Abstract: The Indian Navy (IN) has been at the forefront of Defence Indigenisation in India. Most IN Ships and submarines including the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier and Strategic Platforms have been indigenously built in Indian Shipyards. Achieving so much of Atmanirbharta in the Indian Navy has been the result of some consistent proactive thinking in various departments of MoD and the Naval Headquarters. In continuation of this indigenisation strategy, which has evolved over the years, the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) has set an ambitious vision for a fully Atmanirbhar Navy by 2047. This is a challenging target to achieve and would require every possible effort from all quarters. This paper, utilising open domain resources, examines various policies, lessons from history, and critical issues that should be considered by all stake holders to achieve the stated objectives. It also highlights major gaps between perception and reality in the levels of indigenization achieved. The paper also recommends various actions that could drive the mission of a fully Atmanirbhar Indian Navy by 2047.

Atmanirbharta Vision of the Indian Navy

In recent history, the IN’s indigenisation successes in the field of shipbuilding can be assessed to be significant. Most IN Ships and submarines including the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) and strategic platforms (SSBNs) have been indigenously built in Indian Shipyards. This is the outcome of a consistent and genuine intent for Atmanirbharta in India, specifically within the Indian Navy since independence. The stated goal finds repeated mentions in official reports, policies, and news items, ever since. It was further reiterated in Kargil Review Committee report and subsequently by the governments, after 2014.1 In continuation of the above approach, the CNS has set a vision for a fully Atmanirbhar Navy by 2047.2 This is an exceptional long-term and ambitious vision which requires well planned strategies. The first ever Indian Defence plan came into being only as late as 1964, nearly two decades after independence. Subsequently, a 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) was promulgated in the 2000s.3 This has now been revised to a 10-year Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP) in Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020.4 In light of this, how can the reasonableness and possibility of achieving such an advanced target set by the CNS be assessed? Is it accompanied by identification of the correct challenges to address them precisely and professionally to achieve the said target? A holistic review of the Indian Navy’s Capital Acquisition, indigenisation plans, and status would be fundamental to understanding the feasibility of the Atmanirbharta vision.

Evolution of the Policies on Indigenous Content (IC) and Its Verification

In examining the issues more deeply, a few questions could be raised and discussed.

  • What Should Ideally Constitute IC? An indigenous product ideally should have its entire design, development, manufacturing and assembly within the territory of the country. It should essentially be devoid of any foreign content; no foreign currency whatsoever should have been spent on its realization. This situation, however, is beau idéal and possibly unrealistic in a globalized world where supply chains are spread across continents. Globalized competitive markets, shortfalls in skillsets and limited manufacturing infrastructure within the country further complicates the indigenisation objective. Thus, there is a critical need to assess what should encompass indigenisation towards Atmanirbharta and Strategic Autonomy within the confines of globalization. Should it mean developing a competitive design, manufacturing and production ecosystem for everything needed or should it be restrictive in scope regarding what should be generated within the territory of the country and what should be accessed from the Global market including design, manufacturing and assembly, all inclusive of Intellectual Property Rights? Understanding these aspects through existing policies is essential to get a correct perspective of indigenisation in the Indian Navy.
  • Is IC Just a Numerical Target? The 2005 Kelkar Committee report brought out that the concept of indigenisation needs to include capability development, design, system integration and increasing know why, well beyond having simple numerical targets.5 Between Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2006 and 2013, in cases where the products were brought from the Indian firms (‘Buy Indian’ Category), 30% IC was mandated, without defining what exactly constitutes IC. It also did not specify exactly how the 30% would be computed, though it stated a minimum requirement of 30% IC if the system is integrated by an Indian Vendor. The DPP 2008 and 2011 simply mentioned IC on cost basis. Later, DPP 2013 brought in some more clarity in describing IC, this also on cost basis, but attempted to lay out parameters of assessment and audit.6 It also clarified further that in addition to the 30% of contract value as IC requirement, it mandated similar 30% requirements of IC individually in Basic Cost of Equipment, Manufacturers’ Recommended List of Spares and cost of Special Maintenance Tools and Special Test Equipment. It even mandated the requirement of 30% IC for basic equipment in all stages of contract including the Field Evaluation Trial Stage.7 The overall spirit, as apparent from the policy description, appears to be geared at merely achieving numerical targets which is contrary to the spirit of the Kelkar committee recommendations.
  • Refining the Concept of IC through DPPs. The DPP 2016 brought in some more significant changes in terms of IC requirements in Capital acquisition. ‘Buy Indian’ acquisition category required a minimum 40% of the total contract value in the form of IC on cost basis. In case the equipment was not designed and developed indigenously, the requirement went up to 60%. Like in DPP 2013, DPP 2016 also mandated IC compliance in cost of basic equipment, cost of Manufacturers’ Recommended List of Spares and in cost of Special Maintenance Tools and Special Test Equipment. However, these had to be assessed together at all stages including Field Evaluation Trials unlike in case of DPP 2013 where only Basic Equipment Cost was to be considered for IC verification till the Field Evaluation Trial stage. The concept of proving indigenous design was also introduced in DPP 2016 with its responsibility resting on the vendor. The IC verification, based on documentary proof issued by authorized agencies to the vendor, was to be carried out by a committee composed of scientists from the Defence Research and development Organisation (DRDO) and representatives from the Service Headquarters (SHQ). The requirement of verifying the indigenous design and development had to be completed before fielding the Statement of Case for categorization. Many of these aspects of DPP 2016 have continued in DAP 2020, while much has changed as well. The final verification of indigenous design has been shifted to the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) stage while verification of IC could be done within one year of last delivery in the case of DAP 2020. It could be deduced that there has been an attempt through DPP 2013 and 2016 to get indigenous design and manufacture through some policies, which did not work as anticipated. Accordingly, the provisions were relaxed in DAP 2020 whereby the mandatory precondition of indigenous design verification by DRDO scientists for Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) cases were removed. This gives the vendor sufficient bandwidth to argue his case for what comprises indigenous design after it being accepted by the user. Hence, the IC verification also needs major changes to promote real Atmanirbharta.
  •  Indigenous Content: An Undefined and Ambiguous Entity. Though DAP 2020 has brought in greater clarity on the computation of IC, it has, nonetheless failed to clearly define what IC is all about. The ensuing complexity ends up providing the vendors the manoeuvring room to orchestrate the IC. The conjectured definition of IC, that could be drawn from the DAP, is simply the difference between the Base Contract Price in Rupees and the Rupee equivalent of the purchases in Foreign Currency by the supplier. Such implied definitions, or absence of clear definitions, have the following possible disadvantages from the point of view of achieving meaningful indigenisation:
  1. It does not specify the requirements of design, manufacture, or assembly of the product(s) within the territory of India which should ideally be the essence of indigenisation.
  2. IC could be adjusted through price manipulations, simply adding to the cost in Indian Rupees adds to the IC percentage.
  3. The exchange rate variations lead to change in value of IC without any change to it in the real world.
  4.  IC could be manipulated through procurement of foreign goods and services in Indian Rupees through local intermediaries.
  5. Undeclared foreign currency payments by the vendor could simply mean added IC content. Though verification is a feasibility, the absence of a dedicated, independent, credible, and competent organization for the purpose makes it unrealistic and ineffective.
  6. The concept of IC does not necessarily boost either in-country manufacturing or domestic absorption of foreign technology. On the contrary, it certainly adds to the cost being paid in Indian Rupees.
  7. DRDO products, consequently, face minimal formal external scrutiny on the quality and quantity of imported contents.
  •  Complex Task of IC Verification. In essence, indigenisation can only be accurately assessed through a robust verification process. Fundamental requirements of such IC verification should be to trace the location of design, development, manufacture, production, and assembly within the geographical and legal boundaries of the country. This is on the presumption that the ultimate aim of IC is to have critical capabilities within the country and in-country investments that contribute to growth and employment. However, the IC is neither defined nor explicitly described beyond its financial aspects in the DPP/DAP. This is a major shortcoming. Though IC verification is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and could be done through a nominated agency/institution,¹⁰ the absence of a specialized standing agency for this important aspect is a major impediment to indigenisation and its objective assessment. IC verification could be a massive exercise requiring significant resources and could be beyond the MoD’s expertise. Hence, without resources accretion, credible verification could be a distant reality. Even the policy relaxation in design verification of IDDM products between DPP 2016 and DAP 2020, brought out in this paper, could also possibly be attributable to this very reason.

Major Aspects of Current Levels of Indigenisation in the IN

Current Levels of IC in IN. The current indigenisation level in the IN is claimed to be 90% in the ‘float,’ 60% in the ‘move,’ and 50% in the ‘fight’ segment.11 While this paper does not intend to contest these claims, a critical analysis could reveal a different narrative. There is much ‘undefined’ IC, to be discussed subsequently in more detail, in these numbers. Since the present processes and rules are inadequate to identify or verify them, significant parts of these content percentages could belong to the imported category. Further, this specific reference does not include the entire aviation segment which is outside the Materiel branch of the Indian Navy.12 As per open source information, Naval Aviation is procuring a major part of their assets, costing over Rs 1.5 Lakh Cr, from global sources (P8I Aircraft ($ 4.7Bn),13 MH 60 R Helicopters ($ 2.6Bn),14 MH 60R weapons,15 MQ 9B HALE RPAs ($ 3.5Bn),16 and the Rafale MRCBF ($ 8Bn)).17 Some of their deliveries are likely to happen in the next decade. With a minimum of 20 years and in most cases 30 years life, these equipment will serve till the decade of 2050s. If the ambitious target of Atmanirbhar Navy by 2047 set by the CNS needs to be achieved, the minimum essential condition would be to ensure that all the afore mentioned issues are comprehensively addressed.

Current Levels of IC: A MoD Perspective: As per the 36th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, the Indian Naval surface and subsurface assets of the present and near future constitute 130 ships and submarines. Another 43 are under construction and 57 have been accorded AoN. The current air assets include 273 aircraft: 143 fixed-wing and 130 helicopters.18 LTIPP is the broad basis under which these assets are procured. To man and support these assets, the Indian Navy comprises more than 10500 officers and 65000 sailors. Both cadres have vacancies of 13% to 15% potentially impacting on manning and planning including indigenisation.19 As per this report, the budget earmarked for 2023 for defence, capital procurement from indigenous and foreign sources is in a ratio of 70:30. While on the face of it, this looks attractive, the figure would be misleading regarding indigenisation and indigenous procurements. This 70% order on indigenous sources, as per the extant policies, permits up to 50% of foreign content. Similar situation could exist even in systems designed and developed by DRDO. Thus, the overall foreign content, even in this case or in the worst-case scenario, could be more than 60%. This is twice as much as the presented figure of 30%. Further, the report also indicates that only three schemes, costing around Rupees 4400 Cr, are planned from foreign sources in the years 2023-2025. However, the planned procurement of MQ9B, MH 60R weapons,20 and Rafale Multi-Role Carrier- Borne Fighter (MRCBF), could significantly alter the figures since they have a cost implication of nearly Rs 1 Lakh Cr.21 In essence, there is a huge gap in the IC perception and reality.

 As per data submitted to the Standing Committee on Defence by MoD, in the decade spanning 2012 to 2022, the IN has acquired nearly 40% by value of its entire capital procurements from foreign sources. The comparison between imported and indigenous equipment procured in percentages of value remains almost unchanged year on year in these ten years, with a few exceptions. The specific value of import in the decade commencing 2012 was Rs 1.04 Lakh Cr. A similar amount is likely to be spent in the coming decade for importing the earlier mentioned aviation assets alone, thereby substantiating the irrecoverable adverse impact these recent foreign acquisitions have on the overall indigenisation plan in the near future.22 There is a need to limit as well as leverage these acquisitions to ensure that they support the cause of indigenisation in more ways than one. A critical outcome from such purchasing power ought to be transfer of technology and integration of indigenous equipment on these platforms.

Major Foreign Dependencies for IN. The earlier analysis posits that the present system of indigenous procurement inherently permits 40 to 50% of foreign content. In the case of high-value projects, this could cater for major systems and components to be sourced from abroad even while the procurement of the larger equipment/system falls under ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ category. Though there are restrictions in procuring Buyer Nominated Equipment (BNE) from abroad, the same is not true for other system parts. As a result, the items brought through ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ and ‘Buy (Indian)’ categories could possess considerable critical foreign contents, value of which ranging up to 50%. Equipment designed and developed by the DRDO too is no exception. This aspect of inherently high and critical foreign content in equipment procured even through ‘Buy,’ ‘Make,’ innovation and DRDO acquisition models needs to be seen in conjunction with the earlier mentioned acquisitions of MH 60 R Helicopters, P8I Aircraft MQ 9 B HALE RPAs, and Rafale MRCBF in a short span of five to ten years. Delving further into technicalities of the foreign content would indicate that in addition to these critical systems coming from abroad, the country’s dependence for these systems on foreign sources could be prolonged. As the IC assessment is undertaken purely on cost basis, progress on indigenisation and real IC in reality is still too little to achieve strategic autonomy in any foreseeable future. Therefore, there is a serious need to identify the amenability of technologies/equipment/ components to indigenisation and the time-frames needed to achieve them.

Specific Challenges in Meeting the Indigenisation Goal

Lessons from History on Indigenisation. In the present context of Atmanirbhar Bharat, reviewing the legacy of indigenous shipbuilding in India and how it has influenced the present and carry many lessons for the future, is crucial. The country had an unparalleled shipbuilding tradition till late 19th century, which has been internationally acknowledged time and again since the 5th century BC.23 For over 150 years, up to the late 19th century, the Wadia’s built more than 170 war vessels for the East India Company and 34 war ships for the Royal Navy as well as 87 other merchantmen.24 Wadia ships were known to be faster, stronger, and cheaper than what the best of the West had to offer. The English observed that an “India teak” ship lasted 30 years against their more expensive oak ships which lasted only 11 years. The Indian construction was nearly 25% cheaper.25 The country, which had such a pioneering and robust shipbuilding legacy till the 19th century, lost all of it when steam propulsion, first introduced in 1786, replaced sail; and later iron ships, first introduced in 1840, replaced wooden hulls. Even the screw propeller, invented in 1830, came into Indian construction only in 1883, that too only for some small craft. Significant political and scientific upheavals in the 50-year span commencing the 1857 uprising, severely impacted the Indian shipbuilding industry. None of the subsequent inventions i.e. steel hull in 1880, diesel engine in 1895, the turbine in 1900 and electric motor vessels in 1903 were introduced in the country due to non-existent industrial capability. These hastened the erosion of indigenous shipbuilding capability.26 Though much of this erosion was by deliberate British design, it highlights how a set of evolved and acquired skills and capabilities could be lost in quick time in an environment of successive failure to absorb technology and creation of adequate scientific and industrial capabilities. There is much to learn from this while Atmanirbharta is pursued in its current form, which also hinges greatly on possession of scientific and industrial capabilities as well as absorption of technology.

Is the IN Equipped to Undertake Its Own Indigenisation? Presently, the Services have major ownership in indigenisation. This is seen clearly from the role played by SHQ in each of the procurements including Make and Innovation as per the DPP/DAP procedures. The in-house indigenisation organisations and directorates further add to this role. This is not an optimal scenario since the Armed Forces neither have the requisite technical wherewithal nor the bandwidth for undertaking any major indigenisation. They ought not be distracted from the primary role of warfighting and training continuously for it. Indigenisation is the responsibility of the DRDO and has to be industry-driven, except in exceptional cases where services could contribute towards meeting some urgent and non-institutionalised field requirements. A dedicated neutral agency, possibly ‘Services-driven but not Services centred,’ with representation from all stakeholders is also a viable option to comprehensively drive indigenisation. Weapons And Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE), set up in July 1978 as Weapons and Systems Organisation (WESO) to support integration of Western and Russian systems onboard Godavari class ships is an independent naval organisation,27 that has made significant contributions to Atmanirbharta.28 Such institutional models could be one of the possible ways forward. Various lists of equipment/spares indigenised through in-house efforts, available at the IN portal from the Aviation side and Materiel Branch presents a less than encouraging story about the breadth and depth of in-house indigenisation attempts and successes thus far despite investing lot of its scarce and valuable resources.29 Hence, it is imperative that indigenisation, which involves considerable design and development, be left to full time professionals in industry and the DRDO, and not the Indian Navy. The IN’s responsibility should be limited to generating prioritized lists of items requiring import substitution.

 Myths About Positive Indigenisation Lists. Promulgation of various lists of equipment and technologies placed under import ban, called PositiveIndigenisation List,30 by the Government of India is a step in the right direction to decide what should not be purchased from the Global Market. This indicates a future timeline to generate substitutes within the country. Additional Indigenised/Positive Indigenisation lists for subsystems and Line Replaceable Units (LRU) published by Defence Public Sector Units (DPSU),31 which currently include another four lists and more than 4500 components, contributes further to these indigenisation supporting initiatives. Though Positive Indigenisation Lists, in principle, promote indigenisation, a detailed analysis of their contents indicates that they may not necessarily serve the intended purpose. A majority of the first three lists published so far comprises major equipment and systems which are already developed or under development within the country. However, the freedom for these systems to have 50% foreign content by cost without restrictions on the technology aspects invariably result in continued foreign dependence even for these products. Many of these dependencies will also be tied to Intellectual Property Rights, resulting in foreign dependence in perpetuity.32

Absence of Positive Import Lists: While there are multiple Positive Indigenisation Lists indicating what should not be imported, there are no similar lists which provide information regarding what all equipment, subsystems or parts are not worth attempting for indigenisation due to their financial or technical unviability. Hence, there is a simultaneous need to identify and promulgate a progressively diminishing list of equipment and technologies which are better to import than indigenise in the reasonable future. These could include technologies and products which are easily and widely available globally, but financially unviable to develop and manufacture ab-initio within the country. The absence of such a List lead to infructuous investments to produce financially and technically unsustainable technologies and products. Further, such a list would un-burden the Armed Forces by reducing considerable time and efforts invested in identifying and recommending indigenisation plans for systems and equipment which are un-viable for indigenisation. One preferred example in this case could be integrated circuits and Chips. The country presently does not have sufficient infrastructure to manufacture Chips and integrated circuits. Unless basic infrastructure for the same is built within the country, it is better to presume that these parts of any equipment would continue to be imported. Hence the cost aspect of these could be removed from the base used for calculating the IC for any defence procurements till such facilities are established.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the CNS’ vision of Atmanirbhar Navy by 2047 is in line with India's post-independence aspirations. However, much needs to be understood and corrected at various levels to realize this dream. While there are lessons to be assimilated from the pre-independence legacy of acclaimed shipbuilding and its sudden fall, there are also multiple issues, both at higher policy level and within the Navy which stand in the way. These issues include ambiguous understanding of IC and the lack of a definition to accompany it; the limitations of Positive Indigenisation Lists; steering of indigenisation by the IN which is ill-equipped for it; continued import of large value equipment and ‘undetected’ inherent foreign content and technology in the indigenous products of all kinds. The following guide-map would be necessary to achieve the challenging dream of an Atmanirbhar Navy by 2047:

  • Define Atmanirbharta and IC with greater clarity to ensure that primary focus is on developing and attracting technologies which are unavailable in the open market. The IC definition needs to cater for identifying location of design, development, assembly, and manufacture so as to ascertain and achieve the real sense of IC value addition within the country in terms of design, development, manufacture, assembly and technology adoption on a scale other than money terms (say technology, function, criticality etc.).
  • Generation of Positive Import or Negative Indigenisation List(s) to avoid wasting of precious efforts in developing and manufacturing financially unviable products which are otherwise available for import without restrictions from multiple sources.
  • One of the models for absorbing technology should be from developing financially viable products of the required technology before shifting to required products; the real aim being to fully absorb technology prior to arriving at a military product. Developing dual use technology would be the most optimal solution.
  • Every sinew needs to be strained to drastically reduce and then stop imports in the field of Naval Aviation, with a calculated plan to accept the voids and also promote indigenisation. Indian Navy’s real Atmanirbharta would depend significantly on its Atmanirbharta in Aviation.
  • DRDO needs to disclose full details of import dependence and content in its products. There is also a need to define what is permissible for import for DRDO as well; both directly and indirectly to ensure that their products are fully Atmanirbhar or at least understand what it would take to make them fully Atmanirbhar. There is a need for a technically competent external agency to scrutinise and evaluate the DRDO Atmanirbharta performance. It could be constituted under the MoD, composed of technocrats from industry and Ex DRDO/ISRO etc.
  • The import of all ammunition should be discontinued and ensure integration of indigenous weapons (and sensors where viable) on all foreign platforms. All foreign procurements should be leveraged with this conditional clause.
  • The IN should almost completely disengage itself from indigenisation and innovation except generating lists of items required to be innovated or indigenised. Indigenisation and innovation need to be steered by professionals in the DRDO or Industry and not the Armed Forces. WESEE, which has independently achieved significant and credible indigenisation through its unique model, could remain an exception.

Endnotes

  1. “Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative in Defence Production,” Press Information Bureau, 1 April 2022, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1812297.
  2. “Keynote Address by CNS for Swavalamban Seminar,” YouTube, 5 October 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yk3GjTNAeWs.
  3. Laxman Behera, “Defence Planning in India,” Journal of Defence Studies 4, no. 3 (July 2010), https://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_3_lkbehera.pdf.
  4. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020, 7, https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DAP2030new.pdf. The printed address uses the filename DAP2030new.pdf.
  5. Ranjit Ghosh, Indigenisation: Key to Self-Sufficiency and Strategic Capability — Global Defence Industrialisation and Re-modelling the Indian Programme (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), 1.
  6. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Defence Procurement Procedure: Capital Procurement 2013, 73–75, https://cgda.nic.in/pdf/DPP2013.pdf.
  7. Ministry of Defence, Defence Procurement Procedure: Capital Procurement 2013, 3–4.
  8. Ministry of Defence, Defence Procurement Procedure: Capital Procurement 2013, 2. The note as printed cites the 2013 procedure at this point in the discussion of the 2016 procedure.
  9. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020, 14–17.
  10. Ministry of Defence, Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020, 16.
  11. “Keynote Address by CNS for Swavalamban Seminar,” YouTube, 5 October 2023.
  12. Jayant Baranwal, SP’s Military Yearbook 2021–22 (New Delhi: SP Guide Publications, 2023), 190–92.
  13. “Boeing Delivers 12th P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft to Indian Navy,” The Economic Times, 24 February 2022, accessed 14 September 2023.
  14. Ravi Sharma, “Indian Navy Gets First Two Romeo Multi-Mission Helicopters as Part of Deal Signed with the U.S. in 2020,” Frontline, 17 July 2021, accessed 16 September 2023.
  15. “DAC Clears Procurement of Weapons for MH-60R Choppers, EW Suite for Mi-17 V5s,” The Indian Express, 25 August 2023, accessed 5 February 2024.
  16. Mayank Pandey, “India to Buy 31 Predator Drones from US for $3.5 bn,” Business Standard, 20 June 2023, accessed 18 September 2023.
  17. Pradip R. Sagar, “Deal to Buy 26 Rafale M: The Navy Gets New Wings,” India Today, 7 August 2023, accessed 20 September 2023.
  18. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence: Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, Ex-Servicemen Health Scheme, March 2023, 31–40.
  19. Ministry of Defence, 36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence.
  20. “DAC Clears Procurement of Weapons for MH-60R Choppers,” The Indian Express, 25 August 2023.
  21. Ministry of Defence, 36th Report, Standing Committee on Defence.
  22. Standing Committee on Defence (2022–23), Thirty-Seventh Report, 23, accessed 26 September 2023. The printed web address for this report is broken.
  23. K. Sridharan, History of the Naval Dockyard Bombay: Two Hundred and Fifty Years (1735–1985) (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), 4, 75.
  24. Sridharan, History of the Naval Dockyard Bombay, 91.
  25. Baldeo Sahai, Indian Navy: A Perspective — From the Earliest Periods to Modern Times (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2006), 170.
  26. Sridharan, History of the Naval Dockyard Bombay, 12, 13, 83–85, 90.
  27. G. M. Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–90 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2005), 52.
  28. Akash Sharma and Shilpy Bisht, eds., “From Combat Management to Military-Grade Security, How WESEE Powers Navy’s Aatmanirbharta,” News18, 24 July 2023, https://www.news18.com/india/from-combat-management-to-military-grade-security-how-wesee-powers-navys-aatmanirbharta-8408443.html.
  29. Naval Headquarters, “Naval Aviation Indigenisation Road Map 2017–22,” “Naval Aviation Indigenisation Road Map 2019–22,” “Naval Aviation Indigenisation Road Map 2022–27,” and the lists of systems indigenised by DWE, DEE, DME and IUW, published on the Indian Navy website.
  30. Department of Military Affairs, Ministry of Defence, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Positive Indigenisation Lists, and “Import Embargo List of Defence Weapons/Platforms,” accessed 14 September 2023.
  31. Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, SRIJAN dashboard, status of the positive indigenisation list of defence public-sector undertakings, https://srijandefence.gov.in/DashboardForPublic; and “Aatmanirbharta in Defence: MoD Approves 4th Positive Indigenisation List,” Press Information Bureau, 14 May 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1923971, accessed 14 September 2023.
  32. “MoD’s Big Push to Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative,” Press Information Bureau, 9 August 2020, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1644570, accessed 15 September 2023.