CLARIFYING PRESENCE AND POWER PROJECTION

Indian Naval Despatch Spring 2023 - Volume 4 No. 1. “Command of the Sea, Sea Control and Sea Denial in Contemporary Naval Warfare” by Cdr Prakash Gopal (Retd.).

The varied understanding of Sea Control and Sea Denial has oft been discussed and misinterpreted in professional exchanges, both in written and verbal debates. Cdr Prakash Gopal’s article is, therefore, a much-required examination that clarifies the fundamentals of these concepts. In doing so, the author examines its historical evolution and discusses their complexities as well as contemporary relevance. It would also serve the reader in possibly clearing cobwebs and potential misconceptions that emanate from a shallow grasp of sea control/ sea denial being ‘ends’ rather than ‘means or ways’ to employ naval effort.

That said, there is perhaps a necessity to delve deeper into two other concepts and tasks, which are also often misunderstood or misinterpreted. These are ‘naval presence’ and ‘power projection.’ As explained in an ORF paper, another author highlights that presence is a peacetime mission that has its importance, limitations and consequences on other training at sea. In times of tension, naval forces demonstrating presence may need to suddenly exercise sea control or sea denial as the circumstances may require or sometimes find themselves inadequate for the task and need to leave the area and perhaps return in force.¹

While the overall effectiveness of wartime tasks of sea control and sea denial would depend on the skills of operational planners, presence missions in peacetime (i.e. ‘mission-based deployments’ or forward deployment of naval assets) would require careful examination for the extent of usefulness as a deterrent or as a means for coercive or supportive diplomacy. Advantages of having platforms at the right place and at the right time to meet emergent peacetime missions like HADR, piracy, maritime terrorism, presence off an adversary’s coast/ where our interests are affected etc., notwithstanding, peacetime planners would do well to weigh resultant impact of such deployments on operational readiness of ships/ submarines. A sudden increase in tensions or chances of conflict (owing to a developing tension on land borders) must always be a planning factor that is provided due importance. Such deployments may also have an undesirable bearing on the number of opportunities that a crew should ideally be exposed to, at core warfighting procedures and developing tactical acumen of what is simply called fleet work and combined tactics. Such competence is honed and mastered only by practically applying theoretical learning with intense exercise programmes. Only then will new ideas or innovative tactics emerge as second nature, thereby nurturing future leaders to be competent commanders at the operational level.

On the other hand, the demonstration of ships, aircraft and submarines operating together for a finite period should not be mistaken as ‘power projection’ (which is a military mission in times of conflict) and not be conflated with presence which is often off a likely adversary’s coast.² At  best, such events may occupy some ‘screen time,’ but for the thorough practitioners of operational art (and we must provide that veto to an adversary), it may not serve the desired coercive purpose. Power projection, as we know, is focused on projecting naval force on land by means such as amphibious warfare, sea-launched missile strikes/ nuclear strikes etc. This can be seen in the article authored by Adm Stansfield Turner and referenced by Gopal, which contains the modern understanding of sea control and sea denial. With a peer adversary, it would be a challenging task and certainly would be a contested objective. Perhaps, deciding on the quantum of effort dedicated towards Counter Force (CF) and Counter Value (CV) missions along with associated interplay could also be concepts that must be deliberated, and must occupy space in our operational planning matrix.

Another aspect that requires clarity is that sea control and sea denial are both intrinsically linked to factors of space, time and force. While presence missions demand both time and space, the degree of force employed for such tasks in peacetime requires due consideration. Meanwhile, naval diplomacy and constabulary efforts have witnessed a whole-of- Government impetus and our platforms with long sea-legs have successfully met these requirements. We could also take a leaf from the US Navy experience, which had four serious accidents in 2017, including the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions. Adm Scott Smith, the Pacific Fleet Commander in a statement issued immediately after the USS John S. McCain collision said that “…continuous operations over time causes basic skills to atrophy, and in some cases gives commands a false sense of their overall readiness.” He warned ships’ crew against complacency and urged a back-to-basics approach.³ While the Indian Navy sincerely meets all peacetime mandates, we must continue to be focused on our core responsibility of emerging victorious in times of conflict. That, essentially, is our primary military role.

To calibrate or measure the effectiveness of our actions, we would possibly be best aided by strategic thought, a clear understanding of naval strategy/ concepts and of course, correct application. The thoughts penned here only suggest that we need to be fundamentally correct in our understanding of naval concepts so that our lines of effort are strategic in thought or in other words, future-proof.