A FRAMEWORK FOR PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS IN BACKDROP OF OPERATION SINDOOR

Abstract: Perception Management has emerged as a niche and sophisticated sphere of Strategic Communication in Multi Domain Operations in contemporary state-to-state and even state-to-non-state interactions. An inability to effectively convey one’s message to various audiences, has frequently led to operational victories becoming strategic ‘losses’. The propensity to assume that messages disseminated would be received and analysed by the target audience in the same spirit is also naïve. This necessitates a granular analysis of impact of a Perception Management campaign by specialist organisations such as the Indian Information Services cadre in India. Tangible military outcomes have a perception quality of their own, however, in most cases, jus-ad-bellum and outcomes of military conflict can well be complemented by a robust perception management campaign. The recent Operation SINDOOR can be studied as a test bed to analyse the efficacy of an adversary’s propaganda machinery as well as of our response to it. The proactive versus reactive debate in kinetic operations applies equally to Strategic Communications too and thus there exists an urgent need to assess the Indian ability to proactively dominate the strategic communication domain.

Introduction

The sine qua non for measuring battlefield victory shall remain a verifiable, visible, physical victory, at least for the foreseeable future, while the rationale for application of violence by states continues to be compellence of the adversary. Sometimes integral to a military operation and consequent battlefield victory, but at times adjunct to this core, are Information Operations (IO). These have been a permanent component of warfare. Perception Management (PM) is a linchpin of IO and pursued with great vigour by all nations and their Armed Forces, prior to, during and in the post- operations phases. IO has emerged as a niche field, closely integrated with kinetic operations and one that is best handled by experts. However, the efficacy of PM operations in conflict, is often difficult to discern as its impact could be in cognitive domain and thus not necessarily be obvious. It is widely believed that the existing military and government framework in India were largely unable to create a favourable narrative of Operation SINDOOR.¹ Some of the reasons attributable to this limitation include ambiguous results of some kinetic engagements, concerted disinformation by the adversary and lack of our own synergised PM operations. Objective and verifiable Public Information Operations by Government of India (GoI), timely dissemination of events and debunking the adversary’s propaganda as well as strategic signalling with women officers and the naming of the Operation (Sindoor) were certain positives of the strategic communication (SC) campaign. However, inability to garner global acceptance of the Jus Ad Bellum, jingoistic reporting by domestic media, inability to exploit certain media and social media (especially TikTok) and an overall ad-hoc approach to PM seemed to be glaring problem areas.

It would be useful to analyse a little of the history of PM operations to evolve a more efficient and implementable modus operandi, capitalising on our strengths and overcoming shortcomings. Empirical study shows that a holistic approach to perception management is likely to lead to integrating all functions of strategic communication which includes perception management, with an operational link to apex levels of government. Understanding target audiences, harnessing credible messaging and exploiting technology effectively would also have to be formalised to reap benefits of an integrated approach to perception management. Institutionalising a formal structure and implementing a well-coordinated system could also facilitate better counter disinformation and counter misinformation efforts when compared to Operation SINDOOR. Building credibility in one’s own Public Information (PI) and Public Diplomacy (PD), whilst allowing sustainable PM operations seems to be a logical way of operating. However, an over-bearing focus of operational commanders and staff on SC, at the cost of battlefield efficiency, must be kept in check. Employment of dedicated specialists to pursue these ends would possibly be effective and efficient. These concepts and lessons from history are analysed further in this essay.

Every belligerent needs his story to be told well for differing impact on domestic, enemy and global audiences. The danger of an absent or incoherent strategic messaging lies in losing legitimacy on the global stage, lowering morale of one’s own citizens and troops and allowing moral ascendancy to the adversary. Even though PM operations are tricky and nuanced, many nations attempt to successfully employ these as tools for myriad operational, nation building and military tasks. Analysing certain best practices with respect to PM operations would assist us in refining our employment of the tool.

• Al Jazeera and Parallels with Chinese Media. Al Jazeera embodies Qatar’s SC to subtly execute IO, drive global and domestic narratives under the guise of independent and free journalism. It balances editorial independence in peace time with state sponsored curated messaging during crises, making Al Jazeera a powerful tool for public diplomacy.² It has been used to project the Taliban, China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Balochistan and Gwadar port from the Arab perspective while legitimising the Baloch insurgency.³ Its intricate relationship with Qatari state interests raises compelling questions about where journalism ends and geopolitics begins.⁴ The modus operandi of Al Jazeera and Chinese print media including the China Global Television Network (CGTN), Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily etc are closely interlinked, being mouthpieces of the respective regimes. Despite criticisms of lack of objective and inadequate credibility, Al Jazeera and Chinese media enjoy spheres of influence that can discredit or confuse media narratives across the world.

• Base 311. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also utilises PM operations to target Taiwan, particularly through the efforts of a SC facility called Base 311. Its coverage of Taiwan is routinely negative, often highlighting political contention and social issues maintaining a public presence through involvement in Taiwan Strait forums masquerading as a ‘think tank’.⁵ A Chinese researcher Li Bicheng laid out his ideas about manipulating PI using Artificial Intelligence (AI) where a network of ‘intelligent agents’ managed by generative AI, could flood social media and internet reading content through seemingly credible scholarly and analytical articles often interpreting international and national laws, culture or history in favourable ways.⁶ This could en masse affect cognition of foreign leaders, bureaucrats, civilians and military personnel in ways that are beneficial to Chinese causes.

• ISPR. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), founded in 1949, is the media wing of Pakistan’s Armed Forces and has evolved into a powerful SC agency. ISPR automatically manages the broader perception of Pakistan’s military and national security agenda across domestic and international audiences. Its SC modus operandi integrates narrative building, emotional storytelling and multimedia production, blending defence communication with popular culture.⁷ ISPR has excelled in shaping PI by producing dramas (Alpha Bravo Charlie, Ehd-e-Wafa etc), documentaries and patriotic songs that glorify military sacrifice and national unity. The key takeaways from the ISPR include efficient and profound use of all available media and methods including print, traditional television, social media, memes etc., for narrative building. The unified nature of all IO through the organisation lends focus to their campaigns. Their adeptness at analysing the target population, especially Pakistani citizens, understanding of what resonates with the society and using that to guide their SC is noteworthy.

• Britain’s 77th Brigade: Information Warfare Unit. The 77th Brigade Group of the British Army is an IO Unit comprising the Brigade Operations Centre, two IO Task Forces, a Military Intelligence Battalion and a Mentoring and Coaching Group. The task forces are trained in tactical information and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and are manned by personnel from all services as also reservists and contract personnel. They are capable of extracting and injecting information of strategic value from and into international media and are trained in strategic communication and exploitation of all media, employment of AI and academia. It consists of a dedicated in-built and deployable military intelligence gathering unit.⁸ They also have a system of assessing the efficacy of their actions through a measurement and evaluation feedback process. Critical lessons to be learnt include methods of implementing an IO framework through a Military Unit as also instituting a feedback mechanism. As discussed earlier, the battlefield efficacy of the Unit is difficult to discern or measure, however, the Unit did successfully run complementary radio stations and execute visible PM operations in Afghanistan.

• Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA). The IRA is a St Petersburg based Kremlin-linked ‘troll farm’ specialising in Information Warfare (IW), PM and disinformation operations. The IRA employs hundreds of staff working in shifts, producing propaganda, memes and fabricated news or research articles in multiple languages through fake accounts or operatives. These are coordinated into mass movements called astroturfing campaigns (artificial grassroots movements), coordinating inauthentic social media activity and direct messaging to target audiences. Its operations are also reflected Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on Informatsionnoye Protivoborstvo (Information Confrontation) which considers that the information sphere is a battlefield equal to land, sea, air or cyber domains.⁹ Propaganda disseminated by IRA has limited reach outside the erstwhile Soviet bloc states due to a more aggressive media and narrative control by Western countries. However, the quality of content disseminated by the IRA did seem to have a pronounced impact during the 2016 US elections.¹⁰

• ‘Der Chef’ Radio Operation. During WWII, the British Army used to broadcast a radio program ‘Der Chef’, where a fictional Nazi insider criticised Hitler and the Nazis while masquerading as a Nazi station called Soldatensender. It was a very popular covert station with 41% German soldiers tuning in. As the war progressed, the station gave visceral accounts of German soldiers abandoned by Nazi leadership. Such content was curated to demoralise the German troops. It also conformed to the existing desire of the German soldiers to surrender, defect or disobey the Nazis.¹¹ The Der Chef radio operation highlights the criticality of analysing the target audience and selection of correct media to reach the target audience. The Germans also executed a counter operation on similar lines. However, the British operation is believed to have had more impact as it was based on a more believable premise.

• US Pentagon Military Analyst Program (PMAP). The PMAP was launched in 2002 and covertly trained and deployed retired military officers as ‘message force multipliers’ on corporate media channels and periodicals to promote government policies, particularly the Iraq War. These analysts received carefully crafted talking points and confidential information to disseminate these narratives.¹² This system exemplifies the importance of credibility of the source in “propaganda” terms by providing “presumptively accurate” information. The adoption of a similar system in India could also preclude retired officers from independently voicing contradictory and unreasonable statements.

• PM Through Nuclear Fear Campaign. During the cold war, the US government launched a comprehensive civil defence initiative seemingly to prepare civilians for the possibility of nuclear attacks. The government spearheaded programs like ‘Survival Under Atomic Attack’ and ‘Alert America,’ to reassure the public that nuclear threats could be managed through simple actions and generate anti-communist sentiment to justify possible future nuclear action against USSR. Drills were disseminated to citizens through television shows, educational movies and comic strips. Schools implemented the famous “Duck and Cover” drills, teaching students to seek shelter under desks at any sign of danger.¹³ This campaign demonstrated effective methods of diversifying media available for IO and the critical role that educational institutes can play in shaping perceptions within domestic audiences.

Existing Military and Government Framework in India

The Additional Directorate General Strategic Communications (ADG SC) at IHQ of MoD (Army), the Media and Public Information Cell (MPIC) at the Naval Headquarters and the Media and Public Relations (MPR) at Air Headquarters are the central directorates at the Service Headquarters (SHQs) responsible for IO. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) presently has only one brigadier rank officer, the DACIDS PM. He manages PM operations of the entire Armed Forces of India. SC functions on behalf of the GoI are shared between various stakeholders including the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Department of Public Rations (DPR) in MoD, intelligence agencies and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) through Prasar Bharti and Press Information Bureau (PIB) to name a few. All available media including print, digital, electronic and social, whether national or corporate, are used for SC. Various OTT platforms and podcasts have also recently started being used as well. The PROs deputed to the DPR carry out similar function under the DoD (Department of Defence). Additionally, PD operations are regularly conducted by the MEA. The PIB does release frequent Press Releases and information through social media handles, but most of these have very low visibility and can barely constitute as a workable SC model. Thus, it would be appreciated that multiple agencies are involved in SC operations, which are not necessarily integrated and not synchronised at the apex level.¹⁴

Disinformation by Pakistan During Operation SINDOOR

A study of SC operations conducted recently during operation SINDOOR can serve as an apt benchmark to analyse the effectiveness of our frameworks and policies in this domain. During Operation SINDOOR and in its aftermath, an aggressive propaganda and disinformation campaign was launched by Pakistan, through the ISPR but supported by private social media users in China and global print media. The likely aim seemed to be distorting the truth regarding damage suffered by Pakistan Armed Forces, mislead the global and domestic audience into believing that Pakistan’s response was more potent than Indian strikes, restore Pakistan Army’s credibility etc. The actions reaped varied degrees of results in India, Pakistan and in global audiences. However, its impact on the battlefield was minimal. The most telling impact would remain the US Congress’ assessment of ‘Pakistani success’ in the operation.¹⁵ However, the PIB did identify and debunk over 40 instances of fake news propagated by Pakistan-based sources.¹⁶ Some of these and other critical disinformation attempts, and own rebuttals are as under:

• Indian Soldiers Crying and Abandoning Posts. A viral video on social media claimed that Indian soldiers, overwhelmed by the conflict, were seen crying and abandoning their posts. The video, however, is an old clip of a defence coaching institute students that has been falsely linked to recent events and was rebutted by PIB.¹⁷

• Al Jazeera’s False Claim of Explosions Near Srinagar and Jaipur Airports. Al Jazeera falsely reported approximately 10 explosions around Srinagar Airport as well as some reports on social media claimed explosions around Jaipur Airport. No such incidents had occurred and were rebutted.¹⁸

• Indian Posts Destroyed by Pakistan. Social media posts alleged that military posts of the Indian Army were destroyed by Pakistan. The IA confirmed that no such incident took place and the post in question remains intact.

•  Cyberattack on India’s Power Grid. Chinese newspapers alleged that a cyberattack by Pakistan resulted in 70% of India’s electricity grid becoming dysfunctional. The Ministry of Power and PIB labelled this claim as entirely false.¹⁹

Fig 1: Chinese Language Newspaper in Singapore Lianhe Zaobao Falsely Claiming a Successful Cyber Attack on Indian PowerGrid

• Destruction of S-400 Missile System. One of the most sensational false claims suggested that Pakistan destroyed India’s S-400 missile system. The allegation was fact-checked and labelled false by PIB.

• Destruction of Srinagar, Udhampur, Nagrota, Bhatinda, Delhi and Jammu Air Bases. Various digitally altered videos were shared on social media, claiming Pakistani attacks and destruction of IAF airbases. An old video of a gas explosion at Aden, Yemen, was circulated on social media, as evidence of missile strike on New Delhi Airport. These claims were countered on social media and through press releases.

• China Daily Claimed Three Indian Jets Crashed in Kashmir. China Daily falsely stated that three Indian jets had crashed in Kashmir.²⁰ The image used in the report was from an incident in 2019 covered by Al Jazeera. This disinformation was identified as part of a coordinated propaganda campaign aimed at misleading audiences in India.

• Fake Video of MLRS Attack on India. A video depicting a heavy MLRS was circulated online, falsely presented as evidence of a Pakistani attack on India. The video belonged to a video game and was approximately three years old.

• Hazira Port in Gujarat Attacked. A video was widely shared on social media, falsely claiming that Hazira Port in Gujarat had been destroyed by PAF.

• India Targets Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project. Social media posts falsely claimed that India targeted the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project in Pakistan.²¹

• Pakistani Attack on Indian Military Area. An old video was circulated on social media claiming a Pakistani attack on an Indian military residential area while the video originated from Indonesia on 06 May 2025.

• Helicopter Crash Video. Pakistani social media accounts circulated an old video, falsely claiming it depicted an aircraft crash related to Operation Sindoor. The video was from an earlier incident in 2019, near Budgam, Jammu & Kashmir.

•  DG ISPR Press Releases & Press Briefings. Press briefings and releases of DG ISPR during the Operation were well-crafted and severely distorted the truth.²² They showed India as an irresponsible and technologically inferior aggressor targeting innocent citizens of Pakistan thus automatically providing Jus-ad-bellum for their military retort.

Fig 2: ISPR Website Disinformation Targeted at Domestic Population

English Transliteration. India's five modern aircraft, drones and several posts were destroyed resulting in many military casualties. India is attacking Pakistan with Israeli-made Harop drones in panic, of which 25 have been shot down by the Pakistani military's soft and hard kill capabilities.

• Pakistan Propaganda Videos on YouTube and TikTok. Sophisticated AI videos emphasising superiority of Chinese equipment used by Pakistan, over equipment used by India, also were viral over social media and were widely circulated, especially via TikTok, that was neither employed nor debunked by Indian fact check agencies.

Impact on PM, Credibility of Indian Media and National Security

Despite efforts in countering disinformation disseminated by Pakistan, the popular world opinion regarding various aspects of the operation did not find immediate traction with global leaders and population. Though these attempts by the adversary may have been largely ineffective within India, they did cause confusion and created a perception of ‘zero-sum’ result of the campaign. Jingoism by a major section of the media and the dissemination of imaginary reports along with provocative debates and declarations by panellists including retired Armed Forces fraternity, had a direct adverse impact on the credibility of Indian media during Operation SINDOOR. Comments by some regular veterans who appear on a few TV channels lacked credibility and maturity. Such vociferousness and activism of some retired Armed Forces officers in social media also contributed to incredulity.²³ Such reporting and provocative, aggressive, and even false declarations and debates, negatively impacted the calm IO being undertaken by the GoI, its agencies and the Armed Forces. All this added to the confusion caused by Pakistan's disinformation and fake news, rather than countering it. While the PIB’s Fact Check series of tweets and social media posts on Facebook and Instagram were active, their rebuttals were issued too late, in too few media platforms and did little to help in perception management. The government's relative silence in the immediate aftermath of most events also contributed to the problem, as Pakistan was often six to twelve hours ahead of Indian dissemination of verified content. The lack of a robust, unified national SC plan allowed adversaries to exploit the information space, reducing to an extent the impact of India's kinetic success. The operation highlighted that information is a sophisticated domain where controlling narratives, countering enemy propaganda and managing international perception are as crucial as traditional military capabilities.

From a national security perspective, the reckless reporting by mainstream Indian media posed significant challenges to narrative control. Tempered and objective reporting would have attracted lesser international attention to how the conflict may escalate and probably reduced global interference as well. Frequent provocative reports caused panic as well as war hysteria in many sections of the society creating a public expectation of greater violence. The various news channels and anchors, probably in a bid to increase their ratings, let their reporting be guided emotionally, allowing ISPR to berate Indian media houses, calling them a ‘Bollywood Drama’. The Indian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, elaborated that about 15% of the Armed Forces’ time during Operation SINDOOR was spent countering false narratives and fake reporting, rather than focusing on the operation itself.²⁴ Fake news eroded trust in the GoI press releases as well making it harder to respond effectively in PI and PD domains. In many locations e.g. Amritsar, fake news regarding drone attacks on the city and the airport triggered panic that overwhelmed the civil administration with hundreds of calls and messages to verify or debunk these and causing operational strain. The civil administration had to mobilise multiple resources including police patrols, social media outreach, Gurdwara loudspeakers among others. Many resources that could have been devoted to strengthen the national effort had to per-force be side-stepped for internal order.²⁵

Operation SINDOOR was largely perceived as a decisive response to terrorism. Indian leadership was praised for orchestrating a response that balanced strategic restraint with assertive action, and establishing clear red line response “Any future terror attack would be treated as an act of war, with no distinction between terrorists and their state sponsors.”²⁶ The success of indigenous technologies and tri-service coordination also boosted national confidence. However, a section of the society was sceptical of successes of the Indian Armed Forces, while also questioning legitimacy of the strikes. Though muted, many individual and institutional questions were raised regarding loss of our own aircraft in the operation; reasons for accepting an early ceasefire; non-involvement of IN in the operations; inability of Indian Armed Forces to preserve its own assets against enemy drone swarms etc. These opinions were largely swayed by focussed disinformation campaign by Pakistan, China, Al Jazeera, BBC etc. The weight of the disinformation campaign by Pakistan and its allies forced India to execute an elaborate perception management strategy wherein seven All-party Delegations, mainly of Members of Parliament, were sent to 33 countries across the world to deliver credible perceptions from the Indian Government between 22 May to 10 Jun 2025. These delegations put up a united Indian front, cutting across political and ideological divides. The efficacy of this initiative too, was not tangible and was received with varied levels of conviction.²⁷

The narrative created in Pakistan, primarily by the ISPR, was one of defiance and inflated claims of victory. Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif termed India's strikes as an ‘act of war’ and claimed Pakistan had a right to respond. The propaganda machinery in Pakistan worked in a coordinated manner with the DG ISPR taking the lead in the Public Information (PI) domain. They were quick to capitalise on incorrect news from some Indian media, interweaving and pushing their information agenda with rebuttals. Celebrities across the country led mass events in the streets speaking about Pakistani “victory” over India. These were given wide coverage in their national media. A general perception was created that India had been punished by superior Pakistan Armed Forces. General Asim Munir elevated himself to the rank of Field Marshal and military nationalism was reportedly revived in Pakistan, with claims of winning the ‘100-hour war’ from May 7 to May 10. Pakistan also sought to internationalise the Kashmir issue, using the ceasefire to seek external intervention.

Analysis

Infirmities in planning and execution of Indian PM operations resulted in sub-optimal support for kinetic operations from the global community, despite several nations condemning the terrorist attacks at Pahalgam. Talk of Indian strategic autonomy also seems to have played a role in this underwhelming support.²⁸ There was a general lukewarm ability on display towards generating acceptance of the narrative of self-defence against Pakistan- based terror networks. Thus, in future, global perceptions may have to be shaped through more cogent IOs. We witnessed a hyphenation of Pakistan and India as equal partners in violence, leading to the international community urging both nations for restraint in the same breath. Countering this hyphenation must become one of the lines of efforts for Indian SC, lest our efforts at garnering support for action against terrorism though Pakistan meet the same fate repeatedly. Finally, only France, Israel and Armenia openly expressed solidarity and support for Operation SINDOOR. US comically claimed credit for brokering a ceasefire which we were largely unable to debunk, further degrading credibility.

Recommendations for Future of PM Operations

• Impact on Battlefield. Military commanders must primarily occupy themselves with the component of PM operations that show verifiable results on the battlefield and contribute to success of the operational plan directly. Thus, operational commanders will have to detach themselves from the recent propensities of operating social media handles for PM operations that are largely incoherent and at times counter- productive.²⁹

• Formalised National Level SC Guidance. Coherent perception management requires institutionalised and centralised guidance from the apex level. Presently, all agencies in the country are focusing on public information or public diplomacy operations in independent silos. It is proposed that national level SC direction be provided directly from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) through the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) cutting through bureaucratic processes and minimising communication gaps. The NSCS could expand with a separate vertical headed by an Additional Secretary reporting to the Deputy NSA (Strategic Affairs) based on curated intelligence from the Deputy NSA (Technical Intelligence) and other intelligence agencies. The organisation would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive SC roadmap that may be updated and disseminated fortnightly to convert political directives into implementable orders for all governmental agencies including the Armed Forces. This vertical may be provided with an officer from the Army, besides representatives from the MoD DPR, MIB, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), MEA and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). All communications with respect to national security related SC is recommended to be undertaken by a re-energised division in IDS with service specific agencies viz ADG SC, MPIC and MPR functioning under the overall guidance of the IDS. The three service specific agencies are recommended to be expanded to include dedicated verticals for PI, PD, PSYOPS and IO.

• Harmonising Allocation of Business (AoB) Rules for PM. The DPR in the DoD is the legacy institution responsible for PI and PD at the MoD. After centralisation of SC verticals in IDS and the services, the PROs deputed to the DPR in MoD could be redeployed and it would be possible to control entire span of SC from IDS itself. The DMA itself is now capable of engaging with other ministries and Prasar Bharti etc. It is thus recommended that the AoB rules be amended to grant all military SC responsibilities to HQ IDS in DMA.

• NSS, PM Doctrine and Academic Research. India does not have a stated or formally adopted National Security Strategy neither does it seem to be on the horizon, resulting in disjointed and unplanned strategic planning. This is one of the reasons attributable to PM operations having suffered a lack of direction. It is suggested that a comprehensive Joint PM Doctrine be evolved and adopted in a similar spirit in which the Joint Doctrines for Multi Domain Operations (MDO), Special Forces Operations and Airborne-Heliborne Operations were released during Ran Samvad 2025. It is also recommended that academic research on contemporary SC or PM issues be sponsored during the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) course, Higher Command Courses and at the National Defence College.

• Tri-services PM Unit. It is recommended that a tri-service PM unit be raised directly under the HQ IDS on similar lines as the British 77th Brigade Group. This Unit must be posted with all ranks from all three services and mandated for execution of PM related tasks across the nation. Their mandate is recommended to include groundwork for content creation in terms of videos, photos, memes, outsourcing of content creation, transliteration, operating social media accounts and handles, engaging with civilian agencies etc. The Unit would operate across the nation, with all three services and reduce load of PM activities on IA formations, IAF wings and IN bases/ ships. The Unit would function most efficiently if posted with officers from all three services as also permanent deputation of specialist officers recruited specially for this purpose. would function most efficiently if posted with officers from all three services as also permanent deputation of specialist officers recruited specially for this purpose.

Fig 3: Recommended Tri-services PM Unit – Schematic Prepared by Author

• Joint Strategic Communications Division at IDS. The JSCD is already being established in some manner and format at HQ IDS. The Division is likely to be commanded by a Lt Gen equivalent officer from the Armed Forces and would consist of the PM and Cognitive Operations agencies to address all components of SC.³⁰ Based on various best practices and lessons learnt, it is recommended that branches dealing with Behavioural Analytics of target populations, global political leaders and military leaders of China and Pakistan be incorporated as part of the framework. These would assist in designing customised, cognitive content specifically targeting their cognition. A separate branch dealing with developing and deploying dark web abilities must also be operationalised. Informal linkages between the SC Directorates of the services, JSCD and the DPR of MoD, MEA and MIB must be formalised immediately to increase accountability. These stakeholders could continue to collaborate with each other through MSCG framework at the DMA. Overall, a sum of above recommendations is visually represented below:

Fig 4: Recommended National Military Strategic Communications Framework with Focus on Perception Management – Schematic Prepared by Author

• HR Aspects – Attracting and Retaining Talent. The present system of posting generalists for one-odd tenures in SC/ PM appointments impedes success of SC. It is recommended that all three services adopt a culture of creating specialists in this domain by exposing volunteer officers to IW and SC degree courses on study leave and posting on project based, long and multiple tenures in SC appointments. Career progression in generalist streams may become limited for such officers and suitable professional incentives in terms of time scale/ acting ranks may be worked out through a separate study. Postings of such officers is recommended to be planned only on SC/ PM billets in theatre commands or service HQs in addition to JSCD. It is recommended that specialists in field of SC, mass communications, content creation, AI engineers etc., be directly recruited as short service officers with a very short orientation at respective academies. This talent would need to be identified and recruited directly from Indian and foreign universities akin to the Navy’s IT entry that undergoes six-week orientation at Indian Naval Academy (INA), Ezhimala. Their employment would be restricted only to specialist appointments in their field, and they would form a small niche group executing highly specialist tasks for the three services.

• Outsourcing All-Media Content Creation. With high quality content creation being undertaken by various private media firms, it is recommended that small media firms be hired for content creation through an annual contract. Keeping in view the round-the-clock requirements of the Armed Forces, individual experts could be hired accordingly. The content is recommended to be developed for all-media scenarios including social media posts, memes, short films, advertisements, tickers on satellite television programs, pop up advertisements on internet, OTT movies, You Tube reels etc.

• Academic Infusion. Academic infusion ensures that the practitioners are provided constant intellectual impetus, mid-course corrections from an independent unbiased perspective, avenues for granular analysis or research of contentious or intricate issues as also opportunities to spread academic orientation of military subjects among the wider citizenries. It is strongly recommended that the University Grants Commission (UGC) be urged to include military SC as a subject in various universities across the country. Presently, only the IIMC provides a two-year degree in SC and OP Jindal University gives a diploma in the subject. There are no executive military SC programs or distance learning programs in the country but are needed. Universities are recommended to be incentivised by the Armed Forces by providing military orientation through visits and guest lectures for all programs of the universities. More tangibly, it is recommended that UGC provides certain concessions to aspiring or deemed universities in case they include graduate and post-graduate programs in Military SC among other military related subjects in their curricula. It is also recommended that UPSC be approached to include certain military SC questions as part of all entrance exams to catalyse the educational framework to also focus on SC.

• Energising and Engaging Media. Prasar Bharti has recently given a makeover to its television channels, mobile news applications, radio channel content. It is recommended that 187 YouTube channels and 44 television channels, 22 regional channels and an international channel that have been revamped, be extensively leveraged for PM operations.³¹ DD traditionally enjoys credibility that most corporate owned media channels lack. Concerted efforts must be made to leverage this credibility by disseminating maximum SC content through DD. DD global viewership dropped to 656.4 million in September 2024 and the channel faces shortage of manpower and budgetary cuts. It is recommended that marketing and re-vitalisation of the channels be explored by hiring professional agencies to expand national and international footprint of its channels.³² More than 240 radio services of AIR are live streamed on the NewsOnAir application, which is the Prasar Bharti’s official application. The cumulative listenership of these channels stood at approximately 19 million in March 2022. The AIR also streams these channels including those in various regional languages to 85 countries globally.³³ The wide listenership of AIRchannels is recommended to be exploited by making this as a standard media to be used by all agencies for military PM operations. It is also recommended that the listener base of AIR be further enhanced internationally by exploring third party broadcast on other digital radio platforms. OTT platforms including the newly launched Prasar Bharti Waves, must be exploited by producing programs and movies that assist in PM.

• Rebuilding Credibility of Indian Corporate Media. It is recommended that lessons from fanciful news reporting or vitiated and animated news debates be internalised and guideline be suggested to all corporate media houses through the MIB. Prolonged adherence to ethical reporting may rebuild the credibility of corporate media in the long run. The retired Armed Forces community that develops a certain online viewership is recommended to be sensitised regularly by the JSCD for legitimate broadcasting of verified data, analyses, options and agendas.

• Infusion of AI. These recommendations would entail creation of carefully curated content in various languages and formats. A pressing need is also identified to granularly scan all media content being disseminated globally that solicits our attention in SC domain. It would be inefficient to execute these actions manually and thus it is recommended that AI tools and LLMs be exploited. In the immediate future, a combination of third-party software can be used to ensure data integrity. However, ultimately, it will be imperative to use indigenous AI tools.

Conclusion

PM has emerged as an important instrument of statecraft, bridging the space between information, influence and power. This essay has traced global best practices, from the coordinated SC of the western world, the sophisticated information ecosystems of Russia and China, to the culturally attuned narratives crafted in the Middle East, demonstrating that perception is often a critical capability in shaping outcomes. The analysis has also revealed that successful PM is neither ad hoc nor episodic. It is deliberate, deeply resourced and institutionally formalised. For India, this underscores the urgent need for both structural and doctrinal evolution. Structures recommended are likely to be agile enough to fuse civil, military and technological capacities, while doctrine recommended is likely to recognise PM as a central component of national security and foreign policy. A whole-of-nation approach, rooted in credibility and adaptability, will allow India to counter disinformation, project narratives aligned with its values, and safeguard strategic interests in the grey zones of competition.

Endnotes

1. Pamreihor Khashimwo, “India’s Loudspeaker Diplomacy Isn’t Being Heard On The International Stage,” East Asia Forum, September 08, 2025, https://eastasiaforumorg/202 5/09/08/indias-loudspeaker-diplomacy-isnt-being-heard-on-the-international-stage/:~:text=After%20the%20April%202025%20Pahalgam,flexing%20for%20minimal%20ge opolitical%20gain.

2. Tal Samuel Azran, "Al-Jazeera, Qatar, and New Tactics in State-Sponsored Media Diplomacy", Sage Journals (May 15, 2013), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/ 10.1177/0002764213487736 accessed on August 20, 2025.

3. South Asia Times Editorial Desk, “Al Jazeera: Shaping Opinions or Just Reporting", South Asia Times (October 31, 2024), https://southasiatimes.org/al-jazeera-shaping-opinions-or-just-reporting accessed on August 20, 2025.

4. Kaoutar Chahbane and Sarra Chahbane, “A Study of Media Evolution and its Integral Role in Shaping Political Dynamics in the Arab World: The Case Study of Al Jazeera Network,” Studies in Media Journalism, May 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380869189.

5. Elsa B. Kania, “The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare Against Taiwan (Part 3),” Global Taiwan Institute, February 15, 2017, https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/02/the-role-of-pla-base-311-in-political-warfare-against-taiwan-part-3.

6. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Bill Marcellino, “The US Isn’t Ready for AI Fuelled Disinformation-But China Is,” Time, May 10, 2023, https://time.com/6320638/ai-disinformation-china.

7. Divya Malhotra, "Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR): Assessment of the Pakistan Military’s Discreet Propaganda Factory Post-1990", IDSA Journal of Defence Studies Vol 14 No 4 (April 14, 2020), https://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds-14-4-2020-inter-services-public-rel.pdf, accessed on July 22, 2025.

8. "77th Brigade Groups - The British Army", https://www.army.mod.uk/learn-and-explore/about-the-army/formations-divisions-and-brigades/field-army-troops/77th-brigade-information-operations/groups-within-77th-brigade, accessed 23 August 2025.

9. Alina Polyakova and Spencer Phipps Boyer, "The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition", Brookings (March 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-future-of-political-warfare-russia-the-west-and-the-coming-age-of-global-digital-competition, accessed 24 August 2025.

10. John D. Gallacher and Marc W. Heerdink, “Measuring the Effect of Russian Internet Research Agency Information Operations in Online Conversations,” Defence Strategic Communications, volume 6, 155-198.

11. Peter Pomerantsev, “The Man Who Used Nazi Propaganda to Help the Allies Win,” Time, March 18, 2024, https://time.com/6957547/sefton-delmer-world-war-two-propaganda.

12. Andy Valeri, “The Pentagon’s Military Analyst Program,” Policy Futures in Education volume 12, No 4, (2014).

13. Sarah Pruitt, "How “Duck-and-Cover” Drills Channeled America’s Cold War Anxiety", HISTORY (March 26, 2019), https://www.history.com/articles/duck-cover-drills-cold-war-arms- race accessed on July 22, 2025.

14. NN Bhattacharjee, erstwhile Brig PM, IDS, During Interaction with Author (August 16, 2025).

15. U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2025 Annual Report to the Congress, (Washington, DC: November 18, 2025).

16. Shashank Kumar Dwivedi, “Pakistan’s Misinformation Blitz: Over 40 fake news claims debunked by PIB amid Operation Sindoor,” The Organiser , May 11 , 2025 , https://organiser.org/2025/05/11/291542/bharat/pakistans-misinformation-blitz-over-40-fake-news-claims-debunked-by-pib-amid-operation-sindoor.

17. Ibid

18. Ibid

19. Lianhe Zaobao, “India - Pakistan Clash: Pakistani Military Claims it has Disabled 70% of India’s Power Grid,” May 10, 2025.

20. “3 Indian Jets Crash in Indian-controlled Kashmir,” China Daily, May 07, 2025, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202505/ 07/ WS681afa44a310a04af22bde88.html.

21. Newsdesk, “Wapda Top Brass Assesses Damage to Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project after Indian Attack,” Pakistan Today Profit, May 09, 2025, https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2025/05/09.

22. “Army’s Press Release Archive,” ISPR, May 07-10, 2025, https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-archive?cat=army &dt=2025-05 accessed on August 10, 2025.

23. Rohinee Singh, “War As Spectacle: How Indian Media Stages A Battle Before First Bullet,” The Friday Times, May 05, 2025, https://www.thefridaytimes.com/05-May-2025/war-as-spectacle-how-indian-media-stages-a-battle-before-first-bullet.

24. Rajat Pandit, “Spent 15% of Time Nixing Fake News during Op Sindoor: CDS Anil Chauhan,” The Times of India, June 01, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/spent-15-of-time-nixing-fake-news-during-op-sindoor-cds/articleshow/121544057.

25. Pragya Singh, “How Amritsar Authorities Battled Social Media Misinformation During Operation Sindoor,” Outlook India May 29, 2025, https://www.outlookindia.com/national/how-amritsar-authorities-battled-social-media-misinformation-during-operation-sindoor.

26. “English Rendering of the PM’s Speech to the Nation,” PIB, May 12, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128268, accessed on November 19, 2025.

27. Mr MJ Akbar, during his address to NHCC 38 at Naval War College, Goa on August 12, 2025.

28. “World Leaders Show Solidarity With India After Operation Sindoor,” Akashvani News, May 07, 2025, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/world-leaders-show-solidarity-with-india-after-operation-sindoor.

29. Maj Gen NN Bhattacharjee, erstwhile Brig PM, IDS, During Interaction with Author (August 16, 2025).

30. Ibid

31. Prasar Bharti, DD Channels – Satellite Channels DD Network, accessed August 22, 2025, https://prasarbharati.gov.in/ddchannels/#:~:text=Satellite%20Channels%20DD%20Network% 20DD,the%2Dclock%20(24X7)%20 accessed on August 22, 2025.

32. Akanksha Nagar, "Doordarshan Network Viewership Declined to 656.4 Mn in 2024" (January 03, 2025), https://www.storyboard18.com/how-it-works/doordarshan-network-viewership-declined-to-656-4-mn-in-2024-faces-acute-shortage-of-staff-52177.htm, accessed on August 02, 2025.

33. Press Information Bureau, “NewsOnAir Radio Live Stream India Ranking,” April 13, 2022, accessed August 28, 2025, https://prasarbharati.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/PIB-1816258.pdf.