Abstract: The growing trend of undersea cable sabotage in recent years has emerged as a significant concern in the context of deniable operations. This essay analyses grey zone operations through an examination of recent incidents, news reports, state responses, and legal proceedings. The Baltic Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the Red Sea have witnessed notable instances of cable disruptions, with more than half of the incidents between 2020-2025 attributable to suspected sabotage or accidental causes. Employment of commercial vessels as proxies, AIS spoofing, coordinated timing, and plausible deniability characterise this pattern. The Baltic Sea is now a testing lab for undersea cable-focussed grey zone activities, while the Taiwan Strait incidents demonstrate capability testing. Red Sea incidents demonstrate non-state actors’ integration into the grey zone domain. Strategic stability concerns arise from the ambiguous nature of undersea cables. Defensive responses include presence and surveillance missions, information-sharing centres, and joint expeditionary forces. The Indian Ocean Region faces challenges in protecting its critical undersea infrastructure amid the growing undersea cable market.

Introduction

On a cold, foggy morning in Nov 24, a lone merchant ship emerged from its misty obscurity in the Baltic Sea. Meanwhile, in the hinterlands of the Baltic countries, there was mayhem caused by large-scale internet and connectivity service outages. Within a span of eighteen hours, Sweden, Lithuania, Finland, and Germany lost more than one-third of their Internet connectivity. Subsequent investigations indicated a chilling connection between the terrestrial internet outages and the movements of Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-flagged vessel which was underway in the Baltic Sea dragging its anchor owing to navigation error in bad weather. Subsequent analyses of Automatic Identification System (AIS) records revealed unexplained course alterations, prolonged loitering over undersea cable areas and pattern of anchor deployment that seemed to coincide precisely over laid down undersea cables.1 The act of “supposed clumsiness” in the maritime domain by commercial shipping was both deniable and brazen enough to send a clear signal to NATO and its allies.

In the murky space between peace and conflict, a new space has emerged, popularly referred to as the ‘grey zone’–a domain of persistent engagement characterised by ambiguous, deniable, and low-intensity operations designed to achieve strategic objectives without provoking direct confrontation. Beneath the roiling surface of the globalised world’s oceans lie the critical arteries of the digitalised economy. Although the protection of vital undersea infrastructure has been gaining recognition in security discourses, the domain remains largely ‘clouded’ in the periphery. The article in the Indian Naval Despatch Vol. 5 No. 1 titled, “Growing Imperatives of Submarine Cables for India” highlighted the vulnerabilities and critical security gaps in India’s undersea cable infrastructure. This essay attempts to analyse the growing trend of undersea cable disruptions in recent years from the lens of ‘grey zone warfare’ and its strategic implications.

Through an examination of recent incidents, state responses, and legal proceedings, this essay attempts to analyse how the manipulation, disruption, and exploitation of undersea cables have become central to contemporary grey zone warfare. The Yi Peng 3 incident is one of the many global instances of undersea cable disruptions owing to “supposed clumsiness”, which have been analysed in this essay to analyse the evolving nature of grey zone operations in the undersea domain.

Rising Cases – An Emerging Pattern

Undersea cable disruption is caused by natural catastrophes, human activity, or technical failures. In 2022, the island nation of Tonga suffered a complete blackout of connectivity for five weeks owing to damage to undersea cables (Tonga-Fiji cables).2 The disruption of cables in the Red Sea in 2024 affected twenty-five per cent of data connectivity in Asia and Europe for more than five months, while disruptions in West Africa affected 13 countries simultaneously.3 Whatever the cause, its disruptive impact on the global economy is bound to be profound.

Undersea cable disruptions are not a rare occurrence anymore, which merits a careful analysis of the nature of their disruptions, geographical distribution, and attributability concerns. Some of the most notable undersea cable disruptions in recent years are as follows: -4

Table 1: Locations and Frequency of Undersea Cable Damage (2020-2025) (Source – Telegeography, 2025)5

Fig 1: Distribution of Cable Outages by Associated Causes (2020-2025) (Source – Telegeography, 2025)6

Emerging Pattern. As evident from Fig 1 above, the highest share of undersea cable outages from 2020-2025 emanated from ‘suspected sabotage’ – the prime benefit of grey zone tactics. However, if one considers ‘suspected sabotage’ and ‘accidental/ uncertain’ incidents together, they account for 40% of cable disruptions. Adding the instances of ‘confirmed sabotage’ elevates the share to 52%. This means that of all the 26 incidents of undersea cable damages between 2020-2025 globally, more than half of the incidents were caused by vessels dragging their anchors or intentional sabotage in the high seas, while natural calamities or domestic/ terrestrial actors caused the remaining.

Geographically, the highest number of undersea cable outages occurred in the Baltic Sea, followed closely by the Taiwan Strait. The Red Sea and West Africa are also experiencing an increase in undersea cable disruptions. It is a rather uncanny coincidence that most cable disruptions owing to ‘uncertain’ and ‘accidental’ causes have occurred in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait. A continued focus on global disruptions however, may provide the benefit of hindsight to discern a more compelling pattern.

The emergence of undersea cable warfare as a preference in the grey zone is presenting complex strategic dynamics that challenge traditional concepts of deterrence, escalation, and conflict management. Unlike conventional military operations or cyber warfare, cable operations occur in physical domains with clear attribution possibilities; however, their carefully orchestrated operations within legal and strategic grey zones complicate retribution mechanisms. Undersea cable sabotage has emerged as a preferred tool for strategic coercion due its ability to severely impact economic activity, impose prohibitive repair and overhaul costs and accrue considerable deniability. The salient aspects of this emerging pattern witnessed so far have been as follows:

  • Employment of commercial vessels as proxies.

  • AIS data manipulation while performing operations.

  • It is coordinated with times of heightened states to cause maximum psychological impact.

  • Plausible deniability citing ‘accidental’ damage.

The Baltic Sea – A Laboratory for Hybrid Warfare

The Baltic Sea has emerged as a testing lab for undersea cable-focused grey zone activities, with more than seven recorded incidents of submarine cable damage since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. This crucible of grey zone activities provides valuable insights into the future of maritime threats and grey zone operations in the region.

On 18 Nov 24, the BCS East-West Interlink (connecting Lithuania and Gotland, Sweden) and C-Lion1 (connecting Finland and Germany), were found to be damaged almost simultaneously, disrupting Internet and telecom in several countries in Europe.7 While the C-Lion1 cable was damaged at a depth of 40m near the Swedish island of Oland, the BCS East-West Interlink was found damaged at a depth of 150 m, severely impacting Lithuania’s Internet services. The Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3 emerged as the primary suspect,8 having been present in the area with its anchor dragging. Furthermore, the vessel’s previous port calls in Russia, suspicious movements in the Baltic Sea, and the supposed precision of the damage indicate a deliberate operation undertaken at Russia’s behest.

Fig 2: Undersea Cable Disruptions in the Baltic Sea (Source – Statista)9

Balticonnnector and Nordstream Sabotage. The Balticonnector and Nordstream pipeline disruption incidents of 08 Oct 23, represent an interesting study on the evolving nature of low-intensity attacks on energy infrastructure for strategic signalling. A Chinese ship the Newnew Polar Bear,10 dragged its anchor for several kilometres, disrupting the Finland-Estonia gas pipeline and communication cables. Similarly, on 26 Sep 22 the Nordstream pipeline, which supplies Russian natural gas to Germany, was disrupted by seemingly coordinated underwater explosions, creating massive ruptures at a depth of 70-80 metres.11

Fig 3: Nordstream Pipelines in the Baltic Sea (Source – BBC)12

The 25 Dec 24 incident of the Russian oil tanker Eagle S represented an escalation in both operational sophistication and strategic signalling. According to Finnish reports, the vessel Eagle S “deliberately dragged its anchor for dozens of miles across the seafloor”, severing multiple cables and power connections.13

These operations were supposed to have achieved multiple objectives simultaneously - strategic signalling, testing NATO responses, disrupting regional communications, and conveying Russia’s ability to cause severe disruption in communication infrastructure. Notably, these incidents align with the Russian doctrine of pressurising adversaries using non-kinetic means, especially against the backdrop of economic sanctions and conflict escalation. The only difference has been in its modus operandi, which has evolved from the employment of deep-diving submarines to employment of proxy merchant vessels.

The Taiwan Strait - Grey Zone Pressure Campaigns

Panning from the Baltic to the South China Seas, Taiwan is another case study in the ingenious integration of undersea cable incidents with experimental pressure tactics. Taiwan has reported 5 instances of submarine cable damage between Jan – Feb 25 alone,14 with increasing evidence of coordinated planning and execution. In early Jan 25, the Xingshun 39 – a Tanzania-flagged vessel15 owned by a Chinese company, severed several undersea cables near Keelung, disrupting Taiwan’s internet connectivity. Previously, the same vessel was registered as Shunxing 39 registered in Cameroon.16 In Feb 25, the Hongtai 58, a Togolese-registered vessel17 with suspected Chinese crew severed another undersea cable connecting Taiwan to Penghu. This vessel too, had changed its name and flag-state twice (Hongtai 168 registered in Andorra and Jinlong 58 registered in Tanzania).18 In 2023 alone, cables connecting Taiwan to Matsu Islands were damaged 12 times, according to Chunghwa Telecom.19

The pattern of incidents in Taiwan reveals sophisticated strategic thought and an understanding of grey zone warfare. Unlike the Baltic Sea incidents, however, the Chinese operations appear to demonstrate capability, test Taiwanese responses, cable repair capabilities, and eventually normalise the concept of cable vulnerability in the region. The low tempo and minor nature of the undersea cable disruptions perfectly align with the well-known Chinese strategies of “salami slicing” and “strategic patience”.

The successful prosecution of Chinese vessel Captain Wang (Hongtai 58) for deliberate cable damage represents a significant development in establishing legal precedents for cable-focused grey zone operations.20 Taiwan’s ability to prove deliberate intent and secure criminal convictions demonstrates both the feasibility of attribution and the potential for legal responses to grey zone undersea cable warfare.

The Red Sea - Evolution of ‘Grey Zone-Proxy’ Operations

The Red Sea submarine cable incidents attributed to Houthi operations demonstrate how non-state actors can be integrated into the grey zone domain. The severing of four critical cables in 2024 affected twenty-five per cent of the traffic flow between Asia and Europe, demonstrating the strategic impact achievable through proxy operations.21 This act of disruption of major cables, was caused by the sinking of a ship Rubymar22 (Belize flagged and UK owned bulk carrier cargo) carrying 41,000 tons of fertilisers. Of the 17 African countries which experienced disruption, Ghana, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire experienced a digital blackout for several days.

Fig 4: Undersea Cables in the Red Sea (Source – Telegeography)23

While Houthi forces denied deliberately targeting undersea cables, the incidents occurred within the context of their broader campaign against international shipping, suggesting coordination with their state sponsors seeking to maximise regional disruption while maintaining deniability. This model of proxy-conducted cable warfare provides state actors with additional layers of impunity and strategic flexibility while achieving significant disruption. Moreover, the employment of Houthis as proxies combines asymmetric warfare, strategic ambiguity and regional influence in Indo-Pacific thereby complicating direct attribution.

Escalation Dynamics and Strategic Implications

Escalation Ladder Complications. These complications arise from the ambiguous nature of undersea cable operations, and their potential to wreak economic and psychological havoc in the target country. Accidental cable damage occurs frequently through commercial fishing and anchoring operations, creating cover for deliberate operations but also creating risks that accidental damage might be interpreted as deliberate attacks during periods of heightened tension. The dual-use nature of undersea cables, which carry both commercial and military data, further complicates the escalation calculus. Should attacks on undersea cables, therefore, be construed as attacks on military infrastructure? This decision dilemma is the quintessential characteristic of grey zone operations, where attributing intent or culpability is becoming exceedingly difficult. The ensuing ambiguity fuels strategic uncertainty, as misconstruing an accident for aggression (or vice versa), could rapidly escalate a grey-zone incident into open confrontation.

Strategic Stability Concerns. In the case of the Indian Ocean specifically, Southeast Asia is a digital hub for cable traffic, with an increased disposition to natural disasters (‘Ring of Fire’) as well as strategic competition. Moreover, the region witnesses extensive fishing activity compounding the threats from anchors and drag nets. The interconnected nature of global communication systems means that disruptions to key cable systems can affect multiple countries simultaneously, potentially creating crisis management challenges that exceed the intended scope of grey zone operations. The expansion of China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiatives,24 advancement in cable-cutting technology, and a predisposition to employ grey zone operations to cause maximum effect are likely to affect the balance of stability in the Indian Ocean.

Defensive Responses

Responses to the targeting of undersea cables have emphasised multiple complementary approaches designed to enhance resilience, improve detection, and complicate adversary operations while avoiding escalatory responses that might expand conflicts into the conventional domain. Some of the notable responses to address the growing threat to undersea infrastructure are discussed later.

Presence and Surveillance Missions. The ‘Baltic Sentry’ is a NATO-led programme launched on 14 Jan 2025, designed to monitor and protect the integrity of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) in the Baltic Sea.25 The mission represents NATO’s first dedicated programme specifically focussed on deterring and defending against attacks on undersea cables, pipelines, and other critical infrastructure. The trigger event for this mission was the disruption of Estlink 2 power cable on 25 Dec 2024, which connected Estonia and Finland. Since then, ships and drones have been deployed on Presence and Surveillance Missions (PSM) in the Baltic Sea under the aegis of ‘Baltic Sentry’ towards protection of CUI network.

Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI). NATO has established a networking and information-sharing centre focussed on CUI, under the supervision of the Commander, Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) based at Northwood, United Kingdom. It was established in May 24, in response to the rising ‘hybrid’ threats to the CUI with the overarching aim to deny the aggressor any “plausible deniability.”26 What is significant is that MARCOM realises that it is difficult to literally protect the entire CUI and therefore aims to incorporate tools to record surreptitious activities using a combination of underwater sensors.

Redundancy via Satellites. NATO’s Hybrid, Space, Submarine Architecture Ensuring Information Security of Telecommunications (HEIST) programme aims to create satellite backup systems for damaged undersea cables.27 While satellites offer better protection against physical attacks (presently), they provide only 5-10 Gbps capacity of data as against terabytes per second data rates afforded by undersea cables. Although a conceptually sound mitigation plan, its efficacy is yet to be established in the overall telecommunication security and redundancy framework.

Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – The ‘Nordic Warden’. A UK-led initiative of ten North European countries, it was established and fortified in the aftermath of the Estlink2 cable damage (Finland – Estonia) in Dec 24. This is a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) named ‘Nordic Warden’ (akin to ‘Baltic Sentry’), which aims to harness Artificial Intelligence (AI) to assess and analyse shipping data to predict the risk imposed by any vessel in the vicinity of CUI. Its specified areas of interest are the English Channel, North Sea, Baltic Sea, and Kattegat. Specifically focussing on Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’, the AI algorithm assesses potential risk, and alerts JEF as well as NATO nodes prompting an immediate response.28

Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre. This is a Government of Australia initiative, integrating government and industrial agencies to work together across the Indo-Pacific - with the purpose “…to support the effective development and management of undersea telecommunication cables”. During the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in May 23, the Centre is part of the numerous deliverables from the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.’29 Although not developed as a direct response to any sabotage activity, it is a notable development in the Indian Ocean nevertheless.

Indian Ocean Region - Present Conundrum and Future Challenges

The global undersea cable market, valued at $29 billion in 2024, is projected to reach $56 billion by 2035.30 While laying cables on the seabed is the ‘easy part’, their repair-and-overhaul process imposes prohibitive costs on national finances and resources. Therefore, undersea cable-focused grey zone warfare represents several critical challenges that require sustainable policies, actionable objectives, and innovative responses. The ever-growing reliance on artificial intelligence, cloud storage, and the Internet of Things (IoT) is both a capability and a vulnerability. Naturally, the protection and hardening of the undersea cable infrastructure is the only prudent way forward.

China has fundamentally changed the concept of strategic competition in the maritime domain, perhaps beyond the conventional wisdom. At the heart of an evolving grey zone doctrine is China’s deep-sea cable cutting technology, engineered to sever hardened undersea cables at depths of more than 4000 – 5000 metres. With the added benefit of the Fendouzhe deep-sea vessel’s 10,000 m operating depth, no depth of undersea cables appears to be beyond reach.31 However, the destabilising force is the plausible deniability that this technology offers in the form of commercial proxies (as seen in the Yi Peng 3 incident in the Baltic Sea). Furthermore, through HMN (Huawei Marine Networks) Technologies’ share of 25% of global undersea cable maintenance and 34 BRI cable projects,32 China now holds the right cards to capitalise on a kind of ‘repair-boat diplomacy’.

Regional cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms would be the most reasonable way forward, but they bring their own inherent challenges. While the Quad is likely to take its time to build credibility and solidify into a formidable framework, it is imperative to focus on regional partners to bolster undersea cable security in the Indian Ocean region. In the meantime, military and non-military forums such as IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) and IORA (Indian Ocean Regional Association) respectively, provide a bridge between individual capability deficits and collective cooperation mechanisms. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) could also be harnessed similarly to provide an additional layer of security to the undersea cable infrastructure.

Apropos the natural diversity of the Indian Ocean, the Indian Ocean nations themselves have a huge disparity in economic and financial goals, presenting numerous challenges for formation of a dedicated Regional Monitoring Mechanism (a la Baltic Sentry). India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) initiatives need to be leveraged to enhance overall security in the region, including undersea cable infrastructure.

A sweeping change in India’s doctrinal outlook in recognising undersea cables as National Critical Information Infrastructure (NCII) is underway and positive. The rising acknowledgement of the undersea infrastructure as being crucial to India’s overall economic and maritime security is exemplified by the Red Sea incidents, wherein regional conflicts can have cascading effects on global telecommunications. A clear articulation of India’s maritime interests (including its undersea infrastructure) is the way forward for formulation of appropriate maritime security objectives, which would in turn drive capability development plans.

Conclusion

The transformation of undersea cables from mere telecommunication infrastructure into contested battlegrounds signifies a paradigm shift in how nations conceptualise strategic competition and signalling in the 21st century. This evolution also reflects a broader change in the character of warfare, where critical information infrastructure systems need not be subjected to direct kinetic action but are gradually and systematically targeted below the threshold of conventional warfare.

The documented incidents of cable disruptions indicate that submarine cable warfare has evolved from a theoretical possibility to an operational reality. Additionally, the concentration of major attacks around the Baltic Sea, Red Sea, and Taiwan Strait indicates that constricted waters are a favoured area for undersea cable attacks. Consequently, the emergence of this new domain also creates significant risks and challenges that require urgent attention from policymakers, military capability and perspective planners, and legislative bodies alike.

Recommendations

Legal. There is an urgent need to evolve from consultative stage to implement actionable measures for undersea cable security in response to increasing hybrid threats. Firstly, the existing international frameworks such as UNCLOS and the Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables (1884) must be operationalised by integrating specific threat mitigation protocols into our Indian Maritime Doctrine. Secondly, the Government and TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) should expedite the licensing process and regulatory guidelines, mandating the use of Indian-flagged vessels for cable maintenance and making domestic cable laying a priority. Finally, immediate establishment of a multi-agency task force – including the Ministry of Defence, TRAI and other stakeholders – to coordinate real-time monitoring, risk assessment, and cyber security measures will provide the institutional momentum needed to counter grey zone activities effectively.

Operational. A comprehensive operational framework which involves doctrinal recognition of the aforementioned threats, and perspective plans which finally manifest into operational capabilities. Operational imperatives include advanced Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) equipped for sustained deployment, persistent surveillance and quick intervention along critical cable routes. IN’s modernisation plans need to incorporate effective cable-laying and repair systems to obviate this strategic vulnerability. Moreover, establishment of an Indian Naval Underseas Cable Protection and Monitoring Cell (IN-UPMC), networked with IFC-IOR (Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region) would facilitate continuous monitoring, early threat detection and coordinated response from both IN and telecom agencies. Such an integrated framework will ensure resilient protection of India’s undersea cables (and information systems) against the evolving grey-zone threats.

Capability Development. India’s private sector currently holds expertise only in landing undersea cable infrastructure. For example, the SEA-ME-WE 6 cable connecting India to Singapore and France via Egypt – was laid by a US based company SUBCOM (by outbidding the Chinese HMN Technologies for a lower price at the SMW6 consortium in Feb 22).33 Once the cable makes landfall, Bharti Airtel exercises exclusive rights over its maintenance. The extant gap in expertise for laying/ maintaining undersea cables is a critical vulnerability. Firstly, collaborative drills and joint patrols between the IN and cable-laying entities should be initiated to ensure robust physical security and rapid incident response along critical routes. Secondly, investment should be made in indigenous shipbuilding and repair capacity, reducing reliance on foreign assets for cable protection. Thirdly, formation of ‘cable reserve fleets’– ships capable of being deployed at short notice for cable repair operations by employing private enterprises would largely address the question of additional resources. Nevertheless, private enterprises would require substantial incentives and concessions for a successful public-private model to materialise.

Regional Partnerships. As the Indian Ocean bottom continues to get congested with CUI, real-time tracking, and monitoring of suspicious movements around cables would be the first step towards effective responses. As mentioned earlier, the large disparity within the IOR states with respect to technical and technological capabilities, presents formidable challenges in the realisation of such a dedicated framework.

However, if combined with existing frameworks such as IONS, IORA, BIMSTEC, ASEAN and Quad, information and intelligence sharing may present opportunities to at least bring the perpetrators to justice thereby presenting a deterrent value in the grey zone domain. Swift and visible responses to hostile acts – achieved via regional law enforcement cooperation and joint maritime responses – will enhance deterrence and shore up collective resilience against threats to strategic undersea assets.

The way forward is a clarion call for a comprehensive approach that combines enhanced physical security, improved detection and monitoring capabilities, clearer legal frameworks, and effective deterrent strategies. Most importantly, it requires recognition that the depths of the world’s oceans have become a new frontier of strategic competition, where the invisible arteries connecting the ‘globalised world’ have emerged as both means (cyber operations) and ways (cable disruptions) of strategic warfare. As the telecommunication sector continues to evolve, the undersea domain continues to grow into the murky realm of grey zone operations, where invisibility is a prime attribute, deniability and ambiguity are tools, and “sorry, my anchor must have dragged” is the perfect defence. In such grey zone scenarios, ‘denying deniability’34 may be the only way forward.

Endnotes

  1. Sophia Besk and Eric Brown, “A Chinese-Flagged Ship Cut Baltic Sea Cables. This Time, Europe Was More Prepared,” Emissary, December 03, 2024.

  2. Qiu Winston, “Tonga Cables Cut after Volcano Eruption, at Least Four Weeks to Restore,” Submarine Cable Networks, January 19, 2022, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/ australia-usa/tonga-cable/tonga-cable-cuts-after-volcano-eruption.

  3. Internet Society, “2024 West Africa Submarine Cable Outage Report,” accessed 26 August 2025. https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2024/2024-west-africa-submarine-cable-outage-report/.

  4. Insikt Group, “Submarine Cables Face Increasing Threats Amid Geopolitical Tensions and Limited Repair Capacity.” RecordedFuture, 17 July 2025. accessed 27 August 2025.

  5. TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Disruptions Database, 2020–2025. 2025, https://www.telegeography.com.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Wilson Centre, “Mapping Undersea Infrastructure Attacks in the Baltic Sea,” 24 March, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mapping-undersea-infrastructure-attacks-baltic-sea.

  8. Anna Cooban, “Europe’s Undersea Infrastructure Keeps Getting Damaged. What Is Going On?,” CNN, January 29, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/29/business/baltic-cables-russian-sabotage-explained-intl.

  9. Katharina Buchholz, “Map of Undersea Cable Disruptions in the Baltic Sea,” Statista, February 06, 2025, https://www.statista.com/chart/33892/damage-to-underwater -cables-and-pipelines-in-the-baltic-sea/.

  10. Eric Tegler, “Investigating the Chinese Ship That ‘Accidentally’ Hit Undersea Lines,” Forbes, 28 November 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2023/11/28/investigating-the-chinese-ship-that-accidentally-hit-undersea-lines/.

  1. Laura Gozzi, “Nordstream: Denmark Closes the Investigation into Pipeline Blast,” BBC News, 26 February, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68401870.

  2. Merlin Thomas, “Nordstream blast blew away 50m of pipe,” BBC News, October 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63297085.

  3. Jonathan.Baker, “Eagle S Crew Members Banned from Leaving Finland Due to Allegedly D a m a g e d S u b s e a I n f r a s t r u c t u r e , ” I C E N E W S , J a n u a r y 0 2 , 2 0 2 5 , https://www.icenews.is/2025/01/02/eagle-s-crew-members-banned-from-leaving-finland-due-to-allegedly-damaged-subsea-infrastructure/.

  4. Gahon Chia-Hung Chiang, “Countering China’s Subsea Cable Sabotage,” Global Taiwan Institute, March 19, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/03/countering-chinas-subsea-cable-sabotage/.

  5. Ibid.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Ibid.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Koh Ewe and I-ting Chiang, “Taiwan Jails China Captain for Undersea Cable Sabotage in Landmark Case,” BBC News, June 12, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/.

  11. Sameer Patil and Prithivi Gupta, “Undersea Chokepoints: The Red Sea Cable Disruptions,” Observer Research Foundation, May 21, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/undersea-chokepoints-the-red-sea-cable-disruptions.

  12. Ibid.

  13. TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Disruptions Database, 2020–2025, 2025. https://www.telegeography.com.

  14. Eurasia Group, “The Digital Silk Road: Expanding China’s Digital Footprint,” April 29, 2020, https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/digital-silk-road-expanding-china-digital-footprint.

  15. European Commission, “NATO Launches Baltic Sentry to Increase CI Security,” Press Release, June 15, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/items/888102/.

  16. Public Affairs Office, “NATO Officially Launches New Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure,” Defence Industry Europe, May 29, 2024, https://defence-industry.eu/nato-officially-launches-new-maritime-centre-for-security-of-critical-undersea-infrastructure/.

  17. Synergia Foundation, “The Hidden Battleground Beneath the Ocean,” January 04, 2025, https://synergiafoundation.org/2025/01/04/the-hidden-battleground-beneath-the-ocean/.

  18. Government of the United Kingdom, “Joint Expeditionary Force Activates UK-Led Reaction System to Track Threats to Undersea Infrastructure and Monitor Russian Shadow Fleet,” Press Release, January 06, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-expeditionary-force-activates-uk-led-reaction-system-to-track-threats-to-undersea-infrastructure-and-monitor-russian-shadow-fleet.

  1. Australian Government, “Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Press Release, July 29, 2024, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/ minister/penny-wong/media-release/launch-cable-connectivity-and-resilience-centre/.

  2. Markets and Markets, “Submarine Cable Systems Market – Size, Share, Trends and Forecast (2025–2030),” July 2025, https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/submarine-cable-system-market-184625.html.

  3. Nigel Cranworth, “China’s Deep-Sea Exploration Advances with Jialong and Fendouzhe Success,” Maritime Technology Review, January 02, 2025, https://maritimetechnologyreview.com/2025/01/02/chinas-deep-sea-exploration-advances-with-jiaolong-and-fendouzhe-success/.

  4. Sameer Patil, and Prithivi Gupta, “China’s Expanding Tech Lead Through Digital Silk Road – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, June 26, 2023, https://www.eurasiareview.com/26062023-chinas-expanding-tech-lead-through-digital-silk-road-analysis/.

  5. Submarine Cable Networks, “SEA-ME-WE-6,” August 30, 2025. https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/asia-europe-africa/smw6.

  6. Government of the United Kingdom, “Joint Expeditionary Force Activates UK-Led Reaction System to Track Threats to Undersea Infrastructure and Monitor Russian Shadow Fleet,” Press Release, January 06, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-expeditionary-force-activates-uk-led-reaction-system-to-track-threats-to-undersea-infrastructure-and-monitor-russian-shadow-fleet.