Back to the Future

China’s incentive to modernise and reorganise the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) can be traced to the United States’ (US) “shock and awe” doctrine used in the 1991 Gulf War, whereinsuperior technology and overwhelming advantages of asymmetry in key capabilities of the US and coalition forces outmanoeuvred Iraq.1 At the time, China’s domestic political scenario, especially lack of money, delayed the advent of modernisation, which is currently ongoing at a rapid pace. Therefore, they imbibed lessons for implementation later, through the organisational theory linked methods of scanning and vicarious learning.2

Given their strict hierarchical setup and tight bureaucratic norms, militaries are often disinclined to change.3 In the USA, the debate for higher defence reorganisation post World War II (WW II) started with the enactment of the National Security Act 1949 and culminated in the enactment of the Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986, despite reservations in the Department of Defence (DoD). This reorganisation was aimed at addressing interservice rivalries observed during WW II, operational failures of the Vietnam War; subsequent operations like the failed Iran hostage rescue mission in 1979 and the invasion of Grenada in 1983.4 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s move to reorganise the PLA in 2015, has been seen as mirrored on the USA model. This comparison can be considered correct vis-à-vis intent, and up to the point of enactment. While US military reforms have followed the democratic path of debate and discussion, Chinese military reforms have followed an authoritarian methodology with the Central Military Commission (CMC) effectively assuming central control of the PLA, the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) and the Militia, as well as the Theatre Commands. This central political control of the PLA and the Theatre Commands underscores the primary aims of the PLA, which are the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and reunification of Taiwan. The PLA’s reorganisation is also impacting the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific as it is the omnipotent arm being used to pursue the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, espoused by Xi Jinping in 2013.

Reform Process

The Third Plenum of 18th Party Central Committee, held on 12 November 2013, was the first plenum chaired by Xi Jinping after taking over as President. The plenum discussed Xi’s report on reform, development, and stability in China.5 The plenum also adopted the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ in which part XV dealt with reforms related to National Defence and the Armed Forces.6 The reforms were at the organisational and operational-command levels. The former dealt with reorganising the existing four general departments into 15 departments and offices. The prefixing of CMC with each new name indicated central control and reduced the possibility of the department from acting in an autonomous manner.7 The latter reorganisation converted the existing seven military regions into five new Theatre Commands.8 It also raised the level of the Second Artillery Force to a full military service, renamed as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), at par with the PLA (Army) (PLAA), PLA (Air Force) (PLAAF) and PLA (Navy) (PLAN).9 Apart from placing central control of the PLA with the CMC, this reorganisation reduces the dominance of the PLAA while increasing the role and participation of the PLAN and PLAAF. The expansion of departments to 15, also provided Xi the opportunity of appointing officers who would support him, and thereby, reduced the influence of officers who had been appointed by his predecessor Hu Jintao. This enabled Xi Jinping to model the PLA in a manner, that would aid his vision of the ‘Chinese Dream,’ and which is impacting the regional security architecture.

Theatre Commands: A Changed Spatial Geography

The five Theatre Commands were officially established on 01 February 2016. Their creation clearly indicated the (greater) degree of control the CMC, and therefore, the CCP, would exert over the functioning and operations of the PLA. The handing over of the new flags to the Theatre Commanders, as well as the political commissars underscored the involvement of the CMC and the CCP in the chain of command. These actions were stressed upon by Xi Jinping in his speech during the ceremony, wherein he stated: - 10

  • Theatre commands are to remain loyal by carrying out the orders and follow instructions issued by the CCP Central Committee and the CMC.

  • Theatre commands are to focus on combat readiness, strengthen joint command and joint operations to safeguard China's national sovereignity and security interests, while the individual services would focus on development, all under the overall charge of the CMC.

The internal delineation of the new commands varied greatly from the existing Military Regions (MRs) (Fig 1), with maximum area going to the Western Theatre Command (WTC), which faces Bhutan, Nepal, India, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and includes a marginal border with Russia and Myanmar. The border with Myanmar is shared with the Southern Theatre Command (STC) while the Northern Theatre Command (NTC) also looks at Russia and Mongolia. The WTC has no coastline and hence, there would be no maritime element in this Command. This implies that maritime engagement with the maritime nations, which WTC faces, like India, Pakistan and Myanmar, would most probably be the responsibility of the STC, or come directly under the CMC. The likely areas of responsibility are as indicated in Table 1.


                                                 

Table 1: Possible Areas of Responsibility of the Theatre Command

                                                 

Fig 1: Comparison of Military Regions (MRs) and Theatre Commands (TCs)12

                                                 

Fig 2: Theatre Commands13

The likely areas of responsibilities and actions taken by Theatre Commands within their operational jurisdiction are aimed at addressing not ETC have maritime areas within their operational jurisdiction only China’s security challenges, but its insecurities as well, in line with the political directives of the top CCP leadership and follow-on strategies and policies. Although the South China Sea is the only maritime area indicated (under STC as per Table 1), it is clear from Figure 2 that the NTC, CTC, and ETC also have maritime areas within their operational jurisdiction.

Northern Theatre Command

The NTC looks at the Korean peninsula, an Indo-Pacific hot spot, with nuclear underpinnings. This area is a source of tension for the US and South Korea due to the actions of North Korea, specifically missile firing tests and the associated nuclear threat to South Korea, Japan, US bases in the region, as well as mainland USA. This command is divided into two areas with the CTC in between these two areas (Fig 2). The smaller southern area has a coastline with the North Sea Fleet based at Qingdao and the port of Dalian, which is an ice-free port. This would enable the NTC to focus jointly on the land, air and maritime areas of the Korean peninsula and Japan. The reduction in envisaged threat from Russia resulted in this command being placed at serial 4 in protocol after the ETC, STC and WTC, which would enable the NTC to focus more attention on the Korean peninsula, and Japan, especially its northern islands.14

Possible force allocation is given in Table 2 and it is apparent that the presence of 7 SAM Brigades at Dalian could also be to provide air defence to the Dalian Shipyard of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, which has an area of 1330 acres.15 This shipyard is a vital element in China’s warship building programme as it undertook the refitment of the Liaoning and also constructed the Shandong, China’s first indigenously designed aircraft carrier.16

Table 2: Possible Force Allocation of Northern Theatre Command17

Central Theatre Command

This command, would in all probability, be the strategic reserve force of the PLA and provide support to the other commands by controlling strategic assets of the new departments placed under the CMC. A vital responsibility of the CTC could be the defence of Beijing, as well as safety of the CMC and top leadership of the CCP. As per the possible force allocation in Table 3, it can be surmised that: -18

  • The task of the additional heavy mechanised infantry and two ground divisions could be the defence of Beijing and ensuring the safety of the CMC and top leadership of the CCP.

  • The two transport and bomber divisions, six Airborne Brigade (AB), one bomber Brigade, as well as the Surveillance Regiment could be used as strategic reserve or deployed directly by the CMC, in support of operations being conducted by other Theatre Commands.

  • The large numbers of SAM units in comparison to other theatres indicates the priority of protection accorded to this region, specifically Beijing, from attack by air including missiles.

Table 3: Possible Force Allocation of the Central Theatre Command19

Eastern Theatre Command

The possible force allocation at the ETC (Table 4) is indicative that its focus would be Taiwan, with an eye on the East China Sea and Japan. In the eventuality of conflict with Taiwan, the East China Sea area and Japan could be looked after by the NTC. The fact that this Theatre Command appears to have retained the geographical boundaries of the erstwhile Nanjing MR reiterates the point that China’s strategy to ‘reunite’ Taiwan, and deter any US assistance to Taiwan, will follow a joint approach. The recent sabre-rattling and military drills by China due to the visits of Alex Azar, the US Secretary for Health and Human Services, followed by Keith Krach, the US Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, is indicative of this approach and resolve. In all probability, the East Sea Fleet operating under the ETC would focus on Taiwan while engaging Japan in the East China Sea. In support of its Taiwan policy, the PLA is known to have conducted more than 30 maritime drills in all four of its major sea regions since July 2020.20

Table 4: Possible Force Allocation of the Eastern Theatre Command21

Southern Theatre Command

The STC probably faces the most challenging tasks amongst all the Theatre Commands. These could stretch from protecting China’s interests in the South China Sea; keeping China’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda open; and, engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially Myanmar and Vietnam, to handling the situation in Hong Kong. Given the vast maritime area, it is possible that the Shandong, China’s second aircraft carrier and first indigenously constructed carrier, could be based with the South Sea Fleet. The wide array of the possible force allocation (Table 5), therefore, covers a wide ambit with the focus on : -22

  • Hong Kong, as the assigned with 1 Composite Infantry Battalion, 1 Helicopter Squadron and 1 Air Defence (AD) Battalion, indicates the sensitivity of the city and that China could use extreme hard measures to ensure Chinese control.

  • The South China Sea, where the tanker brigade could be used to extend lines of operation, especially for aircraft deployed at the reclaimed islands bases. The large marine force is considered just about adequate to address the small size of disputed land masses in the South China Sea.

Table 5: Possible Force Allocation of the Southern Theatre Command23

Western Theatre Command

The WTC is with the largest geographical area. Apart from engaging India on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Pakistan in POK, it could also address the challenges of controlling unrest in Tibet and the Xinjiang Regions.24 While the WTC would address land and air aspects, maritime aspects within the Indian Ocean would have to be undertaken by another command, most probably the STC, unless the CMC takes direct control of ‘far seas’ operations. This would require a high degree of joint approach, specifically in terms of sequencing of operational plans.

Given the vast geographical area and possible force allocation (Table 6), the following aspects emerge: -25

  • The number of units assigned to the Xinjiang and Xizang military districts indicates the high degree of existing unrest requiring adequate military presence.

  • In order to address the LAC with India, especially in times of high tension or conflict, the ground and air forces would have to be augmented from other commands. In all probability most of these additional forces would come from the CTC.

Table 6: Possible Force Allocation of the Western Theatre Command26

Conclusion

One of the most important long-term operational goals of the reforms is to improve the PLA’s joint capabilities across multiple warfighting domains.27 Even though the reforms are expected to be completed by 2020, the efficacy of joint operations by the PLA will only emerge with time. In 2019, Beijing acknowledged for the first time the conduct of theatre-level joint exercises, code-named North, East, South and West. An example is the July 2019 exercise involving all five Theatre Commands, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). However, there was no official confirmation of this.28 Nonetheless, there are inherent limitations when Theatre Commands are required to focus on domestic as well as external regional areas. This divergent requirement could impact the focus of joint operations, which would need a high degree of coordination between the Commands and the CMC.

A case in point would be China’s ability to exert pressure by land, air and sea on India, in equal measure, in future stand-offs on the LAC. A test of equal measure would be the ability to exert pressure on Taiwan, as US presence and deployment would require the involvement of the STC, and possibly CTC, in support of operations of the ETC. These are two litmus tests that would provide clarity on the degree of jointness, coordination and China’s ability to move forces between commands, if required, to address strategic, operational and tactical scenarios, as they change or arise, without reducing the overall effectiveness of the other Theatre Commands. As per newspaper reports, India is looking at establishing five theatre commands based on the USA and China models, which will replace the existing single service commands and single tri-service Andaman and Nicobar command.29 A careful examination and analysis of the path walked by the USA and that being followed by China would enable India to achieve the requisite joint synergy across land, air and sea, while ensuring optimum utilisation of India’s defence capability and capacity.

Endnotes

  1. Robert Farley, “What Scares China's Military: the 1991 Gulf War,” National Interest, 24 November 2014. https:/nationalinterest.org/print/feature/what-scares-chinas-military-the-1991-gulf-war-11724, accessed 19 September 2020.

  1. Ibid.

  2. Vivek Chadha, Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), 11.

  3. Colonel Rajneesh Singh, United States Reforms to its Higher Defence Organisation: Lessons for India (New Delhi: IDSA, 2014).

  4. “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 15 January 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/15content_31203056.htm#:~:text=The%20Third%20Plenary%20Session%20of%20the%2 018th%20Central,Central%20Committee%20of%20the%20Communist%20Party%20of%20C hina, accessed 20 September 2020.

  5. “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major IssuesConcerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” 16 January 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602_15.htm, accessed 20 September 2020.

  1. Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017), 253.

  2. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W Allen, eds., “The PLA as Organization v2.0,” 54. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/PLA_as_Organization_v2.pdf, accessed 20 September 2020.

  3. Op Cit., n.7, 251-256 and Office of the US Secretary of Defence “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,”Annual report to Congress, 26 April 2016, 1-3. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/2016-prc-military-security.pdf, accessed 20 September 2020.

  1. “President Xi Announces Establishment of Five PLA Theatre Commands,” China Military Online, 01 February 2016. http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2016-02/01/content_6884075.htm, accessed 26 September 2020.

  1. Op Cit., n.7, 254.

  2. Kevin McCauley, “PLA Transformation Difficult Military Reforms Begin,” The Jameston Foundation, 09 September 2015. https://jamestown.org/program/pla-transformation-difficult-military-reforms-begin/, accessed 26 September 2020.

  1. Op Cit., n.7, 255.

  2. Peter Wood, “Strategic Assessment: China’s Northern Theatre Command,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-assessment-chinas-northern-theater-command/, accessed 26 September 2020.

  3. Military Balance, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020), 267 and Office of the Secretary of Defence USA, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress 2020, 107-109.

  4. Monty Khanna, “Understanding China’s Naval Ship Building Industry: Lessons India can Learn,” Maritime Affairs vol. 15, no. 1 (2019), 1-14.

  5. Op Cit., n.15.

  6. Op Cit., n.15, 267.

  7. Op Cit., n.15, 267 and Office of the Secretary of Defence USA, Op Cit., n.15, 110-111.

  8. “As Another Top US Official Visits Taiwan, China Launches More Military Drills,” Bloomberg, 18 September 2020. https://time.com/5890135/china-military-drill-keith-krach-visit-taiwan/, accessed 26 September 2020.

  1. Op Cit., n.15, 265-266 and Office of the Secretary of Defence USA, Op Cit., n.15, 95-98.

  2. Op Cit., n.15, 266.

  3. Op Cit., n.15, 266 and Office of the Secretary of Defence USA, Op Cit., n.15, 99-103.

  4. Kevin McCauley, “Snapshot: China’s Western Theatre Command,” China Brief vol. 17 no.1,13 January 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-western-theater-command/,accessed 27 September 2020.

  1. Op Cit., n.15, 266 and Annual Report to Congress 2020, 104-107.

  2. Op Cit., n.15.

  3. Bates Gill, Adam Ni and Dennis Blasko, “The Ambitious Reform Plans of the People’s Liberation Army: Progress, prospects and Implications for Australia,” Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies vol. 2 no. 1 (2020), 5-26. http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/AJDSS/volume2-number1/ambitious-reform-plans-of-the-PLA.asp, accessed 26 September 2020.

  4. Op Cit., n.15, 232.

  5. Shishir Gupta, “India to Get 5 Military Theatre Commands, One Each for China and Pak,” Hindustan Times, 27 October 2020. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-get-5-military-theatre-commands-one-each-for-china-and-pak/story-UzFJNollsvpj3tc UetWVNM.html, accessed 29 October 2020.