Fig 1: Representation of Nord Stream Pipeline Damage1

“When we talk about seabed warfare, always consider that from a French perspective there are two main goals: first is to protect critical underwater infrastructure; and second is to ensure freedom of manoeuvre for naval forces.”

- Rear Admiral Cédric Chetaille, Deputy Chief for Operations and Director of Seabed Capability Development, French Navy

Abstract: France has demonstrated a big shift in its approach to maritime security by adopting the Seabed Warfare Strategy in February 2022. This posture was based on the presumption that future wars will extend to and from the seabed. The presumed possibility was proven correct by the incidents of the Nord Stream blast in September 2022 and disruption of submarine cables in the Red Sea in 2024. These incidents highlighted the need for a national security posture transcending the scope of conventional naval operations in the seabed domain. The French framework exactly resonates with the contemporary requirements of operational capability to act against hybrid threats in depths extending up to 6000 metres. It offers a model template of integrating scientific research with military objectives through technological development. In contrast, India does not have a defined roadmap for acquiring credible defensive and offensive capabilities in the seabed domain. Moreover, there are significant deficiencies in operational, strategic, economic, technological and legal frameworks which make India vulnerable to the prevalent hybrid threats. Therefore, it would be prudent for India to adapt France’s model in developing a synergised seabed security strategy to protect its economic and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region.

Introduction

The contemporary global maritime security environment has experienced a fundamental transformation with the seabed evolving as the latest area of strategic rivalry and potential confrontation. Growing threats to Critical Underwater Infrastructure (CUI), like energy transmission systems and submarine communication cables, have elevated seabed security from a niche technical concern to a critical element of national security architecture. The turning point came in September 2022, when the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines exposed the vulnerability of undersea assets and demonstrated how adversaries could exploit the underwater domain while maintaining plausible deniability.2 This incident underscored the urgent need for coastal and global powers to enhance resilience in their subsea networks. Building on this awareness, France, in February 2022, had already unveiled its forward-looking Seabed Warfare Strategy, structured around the doctrine of ‘Know, Monitor, and Act’. This framework is aimed at achieving operational capabilities at depths up to 6000 metres by 2026. It will enable France to reach 97% of the world’s seabed, encompassing not just national waters but also deep international zones where French and allied interests could be at stake.3 The threat landscape further evolved in 2024 when undersea cable disruptions in the Red Sea highlighted telecommunications vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the economic and geopolitical importance of seabed security.4 These events collectively marked the transition of seabed protection from a specialised naval issue to a core component of comprehensive national and collective defence planning.

For India, which commands 11,098.81 km of coastline5 and 2.02 million, square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),6 it will be irrational to disregard the strategic imperatives of the seabed domain. Chasing economic prosperity through the Deep Ocean Mission (DOM) by aiming to develop technology for deep-sea mining, underwater robotics and manned submersibles,7 will remain incomplete if India fails to address the prevailing strategic challenges in the deep-sea domain. For instance, India’s digital economy is reliant on merely seventeen international subsea cables,8 with fifteen cables amassed within a six-kilometre coastal sector near Mumbai.9 This single point of failure makes India's digital economy, financial systems and military communications networks vulnerable to targeted assaults. The problem for India in the seabed domain is further aggravated by increased Chinese assertion in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has been undertaking deployment of research and survey vessels to augment Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and collect sensitive oceanographic and marine data.10 These overarching challenges entail the development of a comprehensive seabed warfare capability with robust protection mechanisms for CUI. Acquiring these capabilities is now no more a policy aspiration but an urgent national security imperative for India.

Analysis of France’s Approach to the Seabed Domain

France has the second largest maritime space in the world, approximately 10.7 million square kilometres, spread across all oceans. The overseas territories account for 97 percent of these spaces and thus act as an enabler in France's geopolitical influence across the world. Further, this massive maritime space offers significant jurisdiction rights over exploration and exploitation of marine resources. To establish a legal framework for its claims, France ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in April 1996.11 The strategic and security implications of the seabed gained formal recognition when President Macron announced the ‘France 2030’ plan, which included ‘exploring the seabed’ as a key objective. Thereafter, France publicly released its Seabed Warfare Strategy in February 2022, which is structured around three interdependent functions, i.e., ‘Know, Monitor and Act’ for augmenting the information about the seabed to develop defensive and offensive capabilities to act in this domain.12

Know, Monitor and Act Doctrine

The core of the French approach to seabed domain is ‘Know, Monitor and Act’ doctrine which reorganizes the development of sovereign capabilities to operate at depths up to 6000 metres. Rear Admiral Cédric Chetaille - Marine Nationale’s Deputy Chief of Operations and Director of Seabed Capability Development, underscores the scope of this model as “an end-to-end operational function, from the analysis and the anticipation of the threats to offensive or defensive actions”.13 The ‘Know’ function involves improving current deep seabed understanding to obviate strategic knowledge gap which directly hampers threat detection, identification and intervention in underwater environments. This foundational knowledge is crucial for precise navigation, strategic positioning of sensors and identification of adversarial hideouts. The ‘Monitor’ function focuses on creating long-lasting surveillance capabilities to keep an eye and ear on activities that happen on or from the seabed. This capability is important for detecting underwater activities to defend CUI. The ‘Act’ function refers to the ability of executing search and retrieval of objects from seabed to undertake offensive operations like mining.14 This doctrine represents a continuous and dynamic cycle of intelligence wherein the outcomes and lessons learnt from ‘Act’ function goes as feedback into ‘Know’ function and thus creates a continuous learning and adaptation process. This non-linear and iterative process ensures continuous improvement of response in the rapidly evolving domain.

Fusion of Scientific Studies with Military Objectives

France’s strategy is heavily reliant on scientific contributions from French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea (IFREMER) and French Naval Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service (SHOM). The involvement of these organisations represents a deliberate synergy at the national level to leverage scientific knowledge for building military capabilities.

IFREMER is dedicated to Research and Development (R&D) in ocean sciences and has developed advanced expertise in the deep sea domain. In 1984, IFREMER commissioned a deep-sea submersible Nautile for scientific exploration up to a depth of 6000 metres. This made France the only country in the European Union to design, maintain and operate a manned submersible capable of operating at such depths. Over the past 40 years, it has completed 2122 dives, placing France alongside US, Japan, China and Russia that have submersibles with these kinds of capabilities.15 The operation of Nautile provided significant learnings about advantages and constraints of deep-sea manned diving. Building upon this knowledge, IFREMER has developed and demonstrated Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) Ulyx which is capable of diving to 6000 metres. The architecture of Ulyx is being used for developing A6K-M AUV by the French defence firm Exail Technologies. This programme underlines the pursuit to acquire maritime freedom of action and national sovereignty by conducting seabed research and continuous surveillance of vital underwater infrastructures at 6000 metres. A6K-M AUV emphasises on ‘Know’ and ‘Monitor’ functions of seabed warfare strategy and showcases how effectively France is leveraging the technological advancement meant for civilian research in military applications.

SHOM is the national hydrographic service which is an administrative establishment under the supervision of French Ministry of Armed Forces. It has an explicit mandate of rendering essential defence expertise and operational support about the knowledge of the aero-maritime environment. It provides updated and precise Hydrographic, Oceanographic and Meteorological (HOM) environmental intelligence which is indispensable for submarine navigation safety and functioning of modern command and weapons systems. To meet its objectives, SHOM develops efficient tools and services which is tailored to various types of warfare, sensors and weapons systems, in order to measure, describe and forecast the HOM environment.16 Essentially, SHOM emphasises on improving the knowledge of seabed thereby executes the ‘Know’ function.

Contributions of Academia

In order to transform the raw and complex underwater data into actionable intelligence, it is necessary to build advanced data processing capabilities. This gap is being addressed by French universities. The Naval Academy Research Institute (IRENav) is focused on studying underwater acoustics and signal processing. It is also a member of the national scientific cluster ‘Europole Mer’ comprising of engineering schools and universities inclined towards study of maritime environment.17 Additionally, a joint initiative by French Engineering School (Mines Paris – PSL) and Union of Metallurgy Industries (UIMM Sud) resulted in the establishment of the College of Naval Sciences (CSN) at Toulon on 25 June 2025. This partnership is aimed at undertaking dedicated research in the field of undersea robotics, drones, autonomous marine and submarine systems.18

Robust Industrial Capacity

French government has involved leading defence firms such as Naval Group, ECA Group, Exail and Thales to foster robust industrial capacity tailored to the needs of the envisaged underwater capability. Thales and Exail have been selected by the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) to deliver eight A18-M AUVs with mine warfare capabilities. Exail has been entrusted with developing the fully autonomous capability of AUVs. While Thales will integrate the AUVs with SAMDIS 600 sonar for superior performance.19 This industrial collaboration resonates with ‘Act’ function as it will contribute to the Système de lutte anti-mines marines du future (SLAMF) programme wherein French Navy is looking at mine warfare capabilities with massive use of unmanned systems.

Validation of Scientific and Technological Advancements

Integration of scientific advancements into military objectives is evident in France’s rigorous operational testing and training regimes. This move represents the ‘Act’ function of the seabed warfare strategy. A case in point is Op Calliope, initiated in 2022 to rigorously test off-the shelf technologies of AUVs and Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and impart training to Navy in deep-sea domain.20 Op Calliope simultaneously delivers experimental data and operational results, demonstrating how scientific learning directly affects the military practice. Further, the French Navy regularly participates in NATO exercises to refine its operational doctrine in seabed domain. Participation in ‘Polaris-25’ which was held between 12 May-17 June 2025 is an illustration in this regard. During this exercise, French Navy undertook simulated manoeuvres and confrontation on the seabed to tackle hybrid and non-linear threats.21 France also participated with Italy in exercise ‘Mare Aperto’ in 2025, to hone tactics of protecting underwater infrastructures and lines of communication. It included mine countermeasure operations involving manned and unmanned assets in simulated training scenarios. During real time clearance activities, thirteen unexploded ordnance dating back to World War II were discovered.22 Therefore, it is evident that these operations transcend mere testing of technology and function as a dynamic real-world laboratory for developing and refining France's seabed warfare doctrine.

Initial Operational Capability with Offensive Dimension

France is aiming for initial operational capability (IOC) of operating at 6000 metres by 2026 and full deployable capability by 2028.23 Further, France’s doctrine is not limited to a defensive stance; it is aimed at integrating offensive capabilities alongside protection of CUI. Rear Admiral Cédric Chetaille has reaffirmed that information gathered on the enemy’s seabed infrastructure, vulnerabilities and militarized systems will be subjected to offensive action using future AUVs and ROVs.24 Explicit inclusion of offensive capabilities in doctrine is not merely a policy declaration but a powerful driver for development of advanced combat AUVs and precision sensors.

Lessons from France’s Experience

France has transformed its reactive posture of CUI protection to a resilient defensive and deterrence posture. It has been achieved by integrating scientific research and industrial collaboration. Therefore, it is concluded that France has demonstrated an operationally oriented framework for academic study and policy adaptation. France's approach in developing capabilities for seabed warfare can be effectively adapted to India's strategic context through systematic integration of institutional technological foundations, targeted capability development and coordinated regional cooperation mechanisms. It would result in a comprehensive underwater domain awareness and response capabilities within a 10-year implementation timeline.

Ocean Sciences in the Indian Context

Ocean sciences in India traces back to the establishment of the first oceanographic centre in Asia, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research–National Institute of Oceanography (CSR-NIO) in 1966. Subsequently, other institutes were established viz. Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT) and National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research.25 This multi-institutional framework has steadily increased India's ability to map the seabed, assess biodiversity and provide real-time data services.

Deep Ocean Mission (DOM) – India’s Gateway to the Seabed Domain

The Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) launched DOM on 07 September 2021 with an aim to develop deep sea technologies for seabed mining and understanding the role of ocean in climate change. This mission targets to enhance India’s strategic and scientific presence in deep ocean regions by indigenously developing manned submersible ‘Matsya 6000’ under a comprehensive budget of ₹4,077 crore over a period from 2021 to 2026. It will have a capability of operating for 12 hours and sustenance up to 96 hours in case of emergency. It features advanced systems like Li-Po batteries, acoustic telephone, emergency escape suite and bio-vests for crew safety. Maiden wet harbour trials were conducted in 2025, which included five manned and five unmanned dives to assess stability, manoeuvrability, power management, communication, control devices and human support systems. Scientific payloads including advanced oceanographic sensors were tested to confirm the functionality.26 Further, on 5 and 6 August 2025, Senior Scientist Shri Raju Ramesh and Cdr Jatinder Pal Singh (Retd) from NIOT, completed their inaugural dive to 5002 metres onboard Nautile in collaboration with IFREMER. They gained hands-on experience on dive planning and operational procedures, habitability management, buoyancy operations and trajectory tracking. The experience gained by the NIOT crew will directly support the Matsya 6000 programme in achieving envisaged milestone of shallow water dive to 500 m by 2026.27

Strategic Significance of DOM

DOM establishes a direct link with India’s Blue Economy vision as it aims to ensure sustainable exploration of 380 million tonnes of polymetallic nodules in 75000 square kilometres of Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB).28 This critical mineral security coupled with economic imperatives of the ‘Blue Economy’ provides a powerful civilian justification for funding into development of deep-sea technologies. If India leverages it for military utility, DOM will become a strategic national asset which will underpin economic prosperity and future defence capabilities. This dual benefit will facilitate greater public and private investment and political will, compared to a purely military programme.

Inadequacies in India’s Approach to Seabed Domain

India’s approach to seabed domain has significant strategic vulnerabilities which jeopardises its digital sovereignty, vision of blue economy and national security. The convergence of the factors outlined below has generated an urgent necessity for a robust undersea strategic capability.

Institutional Fragmentation and Limited Strategic Coordination

Contemporary capabilities of Indian Institutes are scattered with minimal converging objectives. For instance, National Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory achieved significant feat by successfully deploying moored autonomous underwater sonar system in 2025.29 However, this feat is organisationally isolated from Matsya 6000 programme. This is unlike France’s integrated approach under a unified ministry, which ensures a coordinated institutional development. Lack of unified endeavours in Indian context undermines the development of a coherent seabed strategic capability.

Vulnerability of CUI and Threat to Digital Economy

In 2023-24, the Indian digital economy was valued at approximately USD 190.7 billion and is expected to reach USD 618 billion by 2030.30 However, the digital economy is precariously dependent on submarine cables owned, controlled and maintained by foreign corporations. According to Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Retd.), “India consumes 20 percent of global internet traffic; yet it hosts only 17 trans-oceanic cables i.e. 3 percent of global subsea cables terminating at 14 distinct landing stations across five cities.”31 Whereas, Chinese owned HMN Technologies maintains and repairs 25 percent of the world's subsea infrastructure. Further, corporations in the United States, Japan, and Finland control 90% of the global subsea cable production industry.32 This external dependency brings vulnerability to cyberattacks, espionage and purposeful sabotage during times of high international tension. Moreover, ninety five percent of cable landing points in India are amassed within a six-kilometres coastal sector near Mumbai (depicted in Fig 1), which makes it vulnerable to targeted assaults or natural calamities.33

Fig 2: Layout of Submarine Cables in India34

Inadequate Repair Capability of Submarine Cables

Currently, India does not have vessels capable of undertaking repairs of submarine cables. Inevitably, India relies on international partners for laying of cables and maintenance activities. This capability gap renders digital and financial infrastructures vulnerable to extended outages in the event of cable disruption or damage. For instance, disruption of three undersea cables connecting India to global telecom networks i.e. Asia-Africa-Europe-1, Europe India Gateway and Tata Global Network forced telecom operators like Bharti Airtel Ltd, Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd and Tata Communications Ltd to reroute traffic to other cable systems.35 Further, repair for the same was time consuming and expensive as seen in case of restoration of Asia-Africa-Europe 1 cable in the Red Sea which took four months to restore.36 These prevailing vulnerabilities to subsea cables underscores the need for a swift repair capability.

Emerging Threats to CUI

Recent global incidents expose the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure to both accidental damage and intentional sabotage. On 26 September 2022, powerful underwater explosions and the subsequent release of natural gas were reported in the Nord Stream Pipelines laid out in the EEZ of Denmark and Sweden (depicted in figure 2).37 Following the incident, Russia had asked for an independent international investigation at the United Nations Security Council; however, it was rejected, citing that independent investigations were underway by Danish, German and Swedish authorities.38 These investigations could not conclusively identify the perpetrators; however, they could establish the fact that it was an act of deliberate sabotage.39 Later, an investigative piece published in The Wire by French investigative journalist Freddie Ponton, hinted at use of C4 explosives and detonation by NATO. Ponton has hinted towards credible proof of mine warfare.40 The Nord Stream pipeline catastrophe and the claims that came with it are persistent concerns. It changed the way people used to think about the ocean floor in terms of resource extraction or scientific curiosity. This incident has resulted in increased efforts by nations to build up their seabed warfare capabilities to protect their economic and national interests in the seabed domain.

Fig 3: Layout of Nord Stream Pipelines41

Geopolitical Competition in Indo-Pacific

IOR has been experiencing heightened submarine operations and threats to underwater infrastructures. China has been undertaking seabed mapping, current profiling and unmanned underwater vehicle deployment masked as oceanographic and climatic investigations. These activities often coincide with scheduled missile tests and drills of Indian Navy. As per the media reports of July 2025, Chinese research vessel was involved in seabed mapping and acoustic analysis in the Bay of Bengal adjacent to Indian waters. The vessel was attempting to obscure its whereabouts by deactivating its Automatic Identification System (AIS).42 Further, China has deep-sea cable cutting technology which can paralyse the high-speed connectivity and break the backbone of modern financial system.43

Future Outlook – Policy Recommendations for India’s Seabed Security Strategy

The rising threats to CUI, the aggressive posture of China, lack of specialised units for undersea cable protection and inadequate undersea cable repair capability, underscores significant deficiencies in India’s strategic readiness. However, opportunities exist for India to develop a strategic capability based on existing technological foundations and institutional capabilities. It would be prudent for India to draw relevant lessons from France’s ‘Seabed Warfare Strategy’ to embrace a strategic outlook.

Augmenting Deep Ocean Mission with Know, Monitor and Act Framework

The ‘Know’ function is directly applicable in addressing the knowledge gap about Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) which is critical for protection of CUI and proactive threat detection. Integration of existing seabed mapping expertise of NIOT, ocean observation network of INCOIS and acoustic sensor capabilities of NPOL will provide a detailed UDA necessary for deep-sea operations. The ‘Monitor’ function addresses India’s vulnerabilities in submarine cable protection and threat surveillance through the development of seabed sensor networks and long range AUVs / ROVs to monitor activities up to 6000 metres. Monitoring capabilities for threats on the ocean floor as well as surveillance of water column above is essential for India’s strategic environment which is infested with Chinese activities. The ‘Act’ function offers potential for developing a strategic posture by developing proactive response capabilities including offensive operations. The scope of the ‘Act’ function may range from targeted investigations, recovery of objects and restoration of assets in deep water. It will establish strategic autonomy and deterrence posture in IOR. Leveraging underwater weapons capabilities of NSTL will enable the ‘Act’ Function.

Establishment of Unified Seabed Security Institutional Architecture

The integrated institutional framework adopted by France offers proven solutions to India’s fragmented capabilities through development of a unified strategic direction while preserving existing organisational strength and capabilities. India could adapt this approach by establishing a Seabed Security Strategy Cell under the National Maritime Security Coordinator.Members from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Ministry of Defence, Indian Navy, Ministry of Earth Sciences and Department of Telecommunication could be the proposed stakeholders in this cell. The proposed establishment of a permanent ministerial working group will provide a strategic direction without necessitating restructuring of organisations. It would address coordination challenges by providing a unified mechanism for strategic planning, allocation of resources, roadmap for capability development and operational coordination. It will obviate duplication of efforts and incompatible system development which currently characterises India’s approach. It can leverage the existing technological foundation of DOM for developing military variant of AUVs. This approach will maximise the returns on investment in expensive deep-sea technologies while maintaining civilian scientific justification that facilitates political and financial support.

Adoption of a Formal Seabed Security Strategy

The Seabed Security Strategy Cell can be tasked with formulation of India’s seabed security strategy based on France’s ‘Know, Monitor and Act’ framework adapted to India’s strategic outlook and technological development. Formulation of strategy can be based on varied terms of references viz. integration of existing civilian deep-sea capabilities with the emerging strategic implications of the seabed domain, protection of subsea cables and development of human capital. Adoption of a formalised strategy will provide clarity of intent, streamline allocation of resources and signal India’s commitment to seabed domain to adversaries and allies. This strategy could include defensive posture to protect CUI as well as offensive measures to counter any threat.

Addressing Vulnerabilities of Digital Infrastructure

In the short term, India’s reliance on foreign-flagged vessels for repairs of subsea cables can only be mitigated by immediate procurement of Indian-flagged cable repair vessel. As a long-term measure, India should aim at building sovereign repair capabilities which can include vessel operating at depths more than 6000 metres, contemporary cable repair techniques and trained manpower. Further, to address the single point failure risk of amassed sub-sea cables at Mumbai, seabed security strategy cell can explore alternate cable landing stations to geographically diversify the submarine communication cables. Lakshadweep Islands will provide redundancy for west coast infrastructure. Similarly, Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a suitable alternative to Chennai as it provides the strategic advantage to monitor International Shipping Lanes (ISLs) and cable routes in Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Private industries like Larsen & Toubro, Bharti Airtel and Reliance can be engaged for cable infrastructure development. Member from Department of Telecommunication should be the dedicated authority within the seabed security strategy cell to oversee protection, threat assessment, coordination of repairs, diversification of subsea cables and coordination between Indian Navy and telecom operators.

Indigenous Capability Building

Initial testing of Matsya 6000 has laid the groundwork for military adaption akin to ‘Ulyx’ to A6K-M model. However, its existing underwater surveillance capabilities are insufficient for high-resolution seabed mapping and continuous monitoring which are prerequisites for effective seabed warfare. This gap can be addressed by leveraging the initiatives of National Quantum Mission which is led by DRDO. Seabed Security Strategy Cell can task the Quantum Technology Research Centre at New Delhi, to explore application of indigenous quantum sensing capabilities for Matsya 6000.

Indian industries have fragmented deep-sea and underwater capabilities scattered across Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and private firms. While Keltron builds indigenised capabilities in underwater sensing and communications technology,44 Bharat Forge has a strategic equity play in Italian firm Edgelab to quickly acquire AUV technology.45 Indian private firm such as EyeROV offers ROVs with an operational depth of about 300 meters for use in oil and gas, maritime research and defence.46 Still, the overall ecosystem for deep-sea robotics is not at a level of industrial depth achieved by France. To optimise technological developments while maintain strategic autonomy, India can learn from the public-private collaboration of France. India can emulate this model by a collaborative framework between DRDO, PSUs and private firms to create an end-to-end Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. A member from DRDO can be the coordinating authority for industrial collaboration focussing on developing indigenous capabilities in AUV propulsion systems, sensor integration and data processing.

Revision of Legal Framework

The current Indian legal framework does not provide guidelines for CUI protection zones, monitoring mechanism for activities in territorial waters and EEZ and operations of autonomous vehicles. These regulatory gaps outweigh the geographical advantage to exploit rare earth minerals and polymetallic nodules from the sea.47 The deficiency in Law of Armed Conflict and International Law further aggravates the ambiguity pertaining to operation of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs).48 All these ambiguities have been adequately addressed by France. Starting with the Blue Economy Act of 2016, France systematically developed regulations to provide legal clarity for unmanned maritime operations. French law distinguishes between ‘maritime drones’ as small, unmanned craft without cargo or passengers and ‘autonomous vessels’ as larger ships that may carry people. It ensures that each is subjected to safety and operational standards suited to their characteristics. Authorities facilitate USV activities with transparent permit systems, dedicated insurance and liability provisions. Crucially, French regulations assign the legal status of captain to USV operators and protect their liability in accordance with international conventions like the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976. Continued legislative updates around navigation, certification and liability maintain innovation, safety and accountability for autonomous maritime missions.49 France’s stepwise legal reforms have created a modern, adaptive regime which offers key lessons for India like developing explicit regulations for CUI protection zones and formulating legal guidelines for USV and UUV operations. India may explore the option of Assigning defined legal status and responsibilities for remote/unmanned operators and providing liability limitations modelled on international conventions like the LLMC.

Countering Chinese Posture in IOR

A recent development in India’s maritime diplomacy saw Singapore officially welcoming India’s initiative to join patrols in the Malacca Strait. India’s proposed entry into the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), alongside regional stakeholders like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand marks a significant step in expanding India’s influence and collaborative security posture across the IOR. The proposed partnership emphasises joint efforts to address supply chain disruptions, technology cooperation and regional stability, while respecting the sovereignty and legal frameworks of each partner state.50 This presents a unique opportunity for India in being more assertive in IOR to counter existing Chinese threats. Seabed Security Strategy Cell may explore tacit understanding with partner nations of MSP in establishing surveillance network comprising of AUVs for reconnaissance missions and arrays of sensors in the seabed for persistent area monitoring in Malacca and Sunda Straits. The existing ocean observation capabilities of INCOIS, coupled with military grade sensors of DRDO or Keltron can be the backbone of this surveillance network. Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre can serve as a regional hub for integrating sensor data and threat analytics. This mechanism will facilitate shared domain awareness, coordinated patrols, real-time intelligence exchange, rapid decision-making and strengthen collective deterrence against undersea incursions. It will therefore create a robust maritime security architecture in IOR.

International Collaboration

On the international front, India should seek collaborative operational missions which can encompass seabed mapping, infrastructure monitoring and tactical response simulations. This will foster collective deterrence mechanism while sharing technology transfer and best practices as seen in ‘Polaris-25’ and ‘Mare Aperto’. The recent undersea surveillance pact of July 2025 between India and Australia represents the inaugural science and technology arrangement to monitor submarines and AUVs using towed array target motion analysis and advanced signal processing capabilities.51 This pact can be heralded as a foundation for extending regional seabed warfare cooperation. On similar lines, India should expand the existing Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework for collaborating with the United States of America and Japan for testing and validating technological developments as done by France in Op Calliope. Such collaboration will enhance India’s learning curve and strengthen its position in IOR. Inter-operability will also aid in building human resource capital which will meet the requirement of a specialised workforce capable of operating complex deep-sea robotics.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that India’s future growth and security is reliant on effective seabed protection given the role of undersea infrastructure in blue economy, communications and energy. However, there are possibilities that adversaries may exploit the vulnerabilities associated with the lack of strategic preparedness by India. Therefore, securing this domain is essential for maritime sovereignty. To realise these benefits, India must look beyond the energy exploration aspects of DOM and adopt a whole-of government approach. It is the need of the hour to integrate expertise from industry, scientific research and defence agencies to develop technological and operational superiority in the seabed domain. Establishing a seabed security strategy cell would unify this effort, countering China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region and positioning seabed protection as a driver of future-ready growth and strategic autonomy.

Endnotes

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  10. Saurabh Trivedi, “China’s Expanding Strategic Presence in Indian Ocean Region is a Challenge for India: Parliament Committee Report,” The Hindu , June 28 , 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinas-expanding-strategic-presence-in-indian-ocean-region-is-a-challenge-for-india-parliament-committee-report/article69748570.ece.

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  13. Dr Lee Willett, “French Navy Seeks 2026 IOC for Seabed Warfare Capability,” Naval News, May 29, 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/cne-2024/2024/05/french-navy-seeks-2026-ioc-for-seabed-warfare-capability/.

  14. Rajesh Uppal, “Seabed Warfare Threats: New Strategies, Platforms, and Technologies for Maritime Security,” International Defence Security & Technology, August 03, 2025, https://idstch.com/military/navy/seabed-warfare-threats-new-strategies-platforms-and-technologies-for-maritime-security/.

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