can be seen in the ‘Make in India’ initiative as well, to highlight its current capabilities and dovetail future infrastructure development and capacity/ capability induction plans to support these programmes.3

Risk Communication

The operating environment of the armed forces is replete with threats, risk and dangers, which are their occupational and professional hazards. Consequently, its personnel are trained to negotiate perils to keep the nation safe from external aggression and internal disorder. The armed forces are constantly involved in providing the necessary security envelope to civil society at large, 24x7, 365 days a year. In the course of conducting these operations, there are many times when developing crises may entail loss of precious lives or damage/ loss of assets, requiring the armed forces to also be ever ready, vigilant and prepared for ‘risk communication.’ Sharing crisp, relevant and adequate details will prevent development of false or alternate narratives, which may be exploited by inimical groups with vested interests. Such false narratives may lead to speculation, emergence of conspiracy theories and avoidable media attention, consonant with the idiom “bad news makes interesting stories.” The risk of such stories emanating from internal sources also constitutes an omni-present threat and possibility, which increases exponentially if the official responses are inordinately delayed. The armed forces do not have the liberty to create a ‘spin’ to a developing situation and the communication strategy in such circumstances is best served by projecting an accurate and correct picture. A recent example of ‘risk communication’ is the emergence of 26 positive cases of Covid-19 in an Indian Naval Base, leading to release of a statement to all media houses simultaneously to present the facts and elaborate on the measures undertaken to contain the situation.4

Recommendations for a Comprehensive Communication Strategy

A few recommendations on development of cogent and coherent communication strategies (which may already be in practice to some extent in large armed forces across the globe) are elucidated below: -

  • 21st Century conflicts and great power rivalries are no longer played or restricted to a few domains. Competition, collaboration and conflict require ‘whole of government’ strategies with coordinated responses across the entire spectrum of the DIME.5 Accordingly, a nation’s communication strategy has to flow from a unified entity at the apex level, with communication strategies plugged and meshed into it. This would facilitate cogent and effective strategic communication as an output.

  • A well-established, well-structured and streamlined media organisation, with trained and experienced manpower at multiple levels, is a necessity. Such media organisation at formation/ command levels will facilitate seamless and efficient media handling, and effective communication dissemination.

  • Since success of an operation or mission has assumed visual and sensory connotations (‘smell' or ‘taste’ of victory has transformed to ‘see’ and ‘hear’), aimed at both internal and external audiences, inclusion of a mission specific media strategy inplans for every mission/ operation would facilitate effective utilisation and harnessing of media.

  • Establishment of efficient and bureaucracy-free communication channels, both intra and inter-service as well as in Ministries, with focus on a healthy balance between ‘centralization’ and ‘decentralization’ for content sharing. The underlying principle of “just enough information - just in time,” to harmonise speed of dissemination with accuracy of information, should form the backbone of communication strategies.

  • In view of inherent limitations of developing a cogent narrative or story, formulation of ‘annual themes’ could be considered, which could be the baseline for media engagement for a calendar year. All activities for that calendar year could be focussed on the chosen theme, thus creating a comprehensible, cogent story for that year, facilitating in effective messaging.

  • Develop a clear understanding of corporate/ commercial/ public/ social marketing and media strategies, and implement suitable and adaptable tenets in the content and communication strategies of respective armed forces.

  • Avoidance of both ‘over’ and ‘under’ exposure, as well as competition amongst services, for ‘monopolising eyeballs or airtime.’

  • All Services need to be prepared for ‘risk communication’ 24x7, and should endeavour to be the first to expeditiously break ‘bad news’ and shape the media environment, as opposed to issuing tedious and tenuous clarifications at subsequent junctures. Risk communication should be a sub-set of the operation plan for every mission. Preparation of ‘ready use risk communication templates’ for possible crises will come in handy for handling actual emergencies where ‘time’ and ‘timing’ are of essence.

  • Media organisation of the armed forces should have the technical expertise and ‘state of the art’ equipment to facilitate provision and production of cross platform content. Inability to create content, which can be simultaneously shared on all platforms, severely restricts reach and accessibility.

  • Formal media training for officers across the rank and file is a necessity. Visualisation of confident, well-groomed and well-spoken officers from the field (especially young officers) contributes significantly in appealing to audiences and bringing the true essence of armed forces into the living rooms of the public at large, or rather to the ‘five screens,’ viz. televisions, desktop computers, laptops, I-Pads and mobiles.

  • Development of interesting, informative and appealing websites assist in enhancing visibility and attracting audiences, as opposed to content heavy, laborious, overtly busy, complex web pages with outdated or lack of updated information and posts. The ‘quality’ of websites and their web pages are reflective of the ethos, efficiency and effectiveness of an armed force.

  • Media management and PR teams of armed forces must endeavour to measure effectiveness of the employment of communication and media strategy through number of hits/ views/ clicks, etc.

  • Communication strategy of armed forces should always be a sub-set of, or in-sync with government narratives, to achieve maximum all-round benefit as well as further national interests.

  • Exposure to ‘strategic communication’ for mid-level officers would facilitate in harnessing strength of the media and developing experience in this critical field of modern information warfare. The specialised field of communication and media management should also be considered for inclusion as a field of study as part of professional military education of an armed force.

  • And finally, despite the overwhelming penetration and reach of social media, armed forces should continue to simultaneously harness the credentials and content credibility offered by traditional sources of media, viz. print, audio and television.

Conclusion

The world of media and communications is indeed a fascinating and intriguing one, and can be effectively leveraged to project, shape or influence targeted audiences with a comprehensive and cogent strategy. At the same time, mismanagement of media or an incoherent communication strategy can undermine credibility and reputations developed over years of perseverance and commitment, in a relatively miniscule moment, reverberating on both, the government and its armed forces. The armed forces, therefore, have no option but to adapt and imbibe tenets of modern communication in their work ethos, as well as engage media and manage communication to further organisational goals and objectives. They must ensure that their stories, intent and content are properly ‘comprehended’ and ‘understood’ by the intended audiences.

Endnotes

  1. Simon Sinek, Start With Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action. (USA: Portfolio, 2011)

  2. Cdr Subhasish Sarangi, “Unpacking SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region),” USI Occasional Paper, no. 2. https://usiofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020 /02/USI-Occasional-Paper_2_9-Unpacking-SAGAR-Final-print-File-1.pdf, accessed 12 October 2020.

  3. “Make in India Boost! Defence Ministry invites private players to build 6 submarines worth Rs 45,000 crore,” Business Today, 21 June 2019.

  4. Huma Siddiqui, “Coronavirus crisis looms over Indian Navy’s Western Command Headquarters: INS Angre Locked Down,” Financial Express, 18 April 2020.

  5. Diplomatic, Information, Military & Economic.