CHALLENGES AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COERCION

Abstract: This article endeavours to critically examine the theory and practice of coercion in contemporary international relations, tracing its evolution from ancient statecraft to current global politics. While theoretical models characterise coercion as a rational mechanism for inﬂuencing adversary behaviour through credible threats and signalling, actual applications consistently expose complex challenges and discrepancies. Taking reference and drawing lessons from seminal works of inﬂuential thinkers like Kautilya, Clausewitz and Schelling, along with recent research, this analysis addresses various domains—military, nuclear, cyber, space, and economic coercion—illuminating the significant gaps between theory and practice in each. The discussion identifies key factors that undermine the eﬀectiveness of coercion, including irrational decision-making, misperception, escalation dynamics, geopolitical entanglements, domestic politics, emerging technological domains, and strategic culture. Ultimately, this paper contends that successful coercion demands adaptive, context-sensitive strategies founded on clear communication, demonstrated capacity, and credible intent. It firmly recognizes that no single theory can reliably predict outcomes of coercion in the ever-changing landscape of international aﬀairs.

Introduction

The advancement of human civilisation from a primitive feudal society to a complex Westphalian system witnessed a change in the process of negotiation, bargaining and diplomacy, making it more intricate. The intense quest for power and control over scarce resources, fuelled by competing claims, made the bargaining process more contentious, causing frequent wars and violence and, consequently pushed the need to seek alternative solutions to minimise violence. This led to the interplay of communication of intentions in advance, the acceptance of compromises, and adherence to restraint, termed as diplomacy, coercion, deterrence, and compellence in bargaining and negotiation process.¹

In theory, coercion is a hard skill and a key instrument in negotiation. In an anarchic world order, it appears logical and rational to utilise calculated threats or limited force to influence an adversary's behaviour. In the realm of international relations, Robert Pape explains the logic of coercion in the denial theory of military coercion, that decisions during coercion are often based on a cost-benefit analysis. Coercion suggests that by credibly threatening with the power to inflict pain, one state can compel another to change its behaviour and react to various incentives and disincentives.² However, when we examine contemporary world politics, the application of coercion frequently uncovers significant challenges and inconsistencies. This leads us to the main argument: does coercion as a strategy and/or a tactic always work between state actors in international politics? If not, then, what are the underlying factors which might compel actors to deviate from the expected rational responses to coercion? To address these inquiries, we must first scrutinise the theoretical foundations of coercion and then assess the areas where its theory either aligns with or diverges from practical application.

Since the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) to the present day, the history of statecraft and international relations has seen many instances where coercion has been employed through methods such as sieges, blockades, taking hostages, etc. In the Indian context, ancient texts from the mythical period recount how the Ashwamedh yagna was used as a powerful tool of coercion to establish the king’s dominion over territories where the noble horse roamed. Kautilya’s Arthashastra, written centuries ago, provides valuable insights into various strategies of statecraft, emphasising the need to comprehend an adversary’s values, vulnerabilities, and historical experience. Kautilya advises that a king should ideally use various tactics (Upayas). i.e., sama, dana, bhed and danda as a comprehensive approach to governance; however, if all other three fail, the last resort should be the use of force (danda).³ This entails military mobilization as a means to compel the adversary into submission, often without the need for direct confrontation. Similar concepts find echoes in Sun Tzu’s dictum that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.

Nobel laureate Thomas C. Schelling propagated the theory of coercion as an instrument of diplomacy to threaten the possibility of violence. In his groundbreaking work, Arms and Inﬂuence, he underscores the assumption that there is a distinction between direct use of brute force and the power to hurt. His theory postulates that “the power to hurt is a bargaining power” and is an instrument of coercion and is most successful when held in reserve as latent violence.⁴ He considered military capabilities, whether real or imagined, as bargaining power—a form of what he termed "coercive diplomacy”.⁵ This approach hinges on deftly manipulating an enemy's willingness to accept risk, which he identifies as a key to successful diplomacy.

Having witnessed the Cuban missile crisis and nuclear brinkmanship, Schelling elucidated the crucial distinction between deterrence and compellence. Both concepts can be seen as organic offshoots of coercion. In his view, deterrence is a passive strategy of indefinite duration aimed at preventing an adversary from initiating an undesirable action, essentially inducing inaction through the threat of retaliation.⁶ Compellence, by contrast, is an active strategy with a definite timeframe that seeks to stop an adversary from an action already taken or compel them to take a specific action desired by the coercer.⁷ For coercion to be effective, it is extremely important that the target state receives and understands clear signalling about the coercer's demands, as well as the capabilities and credibility of the intended coercive action.

In international relations, the encapsulation of coercive behaviour requires both a threat and a demand—either explicit or implicit—but also must provide assurance of relief or restraint if the opponent complies. This dynamic ensures that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the potential benefits. As Oriana Skylar Mastro argues in Costs of Conversation, that with rationalist perspectives, direct communication enhances credibility of signals and shows resilience which play a crucial role in shaping the adversary's cost-benefit calculus.⁸ Additionally, in Allison and Zelikow's Essence of Decision Making, we see how intricate communication and signalling occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁹

As rational actors, states and non-state entities often begin their approaches with intimidation through psychological coercion, starting with caution, which graduates to economic sanctions followed by force mobilization and blockades and finally it escalates to military punitive actions. A prime illustration of this process can be found in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, particularly in the Melian dialogue. During the dialogue, to convey their resolve and credibility of threat, Athenian envoys bluntly declared to the small island of Melos that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹⁰ This ultimately led to the Athenian siege of Melos. Similarly, in the 1991 Gulf War, the UNSC issued credible threat signals against Iraq following its aggressive annexation of Kuwait. Subsequently imposing a tight deadline for withdrawal and implementing sweeping economic sanctions, the Council signalled its resolve, while simultaneously mobilising a formidable coalition force led by the United States.

Before delving into whether coercion theory aligns or fails to align with reality, one must briefly examine several domains of coercive strategy, highlighting in each domain the various mechanisms available as per the theoretical expectations. These domains are:

Military Coercion (land, air, sea). To compel an adversary, coercion often manifests as overwhelming military force mobilization involving actions like invasion, blockades, harbour mining, or punitive air strikes. In his work Bombing to Win, Robert Pape propagates air strikes for punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation and also underscores that, denial strategies can be more effective than those aimed solely as punishment and risk.¹¹ This was exemplified in India's ongoing operations (Op Sindoor) against Pakistan. The demonstrated capability of Indian military forces to strike with calibrated precision deep into Pakistan territory (terrorist camps and defence installations) through indigenous standoff weapons like Brahmos, fired by IAF’s strike aircraft, coerced Pakistan from escalating the conflict. Within three days of conflict, Pakistan’s leadership understood that the Indian military has the credible capability not only in terms of numerical superiority but also in employment of indigenous superior weapons to escalate the attack to punish and deny the use of battlespace to Pakistan.
Nuclear Coercion (establishing redlines for use). This domain exemplifies coercion theory in its purest form. Thomas Schelling highlights the manipulation of risk, where escalating actions through the threat of overwhelming retaliation create mutual deterrence, known as principle of a balance of terror. Vipin Narang expands on these ideas in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, arguing the concept of “existential deterrence,” the mere possession of nuclear weapon, indicating potential of catastrophic costs serves as a powerful deterrent against different type and intensities of conflicts.¹² In this context, coercion aims to prevent war, with credibility being crucial to convince adversaries that crossing specific red lines would lead to nuclear consequences—essentially deterrence rooted in fear.

Cyber Coercion (denial or crippling critical infrastructure). A new domain -- in theory at least-- cyber capabilities allow for coercion below a conventional war threshold, enabling nations to exert pressure on opponents without direct military confrontation. Lucas Kello, in his influential work The Virtual Weapon and International Order, examines cyber capabilities concerning deterrence and coercion, positing that cyber threats have capabilities of punctuated deterrence and in creating a condition of “unpeace” – activity that is neither fully war nor peace.¹³ An example of cyber in coercive form are, the US-led Stuxnet worm attack against Iran's nuclear program around 2010 exemplifies a successful coercive cyber operation that led to physically damaging Iranian centrifuges, thereby influencing Iran’s nuclear decision-making. Similarly, the DDoS (Distributed -Denial- of - Services) attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 highlight the impact of cyber tactics in shaping state behaviour.¹⁴ Without the possibility of strategic and tactical use of the cyber domain, the ability to achieve desired outcomes from these states might have involved large costs and would have remained unpredictable under geopolitical dynamics. However, cyberattacks are often conducted clandestinely, making attribution challenging and providing perpetrators with deniability. Despite these complexities, nations are actively developing cyber coercion strategies.
Space Coercion (denial or crippling of space capabilities). In Everett Dolman’s thought-provoking text Astropolitik, he asserts that control over orbital space represents the strategic sanctuary and “ultimate high ground," providing significant strategic advantage.¹⁵ Recent developments have rendered space a more contested arena, with coercive capabilities evolving steadily. These include anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, dazzling lasers, and satellite jamming. A nation that can weaponize space and target or safeguard satellites holds substantial coercive power. Nonetheless, major powers have historically exercised restraint in militarizing space. As documented by James Clay Moltz in The Politics of Space Security, during the Cold War both the known rival great space powers avoided deploying weapons of mass destruction in orbit. In fact, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited WMDs in orbit and national claims of sovereignty in space.¹⁶ Later on this restraint graduated to collective interest in maintaining the safety of space and the fear of escalating debris. Thus, contrary to Dolman's vision of space coercion, no nation has successfully exerted dominance in this arena—largely due to the potential for environmental destruction inherent in such attempts. As technology advances and great power competition extends to orbital space, the application of coercion theory in this domain could well change.

Economic Coercion (asset freeze, embargo targeting specific sector, ban on investment, isolation). Instances of economic coercion are multiple. For instance, during the 2010 dispute and tensions in ECS, China halted the export of rare earth elements to Japan.¹⁷In 2012, following a territorial dispute over Scarborough Shoal (SCS), China banned banana and pineapple imports from the Philippines.¹⁸ In 2021, following Lithuania's establishment of a "Taiwan Representative Office" in Vilnius, China imposed trade restrictions on Lithuania as a retaliatory measure.¹⁹ The G7, EU, and Australia enacted various sanctions against Russia in 2022, aiming to pressure it into altering its conduct in the Ukraine conflict.²⁰ An example of rising economic coercion is the 2024 boycott by Indian citizens on visiting the Maldives in response to anti-India sentiments influenced by pro-China positions.²¹ Additionally, placing a country on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list constitutes a form of economic coercion, as evidenced by Pakistan's inclusion in the grey list until October 2022 due to issues related to terrorist financing.²² A more recent example is the holding in abeyance of the Indus Water Treaty 1960 by India in retaliation to Pakistan sponsored terrorism on Indian soil.²³

In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer argues that under anarchy, states act in their own national interest and survival and often cannot fully trust one another.²⁴ This dynamic leads to a security dilemma, which undermines the coercion process and one’s efforts to deter a target state. These may be interpreted as offensive threats, prompting an adversary to strike first—an idea encapsulated in the term the "Thucydides Trap." Therefore, in practice the coercion process is complex; it’s a game of nerves and notoriously difficult, and even a great power often finds its coercive leverage limited. Theoretical models are based on certain assumptions that rarely hold true in real-world operations. The targeted opponents may misinterpret or ignore signals, leading to misperceptions about various factors such as resolve, stakes, domestic situations, political aspirations, alliances and cultural or ideological influences.

This multitude of factors inherent in the complexities of international relations and human behaviour can harden an opponent’s will, leading to a failure of coercion process and further complicating decision-making. A bit of elaboration follows:

First, the rational actor assumption tends to break down in the face of real-world irrationalities, misperceptions, and cognitive biases. Once again, a case in point is the Melian Dialogue, where the weaker Melians chose to resist and embrace martyrdom instead of submitting. This scenario demonstrates that the theory of coercion often fails to reflect rational behaviour, since the Melians did not see surrender as a valid option, and despite Athens presenting a credible threat, they responded with defiance.
Second, the evaluation of costs and benefits in coercion is inherently subjective and can lead to miscalculations. What a coercer views as an unacceptable cost might be interpreted differently by the target. The German Blitz of Britain in 1940, for example, did not break British resolve. Likewise, during the US involvement in the Vietnam War (1965-73), coercive bombings and troop escalations aimed at North Vietnam failed to deliver the intended coercive signals. Instead, they fortified North Vietnam's leadership resolve, enabling them to adapt and eventually raise the stakes for the U.S. In this context, North Vietnam's leadership perceived the conflict as an existential struggle with reunification representing a domestic legitimacy worth any sacrifice. Similarly, in their analysis of the 1991 Gulf War, Byman and Waxman in The Dynamics of Coercion emphasise that Saddam Hussein weighed the costs of maintaining control over Kuwait against the risks to his domestic political standing if he capitulated to Western threats, forcing coalition forces to resort to punitive military action.²⁵
Third, the degree of control and escalation dynamics inherent in coercive operations are far more unpredictable and are rarely achievable in practice. Actions intended to signal credibility of threat can be misinterpreted as escalatory, leading to unintended and potentially uncontrollable spirals of conflict. Current naval manoeuvres by China and the US in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait serve as examples of coercive signals, where the delicate balance between demonstrating strength and provoking reactions is evident, whereas the margin between a successful show of force and a provocation is thin.

Fourth, coercive actions do not occur in a vacuum. The method and degree of coercive actions and response by the adversary are influenced by the broader geopolitical dynamics, including the involvement of third parties, international norms and legal frameworks and prevailing power oscillations. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine illustrates how external support can impact a target's resilience against coercion, despite the coercer’s formidable capabilities.
Fifth, the nature of the objective significantly affects coercion’s success. For instance, compelling a state to abandon its territorial integrity or fundamental ideological principles or core interests is likely to be far more challenging than enforcing minor policy changes. This was observed in the protracted war between the US and North Vietnam and the US twenty years of conflict in Afghanistan.
Sixth, domestic political considerations and consequent responses within both the coercing and the target state can significantly deviate from the rational actor model. Leaders may pursue or respond to coercive strategies differently based on the prevailing sentiments of domestic masses or to enhance their political credibility and legitimacy. For instance, examining the response of Indian political leadership to Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks, until the 2016 Uri attack, India’s retaliation was restrained largely due to Pakistan’s nuclear asymmetric escalation posture.²⁶ However, following the Uri attack, India's reaction became more assertive, characterised by credible and measured retaliation, involving military force against terrorism emanating from Pakistan, effectively challenging Pakistan’s nuclear coercion.
Seventh, the emergence of new conflict domains, such as space and cyberspace, further complicates traditional coercion theory and practice. Cyber and space operations, with their inherent ambiguity and potential for widespread disruption, challenge conventional notions of deterrence and compellence. Cyberattacks are often conducted clandestinely, making attribution challenging and providing perpetrators with deniability. This ambiguity undermines essential signalling, which is a fundamental aspect of coercion theory. Additionally, the presence of state and non-state actors in space and cyber domains adds complexity, as attacks on neutral third- party entities could complicate coercive dynamics.

Finally, strategic cultural and historical experience significantly shape how states perceive threats and respond to coercive pressure. A coercive strategy that proves effective against one state may fail against another due to differing cultural norms, beliefs and historical narratives. For instance, the United States' involvement in Afghanistan against Taliban incurring a huge cost and ignominious withdrawal in August 2021, leaving the Taliban intact to rule, serves as a testament to the fact that coercive strategies do not always yield the desired outcomes. This highlights the dynamic nature of the war and uncertain outcomes. In the US -Afghanistan case the heralding of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) was a coercive strategy to punish the perpetrators of 9/11 attack. The GWOT initially had predefined the objective of destroying al-Qaeda and driving the Taliban from power.²⁷ The protractedness of this war and the difficulty of achieving any long-term political objective they may have envisaged, resulted the commitment of the US and its few allied participants fizzling out. Despite the elimination of the main perpetrator of the “9/11” attack, Osama bin Laden in 2011 it did not turn out to be the decisive blow to the leadership and activity of jihadi networks.²⁸With the ever-spiralling cost of war, receding objectives and strategic failure, withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan was almost inevitable. Consequently, the very same Taliban was once again in control of Afghanistan twenty years later. The coercive power of the US against these groups was felt by them from several years preceding 2001 before their military operations in Afghanistan began and of course in a more direct way during the active military involvements. Yet, ultimately, it did not seem to have worked politically.

In conclusion, coercion theory offers a powerful framework for comprehending international conflict and shaping an adversary's behaviour. However, the unquestioned alignment of this theory with real-world practice is anything but that; it is often riddled with complexities and inconsistencies. While theory provides us with the ideal constructs of deterrence and compellence, practice confronts us with the unpredictability of human behaviour, particularly under the pressure of high-stakes situations. Effective coercion relies on the three pillars of clear communication, demonstrated capacity, and unwavering credibility, alongside a deep understanding of the adversary's cost-benefit calculations. The foundational works of Schelling, Byman, and Waxman lay essential theoretical groundwork, yet the historical and analytical insights of Pape, Allison, Zelikow, and others expose the significant discrepancies between the elegant logic of theory and the chaotic realities of coercive operations. To bridge this gap, we must engage in meticulous planning, striking a balance between firmness, empathy and flexibility in execution. Each coercive domain imparts unique lessons, enriching our theoretical construct and enhancing its relevance for future challenges. Carl von Clausewitz noted in On War the often-limited aims of some wars that included imposing certain conditions on an opponent and hopes for compelling him to yield.²⁹ He also pointed to the dual nature of war: one of totally defeating the enemy, another of achieving bargaining leverage.³⁰ Clausewitz’s theory still holds good in the contemporary world where coercive measures are more varied across the spectrum of “peace” and conflict. Ultimately, the art of coercion in statecraft is a sophisticated interplay of power and persuasion. The pursuit of alignment between theory and practice—much like the very essence of coercive diplomacy—must be ongoing. Only then can we hope to master the delicate balance of decision-making required to influence adversaries in an intricate and dynamic geopolitical world order.

Endnotes

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inﬂuence (New Haven:Yale University Press, 2008), 1.
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 15-16.
L.N. Rangarajan, Kautilya The Arthashastra (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1992),16
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inﬂuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inﬂuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 5.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inﬂuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 70.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inﬂuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 72.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Costs of Conversation Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 3-4.
Graham T Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999),111-190.
Robert B.Strassler ed., The Landmark Thucydides a Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian war, (New York: Free Press, 2008), 352.
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 31.
Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conﬂict (Princeton:University Press, 2014), 231.
Lucas Kello,The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017),197.
Lucas Kello,The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017),62-63.
Everett C Doleman, Astropolitik Classic Geopolitics in the Space Age, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002)149.
James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security strategic restraint and the pursuit of national interest (Stanford University Press, 2019) 68 and 228.
“Rare Earths Trade Dispute,” Wikipedia, November 02, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Ra re_earths_trade_dispute.
“Philippines Seeks New Markets Amid Sea Dispute with China,” Reuters, May 17, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/business/philippines-seeks-new-markets-amid-sea-dispute-with-china-idUSLNE84G026/.
“China’s Economic Coercion: Lessons from Lithuania,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),May 06, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-economic-coercion-lessons-lithuania
“International Sanctions During the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Wikipedia, November 04, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalsanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
BBC:https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-67942642 last updated on 11 Jan 2024
“Pakistan Taken Off Global Watchdog's Grey List for Terrorism Financing,” Reuters, October 21, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-taken-off-global-watchdogs-grey-list-terrorism-financing-2022-10-21
“Indus Waters Treaty Will Remain in Abeyance Till Pakistan Stops Cross-Border Terrorism: India,” The Hindu, May 23, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indus-waters-treaty-will-remain-in-abeyance-till-pakistan-stops-cross-border-terrorism-india/article69606751.ece. 24 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 31.

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might, (Cambridge University Press, 2002),11.
Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conﬂict (Princeton University Press, 2014), 89.
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” U.S. Department of State Archive, released from January 20, 2001, to January 20, 2009, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm
“Five Years After the Death of Osama Bin Laden: Is the War on Terror Winning?,” RAND Corporation, May 02, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2016/05/five-years-after-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden-is-the.html.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989): 21.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989): 22.

CHALLENGES AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COERCION

Introduction

Endnotes

Author(s) Information