Editor’s Note: -This essay is the author's adaptation of a course paper written at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London in 2022. and not published before.

“If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.”

- Carl Von Clausewitz1

Abstract: The Korean War was the Chinese Communist Party’s first major conflict after coming the power in 1949. The century of humiliation, deep suspicion of western motives, absence of debiasing mechanisms, and prolonged civil war significantly affected the decision-making of the Chinese elites during this war. The essay examines strategic approaches of China during various phases of the Korean war through the lens of various strategy assessment and formulation tools, both ancient and modern. With the benefit of hindsight, tools ranging from Sun Tzu’s maxims to centre of gravity and SWOT analysis, provide insights into China’s strategic-level decisions during the war. It emerges that the Chinese have a distinct strategic signalling behaviour and war commencement/ termination criteria, which has also been observed in later conflicts. The essay also utilises Prospect Theory, a Nobel prize winning economic theory focussed on behaviour under conditions of risk and uncertainty, to analyse Chinese strategic behaviour during the Korean war. The essay concludes that China’s risk-orientation can be assessed with reference to the frame of losses against which the Communist Party leadership measures their national stance, which could provide unique insights into current Chinese strategic behaviour.

Introduction

The Korean War (1950-53) marks a watershed in East Asian geo-politics, with the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government embarking on its first military confrontation with the United States of America (USA). Fighting ceased with the signing of an armistice in July 1953, with China declaring victory against the USA.2 However, in the absence of a peace treaty, the Korean War has still not ended. The CCP, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, formulated China’s policies towards the other principal actors of the Korean War – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); General Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) that had established its rule over the island of Formosa, to which it had escaped in 1949 after having been routed on the mainland; the Republic of Korea (RoK); the United Nations (UN) and the USA. This essay will critically examine China’s strategic approaches during the Korean War through the lens of modern strategy assessment tools and the prospect theory.

This theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky contends that States view outcomes not in terms of their value, but as gains or losses relative to a reference frame. So, further, while states expeditiously renormalise their reference frame after gains, they are much slower to do so in a domain of losses.3 An analysis of China’s strategic approaches during the Korean War reveals that historical territorial losses became a reference frame for their leaders, making them prone to risk-acceptant behaviour.4 Further, it emerges that in the absence of effective de-biasing influences,5 a loss frame significantly affected heuristics of the limited decision-making group of the CCP Politburo.

Prelude to Conflict

Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949.6 At this time, China believed that their ideology was between capitalism (USA) and communism (USSR), which added a Sino-American dimension to the Cold War. However, Mao Zedong had a ‘lean-to-one-side’ policy,7 in which China leaned towards the USSR in its foreign policy and security choices. During the last phase of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), the CCP had also broadened the scope of their revolution by projecting it as a global anti-imperialist movement, to influence other mass- based revolutionary movements.8 At the beginning of the new decade (1950), China’s strategic approach therefore emphasised that they would have a leading role in shaping the course of the Cold War.9 This attitude resulted in the CCP viewing the ongoing USSR-USA Cold War competition as an ‘opportunity’, with shades of Clausewitzian emphasis on tendencies of the masses, one of the pillars of the paradoxical trinity.10

The CCP’s desire to re-mould China stemmed from a perceived historical-cultural burden and tradition of ethno-centrism, the central theme being that China’s superior civilisation had declined due to its inability to resist western imperialist forces. By mid-1950, China had surmised that the USA viewed them with suspicion, and their masses with disdain. This attitude led China to adopt a strategy of implementing their (successful) revolutionary ideals within traditional Chinese society, and to challenge imperialist hegemons towards restoring China’s pre-eminence in the global order.11

Another determinant of China’s strategic approach in 1949-50 was their perception of the USA as the key threat to their security. Conceived during the Chinese Civil War and crystallised by continuing support of the USA towards the KMT, this belief was cemented by 1950. Mao Zedong was also predisposed towards believing the worst of the USA, due to his own belief-set and USA’s intransigence regarding transfer of the UN Security Council seat from RoC to China.12 Apropos, China viewed its security interests as reunification of RoC, maintaining buffer zones viz North Korea and Indochina, internal political mobilisation and revitalising their economy. Further, given that China viewed itself as the fountainhead of globalrevolutionary movements,13 the CCP believed that their security was inexorably linked to the decline of US-led capitalist dominance.14

By June 1950, China was reasonably convinced that direct military confrontation with the USA in East Asia might have to be progressed with unpredictable allies, an obstreperous Stalin and renascent Kim Il-Sung.15 Viewing their security through the lens of a relative-power matrix, USSR and USA would have scored higher on the power-interest quadrant. China therefore restricted release of information about their strategies, intentions and decision-making to prevent their competitors determining how they would impose costs and benefits on their actions.16

Viewed through prospect theory, the combination of values (revolutionary) and territory (buffer zones) which formed the status quo in Korea, reflected China’s primary interests towards Korea.17 China’s strategic choices prior to the Korean War indicate that they were disposed towards taking risks to maintain the status quo in Korea. This strategic approach, coupled with the prevailing western view of China being a weak nation,18 was to have profound consequences in shaping the course of the Korean War.

USA deploys in Korea

On 25 June 1950, DPRK troops crossed the 38th parallel and rapidly made their way south. China was surprised by the alacrity of USA’s response – by 27 June 1950, the USA had decided to deploy its military to assist RoK. Further, since USSR had boycotted the UN Security Council19 to protest RoC holding ‘China’s’ seat, UN resolutions against DPRK’s actions were also passed swiftly. USA also directed its seventh fleet towards the Taiwan Strait, to prevent any Chinese advance towards RoC.20 China perceived this as a direct military threat, reinforcing their perceptions of USA’s aggressive intentions and a belief that the Korean War would determine the eventual fate of East Asia.21

Sun Tzu’s maxim “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”22 was no longer applicable, and China reassessed its immediate response and strategic approach. The likelihood of US-RoK troops moving northwards reminded China of 1931, when Imperial Japan had attacked Manchuria after first annexing Korea.23 China therefore assessed that USA’s intervention in Korea could be a prelude to encirclement on three fronts viz Korea (North), Taiwan (East) and Indo-China (South).24 The CCP was also acutely aware that, to their 540 million citizens25 who would have preferred economic reconstruction, Korea was a litmus test of their ability to manage their vast country.26

Chinese strategic culture views weiji (crisis), as an amalgamation of wei (danger) and ji (opportunity).27 China shaped its response towards the USA in the frame of weiji. By July 1950, China had commenced mobilising its levers of national power – diplomatic, informational, economic and military – to shape its internal and external environments and remain poised. This was in consonance with Mao’s philosophy of ‘striving for the best while preparing for the worst’.28 Accordingly, China postponed precipitating RoC’s reunification,29 and included both RoC and Indo-China in their strategic narrative of western imperialist designs for the Asia- Pacific.30 These strategic adjustments enabled China to pursue internal political mobilisation with greater vigour, supress dissent and portray the US as an increasingly hostile aggressor.31 Concurrently, China also commenced military mobilisation to cater for a situation of stalemate or defeat of DPRK forces. In July 1950, China established the ‘North-East Border Defence Army’ (NEBDA), commenced stockpiling war materiel and set up a logistical supply network till the Yalu River (northern boundary of DPRK and China).32 By October 1950, over 750,000 NEBDA troops were ready for three months of intensive fighting.33

China’s inability to reconcile historical territorial losses of the previous century probably skewed their view of USA’s intervention in Korea as a precursor to further territorial losses. Further, in the absence of effective de-biasing mechanisms, China’s leadership clique possibly viewed China to be in an increasingly deteriorating situation. Faced with a perceived existential threat, China’s propensity for risk-taking was now significantly higher, even though the standard calculus would have indicated that they should have inclined towards restraint.34

Inchon and Intervention

On 15 September 1950, General Douglas McArthur launched a daring, flanking operation at Inchon, surprising North Korean forces and seizing the initiative on the battlefield.35 Soon, they were in retreat and could no longer hold back the UN counter-offensive. China realised that if they now chose to intervene militarily, a substantial burden of fighting would fall upon them, thereby significantly increasing risks. While fighting was initially restricted to within South Korea, after Inchon, it moved closer to Manchuria, just north of the Yalu River.36

Korean Peninsula showing the Yalu River37

While the USSR wished to avoid UN forces occupying the entire Korean peninsula, there was an overriding determination not to escalate into a direct military confrontation with the USA. In this context, Stalin prompted China towards intervention in support of DPRK forces.38 After re-assessing ground realities, China issued a series of advisories to the UN, USA, media and neutral diplomats, to obtain clarity on UN forces’ intentions of crossing the 38th parallel and approaching the Yalu River.39 In particular, on 3 October 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai briefed Indian Ambassador Pannikar that “American forces are trying to cross the 38th parallel and expand the war. If they really want to do this, we will not sit still and will be forced to intervene”.40 This indicates that China’s strategic approach at that juncture may have been protection of their border and preserving the buffer zone (DPRK), and not necessarily a military confrontation.41 However, on 5 October 1950, with UN troops rapidly closing the 38th parallel, the CCP Politburo held a crucial meeting. In the absence of dissenting voices and likely ‘groupthink’, the Politburo unanimously voted for intervention after Mao Zedong described the situation as a closing ‘window of opportunity’ and an increasing ‘window of vulnerability’.42

An analysis of the Chinese decision indicates that they may have assessed their strengths as a greater number of battle-hardened soldiers, tactical acumen and perceived moral right, which gave them a fighting chance against technologically superior UN forces. Their weaknesses towards pursuing intervention were economic hardship, delayed reunification of RoC and possibility of an all-out war with the USA. However, the Chinese viewed several opportunities, primarily the prospect of creating a strategic buffer (North Korea) using their troops. Further, the Chinese may have reasoned that if UN forces closed the Yalu River, they would in any case find a pretext to invade China subsequently. China also viewed the Korean War as a precursor to a wider struggle between imperialist and revolutionary movements. Hence, facing up to UN forces led by the USA was an opportunity to enhance China’s standing, both domestically and internationally. The major threats in this approach were constrained logistics, facing technologically superior forces without air support and nuclear weapons.43 The Chinese were prescient in their assessment that the USA would not use nuclear weapons44 given close proximity of their own troops, limited tactical utility view mountainous terrain of Korea, probable global condemnation45 and retaliation, since USSR had broken USA’s nuclear monopoly in 1949.46

 On 7 October 1950, while the UN debated a Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,47 the US 1st Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel; the ‘Rubicon’ had been crossed. China now viewed the threat from advancing UN forces as both direct and immediate, requiring bold and decisive measures. It was assessed that in a few weeks, UN forces could threaten South Manchuria, which was only a hundred miles north of the Yalu River. As China’s main industrial base, Manchuria consumed one-third of the country’s electricity, produced four-fifth of its steel and most of its heavy machinery. This region was also home to China’s largest coal and metal-ore mines, shale-oil reserves, hydro-electric plants, timber forests and fishing communities.48 The loss of this region would have catastrophic consequences for the development of the nascent Chinese economy and could sound the death-knell for the CCP.

During the decision-making process for intervention, both before and after UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel, it could be reasonably argued that China determined Manchuria to be their centre of gravity, the source that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action and the will to fight.49 Manchuria was the source of China’s economic strength, and a threat to this region provided China with the moral justification to intervene. Further, the two hundred mile buffer zone between the 38th parallel and Yalu River facilitated freedom of action for China’s forces. The will to fight against UN forces was sourced from framing the intervention as a prelude to the struggle between nationalist revolutionaries and imperialist-capitalist societies. To minimise the possibility of a formal declaration of war by the Americans, the nomenclature of Chinese troops deployed to Korea was also changed to ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV)’.50 This was in consonance with the Chinese aim (at that time) of a quick, limited, and conventional war.

Recognising the immediacy of the threat to both China and the CCP, Mao Zedong issued formal directives for China to enter the Korean War on 8 October 1950, one day after UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel.51 China did not issue any further warnings to UN forces after this decision, and adopted a policy of ‘only act and not talk’.52 This approach to strategic signalling is consistent with China’s behaviour in subsequent conflicts, where the tactical-surprise incentive was higher against a stronger opponent and when there was a higher probability of conflict. In this case, from the perspective of tactical surprise, there was greater incentive for China to signal low resolve after taking the decision to intervene.53,54

On 11 October 1950, Stalin went back on his pledge to provide air cover and hardware for CPV troops, which was a serious setback. China had adopted an approach of keeping the USSR informed of all its strategic decisions; this stratagem was modified after this perceived betrayal. However, for China and the CCP, the dice had been cast, and CPV troops crossed the Yalu River into RoK on 19 October 1950.

The sunk costs of the Civil War and ‘century of humiliation’ had significant influence towards Chinese decision-making for intervention. Accommodation to losses tends to be slow and, anxious to recover those costs, China chose a more confrontational approach.55 Further, internal pressures and a ‘fortress mentality’ may also have cajoled the Chinese leadership to deflect pressure onto an external enemy. Moreover, unreliable communication channels56 with western powers and Chinese strategic signalling culture also emerge as key factors leading to China’s decision for intervention.

Fighting to an Armistice

China’s entry dramatically transformed the nature and course of the Korean War. As the technologically inferior force and without air cover, CPV troops employed guerrilla tactics, feints and used the mountainous terrain, regaining control of nearly all DPRK territory by December 1950.57 These successes prompted China to reassess their strategic objectives, seeking to drive UN forces further south of the 38th parallel. This debatable decision was taken during peak winter, with the CPV’s supply lines in RoK at the end of their tether. Despite reinforcements, by the end of spring 1951, CPV forces had once again been pushed north of the 38th parallel, forcing China and DPRK to commence armistice negotiations.58

The preliminary armistice line was agreed on 27 November 1951. However, the final armistice was signed nearly two years later, with the final demarcated line within only a few miles of its location in 1951. This delay was conceivably a joint China-USSR approach to wear down western will and deflect their attention and resources from Europe.59 China was also aware that the war was boosting their prestige in international fora and provided leverage to seek resources and finances from USSR.60 Internally, the war enhanced CCP’s political mobilisation and cemented their rule, whilst also providing valuable combat experience to the CPV army.61 Ergo, China reassessed its limited-war approach and now viewed prolonging the Korean War to be advantageous.

After nearly two years of negotiations, the death of Stalin in March 1953, and President Eisenhower’s threats of conventional and nuclear escalation,62 China assessed that it would be prudent to cease fighting. After pitched tactical battles to gain stronger negotiating positions and acrimonious arguments over POW exchange, China acquiesced to western proposals, and an armistice was signed in July 1953.63

China’s Strategic Approaches during the Korean War

China’s strategic approaches during the Korean War were shaped primarily by their sense of insecurity and historical suspicion of western motives. The CCP also assessed that a limited war with the USA could enhance their internal political mobilisation and be an exemplar to other revolutionary movements. China’s xenophobic attitude towards the west, unreliable communication channels and discontinuities in signalling behaviour also emerge as key dynamics. The Chinese could have possibly accepted an armistice proposal in January 1951, after pushing UN forces south of the 38th parallel. It could be argued that they erred in ignoring the principle of ‘selection and maintenance of aim’, towards war termination. The suitability of the Chinese approach towards the Korean War may also be debated in relation to ‘ends, ways and means’ since they suffered greater loss of life and treasure. However, with limited resources at their disposal, China’s resilience against technologically superior forces significantly enhanced their global prestige. In terms of territory, while China gained its strategic buffer (DPRK), RoC’s re-unification is stalled to this day.

China’s utilisation of surprise, guerrilla warfare and their perspicacious assessment regarding USA’s ability to use nuclear weapons and desire to contain the fighting to Korea64 enhanced the efficacy of their operational-level warfare, which bore greater tactical successes than a simplistic order of battle would indicate. The Chinese also displayed sustainability, both on the battlefield and at the strategic level, stretching UN forces for nearly two years. Sensing weariness and a desire of western powers for conflict termination, the Chinese adroitly adapted their strategic approach, submitting UN forces to an excruciating and bloody period of armistice negotiations.

China’s risk-orientation can be assessed with reference to the frame of losses against which the CCP leadership measured their national stance. Coupled with a prevalent culture of revanchism, visible to this day, China’s elites set their nation on a path of escalating probability of conflict. Further, the absence of de-biasing influences within the Politburo and an era of flux in relative-power dynamics also contributed towards China’s risky strategic approach during the Korean War. In retrospect, since neither side gained much territory after nearly three years of fighting, it could be argued that it was easier for China and the USA to cease fighting towards the distribution of gains, rather than towards the distribution of losses.65

From China’s perspective, the Korean War resulted in sunk costs of life and treasure, failure to unify Taiwan (which bedevils China even today) and their isolation from the west. On balance, having taken immense risks, the decision to stand up to western powers provided China with much-needed catharsis, enhanced their prestige, saved Kim Il-Sung’s regime, and set the stage for China’s dramatic emergence as a global superpower in the next century.

Endnotes

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  33. Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, vol. 1 (Beijing, 2010), 158-59.

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  36. Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 159.

  37. E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , “ K o r e a n Wa r F e b r u a r y 1 9 5 1 t o J u l y 1 9 5 3 , ” www.britannica.com/korea, accessed 21 September 2024.

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  40. Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 180.

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  44. Harry Martin Crocker, “Chinese Intervention in the Korean War,” LSU Digital Commons (2002), 44. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/1804.

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  47. United Nations, UNGA 1950-51, The Problem of the Independence of Korea: Resolution 376b(V) adopted at the 294th Plenary Meeting, 7 October 1950. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209732.

  1. Andrew J Grajdanzev, “Manchuria: An Industrial Survey,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 18, no. 4 (Dec., 1945), 321-339, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2752194.

  2. United States, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning, December 2020, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf.

  3. Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, “Orders to the Chinese People’s Volunteers – October 1950,” trans. Maoist Documentation Project, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/ volume-5/mswv5_10.

  4. Thomas A Christensen, “The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer, 1992), 136, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539160.

  5. Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 209.

  6. Quek, “Discontinuities in Signalling Behaviour upon the Decision for War,” 285.

  7. International Relations normally work on signalling, demonstrating resolve to achieve deterrence, or compellance through high-resolve signalling. While States normally demonstrate high-resolve at the international level, they may sometimes also have an incentive to signal low-resolve. China has historically displayed three broad resolve signalling behaviours – Resolve-Demonstration incentive may involve troop mobilisation and explicit threats of war, presently seen in PLA’s behaviour in the South China Sea; Tactical-Surprise incentive signals low resolve to an opponent to falsely demonstrate military weakness or inaction so as to achieve an offensive advantage, demonstrated in the Korean war wherein China stopped issuing warnings to UN forces after the decision for war had been taken by the CCP Politburo; and, the Domestic-Mobilisation incentive signals high resolve to citizens to mobilise them for an impending war, demonstrated by strong signalling of domestic resolve during the Korean war (stronger opponent), but visibly weaker signalling during the Sino-Vietnam and Sino-India conflicts of 1979 and 1962 (weaker opponents).

  8. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” 287.

  9. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 100.

  10. United States, US Army, The Chinese Interventio, US Army Center of Military History, 23.

  11. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 144.

  12. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 171.

  13. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 172.

  14. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 172.

  15. Samuel William Bettwy, “The Korean war Termination Experience, 1951-53,” SSRN, May 11, 2015, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2604615.

  16. United States, National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives Records Relating to the Korean War, Washington DC, 2003: 222.

  17. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 124.

  18. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” 307.