It is vital to maintain “freedom of navigation and [to] strengthen the international legal regime at sea, particularly the United Nationsm Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for [our] all-round benefit.”

- Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy1

The maritime domain has traditionally been classified as Internal Waters, Territorial Waters and High Seas.2 Later, the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 gave new jurisdiction claims to all coastal States, viz. exclusive economic zone and contiguous zones. UNCLOS is popularly called the ‘Constitution of the Seas’; however, its provisions also affect the operations of aircraft over airspace beyond territorial waters. UNCLOS classifies airspace into sovereign airspace or international airspace.3 India is also one of the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s (ICAO) founder members. This Convention, ratified in 1947, stands as a guiding light for rules and regulations of the airspace. Both treaties, inter alia, form the bedrock of international law in our area of interest - the sea and the airspace over it.

Intercontinental civil and military flights beyond territorial airspace form a major proportion of global air traffic. Of late, instances of civil authorities of various States seeking to control military aircraft transiting/operating in their Flight Information Regions (FIRs) have been reported.4 This article aims to analyse the legal connotations of freedom customarily guaranteed to military aircraft in the legal divisions of international airspace in the contemporary understanding of rules-based order. The article is limited to a broad legal study of maritime air operations and does not focus on type-specific missions, whether operating from an airfield ashore or a ship-borne deck. It briefly examines the rights of military aircraft guaranteed by Indian legislation. The article also throws light on the current practices of major navies’ peacetime air operations, which on the surface may appear to be of very little significance but can lead to the establishment of a sense of “legal obligation” on its military. Such practices/hesitation in practising within established rules have the potential to severely degrade a State aircraft’s freedom of operation and threaten operational security (OpSec) on the high seas and international straits. Nevertheless, the actions of military aircraft against the rules and customs can potentially be of value ex-post, legal conflicts at international courts or cause embarrassment at various political/military forums.

In order to clear the fog around the questions, we need to investigate the existing treaties, conventions and customs on the high seas/international airspace that guide the modern context of a rules-based order.

A Rules-Based Order

Our common prosperity and security require us to evolve, through dialogue, a common rules-based order for the region. And it must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons.

- Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Shangri La Dialogue 2018,5

There is no clear definition of Rules-Based International Order amongst international academia. Many variations of a rules-based order exist; the latest variation of this pledge was evinced upon by the Quad Joint Leaders Statement 2022, where they reaffirmed their “resolve to uphold international rules-based order.”6 This account of Rules-Based Order expressed by the Prime Minister at an international forum resembles Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and reaffirms India’s unambiguous allegiance to International Law.

This reaffirmation implies that the nation is committed to upholding international law for our prosperity and security, applicable equally to all other States and the shared global commons.7 The global common in question is the airspace beyond a State’s jurisdiction, i.e. airspace outside the sovereign airspace; and what legal rights are guaranteed to aircraft of a State and an aircraft performing sovereign functions, a military aircraft.

The Legal Status of a Military Aircraft

Freedom of overflight (for both civil and military aircraft) over the high seas, is customarily extended to all States in international airspace. Contrary to popular belief, the Paris Convention of 1910 was the first step towards codifying such rules for airspace; its subject, however, applies to mostly military aircraft as does the Chicago Convention of 1944 to civil aviation.8 The Paris Convention has now evolved through widespread acceptance to become a norm of customary nature.9 Military aircraft also formally enjoy the customary privileges accorded to foreign warships when authorised to overfly foreign territories.10 The Paris Convention, thus, acknowledged by reference that military aircraft that performed sovereign functions are entitled to sovereign immunity.11 Interestingly, the rights of military aircraft flying over the legal divisions of international airspace are governed under the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and not otherwise.12

Many argue that the Chicago Convention limits the rights of military aircraft by formulating regulations for all aircraft. However, it clearly states that the Convention is only applicable to civil aircraft and that it “shall not apply to state aircraft” except to have “due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”13 Additionally, the Law of the Sea Convention preserves the high seas' freedom of overflight by military aircraft in its regimes of the exclusive economic zone and the high seas. As a peculiar case in UNCLOS, straits regarded as international straits, even though enveloped by territorial seas, were considered to have undisputed freedom of navigation.

Disagreements on such “undisputed freedom” to an overflight by State aircraft among many coastal States bordering international straits cropped up; they rallied to govern State aircraft under the Chicago Convention, which did not find traction for obvious reasons.14 Many delegations, including Denmark, Spain and Ghana, proposed their counter-arguments during the drafting of UNCLOS 1982. The Spanish delegation argued that such provisions would leave military aircraft with “virtually unlimited freedom” and would therefore represent a threat to the coastal states bordering straits and international civil aviation in general.15 While the Chicago Convention exempts State aircraft from its purview, it is the UNCLOS that in some manner, still restricts the “unlimited freedom” of military aircraft. En passant, the flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft is entitled to “sovereign immunity” and to bear “international responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits in the exercise of such “unlimited freedom.”16

Analysing the Indian Legislation

Unlike some other States, India follows a dualist theory of international law, which ensures that the Parliament of India legislates every international treaty before incorporating it into domestic law.17  The Chicago Convention authorises respective States to issue such “regulations” for State aircraft and to have “due regard” to the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.18 The Indian Government legislated the Aircraft Act of 1934 to “make better provision for the control of the manufacture, possession, use, operation, sale, import and export of aircraft.”19  Whereas it mentions that “Nothing in this Act or in any order or rule made thereunder shall apply to or in respect of any aircraft belonging to or exclusively employed in the naval, military or air forces of the Union.”20 This implies that the Indian Legislation (The Aircraft Act of 1934) has upheld the “virtually unlimited freedom” of State aircraft, those operated by the Indian Armed Forces, as enjoyed under international law.

Many would argue that the Aircraft Rules of 1937 directs the military crew to follow the rules as laid down therein, including filing a flight plan and following all ICAO-compliant procedures to give “due regard to the safety of navigation of civil aircraft,” among many other rules. Inquisitive reading of Section 16 of the Aircraft Rules of 1937 finds, “Every person shall comply with the Rules of the Air issued by the Director General [DGCA] in accordance with as may be applicable to that person and every pilot and every person-in-charge of an aircraft.” 21 To set things in the correct perspective, attention should be drawn to the preamble of the Aircraft Rules of 1937, which reads: - 

In exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 5 and 7 and sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Aircraft Act, 1934 (XXII of 19) and section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 85 (XIII of 85), and in supersession of the Indian Aircraft Rules, 1920, with the exception of Part IX thereof, the Central Government is pleased to make the following rules, the same having been previously published, as required by section 14 of the former Act.22

The Aircraft Rules of 1937 were brought into force by the Government of India by the powers given under Sections 5 & 7 and sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Aircraft Act of 1934, which authorises the Government of India with powers to make such rules for civil aviation, its development, fees, licensing of pilots, maintenance of logbooks, other rules of aircraft operations and its safety and investigation of accidents.23 However, Section 19 of the Aircraft Act of 1934 “saves the Act, any order or rule thereunder” from application to military aircraft or any person employed with such aircraft unless such rules are made under Section 8A or 8B of the Aircraft Act of 1934.24 Section 8A and 8B of the Act give powers and emergency powers, respectively, to the Government to make rules for protecting public health. This concludes that the Aircraft Rules of 1937 do not apply to military aircrew or aircraft but only to the Aircraft Act of 1934. This implication is important to realise two things, the charter of responsibilities vested with DGCA established under the Aircraft Act of 1934, and the freedom each military aircraft and personnel enjoy in the discharge of their duties. State aircraft practise “due regard for the safety of navigation” of civil aircraft.25  Therefore, it is advisable to fly ICAO-compliant procedures when flying in the vicinity of civil air traffic (i.e. predominantly within national airspace) without compromising mission objectives and obviating State responsibility.

Nonetheless, it would be rather dangerous to transfer the ideas of municipal law (a legal term for domestic laws) to a very different context of international law and vice-versa. Therefore, practising “virtually unlimited freedom” may bring about dangerous situations to the safety of civil aircraft and their freedom to navigate in Indian airspace. On the other hand, drafting municipal legislation to such effect on persons of the armed forces or its aircraft operating on the high seas/international airspace would render a “legal obligation” on its aircrew, which will, over a period of time, contribute to State practice and have the potential to turn into customary law between two or more States.26  The article now analyses a different facet of civil-military confluence, which emerges out of the assumed sense of “legal obligation” and may create a threat to military operations by developing an operational security situation.

The Civil-Military Aviation Interface

Like all military operations in modern navies, maritime air operations (regardless of fuselage service markings), including fighter, maritime recon and helicopter missions over land and at sea, are done after thorough planning and deliberations on the ground. These military operations share the same facilities and airspace with other civil users. These at times require them to be ICAO-compliant. A typical ICAO model of a flight plan seeks an astronomical amount of information about an aircraft. Out of all the data, the most mission-critical set of information to identify military aircraft is its position at an instantaneous time in three-dimensional space, type of aircraft and its frame marking, departure aerodrome and its destination, which is conveniently available on an ICAO’s model flight plan. The information is thereafter transmitted via the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) to various civil (domestic/foreign) FIRs for their knowledge and action.27

Suppose a mission entails crossing another State’s Flight Information Region (FIR) on the high seas/international airspace; the ICAO advises (civil aircraft) to obtain prior Flight Information Centre (FIC) clearance, ensuring smooth and safe Air Traffic Management (ATM).28 Obtaining permission to overfly international airspace in foreign FIRs for operational safety requirements (of “freedom to navigation of civil aircraft”) comes as muscle memory to civil flight plan handlers without heeding the requirements of the end user. A matter of concern, however, is the relay of mission-critical information, i.e. planned flight path of military aircraft to foreign FICs (including friendly foreign States). As discussed earlier, military aircraft are instruments of sovereign functions that carry “sovereign immunity” at all times, including when operating in FIRs under foreign control and are exempt from following foreign FIR procedures. 29 In military parlance, such flow of information is often termed an OpSec violation, which is punishable under the (Indian) Official Secrets Act of 1923.30

The Implications on OpSec

India is presently the seventh-largest aviation market in the world, with nearly 187 million passengers.31 This load is expected to grow multi-fold in the coming years. The existing infrastructure serves the effective utilisation of the finite airspace available for exploitation and allows the safety of navigation of civil and military aircraft. The country’s aviation IT infrastructure, amongst many other facilities, helps the smooth functioning of the aviation industry. This IT infrastructure is, therefore, designated as Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) within the IT Act of 2000.32 Any sector of the economy on which a cyber-attack “may have a debilitating impact on National Security, National Economy, Public Health or Public Safety” can be regarded as a CII.33 The power infrastructure within our country is also designated as CII. Interestingly, on 12 October 2020, a power grid failure in Mumbai resulted in a massive power outage, stopping trains on tracks, stalling lives and hampering those working from home amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.34 A recent ransomware attack on SpiceJet left fliers stranded on the ground for hours, opening a pandora’s box of probabilities.35  Such reported attacks are limited to seeking ransoms or stealing intellectual property but do not rule out other possibilities, only limited by imagination. Concurrently, the threat of data breach on a similar scale exists to the country’s aviation CII, putting other users at risk, including military users.

While OpSec is only a part of the larger picture, studying State practices of other global powers provides an understanding of the freedom military aircraft enjoy outside our sovereign airspace. Moreover, interpretation of other States’ practices becomes relevant to prevent the incubation of customary practices to our disadvantage and hamper our rights on the global commons.

Other States’ Practices

China. On 06 July 2021, the Prime Minister of Singapore responded to parliamentary questions by two Members of Parliament (MPs) over an incident on 31 May 2021, when 16 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft flew through Singapore’s Flight Information Region (FIR).36 He said, “A country’s FIR refers to civil aviation demarcations managed by its Air Traffic Service (ATS) and may or may not overlap with sovereign airspace.”37 He further added, “State aircraft are also not obliged to contact the Air Traffic Service of another country.”38 “State aircraft from other countries, including military aircraft, are not required to file flight plans with Singapore’s Air Traffic Service before flying through its Flight Information Region (FIR), and vice versa.”39 Such statements concerning a State’s position and practice from a representative Head of State, have legal implications, undoubtedly.

The Chinese planes that had flown through Singapore’s FIR on 31 May 2021 had also flown through Malaysian airspace, prompting Malaysia’s Air Force to scramble its jets.40 The local media, quoting details of official statements of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) said, “16 Chinese military planes almost violated Malaysian airspace with ‘suspicious’ [not “illegal”] activity.”41 The carefully worded statement issued by RMAF and charts with flight path indicates that Chinese planes that entered Malaysian FIR were not violating Malaysia’s sovereign airspace; hence not in violation of their obligations under international law. The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by designating the overflight as “routine training” and cited “freedom of overflight.”42

To further strengthen the notion of practices by the PLA forces and its arms, we also need to look into the reported violation of South Korean and Japanese ADIZ during the Quad Summit held in Japan in 2022.43 Japan’s Ministry of Defence stated that Chinese and Russian bombers, who flew in their FIR, did not violate their territorial airspace.44 The South Korean military issued similar statements.45 Such occurrences and statements by various official foreign sources give an idea of a Chinese aircraft’s practice of not informing the Flight Information Centre (FIC) of their movement, whether on a routine training mission or during a multi-national exercise. It also reflects their understanding of the consequences, like establishing a custom, of such ill-informed actions over international airspace divisions, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs (Further study on the official documents, statements and orders to PLA forces was limited owing to linguistic barriers).

United States of America. The United States Navy (USN) describes a military aircraft as “State aircraft within the meaning of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (the “Chicago Convention”) and, like warships, enjoy sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection. Subject to the right of transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and entry in distress, State aircraft may not enter national airspace or land in the sovereign territory of another State without its authorisation.”46

The USN recognises international airspace as “the airspace over the contiguous zone, the EEZ, the high seas, and territories not subject to national sovereignty (e.g., Antarctica). As per US Navy, international airspace is open to the aircraft of all States. Accordingly, aircraft, including military aircraft and unmanned aircraft, are free to operate in international airspace without interference from coastal State authorities.”47 The extension of States to comply with their FIR procedures is not recognised as the “right of a coastal State to apply its FIR procedures to foreign [US] military aircraft in such circumstances.”48

The United Kingdom/European Union. The United Kingdom recognises the status of State aircraft and their practices, with the same position as the United States, labelling them as customary international law. The UK/EU nations’ practises towards military flying are consistent with US State practices, as evident from their procedures under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Flight Information Publication (FLIP) for cross-FIR military operations.

The European Union and the UK have commenced working on an initiative known as Single European Sky. Under the initiative, flight planning is undertaken separately for General Air Traffic (GAT) and Operational Air Traffic (OAT).49 For military flying, an online “Improved OAT FPL” (iOAT FPL) system is being implemented for better and safe Air Traffic Management (ATM), keeping civilian eyes out of the loop.50 Military flights compliant with GAT rules can continue to use the standard ICAO flight plan format, while for mixed OAT/GAT and all pure OAT flights, the new iOAT FPL format shall be preferred.51 The resulting improvements, in particular the unambiguous identification of OAT flights, aims to bring enhanced civil-military coordination concerning military ATM requirements and, apart from other benefits, help further operational security.52

France has taken the route of asserting its freedom of navigation wherever it deems the maritime territorial claims of another state excessive by the general rules of international law.53 In the latest 2021 incident, SSN Emeraude transited through the Taiwan Strait to assert freedom of navigation following the principles of international law and disregarding China's excessive and illegal claims.54 Such practices protect the inadvertent establishment of customary practice concerning China.

Conclusion

It is apparent that “always-evolving” International Law gives “virtually unlimited freedom” to every State aircraft on the high seas and over international airspace in the context of this article. Every practice, as well as the hesitation of practice by State aircraft in international airspace, is a contributor to becoming potential evidence to serve other States’ lawfare tactics. These tactics may or may not be detrimental to a State’s interests today but are inimically consuming time to designate such practices as a customary law between two or more States at a later point in time.

The present rules, regulations, policies and infrastructure are aptly on the lines of ICAO recommendations, which prioritise the development and safety of civil aviation within a State’s jurisdiction, i.e. its sovereign airspace. The intricate balance between “due regard” to the safety of civil aviation and operational security of military aircraft, especially over the high seas, culminating in unwanted loss of freedom of navigation due to the establishment of customary practices, is well known and appreciated by the political and military hierarchy of major global naval powers. ICAO has recognised that the nature of defence and security tasks of each State can create unique situations requiring special handling and considerations.55 Most military maritime air operations, therefore, fall under the “partially compliant” category [with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP)], upholding the “virtually unlimited freedom” of military aircraft.56

It is debatable whether military aircraft should practise such “unlimited freedom” at all times within national airspace. However, the threat to OpSec translating to a national security situation should not remain a topic of debate. In a recent show of capability, China released footage of a US Air Force F-22 Raptor shadowed by the Chinese Jilin-1 satellite.57 The Chinese satellite used AI algorithms to detect and autonomously track moving targets in real-time without ground support.58  Such AI-based satellite systems, combined with readily available flight plan data and geo-coordinates of exercise areas in which military aircraft operate, form the “instant prerequisites” for the most accurate military aircraft targeting. Taking hold of this national security concern out of many, the US announced the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.59 The blurred lines between the civil-military aviation complex can aggravate the OpSec scenario further; such procedures and practices can serve the AI-based satellite with gigabytes of data daily to train the satellite in pinpoint targeting and prediction of their future manoeuvres and areas of operation.

State practices of major powers in Asia, Europe and America can be found in official accounts of military operations. In most cases, practices by military elements precede orders60 but are also reflected in various other official documents, including military manuals, national legislation and case law.61 Military commanders are wary of such practices that are not in compliance with international law and should act to prevent the inadvertent development of State practice.

Amongst the various kinds of proxy wars that have come into existence in modern warfare, lawfare is designated as one of the prominent tactics of legitimate States around the globe to deter other States’ usage of their legal rights. Lawfare has proved to be a useful modus operandi for challenging other States’ sovereignty and rights, but when combined with advancements in technology, it can prove dangerous in times of increased tensions. There is a strong need for a closer understanding of International Law as it applies to peace and conflict at different levels of military leadership including right down to aviation squadrons and crew. Among other things, it perhaps requires understanding lawfare and developing doctrines accordingly.62  Such steps indicate our willingness to uphold a rules-based maritime order in accordance with our freedom of navigation and operations as guided by Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy.

Endnotes

  1. Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (New Delhi: IHQ MoD, 2015), 6.

  2. Convention on the High Seas, 1958, Article 1. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1963/01/19630103%2002-00%20AM/Ch_XXI_01_2_3_4_5p.pdf, accessed 23 July 2022.

  3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 2(2).

  4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Turkiye, Air Space Related Problems. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/air-space-related-related-problems.en.mfa, accessed 27 July 2022.

  5. “Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Shangri La Dialogue 2018,” Press Information of Bureau, 01 June 2018. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179711, accessed 03 May 2023.

  6. United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 91.

  7. “Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the Global Partnership for Development Beyond 2015,” UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 5-6. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/24_thinkpiece_global_governance.pdf, accessed 15 May 2023.

  8. Michel Bourbonniere and Louis Haeck, “Military Aircraft and International Law,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce (2001), 889-890. https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol66/iss3/2, accessed 27 July 2022.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Bourbonniere and Haeck, Op Cit., n.8.

  11. Bourbonniere and Haeck, Op Cit., n.8.

  12. Bernard H. Oxman, “Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters by Military Aircraft,” Singapore Journal of International Law and Comparative Law (2000), 400. https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1417&context=fac_articles, accessed 28 July 2022.

  13. Doc 7300/9, “Convention on International Civil Aviation,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006, Article 3.

  14. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Second Committee, 12th Meeting, A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.12(1974), para 20 on 128. https://legal.un.org/diplomatic_conferences/1973_los/docs/english/vol_2/a_conf62_c2_sr12.pdf, accessed 21 August 2022; “The Chicago Convention was insufficient for the protection of that right, for three reasons: first, not all States had become parties to that Convention; secondly, concerning overflight of territorial waters by private aircraft, the Convention authorised States in certain circumstances to restrict or suspend overflight; and thirdly, the provisions of the Convention did not apply to an overflight by State-owned aircraft.”

  15. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Plenary meetings, 169th Meeting, UN Doc A/CONF.62/SR.169(1982), paras 1–4 and 6. https://legal.un.org/diplomatic_conferences/1973_los/docs/english/vol_16/a_conf62_sr169.pdf, accessed 21 August 2022.

  16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 31, Article 42 (5).

  17. Rohith Rajeeve Thomas, “Dualist Approach of India,” LexForti Legal Journal vol. II, no. II (2020), 3.

  18. Doc 7300/9, “Convention on International Civil Aviation,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006, Article 3.

  19. The Aircraft Act, 1934, The Preamble.

  20. The Aircraft Act, 1934, Section 19; “Saving of application of Act.—(1) Nothing in this Act or in any order or rule made thereunder 2[other than a rule made under section 8A or under section 8B] shall apply to or in respect of any aircraft belonging to or exclusively employed in 3[the naval, military or air forces of the Union], or to any person in such forces employed in connection with such aircraft.”

  21. The Aircraft Rules, 1937, Section 16.

  22. The Aircraft Rules, 1937, The Preamble.

  23. The Aircraft Act, 1934, Sections 5 and 7.

  24. The Aircraft Act, 1934, Sections 5, 7 and 19.

  25. Doc 7300/9, “Convention on International Civil Aviation,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006, Article 3(d).

  26. “Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2018, Vol. II, Part 2,” United Nations International Law Commission, 2018, 112-13.

  27. Doc 4444, “Procedures for Air Navigational Services - Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM),” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2016, Article 11.1.3.

  28. Annex 2, “Rules of the Air,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, Chapter 3.

  29. Doc 7300/9, “Convention on International Civil Aviation,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006, Article 3.

  30. The Official Secrets Act, 1923, Section 2(5), Section 3(c), Section 5.

  31. “Growth of Civil Aviation in India,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 16 August 2019. https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Documents/WP/wp_380_en.pdf, accessed 11 September 2022.

  32. “Guidelines for Identification of Critical Information Infrastructure,” National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), 2016. https://nciipc.gov.in/documents/NCIIPC_Guidelines_V2.pdf, accessed 11 September 2022.

  33. Ibid.

  34. “Did Chinese Hackers Cause Mumbai's Power Failure in October?,” The Wire, 01 March 2021. https://thewire.in/world/india-china-hackers-border-tension-power-grid-malware-recorded-future, accessed 15 May 2023.

  35. “Aviation is Facing a Rising Wave of Cyber-Attacks in the Wake of COVID,” Stephenson Harwood, 08 August 2022. https://www.shlegal.com/insights/aviation-is-facing-a-rising-wave-of-cyber-attacks-in-the-wake-of-covid, accessed 10 October 2022.

  36. “No Need for Foreign Military Aircraft to File Flight Plans with CAAS Before Flying Through S’pore Flight Information Region,” Today Online, 06 July 2021. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/no-need-foreign-military-aircraft-file-flight-plans-caas-before-flying-through-spore-airspace, accessed 20 August 2022.

  37. Ibid.

  38. Ministry of Defence (Singapore), “Oral Reply by Minister for Defence Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Questions on the 16 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Aircraft that Flew Through Singapore’s Flight Information Region (FIR),” https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2021/july/06jul21_pq, accessed 15 May 2023.

  39. Ibid.

  40. Lieutenant Colonel Aita Moriki (Japan Air Self-Defense Force), “The True Meaning of the Chinese Air Force’s Flying Transport Aircraft Near Malaysia: Airborne Units in Power Projection,” China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), United States Air Force, 2021. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2022-05-06%20PLAAF%20Flight%20Near%20Malaysia.pdf, accessed 14 August 2022.

  41. “Malaysia to Summon Chinese Envoy over ‘Suspicious’ Air Force Activity,” Reuters, 02 June 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-says-chinese-military-planes-came-close-violating-airspace-2021-06-01/, accessed 20 August 2022.

  42. “China Says Military Plane Off Malaysia ‘Routine Training’, Cites ‘Freedom of Overflight,” Republic World, 02 June 2021. https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/china-says-military-plane-off-malaysia-routine-training-cites-freedom-of-overflight.html, accessed 20 August 2022.

  43. “China, Russia Jets Conducted Patrol as Quad Leaders Met in Tokyo,” Al-Jazeera, 24 May 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/24/china-russia-jets-conducted-patrol-as-quad-leaders-met-in-tokyo, accessed 20 August 2022.

  44. Ibid.

  45. Op Cit., n.43.

  46. NWP 1-14M, “The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,” Department of Navy and Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, 2022, Article 2.4.2.

  47. Ibid., Article 1.9.

  48. Op Cit., n.46, Article 2.7.2.2.

  49. “A Flight Plan for Military Operational Air Traffic,” Eurocontrol, 2022, 5, https://www.eurocontrol.int/archive_download/all/node/13647, accessed 12 June 2022.

  50. Ibid.

  51. Op Cit., n.49.

  52. Op Cit., n.49.

  53. Amruta Karambelkar, “An Analysis of the French Strategy in Indo-Pacific,” Maritime Affairs (Summer 2021), 92-93.

  54. Ibid.

  55. Circular 330-AN/189, “Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management,” International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2011, 17.

  56. Ibid, 20-21.

  57. “Shadowing F-22 Raptor-China Plans To Turn Its Low-Cost Satellites Into Spy Platforms That Can Even Track Fighter Jets,” Eurasian Times, 19 May 2023. https://eurasiantimes.com/china-plans-to-turn-its-satellites-into-spy-fighter-jets, accessed 06 September 2022.

  58. Ibid.

  59. “Captured Russian Weapons Are Packed With U.S. Microchips,” The Drive. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/captured-russian-weapons-are-packed-with-foreign-microchips, accessed 10 October 2022.

  60. Bourbonniere and Haeck, Op Cit., n.8.

  61. “Customary Law,” International Committee of the Red Cross. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law, accessed 07 September 2022.

  62. Ministry of Defence (Navy), Op Cit., n.1.