An outstanding article by Lt. Cdr Rajiv Lochan on a subject that has largely been left unaddressed and which often brings out a degree of cynicism that is both unwarranted and unedifying. There is an unspoken, underlying, and pervading impression at all levels in the armed forces the world over, that ethics is a ‘touchy-feely’ topic for wimps or losers, who lack the ‘gravel in their guts’ to understand what it takes to fight and win.
It is therefore, encouraging to see a level of introspection amongst a new generation, seeking advice on how they might achieve a mission, without compromising the moral code they wish to abide by. The article clearly raises some complex questions on the subject. It is a stark reminder of how easy it is to slide down an ever present ‘greasy pole’ by taking the easier route.
On a personal note, I freely admit with some regret that as a young man, I was a poster child for this ‘gung-ho’ approach to ‘all things Navy’, and perhaps unwittingly perpetuated this culture of playing to win at all costs. My Squadron (Sqn) ‘Bravo’ were champions in the NDA three times over, (39th, 41st and my course 42nd). Bravo dominated the competitive landscape at the time earning replicas in cross country and boxing. Later in 1977, I was a Divisional Officer (DivO) in Echo Squadron for two terms. In both terms (52nd and 53rd course), Echo Sqn were champions.
This winning at any costs mantra is driven often subconsciously, and sometimes wilfully, by the officer corps itself. Officers posted to training establishments like the NDA or NAVAC are the cream of their respective services. They are sent to these academies to act as shining examples of what cadets should aspire to be. Unfortunately, the institution itself offers them few opportunities to showcase their own professional abilities or to earn an outstanding ACR, except indirectly, through the performance of their cadets. Contact sports and rugged competitions like Boxing, Cross- Country, Hockey, Football etc give them the best ‘bang for buck.’ Winning then becomes the only recognised measure and ‘currency’ of success and no cost may seem too high.
To be fair, there is rarely any intention (barring exceptions) to openly cheat. Most often there exists a series of small compromises, sharp practices and loopholes that are seen as ‘smart’ and acceptable in this great business of winning at all costs. This is the unspoken, often unconscious, ‘Faustian bargain’ that is struck between the cadets and their officers, and where ethics takes an inexorably downward slide on a slippery slope that is rarely noticed. For many of these cadets, their behaviour then becomes the standard for the next generation, which if unchecked, eventually becomes the ‘values’ of a service.
I realised nearer the end of my tenure that this culture of ‘winning is everything’ had an underlying horrific cost. It was the weak cadets who paid the ‘butchers bill’ for all the trophies that we won. Rather than working to address their own weaknesses, they spent their time chasing trophies for the glory of the Sqn. They suffered relegations and a loss of seniority that would impact negatively on their future careers. Apart from failures in academics that could have been easily prevented, there were cadets who fell through the ‘cracks’ in areas of physical training, and even minor indiscipline which tended to snowball into major incidents that attracted major punishments.
I left the NDA soon thereafter. I have no doubt my successors went on to perpetuate the system by making the same mistakes I made. Years later as the EXO and Chief Instructor of the Naval Academy (INS Mandovi), I witnessed this same ‘winner take all’ culture playing out with the same ‘butchers’ bill’ of failures, paid once again by the weakest cadets. I can see from the article that this system is as yet alive and well, and as bright eyed and bushy-tailed as it was in our time. On the other hand, going the other way by diluting the importance of competitions or the will to win, dilutes the will to fight to the bitter end, a critical attribute expected of any officer. It occurred to me that we might be able to achieve both goals with a simple change in our training philosophy and methods.
Young cadets entering the academy from diverse backgrounds need to develop the core values expected of an officer like honour, integrity, leadership courage, loyalty, commitment, et al. Training and learning activities are all designed to strengthen their mastery of these necessary attributes. Competitions should be viewed through this lens. Winning should be confined to the playing field. You play hard, play fair, never falter however hopeless the situation, you play to the final whistle, and then (win or lose), leave your blood, sweat and tears on the field and part as friends.
There will always be weak links in any unit. The key is to teach weak cadets to put their hands up and ask for help, and then ‘buddy them’ up with cadets who excel in that field. This approach balances out the strengths and weaknesses of the individual members of the team to create a combined cohesive force. Since these weak cadets usually have strengths elsewhere, they can return the favour and buddy up to help other cadets and so on. There is no loss in self-esteem in owning up to a weakness. On the contrary, it enables a squadron to fight and win and yet leave no one behind, which is the abiding credo of any armed force.
The author then pivots seamlessly from the naval academy to comment on how ethics plays out at the level of a junior officer, using the example of Lt Murphy, a USN Seal on a covert mission who encounters a group of civilians including a shepherd boy (a civilian minor) who could well compromise the mission. He chooses not to shoot them. The author uses this example to justify his argument that the ethical harder right is always to be preferred. This reviewer dissents respectfully, arguing that this is a rather simplistic view of some complex situations that might arise, and for which a more nuanced approach might be preferable. This review looks at two such examples although there may be many more.
Imagine the fictitious case of a mission commander of a Missile Boat Squadron in the midst of a high speed attack on an enemy harbour, encountering fishing boats at its entrance. Should he then destroy them and blot his copybook (and that of his Navy)with a monstrous war crime, or, should he let the boats be. If they do have a radio and warn the enemy, his decision would result in the abject failure of his mission, the destruction of all four missile boats and a catastrophic loss of the entire crew.
Imagine a second example of a scenario in war where a frigate is torpedoed, with a pitiful number of its survivors clinging to life in the oily waters and debris around the sunken ship. The sister ship in company detects a possible submarine contact directly under the survivors. Should the captain attack the submarine right there and kill the survivors of his own navy and suffer the opprobrium of their families, worse still, if he later discovers that the contact was a non-sub, or should he stop to pick up survivors, let the enemy submarine go free, to then go on to cause catastrophic losses of other warships later in the war.
To address these rather complex issues military values should be abstracted to the highest levels and then allowed to trickle down to the level of the soldier or sailor. Simply put, it is the primary mission of every armed force to complete a mission or ‘win a war.’What is forgotten however in the noise of the fighting is that it is equally important to “win the peace’ that must come immediately after the fighting stops. Winning the war provides a victory and achieves the mission, Winning the peace depends on a number of macro factors, but a key element in this mix is the manner in which the winning armed force conducts itself on the field of battle.
The examples quoted by the author on the Mai Lai massacre, or even Abu Ghraib, need to be understood in the larger context of their detrimental impact on winning the peace later. It is these tales which inexorably end up as lightning rods that generate hate and animosity that lasts generations. Conversely, the recommendation by the author to take the high road at all times is fraught with pitfalls. Abandoning or compromising a mission should not be left to a few actors on the ground, as no two people have the same moral beliefs. In fact, it opens the door for the cowardly and the craven, to hide under the guise of a moral imperative, “I couldn’t do it sir, there was a farmer on the bridge” knowing fully well there is no one around to confirm it. Worse, missions will then only be accomplished by the completely unethical.
Armed forces prefer to avoid confronting the issue of ethics as a separate quality trait, preferring to deal with it under the rather opaque umbrella of honour, the flag, or officer like conduct and behaviour, in the hope that an officer or sailor will act honourably. Unfortunately, acting honourably and acting ethically are not often the same things. In the end, no two situations are alike. The way to address nebulous ethical situations is to balance out the expedient need to achieve a mission, or victory in war, or a competition for that matter on the one hand, and yet ensure that its men and women act in a manner that is in keeping with their values.
It is useful to break down difficult problems into their individual elements, after which, it makes sense to ’or ‘game out’ possible scenarios that might eventuate. This enables the people at the business end of the mission to derive behavioural strategies or tactics that they can employ. The possibility of meeting a shepherd boy on a covert mission in Afghanistan, or the possibility of meeting a fishing fleet in a raid on an enemy harbour are not outside the realms of possibility. If the mission had been broken down to its elements and ‘gamed out,’ these combatants on the ground could have been briefed on other innovative ways of dealing with each of these scenarios, or, a set of guidelines or SOPs could be established for most situations. It is the ‘unknown-unknowns’ that are a worry. A well trained properly briefed force operating under clear value guidelines would weigh out the importance of the mission versus the values that would be expected and then work out ways of achieving both.
Lt Cdr Rajiv Lochan has fired a starting gun on a problem that has rarely been recognised or addressed in any serious way for many years, and certainly not in my time in the service. His experiences are at the level of a young officer. His article however, paves the way for a more mature discussion on military ethics at higher levels. Ethics is far too important a subject to be left to the machinations of a young cadet or officer in the line of fire, facing an impossible situation and having to ‘wing it’ in the hope of getting it right. If this topic is to be taken seriously, it must be a core section of the dialogue of the navy and by extension in the Indian Naval Despatch. This is the challenge for the Editor moving forward.
