This comment has been received from Lt Col MD Saunders, Australian Army (Retd) on the article, ‘An Appetizing Wrong or an Insipid Right’ written by Lt Cdr Rajiv Lochan, published in the Indian Naval Despatch Winter 2021 Edition (pp 05-11).
I read with interest the article, “An Appetising Wrong or an Insipid Right,” by Lieutenant Commander Rajiv Lochan and a response by my 44th DSSC erstwhile classmate, Cdr Allan Rodrigues (Retd). I think the distilled theme Lt Cdr Lochan raises is whether early officer training predisposes attitudes to the application of the Laws of War, and are they important in modern warfare.
My answer is a categorical yes to both! The conduct of war has been codified in the Laws of War in various versions over the last few centuries and before them in the custom and practice of opposing armies. Nearly all countries have signed up to most components of the various conventions regulating the conduct of armed conflict, including India and my country, Australia.
I would therefore, argue that there is no such thing as “Win at all costs” even in war, in a professional, disciplined Armed Service. There are clearly ethical and moral reasons for this, but there is also game theory and tactical reasons to limit the degree of violence inherent in warfare. Treating POWs in accordance with International Law, so that your POWs have a chance of being accorded the same protection, is an example of the application of game theory. Limiting destruction of civilian infrastructure, particularly culturally significant sites may assist in, “winning the hearts and minds” of the population. This is logical because it limits opposition and minimises resources required to police and protect. The operational benefits could be real and helps the overall political objectives.
Whether it is for game theory, tactical, legal or purely moral grounds, there should be Rules of Engagement (ROE) applied to a force as part of operational planning. If you need to incorporate it in operations, you need to train and educate for it.
So, is it incumbent on the military to both educate and train young officers to use judgement in the application of force? In fact, we seek not only to educate and train; we seek to inculcate behaviour in our young officers through experiential learning. Experiential leadership development is usually enabled by allowing senior cadets to lead juniors in the daily life of an institution. Each of these elements is a vital component of preparing young officers and must be holistically consistent.
I would argue that winning a sporting competition is not the training objective. It is pure hyperbolic flourish to say, “Win at all costs.” 18 year old cadets probably don't and shouldn't be expected to see through the hyperbole. However, senior instructional staff should see this clearly.
Sporting activity and winning at sports should be about inculcating the behaviour we are seeking to be displayed in times of great stress, be that under direct fire or in an operational planning bunker. Of course, the outcome we seek is winning, but it is the process we seek to inculcate that produces that outcome: thinking under pressure, being decisive, displaying physical courage, not giving up in difficult or adverse conditions, following the plan, limiting the application of force to that necessary to achieve the objective.
Institutional myopia around cheating at a military academy does not develop the qualities needed in actual combat operations. If you are allowed to cheat for a cross country race, then perhaps it predisposes an individual to believe it may be institutionally acceptable not to follow Rules of Engagement (ROE) on a cordon and search operation or fisheries patrol. We fight as we train is a military maxim equivalent to muscle memory.
Lt Cdr Lochan cited an example of Lieutenant Murphy’s Seal Team’s possible patrol compromise as an example of ethical behaviour at the cost of life. He infers the argument that one should follow ethics even if that is the consequence. It could be argued that the fate of the patrol was determined not because the shepherds’ lives were spared, but because of a decision not to abort the mission once the patrol had been compromised. Action on compromise would (or should) be a major contingency component of such an operation. In the event the operation was unsuccessful, “pressing on” probably was the wrong decision. It was not necessarily a case where the application of clear and normal laws of war caused the deaths of the soldiers. It may have been the subsequent tactical decision. We need to be sure that the correct cause and effect analyses are applied here.
I also note that he addresses whether the use of ‘cunning’ is ethical. To me it is clear that where the use of lethal force is warranted against a legitimate target, one applies all combat power available, including surprise, deception, cunning and guile. The issue here is the behavioural limit of ‘cunning’ or ‘guile.’ Leaving a booby-trapped attractive item in plain view is considered acceptable but shooting after apparently surrendering is not. How do we instill knowledge of the difference between the one and the other?
Education, training and importantly, inculcation of ethics from the very beginning of our military education are key. Modern warfare is increasingly complex and requires nuanced, proportionate and appropriate responses to achieve military and political objectives. “Winning at all costs” as an overarching training mantra is neither accurate, nuanced, proportionate or appropriate.
