Introduction

This paper would be studying India’s relationship with the five nations of the Central Asian Region (CAR) viz. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. From mid-19th century until almost the end of the 20th Century, most of Central Asia was part of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. The residents of these nations include 7 million ethnic Russians, 500,000 Ukrainians 300,000 Koreans and 170,000 ethnic Germans. The region has a population of about 72 million (2019) - Kazakhstan (18 million), Kyrgyzstan (6 million), Tajikistan (9 million), Turkmenistan (6 million), and Uzbekistan (33 million).1

India’s link to this region dates back to more than 2,500 years through trade routes connecting the Gangetic plains and the Southern Eurasian Continent, known as Uttatapatha.2 The strategic location of the South Central Asian Region made it an essential conduit for the diffusion of trade, religion, philosophy and science across Asia and Europe. This region was also exploited by the Greeks, Turks and Mughals as a staging area for invasions into India. Until the end of the Cold War, India enjoyed strong strategic support within the region under the umbrella of the Indo-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation of 1971.3 However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 resulted in dissolution of the erstwhile USSR, which changed the geopolitical landscape and diminished the strategic support of India in the region.

Today, the nascent energy-rich region is under transformation with various nations across the globe closely monitoring and investing in the region. ‘Great Power Rivalry’ has increased manifold. In the ongoing geostrategic power play, major stakeholders in the region are Russia, China, India, USA, European Union, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The region spread over 4 million sq. km, is landlocked, resulting in poor regional connectivity.4 The region is rich in energy and mineral resources, but its poor connectivity makes it over-dependent on China and Russia due to its geographical continuity with these nations. China’s Belt and Road Initiative passing through the CAR envisages an investment of US $40 Billion.5 The region also faces challenges emerging from authoritarian regimes and religious extremism.

India is also re-aligning and enhancing its strategic presence in CAR. In the year 2015, Shri Narendra Modi, India’s Prime Minister made a visit to the region covering all five nations and paving the way for deep and close cooperation in the fields of education, energy, defence, science and technology.6 While the region has several existing defence production lines, they need heavy investment to rejuvenate.

For optimal international economic and political engagement, the major impediment is terrain which has extremes - mountainous landscape, impassable deserts, and semi-deserts.7 Political processes in these countries were subjected to geopolitical competition after disintegration of the Soviet Union. China used economic levers to achieve a gradual increase in its presence in Central Asia. In recent years, the political processes in these countries have evolved, however, this evolution is in the backdrop of power institutions and party systems defined with the dominance of tribal and regional-clan interests.8

This region is rich in oil, gas, gold, copper, aluminium, uranium, etc. According to the World Bank, oil, and gas exports in countries of this region varies from 30 to 40% of the total volume, and the benefit from sale of these hydrocarbons forms a significant portion of budget income to provide resources for investment and development. The forecast for GDP growth for 2021 is as indicated at Table 1: -

Table 1: GDP Growth Forecast9

Education, Science and Technology

Many of the research institutions established by the erstwhile USSR in this region have since become dated, unable to keep pace with technological advances as well as rapidly evolving national priorities. This has led each nation to optimally merge, shut down or alter the mandate of each institution. Some of these changes are enumerated below: -

  • Merger of many Turkmen Academy of Sciences

  • Reorganisation of Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan

  • Building technology parks in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

  • Creation of technology parks with research, education, industrial facilities, business incubators and exhibition centres in Turkmenistan

The researcher density (researchers per million population) of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is close to the world average.10

Energy - Present and Future

CAR is rich in energy, attracting powerful nations such as Russia and China to establish and build strategic ties. The availability of energy sources in India vis-à-vis CAR and the Middle East are given in Table 2 below: -

Table 2: Availability of Energy Sources11

India as the 3rd largest energy consumer in the world needs assured continuous and diversified energy supply, which is critical for its economic growth. Coal continues to be the main source of energy at 45%, followed by oil at 26%, biomass at 20% and natural gas at 6%. To meet emission norms and enhance clean and green energy, India plans to more than double its natural gas consumption to 15 % by the year 2030.12 Till recently, the Middle East supplied approximately 60% of India’s crude oil demand with Iraq’s share at 24%. However, the Iran supply fell to zero due to US sanctions in 2019. Exports from the Americas (Venezuela) and Africa face frequent disruptions. Similarly, Qatar supplies 41% of the total natural gas demand of India. There is also a need to diversify India’s energy basket by boosting gas, renewable and nuclear sources of energy. The gap between supply and demand for energy from now till 2047 is ever-increasing in India and there is a need to enhance reserve stock and diversify the sources of procurement so that India is secure on the energy front.13

CAR is home to an estimated 4% of natural gas, 3% of oil reserves and over 200 high-quality coal fields. Kazakhstan holds 38% of the world’s Uranium reserves.14 In keeping with the end state of diversifying energy sources, Indian companies have acquired energy stakes in the region. However, the issue of transportation of these resources remains a Gordian knot for India. Notwithstanding, in order to enhance the proportional ratio of natural gas to 15% in the energy basket, energy imports from CAR must increase. Thus, the nation has embarked on, and needs to continue its focus on strategic partnership and assured connectivity with the CAR.

Connectivity to Nations of CAR

Challenges

India does not share land borders with CAR. Further, connectivity to the region is challenged by the US-Iran tensions, antagonistic relations with Pakistan and instability in Afghanistan. The energy and mineral-rich CAR is mostly landlocked and dependent on Russia and China for trade links to the outside world. The internal instability and religious extremism have further made the situation complex.

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

INSTC was initiated in the year 2000 and ratified by India, Russia and Iran in 2002 to provide the shortest transport network to the member states and enhance connectivity to landlocked CAR. It comprises a multi-modal 7200 km transportation system to connect the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean with the Caspian Sea and Russia.15 India is trying to include Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Chabahar Port in the corridor. The project acts as a Gateway for India to expand trade with the CAR and Russia (Fig 1).

Fig 1: The International North-South Transport Corridor16

Ashgabat Agreement

To develop the shortest trade route between Central Asian Countries and the ports of Oman and Iran, an agreement was signed between Turkmenistan, Oman and Uzbekistan. India joined the agreement in February 2018 with the strategic aim of establishing connectivity to Eurasia.

Engagement with China and Russia

The Genesis. Post breakup of USSR, Sino-Russian relations have been strengthening and border issues were resolved on 14 October 2003. The countries have collaborated in various multilateral forums, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose mandate progressively expanded to accommodate the geo-strategic and economic aspirations of the CAR. Traditionally considered Russia’s backyard, there was an implicit acceptance of Russia being the chief guarantor of security of the region. After the global financial crisis in 2009, China emerged as the leading economic player in the region. From less than $1 billion annually in the 90s, trade between China and CAR was US $30 billion in 2019 as against $18.6 billion between Russia and Central Asia.17 The growing Chinese influence is indicative of Russia ceding space to China for economic growth of the region.

Diverse, yet United. The unifying factor for Russia and China in this region is their diverse strategic objectives. Russia’s key interests lie in retaining its hegemony in the politico-security domain and being the primary guarantor of security. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have Russian military bases and military intervention in the Ukraine crisis of 2014 points to the sensitivity of the nation to Western incursions in its backyard. In contrast, China is driven by economic interests, led by energy security and securing overland routes for trade with West Asia and Europe. Concurrently, China wants to isolate its restive Uighurs in the Xinjiang province from Islamic influence prevailing in the CAR. Its strength lies in its investing power and institutions have lent billions of dollars to CAR regimes.

Russia follows a collective policy, wherein, it has devised multilateral forums. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Trade Organisation (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) were created and continue to counter-balance similar Western constructs.

China on the other hand is largely following a bilateral policy, wherein, it engages one on one with member states for economic interests, energy security and to advance BRI. The Chinese initiative has fostered free trade zones and does not adhere to norms of multinational forums that regulate economic relations or force adherence to some specified foreign policy line.18 The Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism between Tajikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China for counter-terrorism is an indicator of China’s growing security role in Tajikistan.

Investments in transport, infrastructure and energy projects by China have enabled the BRI route to pass through Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia (EAEU territory).

CAR Perspective. The nations are conscious of their historical and contemporary relevance and realise their position as a Great Game Arena to leverage from multiple players viz. Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the EU. There is a lurking fear of Russia and its attempts to “re-Sovietize” the Eurasian space. Thus, a deliberate strategy to break away from Russian culture and encourage ethnic linguistic and cultural sentiment seems to be unfolding. While China’s economic clout and ambitions provide an opportunity for economic and infrastructure development, there is growing Sino-phobia due to unbridled expansion and debt traps. This has led to anti-China protests and conflicts between residents and Chinese workers.

The contentious issues between China and Russia are likely to increase in the coming years, especially with China starting to overlap with the security interests of Russia. Concurrently, BRI carries inherent risks of growing anti-Chinese sentiment due to different cultures and threats from terrorist organizations.

Engagement with India - Positive and Aspirational

India views CAR as an extended neighbour. Despite historical linkages and social and cultural affinity, the growth trajectory has just been incremental due to a lack of connectivity on ground and common strategic interests. The overarching influence of Russia, innate political instability and internal security situation in the region were also impediments to establishment of robust engagements. Indian diplomatic relations with the region were first established in the year 1992.19 In January 2019, India and the CAR hosted the first foreign ministerial meeting to explore strategic partnerships in the fields of education, science and technology. The 2nd meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue in October 2020, and the decision to hold it annually, provide an alternative institutional framework for cooperation between India and the Central Asian countries. In this dialogue, India announced a US $1 billion Line of Credit and an innovative grant financing mechanism for High Impact Community Development Projects in Central Asian countries.20 Salient features of the relationship forged with each of the five countries are elucidated below: -

  • Kazakhstan. India and Kazakhstan are strategic partners since the year 2009, with bilateral trade amounting to US $981 million. The Heads of the two states have repeatedly visited each other. India and Kazakhstan actively cooperate at various multilateral forums. The two states have supported each other’s Non-Permanent membership in UNSC. Kazakhstan also supports India’s bid for permanent membership in UN Security Council.21 The inter-Governmental Commission of the two nations established in 1993 is the apex body steered by Minister for Petroleum and Energy and co-chairs trade, technology exchanges, cultural and industrial cooperation. Joint working groups are active in the field of IT, Hydrocarbons, space and defence. The defence cooperation framework between the two nations is governed by a Defence and Military Technical Cooperation Agreement 2015 to include joint exercises, technical cooperation and UN peacekeeping. In addition to joint exercises, the two countries are working towards joint production of military platforms for the three Services. More than 100 premier training and educational institutes are part of the education exchange programmes. Over 1000 professionals in Kazakhstan have benefited from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme.

  • Turkmenistan. India and Turkmenistan enjoy warm and friendly relations through shared historical and cultural links. India has participated in the Caspian Economic Forum and Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and was a co-sponsor to Turkmenistan’s resolution in the UN for declaration of 2021 as ‘International Year of Peace and Trust’ at the 73rd session of UNGA on 22 August 2019.22

  • Uzbekistan. The upward trajectory of India-Uzbekistan relations is maintained by regular exchange of high-level visits. The Defence Ministers met at Tashkent in November 2019 and inaugurated the maiden joint military exercise between the two countries.23 Uzbekistan has the bust of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and a street named after him in Andijon. During the maiden visit of Mr Mirziyoyev, the President of Uzbekistan, seventeen agreements/ MoUs were signed in the fields of law, tourism, military education, agriculture, science and technology, commerce and industry, pharmaceutical, national security, and illicit trafficking. India also has a Line of Credit of US $200 million for projects in the social sector with further possibility of providing US $800 million in Line of Credit and Buyer’s Credit.24

  • Kyrgyzstan. On the independence of Kyrgyzstan in August 1991, India was among the first few nations to establish diplomatic ties. The country supported India’s membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and it’s bid for permanent membership in UNSC. The two countries have signed multiple framework agreements to include trade and economic cooperation, culture, civil aviation, avoidance of double taxation etc. Shri Narendra Modi visited Kyrgyzstan twice in 2015 and 2019, where he signed a declaration on establishing a strategic partnership with Kyrgyzstan.25 MoUs on Health, Export-Import Bank, IT and Strategic Studies have also been signed in past. Bilateral trade was approximately US $59.53 million in the year 2018.26 A five-year roadmap to enhance trade and investments was signed in 2019 to exploit the full potential of trade. Under the ITEC scheme more than 1274 slots have been utilised by the professionals of the Kyrgyz Republic. An agreement on Defence Cooperation was signed in 2015 with the Indo-Kyrgyz Defence Cooperation. Joint Exercise Khanjar is an annual affair for the special forces of the two nations. The last exercise was held in Bishkek in April 2021 despite COVID-19.27 India has also extended a line of credit worth US $200 Million to support Kyrgyzstan Defence Forces Modernisation Plan. There are about 900 Indian Nationals including 800 students in Kyrgyzstan. A visa-free regime for diplomats, officials and service passports of the two nations is effectively in force.

  • Tajikistan. India and Tajikistan share cordial relations and high-level visits over the years have strengthened the bilateral relationship. Both countries are signatories of multiple MoUs on space technology, disaster management, renewable energy, agriculture etc. They have five bilateral consultative mechanisms for counter-terrorism, trade, science and technology, defence and peaceful use of space. Bilateral trade stands at US $20.51 million in export and US $0.29 Million in imports in the year 2019 by India.28 At international forums too, India and Tajikistan have displayed close cooperation. Tajikistan has extended support for the Non-Permanent membership in UN Security Council, and also for membership of SCO. India has provided humanitarian assistance and financial support for multiple infrastructure projects. Tajikistan hosts the first Indian overseas military base located at Farkhor.29 As part of capacity-building measures, India has trained Tajik diplomats, financed training for remote sensing and allotted over 1425 ITEC slots and 360 scholarships. Approximately 1550 NRIs in Tajikistan, including 1250 medical students, contribute US $8.4 million to the Tajik GDP.

Withdrawal of US and NATO Troops from Afghanistan

USA has already withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan.30 It is expected that Taliban-controlled territories could become safe havens and breeding grounds for terrorists, who may be employed against Indian and CAR interests. The terrorists are also likely to target INSTC, which is critical for Iran and India. Moreover, China is likely to fill the vacuum created by the US troop withdrawal and will attempt to play a greater economic and political role in Afghanistan.31 Additionally, the contours of Pak-Russia relations would be a vital factor for India to evolve a strategy for engagement with Afghanistan. The present scenario has a likelihood for CAR to face a potential threat from Islamic extremism.

India is alive to the repercussions of US and NATO troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. To safeguard its national interests, India is working towards enhancing its diplomatic clout in the region including in Afghanistan. Towards this, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan attended the India-CAR Virtual Dialogue held on 28 October 2020, as a special invitee. The forum called for the settlement of the Afghan conflict based on the principle of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled peace process.32 The ministers expressed their interest in the economic reconstruction of a united and sovereign Afghanistan.

President Joe Biden may have implemented Donald Trump’s Afghanistan withdrawal policy, but in doing so has allowed the Taliban take over of Afghanistan to adversely impact the geo-strategical space in the region. The country appears to be taking on hues of a Muslim cleric state amidst eroding respect for human rights. These actions will have global repercussions and also have the potency to destabilise the region further.

Conclusion

CAR has epistemic dynamics as the core interest with India, Russia and China, who are also members of various multilateral organisations that include G-20, BRICS, SCO and RIC.33 The CAR is likely to be the centre of political, economic and military power play or ‘The New Great Game.’ Multiple states are employing trade and financial incentives in the region to pursue energy security. Traditionally, Russia has been the biggest regional player but is slowly being replaced by China. India and Russia have a convergence of interests in the region, and it is time for the two countries to take up joint economic projects in the region. China and India are pursuing strategies of BRI and Connect Central Asia respectively. China is the largest crude oil importer in the world and its energy requirements are likely to double by the year 2050 from 13.5 million barrels of crude oil in the year 2018. The natural gas demands are also likely to inflate by 190 per cent during the same period.34 The demand for Uranium from the region is spiralling upwards for Chinese nuclear power plants.

While China has operationalised oil and gas pipelines from the region, India is yet to make headway in infrastructure build up due to geographical constraints. Energy-rich CAR is vital for source diversification and could lead to a power play between China and India. Like China, Russia is also interested in importing energy and mineral resources and would like to flood CAR with its manufactured goods. In summary, India’s approach is that of a constructivist, while China seems to be hegemonic, and Russia is the archetypal elder Big Brother.

Nations of CAR and India - Way Ahead for Transcending from Relationship to Partnership.

  • India’s constructivist role in sharing and building knowledge bases with CAR nations is seen as an extension of its foreign policy in which symbiotic growth for all partner nations is a top priority. This could very well form the bedrock of an India-CAR partnership.

  • There are a large number of Soviet-era military facilities in the CAR that continue to be vital to Russia.35 The Indian defence forces are also using many weapon systems of Soviet/ Russian origin which require a major upgrade. Several companies in CAR, especially Kazakhstan, have expertise in naval platforms, aviation and missile technology. There is vast potential for the Indian defence sector for joint ventures for the production of missiles, torpedoes and other associated systems. Many Indian firms such as Ashok Leyland, Bharat Electronics, Zen Technologies, Alpha Design Technologies and Hindustan Aeronautics had expressed keen interest in joint production of equipment like Rifles, Protected Vehicles, Artillery Systems, Cruise Missiles, Aviation Assets, Radars, Air Defence Equipment, Software and Simulators for Training Solutions etc.

  • CAR has adequate resources to meet demands of the world market for critical minerals and energy sources. Russia, China and India may explore the option of joint ventures for the mining of critical minerals and energy resources.

  • India should leverage its historical, cultural, people-to-people contact and civilizational bonds with CAR to secure its national interests and continue to give impetus to high-impact projects for socio-economic development.

  • The INSTC and other infrastructure projects such as TAPI and Chabahar port in this region must be made operational at the earliest to establish direct transport communication with Central Asia.

  • Formulate and implement an optimal strategy to engage with and develop a relationship with Afghanistan, post-exit of US and NATO troops.

Endnotes

  1. "Демографическая ситуация" (PDF). Statistika qo'mitasi.

  2. P Stobdan, India and Central Asia: The Strategic Dimension (New Delhi: KW Publisher, 2020).

  3. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, New Delhi,” 09 August 1971. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty+of.

  4. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-central-asian-states-to-hold-1st-ever-joint-meet-on-january-12-13-to-discuss-roadmap-for-strategic%20engagement/%20article%20show/%2067430650.cms?from=mdr.

  5. Ashok Sajjanhar, “Understanding the BCIM Economic Corridor and India's Response,” Observer Research Foundation no. 147 (2016, June). https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ORF_IssueBrief _147.pdf, accessed 10 November 2022.

  6. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25429/Joint_Statement_between Uzbekistan_and _India_during_the_Prime_Ministers_visit_to_Uzbekistan.

  1. “Characteristics of Central Asia as a Region and Features in Political Transformation of its States in the Paper 2nd Cyprus International Conference on Educational Research, (CY-ICER 2013) Central Asian Knot of World Politics”.

  2. S Zhiltsov, “Political Processes in Central Asia: Peculiarities, Problems, Prospects April 2016”.

  3. GDP Growth Rate, 2021 forecast (% per year) Source: Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2021 (April 2021)

  4. Nasiba Mukhitdinova, UNESCO Science Report: Towards 2030 (Paris: UNESCO, 2015), 365–387.

  5. Bernard Looney, “Statistical Review of World Energy ed. 69,” June 2020. https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf, accessed 20 November 2022.

  6. “Country Analysis Executive Summary: India,” US Energy Information Administration, 17 November 2022. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/India/india.pdf, accessed 20 November 2022.

  1. Harendra Kumar et al., “Energizing India: a Joint Project of NITI Aayog and IEEJ,” The Institute of Energy Economics Japan, 16 June 2017. https://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Energy%20Booklet.pdf, accessed 20 November 2022.

  2. Op Cit., n.2.

  3. Kunal Kashyap, “INSTC: India Breeches Great Wall of Pakistan,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies no. 137 (2018, May). https://www.claws.in/publication/instc-india-breaches-the-great-wall-of-pakistan/.

  4. Suhasini Haidar, “India Pushes For Chabahar in India Iran Russia INSTC Corridor,” The Hindu, 04 March 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pushes-for-chabahar-in-india-iran-russia-instc-corridor/article33988009.ece.

  5. “Central Asia’s Economic Evolution from Russia to China,” Worldview, 05 April 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/central-asia-china-russia-trade-kyrgyzstan-kazakhstan-turkmenistan-tajikistan-uzbekistan, accessed 20 November 2022.

  6. https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features (2018/10/08)

  7. Ildar Yakubov, “India and Central Asia: The Thorny Path of Cooperation,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 06 February 2020. https://cabar.asia/en/india-and-central-asia- the-thorny-path-of-cooperation, accessed 20 november 2022.

  8. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, MEA Annual Report 2020-21.

  9. “India-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations,” 12 March 2020 . http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation Kazakhstan_2020.pdf, accessed 20 November 2022.

  10. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, MEA Annual Report 2019-20.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, MEA Annual Report 2018-19.

  13. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Kyrgyz Republic Bilateral Relations,” February 2020. http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Kyrgyzstan_Bilateral_Brief_feb_2020.pdf, accessed 20 November 2022.

  14. Ibid.

  15. Catherine Putz, “India-Kyrgyzstan hold Bilateral Military Exercise Khanjar - Special Forces Troops from India and Kyrgyzstan Started a Two-Week Exercise Outside Bishkek on April 16,” The Diplomat, 28 April 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/india-kyrgyzstan-hold-bilateral-military-exercise-khanjar/, accessed 31 October 2022.

  16. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations,” 20 July 2020. http://mea.gov.in/Portal/Foreign Relation/India-Tajikistan_Public_July_2020 1_.pdf, accessed 21 November 2022.

  17. Jayanta Kalita, “Can Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Clash Harm India’s Strategic Interests In Central Asia?” The Eurasian Times, 02 May 2021. https://eurasiantimes.com/can-the-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-clash-harm-indias-strategic-interests-in-central-asia/, accessed 21 November 2022.

  18. Outlook Web Bureau, “How Will Withdrawal Of US Troops From Afghanistan Impact India? - The Withdrawal of the US and the NATO Troops from Afghanistan will Leave India with Tremendous Concern about the Resurgence of the Taliban,” Outlook, 15 April 2021. https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-news-how-will-withdrawal-of-us-troops-from-afghanistan-impact-india/380272, accessed 10 November 2022.

  19. Op Cit., n.2.

  20. Joint Statement of the 2nd meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue, 28 October 2020.

  21. Chen Dongxiao and Feng Shuai, “The Russia India China Trio in the Changing International System,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies vol. 2, no. 4 (2016), 431- 447.

  22. Ayjaz Wani, “India and China in Central Asia: Understanding the New Rivalry in the Heart of Eurasia,” ORF Occasional Paper, February 2020.

  23. Central Asian Series 8/15 E, Russia and Central Asia, Advanced Research and Assessment Group Defence Academy of the UK.