A REVIEW OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

The Pakistan military has pursued terrorism as a foreign policy tool against India for more than four decades now, and nuclear weapons have served as a shield for conducting its acts of terror. Terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India, such as in Punjab, accelerated significantly after Pakistan acquired nuclear weapon capability in 1987. Pakistan has used nuclear weapons to carry on terrorism on the sly and to deter a conventional response. Threat of nuclear weapons has been used rather conveniently, and frequently, by Pakistan’s leadership during times of crisis.

Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

In the pre-nuclear test period, Pakistan’s doctrine was that of ambiguity. Although, even today, Pakistan does not have an officially announced written doctrine, statements made by key policy makers in Pakistan have clearly outlined basic elements of its nuclear doctrine. There is an unofficial code adopted by the Pakistani leadership, based on ‘Indo-centricity, credible minimum deterrence, strategic restraint and first use.’ Very interestingly, and rather ironically, while the code asserts principles of a peaceful programme revolving more around maintaining a balance against the Indian force build ups, it includes undertaking a first strike in response to ‘not only a conventional attack,’ but also a ‘posed threat’ from India. Pakistan has built-up its defence capability highlighting the perception of threat from India. Threat perceptions in Pakistan form the core of defence policies, and their military strategy has remained India-centric. The narrative of threat perceptions has, thus, been sustained to allow dominance of the military, justify the covert war against India, and diversion of substantial national resources towards defence spending.

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

This is one of the basic tenets of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. The concept of credible minimum deterrence was not based specifically on the numbers. It signified the weapon arsenal, including the nuclear weapons, delivery systems, command and control mechanisms, as well as doctrine and strategy, based on the perceived threat from India. Credible minimum deterrent force intends to build a minimum force capable of inflicting nuclear destruction on India. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif very distinctly talked about it in May 1999, when he highlighted the key elements of Pakistan’s nuclear policy at the National Defence College, stating that “nuclear restraint, stabilisation and minimum credible deterrence constitute the basic elements of Pakistan’s nuclear policy.”¹

The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar, repeated the doctrine in November 1999, stating that “minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy.”² President General Pervez Musharraf also emphasised the concept in May 2000, stating “we refuse to enter a nuclear arms race, and seek stability in the region. Pakistan, unlike India, does not have any pretensions to regional and global power status. We are committed to a policy of responsibility and restraint by maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.”³

A perceptive Pakistani commentator had stated that, “Pakistan has to copy the qualities outlined in the Indian doctrine.”⁴ Therefore, Pakistan has projected its nuclear doctrine as credible minimum deterrence, but one which is India-specific and more manageable^.5 The reasons for Pakistan’s adoption of credible minimum deterrence were obvious. Pakistan was aiming for a financially viable nuclear arsenal as the whole logic of going nuclear was Pakistan’s inability to cope with India’s conventional build-up, primarily due to financial constraints.

First Use Doctrine

Pakistan has long held the belief that, being the weaker state, it can compensate by taking a bold initiative, preferably with strategic surprise, to attack Indian military capability and, thus, reduce the adverse margin of capabilities. This has been its military strategy in all the wars that it has waged against India, including the last one, which was a limited war in Kargil in 1999 and, more importantly, the war through terrorism that it has been waging across the border for more than four decades. Seen in context of the strategic mind set, it is not surprising that it has adopted a nuclear doctrine of ‘First Use.’ In fact, Pakistan has often claimed that it would/ could use nuclear weapons at the very beginning of a war with India if the Indian military even crossed the international border.

Pakistan’s first use doctrine has been clearly stated by Lt Gen Sardar FS Lodhi (Retd) in the Pakistan Defence Journal, “the political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which would later on escalate into a nuclear war…Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine would, therefore, essentially revolve around the first-strike option. In other words, we will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons.”⁷ He goes on to cite Professor Stephen P. Cohen that, “Pakistan would use an ‘option-enhancing policy’ for a possible use of nuclear weapons. This would entail a stage by stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack. The first step could be a public or private warning; the second, a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil; the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces; the fourth stage would be used against critical, but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan.”⁸

Rejecting India’s proposal for a joint ‘No First Use’ pledge in the aftermath of the nuclear tests, Pakistan took the stand that it will be the first to use nuclear weapons to counter India’s conventional capability. Pakistan’s argument has been that, in case of a conventional attack or in a situation when India has breached the defence line causing major set-back to the defence and security arsenal of Pakistan, then, due to the fear of being defeated in a conventional war against India, Pakistan has to resort to the first use option. This was openly announced in 1987, much before the Pokhran tests, when A Q Khan in an interview to Kuldip Nayar said, “Mr Nayar, if you ever drive us to the wall, we will use the bomb. You did it to us in East Bengal. We won’t waste time with conventional weapons. We will come straight out with it.”⁹ A ‘First Use’ policy according to Pakistan’s leadership provides credible security guarantees to their national sovereignty.

The same logic for first use was employed by NATO during the Cold War, as they perceived that a hostile Soviet Union (former) had an overwhelming advantage in conventional forces. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has tried to play down the role of nuclear weapons, but it maintains a doctrine that gives them leverage to use nuclear weapons first in case of a conventional attack. Given the limited resources, geo-strategic proximity, India’s growing power and Pakistan’s concern for strategic depth, Pakistan’s leadership’s claim has been that it cannot afford to adopt a ‘No First Use’ policy. One of the factors contributing to Pakistan’s first use posture has also been the fact that a first strike nuclear force is affordable in financial terms and less complicated to build.¹⁰

Possibility of Pre-emption

Pakistan’s obsessive reliance on the doctrine of ‘First Use’ seems to beemerging from two factors. First, Pakistan wants to keep an option open for ‘pre-emptive nuclear strikes’ against India, and it is convinced that its pre-emptive strikes would lead to destruction of India’s retaliatory capabilities and paralyse the Indian political decision-making. Secondly, Pakistan has failed to consider the consequences of Indian retaliation. Pakistan seems to assume that India would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even after getting hit by Pakistan’s nuclear strike. It also seems to believe that international pressure on India will build-up and not allow New Delhi to react to Islamabad’s nuclear strike. India, in its nuclear strategy and doctrine, has adopted ‘restraint’ as a responsible and politically mature nation-state. But, the Indian restraint cannot be read by Pakistan as an unending and open-ended policy. India’s nuclear doctrine also notes ‘massive retaliation’ to a nuclear strike. The consequences for Pakistan of nuclear adventurism would be fatal.

The scenarios in which Pakistan could opt for nuclear weapons have been spelled out by Pakistani elites, who have cultivated the posture of ‘irrational rationality’ to try and enhance the effect of this posture. Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, former head of the Strategic Planning Division (SPD) in Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control system, claimed that, “nuclear weapons would be used only if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” But he went on to state that Pakistan would definitely use nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails and: -

• “If India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold);

• If India destroys a large part either of Pakistan’s land or air forces (military threshold);

• If India proceeds to economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling);

• If India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates l arge- scale internal subversion in Pakistan ( domestic destabilization).”¹¹

The last two elements, based on economic strangulation and domestic destabilization, cannot be seen in isolation and these vaguely draw vast parameters, which can potentially include various steps taken up by the Indian government in the wake of tension or conventional confrontation. Scenarios outlined by Kidwai created ample uncertainty as they cover a wide range of situations and potential actions by India during crisis. The broad scenarios outlined were, evidently, to deter India from any action, military, economic or diplomatic, which could hurt Pakistan in any form. Interestingly, the interview was published at a time of heightened India-Pak tensions, after the terror attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, which led to Op Parakram.

Weapon of Last Resort

Most of the Pakistani writings pre-1998 pointed towards build-up of nuclear capability against Indian conventional forces and implied its ‘First Use.’ There was an indication of a shift in Pakistan’s thinking regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a relatively moderate stand, by claiming nuclear weapons as the ‘weapons of last resort.’

Abdul Sattar (former Pakistan Foreign Minister), Agha Shahi and Zulfiqar Ali Khan jointly authored an article in The News on 05 October 1999, which stated, “the exigency under which the Pakistan Army may use nuclear weapons is spelt out as: Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons have not been articulated or even defined by the government, the assumption has been that if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communication junctions, the ‘weapon of last resort’ would have to be invoked.”¹²

In April 2002, in an interview published in the German magazine, Der Spiegel, Musharraf made a similar statement, “If the pressure on Pakistan becomes too great then, as a last resort, the [use of] atom bomb is also possible.”¹³ Musharraf’s statement of ‘last resort’ was made in 2002 and during the same period, in his address to Army Corps in Karachi, he said that war with India was averted due to his repeated warnings for using ‘unconventional’ means (interpreted mostly erroneously as nuclear weapons) in case of India breaching the red lines. This no doubt (also) implied use of large number of guerrilla/ jihadi fighters rather than nuclear weapons. Otherwise, there is a contradiction in Pakistan’s stance where, on one side, it claims to use its nuclear weapons as a last resort, and on the other, is convinced that the threat of nuclear weapons was successful in deterring Indian military posture.

A weapon of last resort can be logically interpreted towards a scenario wherein no other means are left with a nation to defend itself. In case of a conventional war between India and Pakistan, if Pakistan’s military reserves are destroyed, it may not have the capacity to defend itself and, rather than losing the war, it could opt to use nuclear weapons against India. Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons, even as last resort, would still invoke Indian massive retaliation with ‘unacceptable damage.’ Although, the weapon of last resort option stood in contradiction with Pakistan’s earlier statements and appeared moderate, it also projects a mind set for self-destruction, where complete destruction of the nation is preferred over all other possible options.

Although there has been no official statement made by Pakistan quantifying its threshold, some analysts believe that if Indian forces crossed the N-5 highway connecting Lahore to Karachi, Pakistan might escalate a conventional conflict into a nuclear one.¹⁴

Nuclear Policy based on Restraint and Responsibility

In the mid-2000s, Pakistan’s endeavour was to project itself as a ‘restrained and responsible’ nuclear power. This posture was necessary from Pakistan’s point of view as the leadership was trying to convey the message to the West and the international community that its nuclear arsenal was safe and not threatened by a potential jihadi takeover. In fact, Pakistan did see a remarkable rise in terrorist attacks and suicide bombings after 2007, with the creation of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which gained prominence for its anti-state agenda. The need was also exacerbated with India and USA signing the nuclear deal. Pakistan was keen for a similar nuclear agreement with USA and, thus, projection of a responsible nuclear posture became necessary. In 2006, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, in his address to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, said that Pakistan dealt with formidable challenges by developing a nuclear policy based on ‘restraint and responsibility’ with four silent features: -

Kidwai spoke about building an ability to deter counterstrikes against strategic assets. Pakistan has expanded its arsenal and delivery systems substantively in the last fifteen years, in order to threaten a disarming strike to wipe out, or at least drastically reduce, India’s retaliatory capability (deter counterstrike).

Full Spectrum Deterrence

India’s stance on the possibility of conventional war under the nuclear overhang challenged Islamabad’s conviction about New Delhi’s consistent restraint and hesitation in responding militarily to a Pakistan sponsored act of terror. The Kargil War in 1999, immediately after the overt nuclearisation of the two countries, demonstrated the space for conventional war below the nuclear threshold, as did the punitive, retaliatory strikes against Pakistani terrorist camps by India in 2016 and 2019.

However, Pakistan has remained fixated on its doctrine and even upscaled it towards ‘full spectrum deterrence.’ On 19 April 2011, Pakistan tested its short-range surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile ‘Hatf-9,’ named as Nasr. The official press release said, “(The Nasr Weapon System) has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges. Nasr, with a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, (and) shoot and scoot attributes. This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats.”¹⁵

Nasr provides Pakistan with a short range missile capability, in addition to long range ballistic and cruise missiles. Also, according to Pakistan’s military officials, Nasr belongs to the category of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and is a low yield battlefield deterrent, capable of inflicting damage on armoured brigades and divisions.¹⁶ According to Pakistan, Nasr is a counter to India’s Cold Start Doctrine, which envisions limited conventional response from the Indian side in response to sub-conventional attacks on India originating from Pakistan.

Pakistan’s eagerness for sea based deterrence can be attributed to, mainly, two factors. First, Pakistan’s nuclear posture, based on an unwritten doctrine, believes in maintaining ambiguity and enhancing deterrence. Sea-based nuclear capability fulfils the ambition of enhancing deterrence by achieving a nuclear triad and a ‘survivable’ capability. Secondly, Pakistan constantly seeks parity with India. However, sea-based deterrence for Pakistan carries security concerns and challenges for command and control. Without going into details, it would be reasonably correct to say that not only are there a number of security risks, but also that Pakistan’s sea-based weapons may aggravate crisis instability.

With Nasr and sea-based deterrence, Pakistan proudly claims to have achieved ‘full spectrum deterrence.’ It claims to have developed nuclear capability to be launched from all three platforms - land, air and sea. Looking into the nuclear posturing of Pakistan, it is clear that full spectrum deterrence for Pakistan also implies a full spectrum of scenarios, since it maintains projection of a low nuclear threshold, as well as an element of uncertainty. It relies on the threat of use of nuclear weapons to deal with a wide range of crises vis-à-vis India.